Scientism

[ImmortalFlame]

I never said that science couldn't eventfully answer those questions. I said that as of now, there are some that can't be. And those questions still deserve answers. I'm sorry you can't see that. And if you will note, I did say they might be answered by science.

I didn't accuse you of holding that position, I merely answered your question of "What about things that science cannot answer?".

And you are denying the fact that science does, in fact, have limits. Ethics is just one of those limits. One can't, ethically, experiment on human in ways that would breach ethical constraints. As I have already mentioned, the experiments by Watson with Albert is just one example. Can you ethically open a persons brain to study Alzheimer's? No.

You and I seem to be discussing different kinds of "limits". You are referring to ethical constraints placed on scientific practices. I am referring to limits as ideas, questions or concepts that science inherently cannot answer, explore or explain. I contest the supposed limits of science's ability to explain, not the ethical limits imposed on its practice.

 

[ImmortalFlame]

In your opinion.

No, in reality. You cannot "use" art as a methodology to reach an objective conclusion about reality. You yourself must agree with this, as you clearly wrote that art "throws facts out of the window". If art throws facts out of a window, you can't exactly believe it is a reliable method for determining facts, can you?

We seem to disagree. I am quite content to leave things at that. Though, last time I checked "inquiry" simply meant the asking of questions, something that can and is explored through things other than the sciences. Like arts and stories. Or direct, personal experience. If you still value other modes of inquiry - regardless of whether or not you consider it a mode of inquiry - you're not holding to the philosophy of scientism to me.

I'm really not interested in semantics.

 

[lovemuffin]

ImmortalFlame, what you wrote initially, which I was arguing against, was this (emphasis added):

Until you can definitively state what science's limits are - which you can't, because science is a progressive methodology which is constantly adjusting, and therefore you cannot definitively state that there are questions that it could NEVER answer - you have no basis on which to assert that science has "limits" and would need "another tool" to answer a particular question.

My understanding of what you wrote here is that it is impossible to ever state any theoretical limits on science, because science has no fixed definition. I don't see any way to read this other than as an assertion that it is impossible for there to be limitations on science, and it's clearly talking about the definition of scientific methodology. So I don't understand your assertion that you never said anything about the definition of science.

That said, it is also true that I overlooked your subsequent post, which seems to me to contradict these first sentences, when you said that there may in fact be limits on science. So assuming the second post clarifies the first, I apologize for the confusion on my part. It's not my intent to misrepresent your views.

Beyond that, I think I would agree there is no single definition of "scientism", it's a term that (afaik) was coined mostly by way of a critique, so it's somewhat polemical. That's why I said earlier in the thread that I think the weakness of it is it potentially leads to strawmanning, which I think is your complaint. I understand where you are coming from on that. I think your summary here is useful:

Some people seem to define scientism as a faith-like belief in science, which I disagree with, while others have defined it as simply the belief that science is the best method we have for understanding reality, which I agree with.

What I would say is that the criticism should be that there is a possibility of begging the question "what is the best method we have for understanding reality?" if we previously define "reality" in certain ways only. In other words, there's a sort of feedback loop between our evaluation of methods and our concept of "reality". The usefulness of science has led people to define reality in such a way as to basically beg the question as to whether science is the best method, because prior to the question they've already defined "reality" as being only that for which science is indisputably the best method. So I agree with your summary insofar as I agree that much of "reality" is best investigated via scientific methods, and in fact I would say science is always useful. Where I think the criticism of "scientism" has some teeth is in pointing out that our way of thinking may condition how we answer the question of methodology, in terms of what we think of by "reality".

Okay. Now all you need to do is demonstrate the existence of phenomena that can never be scientifically repeatable.

I suggested the hard problem of consciousness as potentially the most interesting current scientific and philosophical problem. To be clear, I don't mean that consciousness can't be investigated at all by science, but that the subjective, phenomenal, what-it-is-like-ness, or qualia, of conscious experience, is perhaps something for which no functional scientific explanation will suffice, if you credit the intuition behind calling that a "hard" problem.

The OP also suggests a possible phenomena when it talks about these studies that demonstrate that certain meditative practices are more beneficial than others. The placebo effect has been offered as an alternate explanation, but I think that is by no means demonstrated. Whether we're talking about conscious experience or the benefits of meditation there are competing metaphysical answers, and it's not clear to me that scientific method in itself can resolve that question directly. With the benefits of meditation, again "unrepeatability" refers to the difficulty of operationalizing measurements of very qualitative effects, which doesn't mean that scientific methods can't provide some insight, the question is more whether they can provide a complete understanding without making any prior metaphysical commitments.

