Questions for phycalists and materialists here

[sayak83]

I am not clear what, according to physicalism, the ontological category of quantum wavefunction or quantum state vector is supposed to be?

I am also not clear what according to physicalism, sets and numbers are supposed to be?

Finally I am not clear when does the question "what is it like to be an X" cease to make logical sense and why. For fish? Bacteria? Why not a tornado? Or a hydrogen atom? Zombies? Babies? Is there anything inherently illogical in saying electrons "like" being in low energy states and "strive" to achieve them by "flinging out" photons from within themselves.... or that descriptions in terms of mechanisms are inherently true-er than equivalent descriptions in terms of intentionality?

How to define information units without smuggling in subjective states like "knowing" in the mix. Or should we extend the status of actual knowing to things like thermocouples and transducers?

Any and all answers welcome.

 

[Kuzcotopia]

I am not clear what, according to physicalism, the ontological category of quantum wavefunction or quantum state vector is supposed to be?

How to define information units without smuggling in subjective states like "knowing" in the mix. Or should we extend the status of actual knowing to things like thermocouples and transducers?

Any and all answers welcome.

i'm not a quantum physicist. I have no idea regarding your first question. Observing behavior and making predictions doesn't necessarily explain why. We either don't have the sufficient explainatory model, the necessary technology to observe, or there simply isn't a possible answer to every question.

We're talking about a field less than a hundred years old. . . and a complex standard model with more Greek letters than a US college fraternity system. The question is simply beyond my education. . . probably for all of us here.

I am also not clear what according to physicalism, sets and numbers are supposed to be?

I can answer the number question. Numbers and sets are symbolic representations we invented to model and predict the reality around us. The concept of math was born in the marketplace, to buy and sell goods using a shared system.

Every kindergarten tracher knows that you teach math by starting with concrete and moving to abstract. . . Once in the abstract, you can play with the logic of math and add complexity, but the only real goal of math is to model and predict reality.

Finally I am not clear when does the question "what is it like to be an X" cease to make logical sense and why. For fish? Bacteria? Why not a tornado? Or a hydrogen atom? Zombies? Babies? Is there anything inherently illogical in saying electrons "like" being in low energy states and "strive" to achieve them by "flinging out" photons from within themselves.... or that descriptions in terms of mechanisms are inherently true-er than equivalent descriptions in terms of intentionality?

The last question is also pretty easy. Asking "what's it like to be something" makes sense if the objext of the question has a nervous system capable of producing sensation. The basic structure of life with a nervous system goes like this:

cells -> tissues -> organs -> systems (such as a nervous system).

Only certain kinds of matter, and certain kinds of complex life, have such a system. Asking that question only makes sense for creatures who have one. Otherwise, the question is nonsensically constructed, much like saying "what size underwear does the average tree like to wear?"

Thanks for the questions!

 

[Polymath257]

I am not clear what, according to physicalism, the ontological category of quantum wavefunction or quantum state vector is supposed to be?

There is more than a little debate about that in the physics community. I'd say that at this point we do not know. One viewpoint which seems to be coming out of the quantum gravity world is that the wave function describes the possible observations of an observer, so is dependent on the observer.

I am also not clear what according to physicalism, sets and numbers are supposed to be?

Sets and numbers are linguistic entities in the language of mathematics that humans have invented.

Finally I am not clear when does the question "what is it like to be an X" cease to make logical sense and why. For fish? Bacteria? Why not a tornado? Or a hydrogen atom? Zombies? Babies? Is there anything inherently illogical in saying electrons "like" being in low energy states and "strive" to achieve them by "flinging out" photons from within themselves.... or that descriptions in terms of mechanisms are inherently true-er than equivalent descriptions in terms of intentionality?

Well, this seems to mean that the question itself is ill-defined. When there is an operational definition, the answers to these questions will be more clear.

How to define information units without smuggling in subjective states like "knowing" in the mix. Or should we extend the status of actual knowing to things like thermocouples and transducers?

Any and all answers welcome.

Well, thermocouples measure something. I'm not sure I would say they 'know' something. Information (bit) is produced when there is an irreversible collapse in the quantum wave function. This is apparent in the modern treatment of quantum computers.

 

[sayak83]

There is more than a little debate about that in the physics community. I'd say that at this point we do not know. One viewpoint which seems to be coming out of the quantum gravity world is that the wave function describes the possible observations of an observer, so is dependent on the observer.


Sets and numbers are linguistic entities in the language of mathematics that humans have invented.



Well, this seems to mean that the question itself is ill-defined. When there is an operational definition, the answers to these questions will be more clear.



Well, thermocouples measure something. I'm not sure I would say they 'know' something. Information (bit) is produced when there is an irreversible collapse in the quantum wave function. This is apparent in the modern treatment of quantum computers.

