Religion is fundamentally divisive. That's not helping!

[icehorse]

While such a view might make no sense in modern NY, at what point does it become wrong in the kind of society it traditionally evolved in?

A couple of thoughts:
- we could make use of a Maslov's hierarchy sort of approach to help gauge when it's time to evolve ethically.
- religion tends to be the opposite of nimble. the world is changing faster and faster, and a lack of nimbleness could be deadly. So instead of saying we should get rid of religion, perhaps it would be better to say we should strive to make religion more able to evolve its teachings.

Some problems are unsolvable, and while we may be able to mitigate them to a degree this requires understanding why they are unsolvable.

Humans cannot meaningfully be united as the concept of humanity is theological, not empirical. Once we accept there is no humanity, just different humans with different and often incompatible values, needs and wants it makes little sense to see these differing values, needs and wants as divisive. They are just the natural structure of human society (just a more complex version of other primate societies).

I think one place we tend to butt heads is when it comes to what's possible. Your posts read very pessimistically in this regard. With lots of these discussions it strikes me that - however unlikely - if we don't solve some of these problems it will be the end of us.

As for there being "no humanity", hmmm. I guess I'd need clarification. From a biological standpoint we can say that there is collection of beings on the planet who can breed and make more "humans". That seems like a decent definition to me, no?

With morality, the problem is unsolvable as we are value pluralistic.

And I keep saying, I think that if we cut through the noise, we're more alike than we're given credit for. I think things like religion tend to keep us trapped in the past and keep us trapped in unnecessary, divisive thinking. Thinking that might have been essential for survival 2000 years ago, might be counter-productive these days, no?

==

more later..

 

[Augustus]

As for there being "no humanity", hmmm. I guess I'd need clarification. From a biological standpoint we can say that there is collection of beings on the planet who can breed and make more "humans". That seems like a decent definition to me, no?

There are humans collectively, as there are dogs and cows and monkeys collectively.

A concept like cananity or bovinity or simianity makes little sense though as we recognise they form no meaningful group beyond their species.

Humanity as a collective group with a common purpose or objective, as a collective moral agent, etc. is a religious concept from monotheism.

It makes little sense in a naturalistic world, but it is assumed in many moral theories ( for the good of humanity, humanity can reach its full potential, etc.)

Even the idea that religions/ideologies divide seem to presuppose we would be unified without them.

Monkeys and dogs have no ideologies but are infinitely more divided than humans.

Religions and ideologies unite, some more than others, but all fundamentally exist to unite people.

I think one place we tend to butt heads is when it comes to what's possible. Your posts read very pessimistically in this regard. With lots of these discussions it strikes me that - however unlikely - if we don't solve some of these problems it will be the end of us.

I’d say this is a fundamental misunderstanding of my position.

It is not pessimistic to seek the best solution possible given the circumstances.

On the other hand, it is folly to continually base policies on ideas that are fundamentally flawed in a manner that makes them counterproductive.

Religious folk believe his will unite us but you don’t see this as realistic, how would you feel about this being dubbed pessimism rather than your best interpretation of the evidence?

eligion tends to be the opposite of nimble. the world is changing faster and faster, and a lack of nimbleness could be deadly. So instead of saying we should get rid of religion, perhaps it would be better to say we should strive to make religion more able to evolve its teachings.

If you look at past efforts to make a scientific morality, they have been all over the place and often promoted very harmful and illiberal views.

The problem with “rational” or progressive approaches to morality is that they are necessarily faddish being based on what we think at this moment, and humans being hubristic are overconfident in their own wisdom.

The best systems mix traditional understanding (which is often that which has been tested and verified by time), and adaptation to new realities.

Where the line is is the difficult bit.

 

[icehorse]

I don't think it does (even ignoring the question of why we should assume consequentialism is the correct approach to ethics).

1. wellbeing is not quantifiable in any meaningful scientific sense given there are numerous ways to define or achieve well-being and they are often not compatible. This is especially true if you consider that maximising well-being in the short term often creates an unknown risk of future harm. There is a non-zero chance of human extinction due to climate change, what % chance of this justifies repressive actions "to save humanity"?

2. and even if it was perfectly quantifiable, it still doesn't tell us what we ought to do as society isn't simply an aggregate of individual wellbeing (e.g. if something benefits median well-being but harms mean well being is it good? how much animal suffering is allowed for human wellbeing? etc.)