 

[JoStories]

I didn't accuse you of holding that position, I merely answered your question of "What about things that science cannot answer?".


You and I seem to be discussing different kinds of "limits". You are referring to ethical constraints placed on scientific practices. I am referring to limits as ideas, questions or concepts that science inherently cannot answer, explore or explain. I contest the supposed limits of science's ability to explain, not the ethical limits imposed on its practice.

Actually, I did know what you were talking about and I agree to what you because some of those constraints are imposed due to things like ethics. And ideas themselves that limit due to what they ask. We really are on the same page.

 

[Windwalker]

Yes but, again, that does not say anything about the plusibility of the object of the belief, does it? And once you realize how implausible that is, how can you convince yourself to still believe it so that you are happier?

I think the better way to understand this is to ask the question is the understanding of what is believed in consistent with someone's current general worldviews. That's a different question that asking is something "plausible". Of course the Old Guy in the Sky is plausible to those who think in mythological terms, otherwise they wouldn't believe it. But is it plausible to someone who thinks in rational scientific terms? No, it's not, and therefore they don't believe it. Conceptualizing in mythological terms is a different set of eyes than conceptualizing in in rationalist terms. And conceptualizing in postmodernist terms is different than modernist terms, and therefore what is plausible at postmodernist perceptions, is different than what modernists consider plausible. The postmodernist scoffs at the modernist's idea of plausibility, as much as the modernist scoffs at the mythic believer's ideas of plausibility. It seems to me that how someone accepts or rejects plausibility rests mostly with the set of eyes looking.

In my case, not statistically relevant, my deconversion did not cause any reduction of happiness whatsoever. It was actually an exhilarating feeling. But I cannot exclude that some people might sense a feeling of loss when they realize that they are not going to play harp in the clouds for all eternity .

Oh sure, and I certainly get and appreciate this. If you are trying to force your feet into shoes you have outgrown, you're going to feel a definite sense of liberation and happiness when you put them into a larger shoe! I know the feeling well.

So here's the thing. The problem with belief in God in the West is that God is a size four, mythic-size shoe. Christianity has had this love affair with maintaining the monopoly on God as understood as the mythic stage of development, and has gone to great pains to keep God in the smaller sized shoe of our pre-enlightenment past. So as modernity and postmodernity move the way deeper into the general populace people are left with this choice of either trying to grow beyond this mythic understanding and find themselves increasingly unable to fit in with those in the churches led by the promoters of the mythic version of God and just settle into a certain "ignoring" of that nagging in themselves to keep growing, or they are given the choice to listen to voice and jettison God in favor of becoming an atheist. That's really the two choices given them.

Then those who go the path of being true to themselves rationally and reject the mythic God set off into uncharted lands, either trying to become a full-blown anti-religious Scientisic Atheist Believer, or not join the Dawkins camp of neo-atheists and become a "spiritual atheist" (a term I tried to make work for myself for sometime), the "soft atheist", the "agnostic atheist", etc, and they find themselves kind of in the same camp as being in the church not believing in the mythic God by their fellow believers, only now it's their fellow atheists who seek for uniformity of their "anti-belief", so-called skepticism, and whatnot. All of which is religious. And I don't say this as an outsider to those ranks, mind you, but was very much part of that discussion within the ranks. I've come to call all that as I see it now as simply "Christianity without God".

It's like the saying, "You can take the boy out of the country, but you can't take the country out of the boy". Just changing what one believes in does not change HOW someone believes in it. Hence, for many changing camps like this, science replaces God and becomes Science, with a capital S. It's sneaky that way. Like a friend of mine from Bible College days now self-identifying as atheist proudly declared to me, "I'm so glad I know the truth now!". When I reminded him I recalled him using those exact same words when he was in Bible school, his response was this, "Yes, but the difference is now I really DO have the truth!". You see?

You're absolutely right, you can't go back to thinking in mythic terms once awakened to rationality as the baseline mode of operation. Nor should you. But I think the discussion needs to move beyond thinking in terms of, "Now I really DO have the truth!". It's tiring.