What is the referent of the symbols used in mathematical language? What do the symbols and theorems with these symbols point to?

 

[Polymath257]

What is the referent of the symbols used in mathematical language? What do the symbols and theorems with these symbols point to?

Well, I am a formalist in terms of my mathematical philosophy. So, technically, they don't refer to anything. Just like with a game, there are rules of play and fixed starting points, but the game of math (proof) is deduction in a formal system.

if you choose a different axioms system (and such is possible via Godel's results), you get a different mathematical system; a different game.

Now, when math gets applied to a different system, say a physical problem, the model determines what the referents are. So, in QM, the state vector is used to compute probabilities that can then be measured.

 

[sayak83]

Well, I am a formalist in terms of my mathematical philosophy. So, technically, they don't refer to anything. Just like with a game, there are rules of play and fixed starting points, but the game of math (proof) is deduction in a formal system.

if you choose a different axioms system (and such is possible via Godel's results), you get a different mathematical system; a different game.

Now, when math gets applied to a different system, say a physical problem, the model determines what the referents are. So, in QM, the state vector is used to compute probabilities that can then be measured.

Are you implying that mathematical and logical relations are imposed into the world by us and these relations (like say ratio of proton to electron mass or symmetry group relations) don't actually exist amongst the material objects?

 

[Polymath257]

Are you implying that mathematical and logical relations are imposed into the world by us and these relations (like say ratio of proton to electron mass or symmetry group relations) don't actually exist amongst the material objects?

This question sounds like the following to me:

Do we impose the word 'dog' on the world and dogs don't actually exist amongst material objects?

Well, yes, we impose the word on the world AND there are material objects that we designate as dogs.

The ratio between the proton mass and the electron mass is a construct we make to help us model the world. The same is true of the symmetry relations. They are our language for understanding the world around us. These are very good descriptions of the world, supported by multiple forms of testing, etc. But the mathematics is the language we use: the word 'dog', as opposed to the dogs themselves.

And, just like with the term 'dog', the reality often doesn't conform well to our categories, the question of whether the mathematics is a good description ultimately depends on the model and how it tests out.

 

[idav]

I am not clear what, according to physicalism, the ontological category of quantum wavefunction or quantum state vector is supposed to be?

I am also not clear what according to physicalism, sets and numbers are supposed to be?

Finally I am not clear when does the question "what is it like to be an X" cease to make logical sense and why. For fish? Bacteria? Why not a tornado? Or a hydrogen atom? Zombies? Babies? Is there anything inherently illogical in saying electrons "like" being in low energy states and "strive" to achieve them by "flinging out" photons from within themselves.... or that descriptions in terms of mechanisms are inherently true-er than equivalent descriptions in terms of intentionality?

How to define information units without smuggling in subjective states like "knowing" in the mix. Or should we extend the status of actual knowing to things like thermocouples and transducers?

Any and all answers welcome.

In a way electrons "know" because qm feeds it data that it wouldn't otherwise have at the macro scale. Maybe it's not knowledge as much as it's just having access to all data. Sorry I have to use "knowing", in terms of reality everything is data.

 

[blü 2]

I am not clear what, according to physicalism, the ontological category of quantum wavefunction or quantum state vector is supposed to be?

By my definition, materialism is the view that only such entities and processes exist as are recognized from time to time by the physical sciences.

Since quantum phenomena are recognized by physics, they're part of reality.

Quantum theory is another thing, however, since it consists of concepts, and concepts only exist in brains (are phenomena of mentation, are imaginary).

I am also not clear what according to physicalism, sets and numbers are supposed to be?

Concepts.

when does the question "what is it like to be an X" cease to make logical sense and why.

Why would that worry a materialist?

The question asks us to imagine something that, at least at present, we have no way of describing or assessing; thus we have no understanding of the target. But the question can be indulged for the fun of speculating.

For fish? Bacteria? Why not a tornado? Or a hydrogen atom? Zombies? Babies?

Same answer.

.
Is there anything inherently illogical in saying electrons "like" being in low energy states and "strive" to achieve them by "flinging out" photons from within themselves.... or that descriptions in terms of mechanisms are inherently true-er than equivalent descriptions in terms of intentionality?

In strict terms, yes, there's no reasoned basis for attributing emotions, motives, purposes to sub-atomic particles and phenomena. But as similes they can be helpful, depending on the wisdom of the speaker.

How to define information units without smuggling in subjective states like "knowing" in the mix.

'Information' is that which informs brains and brain-like things eg computers. Information, as far as I can tell, is (outside of Information Theory) just a fancy word for data, not on occasions free of the intention to smuggle in the notion that 'the universe is purposeful'.

Or should we extend the status of actual knowing to things like thermocouples and transducers?