As such, instead of creating a pseudo-scientific approach to morality, accept that science may be able to play a role in guiding our actions, but the principles we base it on are never going to be remotely scientific.

This is not because "it's hard", but because it is not possible given the nature of morality and science.

I think I lean towards utilitarianism, probably close enough for this discussion?

I would say that expertise (or science) of morality would factor in long term well being and also the well being of other conscious creatures.

I'm not claiming we're there yet. But that said, you seem to be attempting to prove that a thing is impossible. You have a steep hill to climb indeed.

The problem is these universal principles can manifest themselves in completely incompatible ways, from uber-progressive activism to honour killings.

I would amend this to say: There are probably many ways to maximize well being, and there is no reason why many different approaches couldn't be in place at the same time. If "the long term, aggregate well being of conscious creatures" is well defined, I think the "abhorrent" solutions would not match the definition, so ideas like honor killings wouldn't make the grade.

 

[Augustus]

I think I lean towards utilitarianism, probably close enough for this discussion?

I would say that expertise (or science) of morality would factor in long term well being and also the well being of other conscious creatures.

I'm not claiming we're there yet. But that said, you seem to be attempting to prove that a thing is impossible. You have a steep hill to climb indeed.

That's fair enough, but where do you draw the line?

"Scientific" utilitarianism can (and has been) be an incredibly illiberal ideology when all that matters is the "rational" calculation of the greater good. Kill 3 to save 4? No problem.

I know you don't believe in anything like that, but where is the line and what possibly could be "scientific" about where this line is drawn?

I would amend this to say: There are probably many ways to maximize well being, and there is no reason why many different approaches couldn't be in place at the same time. If "the long term, aggregate well being of conscious creatures" is well defined, I think the "abhorrent" solutions would not match the definition, so ideas like honor killings wouldn't make the grade.

Harris' argument is basically one against rank relativism, and then a few big leaps of faith so he can use the term "scientific".

It doesn't really deal with a pluralistic system of values (and, saying "there will be some variations doesn't address this at all). Not only are there many ways to increase well-being, many of them are completely incompatible and "well-being" isn't something that can be turned into a metric.

Even if it could, it would be based on 1st order understanding of policy, not one that factors in hidden risk. Then you have the problem of optimisation: optimised systems (the modern global economy, a pro-athlete's body, etc.) are fragile. You can't both optimise well being and mitigate risk, you need a balance.


It's a religious worldview, basically a secular narrative of salvation through reason. One that can't accept certain problems can't be solved as we cannot transcend our nature.

To me it all seems so unnecessary. People who hold too much faith in human rationality and reason paint themselves into a corner where it becomes hard to accept their own views can be irrational or at least capricious.

Instead of simply identifying what values you hold, why they produce the best outcomes, and how best to achieve these (and perhaps science can help inform some decisions here), the goal is changed to justify why the whole value system is scientific/universal (which will likely tend towards pseudo-science imo)

 

[icehorse]

That's fair enough, but where do you draw the line?

"Scientific" utilitarianism can (and has been) be an incredibly illiberal ideology when all that matters is the "rational" calculation of the greater good. Kill 3 to save 4? No problem.

I know you don't believe in anything like that, but where is the line and what possibly could be "scientific" about where this line is drawn?

From the Sam Harris TED talk (paraphrased): Would you agree that the Dalai Lama has BETTER moral expertise than Ted Bundy the serial killer?

That's a real question for you, and a lot will fall out from your answer.

==

I believe that we CAN say the Dalai Lama has better moral expertise. With that said, I agree with Harris that the actual answers might never be found. But I also agree that admitting that there ARE answers to moral questions will beneficially shift how the world works.

Harris' argument is basically one against rank relativism, and then a few big leaps of faith so he can use the term "scientific".

I don't think that's a valid summary. For example, he allows for many "good" moral solutions. He also criticizes common ideas from the religious, who are not by any means relativists. As he says, he finds odd allies with the religious who claim perfect moral expertise.

It doesn't really deal with a pluralistic system of values (and, saying "there will be some variations doesn't address this at all). Not only are there many ways to increase well-being, many of them are completely incompatible and "well-being" isn't something that can be turned into a metric.