It all boils down to priorities. What has priority: happiness or truth (possibly accompanied by lesser happiness)? Do you prefer a comortable lie or an umpleasant truth, in general?

The thing I was trying to get to above is it's not a sharp dividing line between belief or disbelief. That doesn't reflect reality.

In my experience, the amount of skepticism that must be deployed toward a certain claim, is proportional to the comfort that the claim causes us. This simple rule works wonders if truth is priority. Less so if you have other priorities.

And then you run into the idealized view of science as Science, and Theism becoming Scientisim running it's face into the larger picture, and such naive views of truth and reality become equally as tiny and constricting as the mythic God and the Magic Ark did to you! That's when you see that that shoe size is a six 6 instead of a size 4, but your feet are a size 12! Now that's become even more uncomfortable because there are fewer and fewer shoes available in that size. You find yourself having to kind of go barefoot most of the time.

 

[ImmortalFlame]

My understanding of what you wrote here is that it is impossible to ever state any theoretical limits on science, because science has no fixed definition.

Then you have misunderstood what I meant, and perhaps I wasn't quite clear enough. What I meant is that you cannot successfully CLAIM it will never have an answer to a particular question. My issue is with the claim, not with the concept. I simply stated that it is a methodology that progresses; That's not a definition, it's a description. I've made no attempt to strictly "define" science so far on this debate.

That said, it is also true that I overlooked your subsequent post, which seems to me to contradict these first sentences, when you said that there may in fact be limits on science. So assuming the second post clarifies the first, I apologize for the confusion on my part. It's not my intent to misrepresent your views.

That's okay.

Beyond that, I think I would agree there is no single definition of "scientism", it's a term that (afaik) was coined mostly by way of a critique, so it's somewhat polemical. That's why I said earlier in the thread that I think the weakness of it is it potentially leads to strawmanning, which I think is your complaint. I understand where you are coming from on that. I think your summary here is useful:

What I would say is that the criticism should be that there is a possibility of begging the question "what is the best method we have for understanding reality?" if we previously define "reality" in certain ways only. In other words, there's a sort of feedback loop between our evaluation of methods and our concept of "reality". The usefulness of science has led people to define reality in such a way as to basically beg the question as to whether science is the best method, because prior to the question they've already defined "reality" as being only that for which science is indisputably the best method. So I agree with your summary insofar as I agree that much of "reality" is best investigated via scientific methods, and in fact I would say science is always useful. Where I think the criticism of "scientism" has some teeth is in pointing out that our way of thinking may condition how we answer the question of methodology, in terms of what we think of by "reality".

That makes sense, but as science is based on demonstration - not belief - I feel there is little to no real threat of us being mislead by concluding that science is more reliable than it actually is in examining reality. If it fails to produce results, it becomes demonstrably less reliable. The fact remains that science is, thus far, the only methodology we have that produces said tangible results, and the moment it stops doing so is the moment we should begin the question of fundamentally altering our methodology.

I suggested the hard problem of consciousness as potentially the most interesting current scientific and philosophical problem. To be clear, I don't mean that consciousness can't be investigated at all by science, but that the subjective, phenomenal, what-it-is-like-ness, or qualia, of conscious experience, is perhaps something for which no functional scientific explanation will suffice, if you credit the intuition behind calling that a "hard" problem.

While I'm not currently up on cognitive sciences, from what I understand there are many people in the field who no longer consider the hard problem to be a problem at all any more - however, I have yet to really read about or grasp their reasoning.

The OP also suggests a possible phenomena when it talks about these studies that demonstrate that certain meditative practices are more beneficial than others. The placebo effect has been offered as an alternate explanation, but I think that is by no means demonstrated. Whether we're talking about conscious experience or the benefits of meditation there are competing metaphysical answers, and it's not clear to me that scientific method in itself can resolve that question directly. With the benefits of meditation, again "unrepeatability" refers to the difficulty of operationalizing measurements of very qualitative effects, which doesn't mean that scientific methods can't provide some insight, the question is more whether they can provide a complete understanding without making any prior metaphysical commitments.

I see your arguments, but these still just boil down to "we don't have an answer yet". I see no reason to conclude that science cannot answer either the hard problem or the meditation example, nor any reason why we should assume that metaphysics plays any part in either issue.

