Rejections of Materialism

[loverofhumanity]

Even if (philosophical) materialism had caused our extinction, that would still not entail that it is not true.

Ciao

- viole

There always needs to be balance in nature and in man. Any extreme is no good and harmful whether religious or materialistic. We should avoid extremes in either one. Moderation is highly desirable.

Extremes in materialism have destroyed the environment and extremes in religion have caused terrorism and both these two problems are the major problems we face today. Both caused by extremes.

 

[viole]

There always needs to be balance in nature and in man. Any extreme is no good and harmful whether religious or materialistic. We should avoid extremes in either one. Moderation is highly desirable.

Extremes in materialism have destroyed the environment and extremes in religion have caused terrorism and both these two problems are the major problems we face today. Both caused by extremes.

Yet, I insist. Even if (philosophical) materialism were the cause of all the greatest evils, that would still not entail that it is false.

Ciao

- viole

 

[Rick O'Shez]

But materialism has to reject internal life as not real.

How so?

 

[1137]

How so?

Probably numerous reasons. For one internal reality is subjective and cannot be mapped to reality outside the mind. Another is that materialism is monism, meaning that only that which is matter exists, not including things like thoughts and emotions. Also all other reasons mentioned mentioned in op.

 

[Yerda]

What specific categorical differences are you referring to?

Well, you can see neurons firing and you can have an experience of seeing neurons fire but the experience created in the subject (say a tickling sensation) isn't the same as the experience of seeing neurons firing. That make sense?

I don't know if that's what @1137 was getting at or whether it's a problem for materialism.

 

[1137]

Well, you can see neurons firing and you can have an experience of seeing neurons fire but the experience created in the subject (say a tickling sensation) isn't the same as the experience of seeing neurons firing. That make sense?

I don't know if that's what @1137 was getting at or whether it's a problem for materialism.

Basically but to continue is a waste of time. The response will simply assume reductionism as always.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Basically but to continue is a waste of time. The response will simply assume reductionism as always.

I haven't once assumed "reductionism"; I'm just not going to exclude the possibility without a good reason.

... and so far, you've given no good reasons.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Well, you can see neurons firing and you can have an experience of seeing neurons fire but the experience created in the subject (say a tickling sensation) isn't the same as the experience of seeing neurons firing. That make sense?

I don't know if that's what @1137 was getting at or whether it's a problem for materialism.

If that's the intended meaning, then it doesn't support what follows in the argument.

It also seems to me that 1137 is arguing that the neurons firing isn't sufficient to explain being tickled.

 

[1137]

If that's the intended meaning, then it doesn't support what follows in the argument.

It also seems to me that 1137 is arguing that the neurons firing isn't sufficient to explain being tickled.

Neurons firing and being tickled are categorically different. That's the problem with property dualism, that properties of the mind and brain are not identical, not even remotely the same, and in some cases are contradictory. This means that one is not reducible into the other. Plus there the fact that we have no mechanism to connect the two.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Neurons firing and being tickled are categorically different. That's the problem with property dualism, that properties of the mind and brain are not identical, not even remotely the same, and in some cases are contradictory. This means that one is not reducible into the other. Plus there the fact that we have no mechanism to connect the two.

Care to back up any of these claims?

Edit: or are you just going to shout "axiom!" over and over again?

 

[1137]

Care to back up any of these claims?

Edit: or are you just going to shout "axiom!" over and over again?

Well they are indeed basic observations about the world, simply making the least assumptions. Neurons firing is a physical act for example, yet feeling love is not. A brain is a physical object, a mind is immaterial.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Well they are indeed basic observations about the world, simply making the least assumptions. Neurons firing is a physical act for example, yet feeling love is not. A brain is a physical object, a mind is immaterial.

I think it's funny that you would describe your basketfull of unjustified assumptions as "the least assumptions".

 

[1137]

I think it's funny that you would describe your basketfull of unjustified assumptions as "the least assumptions".

So not addressing the point, classic materialist move. Can you tell me what assumptions I've been making? Maybe just two or three examples?

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

So not addressing the point, classic materialist move. Can you tell me what assumptions I've been making? Maybe just two or three examples?

The two big assumptions in the post I quoted:

- feeling love is not a physical act.
- the mind is immaterial.

 

[1137]

The two big assumptions in the post I quoted:

- feeling love is not a physical act.
- the mind is immaterial.

And how are they assumptions? You've felt someone's love directly in physical ways? You've touched it, tasted it, etc? I'm very interested to hear these experiences! Same for examples of the mind.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

And how are they assumptions?