Even if it could, it would be based on 1st order understanding of policy, not one that factors in hidden risk. Then you have the problem of optimisation: optimised systems (the modern global economy, a pro-athlete's body, etc.) are fragile. You can't both optimise well being and mitigate risk, you need a balance.

Harris is not minimizing the "variations" as you are.

As for hidden risk or balance, in what way do Harris's idea conflict with adding those factors into moral expertise?

It's a religious worldview, basically a secular narrative of salvation through reason. One that can't accept certain problems can't be solved as we cannot transcend our nature.

Your claim of what's impossible seems to me to be an extraordinary claim, one which I think you will not be able to defend. Not to trivialize your defenses so far, but they do seem to be summarizable as either:

- it's really, really, really hard
- history shows we have not yet succeeded.

I would agree with both of those claims. But they don't defend the "it's impossible" argument.

Here we are, many miles, perhaps thousands of miles apart, having this discussion on the internet, making use of microchips and geosynchronous satellites and unbelievably precise GPS networks and on and on, to make this conversation possible. 200 years ago, this would have been deemed "impossible".

People who hold too much faith in human rationality and reason paint themselves into a corner where it becomes hard to accept their own views can be irrational or at least capricious.

This is sometimes true, but not at all unavoidable. Again, I've read and accepted what Kahneman has to say. And Kahneman - arguably the world's leading authority on bias and human irrationality - would argue that we can proceed and avoid painting ourselves into these corners.

Instead of simply identifying what values you hold, why they produce the best outcomes, and how best to achieve these (and perhaps science can help inform some decisions here), the goal is changed to justify why the whole value system is scientific/universal (which will likely tend towards pseudo-science imo)

No one in this conversation has made the claim you're attacking here.

 

[Augustus]

From the Sam Harris TED talk (paraphrased): Would you agree that the Dalai Lama has BETTER moral expertise than Ted Bundy the serial killer?

That's a real question for you, and a lot will fall out from your answer.

I believe you can state some behaviours are better than other, yes. But the choice isn't between rank relativism and scientific morality

If you would like a more detailed explanation of my view

Value pluralism - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I believe that we CAN say the Dalai Lama has better moral expertise. With that said, I agree with Harris that the actual answers might never be found. But I also agree that admitting that there ARE answers to moral questions will beneficially shift how the world works.

It shifts it very little unless you think the only choice is between rank relativism and universal morality.

Humans aren't a blank slate, but they are a very malleable one which can produce vastly different systems that are all equally "right".

Your claim of what's impossible seems to me to be an extraordinary claim, one which I think you will not be able to defend. Not to trivialize your defenses so far, but they do seem to be summarizable as either:

- it's really, really, really hard
- history shows we have not yet succeeded.

I would agree with both of those claims. But they don't defend the "it's impossible" argument.

Here we are, many miles, perhaps thousands of miles apart, having this discussion on the internet, making use of microchips and geosynchronous satellites and unbelievably precise GPS networks and on and on, to make this conversation possible. 200 years ago, this would have been deemed "impossible".

Those are not remotely my arguments.

My view is that humans are animals. That is what the science tells us, it is what you believe too. We may want to believe we can transcend our genetic nature and become a rational, unified species but why would anyone scientifically minded accept such thing as remotely plausible?

Our species has limits, just as cats and dogs and chickens do, we may have more scope for adapting our environment, but we are still just fancy monkeys underneath it all.

Most atheists understand this, but many just can't accept the consequences and that there is no salvation through science and reason or something else.

There isn't even a "Humanity" that we are responsible for advancing the interests of.

I don't think that's a valid summary. For example, he allows for many "good" moral solutions.

I think you give him far too much credit. He is not making a value pluralistic argument, but one where there are range of 'correct' values that are more or less aligned with liberal humanistic ones and the correct approach is to maximise utility in accordance with these.

This doesn't mean they are uniform and there is only one true answer, but his argument jumps from "rank relativism is wrong, therefore utilitarian liberal humanism can be scientific".

If you have any evidence of him saying something that shows the possible range of values he considers may be "correct" by all means share it.

No one in this conversation has made the claim you're attacking here.

Sam Harris did, and it was also noted in the article critiquing Harris view.


