I'll just put one little notion in front of you, since I think that you are playing quite "fast and loose" yourself.I suspect you are playing very fast and loose with the term "exist". Because all of the things on my list, including 'existence', itself, is an idea-set, derived from the combination of our experience and imagination. None of them are substantial, or materially (objectively) verifiable. They are all, in fact 'opinions about reality' (metaphysically extant), rather than a 'reality without opinion' (physically extant). Just as "God" is an idea-set: an 'opinion about reality' (metaphysically extant), rather then a 'reality without opinion' (physically extant).
You cannot say "our experience and imagination," when what you mean is "my experience and imagination." You cannot share my experiences, you can know for certain, in fact, nothing whatever about them. And as my imagination and your imagination are informed by the totality of everything we've experienced before (all very different between the two of us). From this, I conclude it should not be possible for human beings to agree so incredibly widely on so much of what exists...on flowers and bees, colours and sounds, the presence or absence of physical barriers, and a trillion other things. Yet, surprisingly by your thesis, we do very much agree on all of that. I've never met anyone, ever, who looking up at the Eiffel Tower or the Washington Monument, mistook one for the other.
This brings us to the subject of metaphysics, which I take to mean...well, nothing at all, really. And I do that for one very simple reason..."Insofar as it is possible to find a coherent line of argument in the writings of any anti-realist, it is hard to see why they, like the logical positivists, are not open to a charge of self-referential incoherency." (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Metaphysics). Therefore, for me, metaphysics (literally "before physics") has no meaning in a physical world.
And one last point I'd like to bring up, since you are attempting to suggest that "opinion" (or matters of mind) are somehow not physical (you do this when you claim "metaphysically extant" and "physically extant") that the current work in trying to "turn thought into speech" which is now well underway, suggest that, sadly for you, even thought is quite physical enough to be detected and interpreted mechanically. And if thought itself were somehow "metaphysical," that ought to be impossible.