 

[lovemuffin]

While I'm not currently up on cognitive sciences, from what I understand there are many people in the field who no longer consider the hard problem to be a problem at all any more - however, I have yet to really read about or grasp their reasoning.

I see your arguments, but these still just boil down to "we don't have an answer yet". I see no reason to conclude that science cannot answer either the hard problem or the meditation example, nor any reason why we should assume that metaphysics plays any part in either issue.

The reason the so-called hard problem of consciousness is a useful example is because, if you credit the philosophical argument, then it really isn't a question of "we don't have an answer yet". The argument is not that it's just something that science hasn't explained yet, but that it's fundamentally something which could not have an explanation in the usual way science proceeds. For example, here's what Chalmers argued in one of his early papers:

"Why are the easy problems easy, and why is the hard problem hard? The easy problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need only specify a mechanism that can perform the function. The methods of cognitive science are well-suited for this sort of explanation, and so are well-suited to the easy problems of consciousness. By contrast, the hard problem is hard precisely because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. The problem persists even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained. (Here "function" is not used in the narrow teleological sense of something that a system is designed to do, but in the broader sense of any causal role in the production of behavior that a system might perform.)

Throughout the higher-level sciences, reductive explanation works in just this way. To explain the gene, for instance, we needed to specify the mechanism that stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next. It turns out that DNA performs this function; once we explain how the function is performed, we have explained the gene. To explain life, we ultimately need to explain how a system can reproduce, adapt to its environment, metabolize, and so on. All of these are questions about the performance of functions, and so are well-suited to reductive explanation. The same holds for most problems in cognitive science. To explain learning, we need to explain the way in which a system's behavioral capacities are modified in light of environmental information, and the way in which new information can be brought to bear in adapting a system's actions to its environment. If we show how a neural or computational mechanism does the job, we have explained learning. We can say the same for other cognitive phenomena, such as perception, memory, and language. Sometimes the relevant functions need to be characterized quite subtly, but it is clear that insofar as cognitive science explains these phenomena at all, it does so by explaining the performance of functions.

When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of explanation fails. What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report - there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open.

There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. If someone says "I can see that you have explained how DNA stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next, but you have not explained how it is a gene", then they are making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is to be an entity that performs the relevant storage and transmission function. But if someone says "I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced", they are not making a conceptual mistake. This is a nontrivial further question.

This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. There is an explanatory gap (a term due to Levine 1983) between the functions and experience, and we need an explanatory bridge to cross it.

- Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
​

I can't speak to how popular various theories in philosophy of mind or cognitive science are (the last time I was talking about this subject with someone, they told me that reductive physicalism was not as popular as it used to be, but I don't know), but I can say that for those who consider it not to be an issue, they are just generally eliminative about consciousness as a qualitative phenomena. That is, they simply dismiss the need for an explanation of experience in the way Chalmers talks about.

What is interesting about this argument is that it's an intuitive one, rather than a logical or empirical one. Those who believe that consciousness raises a problem for physicalism or for normal scientific methods take this subjective qualitative element of experience as a given, as something that is the most immediate fact of the matter that we could possibly be aware of, and take that seriously. It could not possibly have a more basic explanation because it is itself, for us, something ultimate. Eliminative or reductive materialism dismisses this not by explaining the phenomena but by simply declaring that our intuition about the immediacy of experience is not a sufficient justification to take it seriously.

 

[Quintessence]

No, in reality. You cannot "use" art as a methodology to reach an objective conclusion about reality.

Where in the blazes did you get the idea I was suggesting that in the first place?!

This has derailed so far from what I've been aiming to communicate and I'm so bloody confused about this strange stuff you're getting from my posts that I'm done trying to salvage this failed conversation. I shouldn't have even bothered replying the first time, as it was clear to me from that post alone that there was a spectacularly massive communications failure that was not going to be corrected. Perhaps at a later date in another thread in another conversation.

 

[Kuzcotopia]

The reason the so-called hard problem of consciousness is a useful example is because, if you credit the philosophical argument, then it really isn't a question of "we don't have an answer yet". The argument is not that it's just something that science hasn't explained yet, but that it's fundamentally something which could not have an explanation in the usual way science proceeds. For example, here's what Chalmers argued in one of his early papers:

"Why are the easy problems easy, and why is the hard problem hard? The easy problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need only specify a mechanism that can perform the function. The methods of cognitive science are well-suited for this sort of explanation, and so are well-suited to the easy problems of consciousness. By contrast, the hard problem is hard precisely because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. The problem persists even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained. (Here "function" is not used in the narrow teleological sense of something that a system is designed to do, but in the broader sense of any causal role in the production of behavior that a system might perform.)