Now, it's often said that science cannot give us a foundation for morality and human values, because science deals with facts, and facts and values seem to belong to different spheres. It's often thought that there's no description of the way the world is that can tell us how the world ought to be. But I think this is quite clearly untrue. Values are a certain kind of fact. They are facts about the well-being of conscious creatures


What also must be reaffirmed is that many people have looked for scientific moralities in the past, and they have often been terribly illiberal.

 

[icehorse]

I believe you can state some behaviours are better than other, yes. But the choice isn't between rank relativism and scientific morality

If you would like a more detailed explanation of my view

First, I agree that the choice is not between relativism and scientific morality. And neither does Harris. Your very own quote of Harris included the phrase "science cannot give us a foundation for morality and values". I'm not making any sort of black and white argument and neither is Harris. In many complex disciplines, experts are constantly called upon to make decisions using BOTH their quantifiable expertise AND their more subjective intuitions.

From your link: Value-pluralism is an alternative to both moral relativism and moral absolutism (which Berlin called monism).[1] An example of value-pluralism is the idea that the moral life of a nun is incompatible with that of a mother, yet there is no purely rational measure of which is preferable. Hence, values are a means to an end. Furthermore, moral decisions often take radical preferences because people’s needs differ. Moral decisions are made with varying rational calculuses that determine moral values attributed to the moral facts.

As Harris alludes to very clearly when he describes "the moral landscape", the nun's choices and the mother's choices, whil very different, can both lead to good moral outcomes. There is no claim that the nun's choices are "preferable".

My view is that humans are animals. That is what the science tells us, it is what you believe too. We may want to believe we can transcend our genetic nature and become a rational, unified species but why would anyone scientifically minded accept such thing as remotely plausible?

I keep inferring that you're arguing against my claims as if I'm claiming perfect solutions. I'm not, and neither is Harris.

OTOH, we know that we human animals often kludge together pretty good approaches. Law, medicine, engineering, architecture, and on and on, produce very reliable - but not perfect - results. Why should we assume that codifying values or morality should be held to higher standards than the disciplines I just mentioned?

Let's zoom in a little on medicine: Throughout the developed world, modern medicine is more unified than it is divisive. So we can see this example of a highly complex discipline that manages to transcend many cultural differences.

What also must be reaffirmed is that many people have looked for scientific moralities in the past, and they have often been terribly illiberal.

you just did what I claimed you do - point to past failures as some sort of proof against future possibilities

 

[Koldo]

I believe you can state some behaviours are better than other, yes. But the choice isn't between rank relativism and scientific morality

If you would like a more detailed explanation of my view

Value pluralism - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

What distinctions do you see between value pluralism and moral relativism? Honestly, the former looks like a branch of the latter to me.

 

[Augustus]

Your very own quote of Harris included the phrase "science cannot give us a foundation for morality and values". I'

"Some people say…” Followed by him saying “But I think this is quite clearly untrue.”

Seems to me you have misunderstood his argument.

I keep inferring that you're arguing against my claims as if I'm claiming perfect solutions. I'm not, and neither is Harris

And I keep emphasising that I am not arguing that.

As Harris alludes to very clearly when he describes "the moral landscape", the nun's choices and the mother's choices, whil very different, can both lead to good moral outcomes. There is no claim that the nun's choices are "preferable".

To me it seems like you are assuming any degree of flexibility = value pluralism.

My view is that Harris assumes the degree of “natural” flexibility is far less than I believe is rationally justifiable.

It’s not simply saying there is no one size fits all approach, pluralism means accepting that many of these “correct” values are mutually incompatible.

They cannot lead to what all people see as “good values”.

This doesn’t really lead to unity or significant common ground for all, it just means “natural” values are highly diverse, but not infinitely flexible.

It is basically a moral minimum, not a foundation for a remotely universal morality.

OTOH, we know that we human animals often kludge together pretty good approaches. Law, medicine, engineering, architecture, and on and on, produce very reliable - but not perfect - results. Why should we assume that codifying values or morality should be held to higher standards than the disciplines I just mentioned?

Let's zoom in a little on medicine: Throughout the developed world, modern medicine is more unified than it is divisive. So we can see this example of a highly complex discipline that manages to transcend many cultural differences.