Before we can do that, we need to read many pages of metaphysical philosophy to work out what we mean by 'knowing' ─ a task I've been putting aside for some time now.

But on everyday principles, the physical phenomena in thermocouples and transducers are simply responses to physical stimuli / input, the ordinary operations of physical rules, which we've arranged for particular purposes.

 

[atanu]

I am not clear what, according to physicalism, the ontological category of quantum wavefunction or quantum state vector is supposed to be?

I am also not clear what according to physicalism, sets and numbers are supposed to be?

Concepts, IMO.

Finally I am not clear when does the question "what is it like to be an X" cease to make logical sense and why. For fish? Bacteria? Why not a tornado? Or a hydrogen atom? Zombies? Babies? Is there anything inherently illogical in saying electrons "like" being in low energy states and "strive" to achieve them by "flinging out" photons from within themselves.... or that descriptions in terms of mechanisms are inherently true-er than equivalent descriptions in terms of intentionality?

The point with consciousness is that it is self evident within self but cannot be ascertained without self. My view, based on Vedanta understanding is:

We assume multiplicity as reality and then try to determine whether this object or that object is conscious. This is rooted upon mAyA, since we are superimposing a multiplicity on a non dual unitive reality called consciousness.

Awareness can be of subject or of object. For example, I am aware of my self and I am aware of the tree. In all situations, you will find that all that is known directly or indirectly through report, are permeated by awareness.

So, to talk about aware 'This' or aware 'that' is an error, from Vedantic perspective.​

How to define information units without smuggling in subjective states like "knowing" in the mix. Or should we extend the status of actual knowing to things like thermocouples and transducers?

Even that would involve knowing.
......

 

[sayak83]

By my definition, materialism is the view that only such entities and processes exist as are recognized from time to time by the physical sciences.

Since quantum phenomena are recognized by physics, they're part of reality.

Quantum theory is another thing, however, since it consists of concepts, and concepts only exist in brains (are phenomena of mentation, are imaginary).

Concepts.

Why would that worry a materialist?

The question asks us to imagine something that, at least at present, we have no way of describing or assessing; thus we have no understanding of the target. But the question can be indulged for the fun of speculating.

Same answer.

In strict terms, yes, there's no reasoned basis for attributing emotions, motives, purposes to sub-atomic particles and phenomena. But as similes they can be helpful, depending on the wisdom of the speaker.

'Information' is that which informs brains and brain-like things eg computers. Information, as far as I can tell, is (outside of Information Theory) just a fancy word for data, not on occasions free of the intention to smuggle in the notion that 'the universe is purposeful'.

Before we can do that, we need to read many pages of metaphysical philosophy to work out what we mean by 'knowing' ─ a task I've been putting aside for some time now.

But on everyday principles, the physical phenomena in thermocouples and transducers are simply responses to physical stimuli / input, the ordinary operations of physical rules, which we've arranged for particular purposes.

Is quantum wavefunction part of quantum phenomena or quantum theory?

 

[blü 2]

Is quantum wavefunction part of quantum phenomena or quantum theory?

As I understand it, it's a phenomenon in physics, supported empirically by various experiments. That being correct, for me it'd be part of reality.

 

[sayak83]

As I understand it, it's a phenomenon in physics, supported empirically by various experiments. That being correct, for me it'd be part of reality.

That's a brave call.

 

[blü 2]

That's a brave call.

I'm tempted to add, And if that's not correct, it isn't.

But that would be squibbing.

 

[Jonathan Ainsley Bain]

I am not clear what, according to physicalism, the ontological category of quantum wavefunction or quantum state vector is supposed to be?

I am also not clear what according to physicalism, sets and numbers are supposed to be?

Finally I am not clear when does the question "what is it like to be an X" cease to make logical sense and why. For fish? Bacteria? Why not a tornado? Or a hydrogen atom? Zombies? Babies? Is there anything inherently illogical in saying electrons "like" being in low energy states and "strive" to achieve them by "flinging out" photons from within themselves.... or that descriptions in terms of mechanisms are inherently true-er than equivalent descriptions in terms of intentionality?

How to define information units without smuggling in subjective states like "knowing" in the mix. Or should we extend the status of actual knowing to things like thermocouples and transducers?

Any and all answers welcome.

Physics has at its root, the notion of Platonic forms - abstraction entirely distinct from the physical world.
Then Aristotle came along and decided to steal that idea and pretend that if he left out the word/concept
'world' he would be able to get away with justifying a purely materialist philosophy that denied the existence
of any type of non-material 'spirituality'. Now he could do away with all of absolute morality - which
meant that he could have no morality - then Alexander the 'not-so-great' was 'justified' in raping and
pillaging as much as he wanted. Its all semantic sleight-of-hand, actually.