They haven't been supported.

You've felt someone's love directly in physical ways?

I have experienced love as thoughts in my mind. If the mind is physical - and you haven't demonstrated that it isn't - then "love" is a term for a physical state.

You've touched it, tasted it, etc? I'm very interested to hear these experiences!

Are you suggesting that a thing must be tangible or tasteable to be physical? If so, add another baseless assumption to the list.

Same for examples of the mind.

Maybe the mind is just "what the brain does". Until you exclude this possibility, it's on the table and you haven't established that the mind is immaterial.

 

[ADigitalArtist]

And how are they assumptions? You've felt someone's love directly in physical ways? You've touched it, tasted it, etc? I'm very interested to hear these experiences! Same for examples of the mind.

I cannot hear, see, touch, feel or taste many material forces and objects. But I can still detect them indirectly through instrumentation. That doesn't mean they aren't physical.
Besides, I don't consider love a 'thing,' certainly not something that has actively independent agency from physical systems. I consider it a process, like the sympathetic nervous system preforming function that causes the fight or flight response. The fear and anxiety we feel is just our body's instrumentation preforming a physical process and detecting it indirectly. I cannot see, feel, touch, etc, your experience of fear and anxiety, but I can still confidently say that your fear is physical, caused by physical systems, detected by physical instrumentation, and experienced by a physical brain. There is nothing about fear, love, et all that can't be reduced to a physical process.

My problem with the 'you are a radio wave and the brain is a radio' is, first of all because radio waves are physical and saying 'it's like something physical but not physical' explains nothing, is that the mind is the data stored on a computer (while simplistic) in every way fits the evidence better. Saying a picture of a tree is not physical because it's encoded data stored on a medium makes no sense. The data, the picture, the way its transmitted and stored are all physical. That you can't see, touch, hear etc (except through indirect 'brainscan' equivalent process) how the computer's difference engine is processing data, it's unique to that computer. That doens't mean the difference engine, the data, and everything about the computer, what it's doing, and how it interprets data, isn't physical.

 

[1137]

They haven't been supported.



I have experienced love as thoughts in my mind. If the mind is physical - and you haven't demonstrated that it isn't - then "love" is a term for a physical state.


Are you suggesting that a thing must be tangible or tasteable to be physical? If so, add another baseless assumption to the list.


Maybe the mind is just "what the brain does". Until you exclude this possibility, it's on the table and you haven't established that the mind is immaterial.

I'm sorry but no, philosophy doesn't just assume a conclusion then argue for it. So instead of starting with mind=brain we start with how things seem and the logic behind them. You're obviously not interested in either, and I'm as confident in you eventually defending your position as Christ returning.

 

[1137]

I cannot hear, see, touch, feel or taste many material forces and objects. But I can still detect them indirectly through instrumentation. That doesn't mean they aren't physical.
Besides, I don't consider love a 'thing,' certainly not something that has actively independent agency from physical systems. I consider it a process, like the sympathetic nervous system preforming function that causes the fight or flight response. The fear and anxiety we feel is just our body's instrumentation preforming a physical process and detecting it indirectly. I cannot see, feel, touch, etc, your experience of fear and anxiety, but I can still confidently say that your fear is physical, caused by physical systems, detected by physical instrumentation, and experienced by a physical brain. There is nothing about fear, love, et all that can't be reduced to a physical process.

My problem with the 'you are a radio wave and the brain is a radio' is, first of all because radio waves are physical and saying 'it's like something physical but not physical' explains nothing, is that the mind is the data stored on a computer (while simplistic) in every way fits the evidence better. Saying a picture of a tree is not physical because it's encoded data stored on a medium makes no sense. The data, the picture, the way its transmitted and stored are all physical. That you can't see, touch, hear etc (except through indirect 'brainscan' equivalent process) how the computer's difference engine is processing data, it's unique to that computer. That doens't mean the difference engine, the data, and everything about the computer, what it's doing, and how it interprets data, isn't physical.

Honestly this thread was nothing but a rejection. Yet all we have is people assuming reductionism and shifting the burden of proof. I'm tired of it. Materialists know where to find me if they ever decide to defend their materialism.

 

[ADigitalArtist]

Honestly this thread was nothing but a rejection. Yet all we have is people assuming reductionism and shifting the burden of proof. I'm tired of it. Materialists know where to find me if they ever decide to defend their materialism.

Okay?