Medicine, technology, knowledge are fundamentally different to human society.

Fixing a broken leg doesn’t require us to collectively overcome our genetic nature.

Knowledge grows, morality has no intrinsic direction.

Do you agree that human society is limited by our biologically defined nature?

The fact that we are so adaptable to environment and experience, and that these will always be diverse, and that this will always lead to numerous other emergent phenomena, means we are divided by nature.

This is what the available science tells us. As it tells us there is no “Humanity”.

you just did what I claimed you do - point to past failures as some sort of proof against future possibilities

That was an example of why it is wrong to assume a scientific morality would be humanistic, not a proof.

The reason we can never really overcome significant divisions Ethernet groups is our biological nature.

So what would be your reason why humans can overcome their collective (partially) selfish, tribal and irrational natures and unite to an exponentially higher degree than has ever been achieved?

 

[icehorse]

In response to: "Your very own quote of Harris included the phrase "science cannot give us a foundation for morality and values"

"Some people say…” Followed by him saying “But I think this is quite clearly untrue.”

Seems to me you have misunderstood his argument.

I should have underlined and bolded the word foundation. I believe he's implying that science CAN give us a foundation.

To me it seems like you are assuming any degree of flexibility = value pluralism.

My view is that Harris assumes the degree of “natural” flexibility is far less than I believe is rationally justifiable.

So far the only way I can understand how you interpret value pluralism is by what you've said, and the link you gave me to read, which I did. If you think I've read that wrong, I think it's your job to explain why value pluralism is not as flexible as you think I think it is

It’s not simply saying there is no one size fits all approach, pluralism means accepting that many of these “correct” values are mutually incompatible.

again, i'm responding to the example in your link. Did the link offer a bad example? The way I read your link is that an individual can choose to be a nun or a mother, but not both. That's different than saying a nun's values are incompatible with a mother's values. I do not see how the latter is implied or true at all.

They cannot lead to what all people see as “good values”.

This doesn’t really lead to unity or significant common ground for all, it just means “natural” values are highly diverse, but not infinitely flexible.

It is basically a moral minimum, not a foundation for a remotely universal morality.

Can we agree that we're talking about "most" people, not all? For example, can we agree that we don't need to get psychopathic murderers to buy into a universal morality?

As for the rest of the above, you're making big claims concerning what's not possible. Do you agree that generally speaking it's immensely difficult to prove a negative or to prove a thing does not or cannot exist?

Medicine, technology, knowledge are fundamentally different to human society.

Fixing a broken leg doesn’t require us to collectively overcome our genetic nature.

Knowledge grows, morality has no intrinsic direction.

Do you agree that human society is limited by our biologically defined nature?

The fact that we are so adaptable to environment and experience, and that these will always be diverse, and that this will always lead to numerous other emergent phenomena, means we are divided by nature.

This is what the available science tells us. As it tells us there is no “Humanity”.

This collection of claims seem mostly unproven and mostly not true. I'll respond to a few of them:

Why would doctors and societies all over the world decide that broken legs are worth fixing? I would say that there are universal values driving that decision, no?

I'm not sure I agree that a growing understanding of morality would have no intrinsic direction. I think supporting the well being of conscious creatures is a likely example of such an intrinsic direction.

I have no idea what your question about the limits of society and our nature means?

I agree that adaptability and diversity are present. I don't know how you can claim that this proves we cannot share morality?

How does science's current take on the concept of "humanity" relate to universal morality? And if "humanity" isn't a label you want us to use, then what term should we use when discussing the ideas and behaviors of the collection of humans on the planet?

So what would be your reason why humans can overcome their collective (partially) selfish, tribal and irrational natures and unite to an exponentially higher degree than has ever been achieved?

It sounds to me as though you're admitting that we humans have selfish, tribal and irrational natures universally, correct? If those characteristics are universal, why couldn't it be that we also share morals universally? Most of us have functioning mirror neurons. Most of us choose to take care of our offspring. Most of us agree that murder is wrong. It strikes me that we have a lot in common, despite our shortcomings.

 

[Augustus]

What distinctions do you see between value pluralism and moral relativism? Honestly, the former looks like a branch of the latter to me.

This should hopefully show the difference between relativism and VP.


[relativism is the idea that] values are cultural constructions: we cannot criticise ways of life on the ground that they fail to meet human needs, for human needs are indefinitely culturally malleable...

value-pluralism is a version of ethical naturalism. The basis of value-pluralism is not the diversity of moral opinion but the truth that humans can flourish in a variety of ways. The human good cannot be fully realized in any one individual or society, and when a choice must be made between ways of life none is bound to be best for everyone...

The central thesis of value-pluralism is that such universal values can be identified and are often at odds. Contrary to moral relativists, there are generically human goods and evils; but such universal values do not amount to a universal morality, for there is no right way of settling their conflicts. Crowder argues that it is only if value-pluralism is conflated with cultural relativism that value-pluralism can threaten liberalism. Actually value- pluralism is bound to undermine liberalism, for it subverts all universal moralities. Those who cling to the moral safety of liberalism must face the fact that they cannot do so while accepting value-pluralism...



@icehorse you might be interested in the distinction between value pluralism and the kind of 'flexible liberalism' promoted by Sam Harris.

It is here that a crux emerges in [Isaiah] Berlin's thought. It was a cardinal tenet of the Enlightenment that, whatever cultural variety the future of mankind would encompass, it was reasonable to expect convergence on a universal civilization undergirded by a shared, rational morality. If the upshot of Berlin's value-pluralism is to undermine the idea of a rational morality, the effect of his work on nationalism is to jettison the prospect that a time may come when men's dominant allegiance is to the norms of a universal civilization.

The crux in Berlin's thought goes yet deeper than this. It is in a tension between the idea of a common human nature and the idea of human self-creation and self-transformation. If, as Vico, Herder, and Berlin maintain, we are a highly inventive species whose forms of life are radically underdetermined by our common humanity, what reason is there to share the hopes of the Enlightenment for an eventual convergence of liberal and humanistic values? Why not expect, instead, endemic conflict among human beings, as they constitute themselves into distinct and incommensurable cultures, each committed to its identity, and not all animated by anything resembling liberal values? ...

It is at this point that the kinship of Berlin with David Hume, remarked upon in notable contributions to this collection by Richard Wollheim and Stuart Hampshire, breaks down. For all his skepticism, Hume believed that the moral and political judgments of men whose minds were unclouded by enthusiasm or false philosophy would come to rest in a general convergence. If only because of his conviction of the constancy of human nature, he could think of human history only as an alternation of civilization and barbarism - not as the exfoliation of incommensurably divergent civilizations.

Yet it is precisely that prospect, so threatening to the hopes and expectations of the Enlightenment, that Berlin's radical value-pluralism opens up. There is, then, a paradoxical kinship between the two thinkers, after all: both are profoundly civilized men, defenders of the values that animated the Enlightenment, whose philosophies render foundationless the enlightened societies to whose defense they remain steadfastly committed.

 

[Koldo]

This should hopefully show the difference between relativism and VP.


[relativism is the idea that] values are cultural constructions: we cannot criticise ways of life on the ground that they fail to meet human needs, for human needs are indefinitely culturally malleable...

value-pluralism is a version of ethical naturalism. The basis of value-pluralism is not the diversity of moral opinion but the truth that humans can flourish in a variety of ways. The human good cannot be fully realized in any one individual or society, and when a choice must be made between ways of life none is bound to be best for everyone...

Ethical naturalism? That alone makes it distinct from moral relativism. What non-moral features of the world lead to moral facts in value pluralism?

The central thesis of value-pluralism is that such universal values can be identified and are often at odds. Contrary to moral relativists, there are generically human goods and evils;

The existence of 'generically human goods and evils' doesn't contradict what moral relativism proposes.

 

[Augustus]

The existence of 'generically human goods and evils' doesn't contradict what moral relativism proposes.

Imo moral relativism doesn't accept the idea of moral facts, although your definition may vary.

What non-moral features of the world lead to moral facts in value pluralism?

I'm not quite sure what you mean here, but a moral fact would be things that develop from our genetic makeup. We can look across societies and we find some kind of universal tenets of morality (loyalty to the group, reciprocity and fairness, etc.), and things humans (near) universally try to avoid (unnecessary and pointless suffering for example) . Morality is, in part, a consequence of universal human cognitive processes.

On the other hand, these are diverse and incommensurable, so a blasphemy law that protects group values cannot be said to be "objectively worse" than freedom of speech that reflects individual rights. A view that favours your people, yet is bad for outsiders again is caused by an incommensurable conflict between equally human values.

Things that play no meaningful social role yet would elicit a (near) universal revulsion and relate to things we (near) universally seek to avoid, like arbitrary torturing people for fun, can be said to wrong as a moral "fact". It is not merely a cultural construct that we have an opposition to such things.

 

[Koldo]

Imo moral relativism doesn't accept the idea of moral facts, although your definition may vary.

Depending on what you mean by 'moral facts', you are correct. But how does this address what I was saying on that quote, that moral relativism doesn't reject the existence of generically goods and evils?

I'm not quite sure what you mean here, but a moral fact would be things that develop from our genetic makeup.

Ok. So the truth value of moral propositions rely on the individual's genetic makeup? Therefore a moral proposition might be true for A and false for B because of their different genetic makeup? Or is it something else?

We can look across societies and we find some kind of universal tenets of morality (loyalty to the group, reciprocity and fairness, etc.), and things humans (near) universally try to avoid (unnecessary and pointless suffering for example) . Morality is, in part, a consequence of universal human cognitive processes.

This part matches with moral relativism.

On the other hand, these are diverse and incommensurable, so a blasphemy law that protects group values cannot be said to be "objectively worse" than freedom of speech that reflects individual rights. A view that favours your people, yet is bad for outsiders again is caused by an incommensurable conflict between equally human values.

Things that play no meaningful social role yet would elicit a (near) universal revulsion and relate to things we (near) universally seek to avoid, like arbitrary torturing people for fun, can be said to wrong as a moral "fact".

So the truth value of moral proposition relies on collective agreements?

It is not merely a cultural construct that we have an opposition to such things.

How do cultural constructs form if not through the basis of our biology?

 

[Muffled]

Agreed that politics is divisive.

But religion is divisive about identity and at least politics has the possibility of being divisive about ideas. Debating ideas is WAY better than identity politics.

I believe I don't know what you mean by identity.

 

[Muffled]

I agree. Anything that pits us all against each other for our own well being is fundamentally evil and potentially catastrophic.

So well being is a catastrophe? I believe the opposite is true. I believe well being is good and helpful to society.

 

[Muffled]

It's already become a long thread

As I said elsewhere, Christians and Muslims and Hindus (and probably others), could CHOOSE to excise the divisive components from their religions, that's all this OP is really addressing.

I don't believe it is ever a good idea to abandon truth in order to live in a common fantasy world of death.

 

[icehorse]

I believe I don't know what you mean by identity.

Sorry. The way I'm using the term "identity" has to do with characteristics of an individual human that they are born with and cannot change. So skin color, height, sex, and nationality are examples. To me, when I hear people talking about "identity politics", it has to do with drawing conclusions about groups of people based on their unchangeable, birth characteristics. For example, if a person is racist, they draw conclusions about others based almost solely on the other person's skin color. I mostly loathe identity politics.

A related idea is criticizing a person's ideas. First thing to notice is that a person change change their mind. To me their is an ENORMOUS difference between criticizing a person for their skin color and criticizing a person for their ideas. An example that comes up a lot on RF is the term "Islamophobia". I'm personally critical of the IDEAS in Islam. But Muslims are NOT a race. They don't all have the same skin color. In most countries (sadly not all), a Muslim can choose to leave the religion. So when I criticize Islam, I'm not criticizing a person's skin, I'm criticizing the ideas they have that Islam supports.

Others might disagree, but I do NOT think that criticizing religion is playing "identity politics".

 

[icehorse]

I don't believe it is ever a good idea to abandon truth in order to live in a common fantasy world of death.

Can you give me an example of what you mean here?

 

[Augustus]

I should have underlined and bolded the word foundation. I believe he's implying that science CAN give us a foundation.

Now I've absolutely no idea what you were getting at in your previous post

But we both agree he thinks science can produce a foundation for values so it doesn't matter. I also think he believes that science will give a foundation for morals that are within a kind of moral 'Overton window' of his.

This is why I'm sceptical of "scientific moralities, as many have been proclaimed, and they all magically seem to more or less align with the values that the person proposing them already holds

I think it's your job to explain why value pluralism is not as flexible as you think I think it is

I believe it is far more flexible than I think you think it is.

(see previous post I tagged you in for why it doesn't tend towards liberalism)

Can we agree that we're talking about "most" people, not all? For example, can we agree that we don't need to get psychopathic murderers to buy into a universal morality?

As for the rest of the above, you're making big claims concerning what's not possible. Do you agree that generally speaking it's immensely difficult to prove a negative or to prove a thing does not or cannot exist?

Yes, that's fine, it's what I meant anyway. Can we also agree when I say something is impossible, this allows for the sliver of philosophical doubt always present?

I can't prove Jesus won't return tomorrow and fix all our problems, but all available evidence shows this to be highly improbable and not really worth entertaining as a serious prospect.

I find both the 2nd coming and the idea we, unlike any other animal, can somehow transcend our nature through sheer force of will to be absurd, and putting faith in either happening at the expense of actual, practical solutions to be harmful folly.

I've probably posted this 100 times, but it sums it up better than I could.

Bertie [Bertrand Russell] sustained simultaneously a pair of opinions ludicrously incompatible. He held that human affairs are carried on in a most irrational fashion, but that the remedy was quite simple and easy, since all we had to do was carry them on rationally."

John Maynard Keynes

You can't save an irrational animal based on a solution that expects it to act rationally.

Why would doctors and societies all over the world decide that broken legs are worth fixing? I would say that there are universal values driving that decision, no?

Because humans care about those they care about, and people can earn resources for performing tasks.

Humans caring about those they care about also drives terrorism, nepotism, bigotry, etc. too.

The same instincts drive very different behaviours.

I'm not sure I agree that a growing understanding of morality would have no intrinsic direction. I think supporting the well being of conscious creatures is a likely example of such an intrinsic direction.

Knowledge and tech progress. We won't go back, en masse, to believing in geocentrism. Knowledge and tech are not intrinsically humanising though. Medicine cures people, and people use the same tech to make biological weapons.

Any moral "progress" can be lost instantly though. Look at Ukraine, or Iraq for what happens when there is a breakdown in society.

If there were a global environmental and economic collapse related to climate change, do you really think powerful countries would act for the good of humanity, rather than for the good of themselves?

Will Americans and Chinese go hungry just to feed some folk in Chad and Somalia? Or will they use their militaries to get what they need if it comes down to that?

What do you think?

How does science's current take on the concept of "humanity" relate to universal morality? And if "humanity" isn't a label you want us to use, then what term should we use when discussing the ideas and behaviors of the collection of humans on the planet?

Like all language, it depends on the context. Words only have meaning in context.

If someone says we need to ban oil "for the good of humanity", that is a nonsense, there is no humanity in that sense. It's like saying "god wills it".

If you say we shouldn't expect humanity to become rational any time soon, that's fine as it just mean the aggregate of humans based on a characteristic shared by all.

It sounds to me as though you're admitting that we humans have selfish, tribal and irrational natures universally, correct? If those characteristics are universal, why couldn't it be that we also share morals universally? Most of us have functioning mirror neurons. Most of us choose to take care of our offspring. Most of us agree that murder is wrong. It strikes me that we have a lot in common, despite our shortcomings.

I agree we aren’t blank slates and share many things in common.

Some of these include:

Adaptation to environment and cultural conditioning
Irrationality
a view of the world that tends towards confirmation of that we already believe
an aversion to emotionally displeasing facts
In group bias
etc.

Collectively (as in not every individual may display these at any given time, but they are common in any group) these include

A propensity to violence
Hatred and prejudice
Jingoism
etc.

Some of the things we share universally are what prevent "humanity" from ever being united to any real degree. And I would say all of the evidence available supports this.

I know you said we only need to "unite enough", but given that religions that unite up to 20% of the world's population (to some degree), across ethnic, national, linguistic and cultural boundaries are in your view "divisive", what do you mean by uniting just enough?

Of course we can, and do, cooperate transactionally based on common interests, but religions don't really prevent this any more than alternative value systems do. Even the crusades/crusader states were dependent on transactional relationships with Muslims.

What is your vision of a realistic global order than is more united? What values will underpin it?

(I believe we can create a world that is a bit less antagonistic, but not one that is substantially more united)