Throughout the higher-level sciences, reductive explanation works in just this way. To explain the gene, for instance, we needed to specify the mechanism that stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next. It turns out that DNA performs this function; once we explain how the function is performed, we have explained the gene. To explain life, we ultimately need to explain how a system can reproduce, adapt to its environment, metabolize, and so on. All of these are questions about the performance of functions, and so are well-suited to reductive explanation. The same holds for most problems in cognitive science. To explain learning, we need to explain the way in which a system's behavioral capacities are modified in light of environmental information, and the way in which new information can be brought to bear in adapting a system's actions to its environment. If we show how a neural or computational mechanism does the job, we have explained learning. We can say the same for other cognitive phenomena, such as perception, memory, and language. Sometimes the relevant functions need to be characterized quite subtly, but it is clear that insofar as cognitive science explains these phenomena at all, it does so by explaining the performance of functions.

When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of explanation fails. What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report - there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open.

There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. If someone says "I can see that you have explained how DNA stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next, but you have not explained how it is a gene", then they are making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is to be an entity that performs the relevant storage and transmission function. But if someone says "I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced", they are not making a conceptual mistake. This is a nontrivial further question.

This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. There is an explanatory gap (a term due to Levine 1983) between the functions and experience, and we need an explanatory bridge to cross it.

- Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
​

I can't speak to how popular various theories in philosophy of mind or cognitive science are (the last time I was talking about this subject with someone, they told me that reductive physicalism was not as popular as it used to be, but I don't know), but I can say that for those who consider it not to be an issue, they are just generally eliminative about consciousness as a qualitative phenomena. That is, they simply dismiss the need for an explanation of experience in the way Chalmers talks about.

What is interesting about this argument is that it's an intuitive one, rather than a logical or empirical one. Those who believe that consciousness raises a problem for physicalism or for normal scientific methods take this subjective qualitative element of experience as a given, as something that is the most immediate fact of the matter that we could possibly be aware of, and take that seriously. It could not possibly have a more basic explanation because it is itself, for us, something ultimate. Eliminative or reductive materialism dismisses this not by explaining the phenomena but by simply declaring that our intuition about the immediacy of experience is not a sufficient justification to take it seriously.

This was a very interesting read. Thanks for sharing it.

Sciences tends to have different methodologies to study each field. Maybe at that reductive level, where neuroscience may fail to explain certain experiences of qualia, could there still be an explanatory system of some kind that is essentially rigorous, but not necessarily neuroscience at all?

I know the social sciences have methodologies to study organizations of human behavior, such as cultural anthropology, social psychology, economics and things like that. They wouldn't need the methodologies of biology or chemistry to explain and study those organizing structures. Maybe the correct field of study for consciousness is more like semiotics or ITT?

If we free up the need for the hard problem to be solved by strictly biological and chemical processes, it doesn't seem as challenging an enterprise to figure out how to explain it. Cosmology and quantum mechanics don't use the same explanatory systems to describe different aspects of physics, so it doesn't feel like quite a cheat to me to have different conceptual frameworks to explain different aspects of consciousness.

I would assume we'd still want to find that unified theory of consciousness, but even if we didn't, I'm sure there would be as many theories on this topic as there is for unification in theoretical physics. At this point, mysticism would certainly be as credible a theory as anything essentially secular. I'd be happy to see where it went either way.

 

[Mycroft]

No, in reality. You cannot "use" art as a methodology to reach an objective conclusion about reality. You yourself must agree with this, as you clearly wrote that art "throws facts out of the window". If art throws facts out of a window, you can't exactly believe it is a reliable method for determining facts, can you?


I'm really not interested in semantics.

You would do well to watch this video.

 

[leibowde84]

You would do well to watch this video.

I've watched that video, but isn't it more about the benefits and subjective enlightenment that art can influence, rather than the acquisition of objective knowledge?

 

[Sapiens]

I've watched that video, but isn't it more about the benefits and subjective enlightenment that art can influence, rather than the acquisition of objective knowledge?

To a large degree that's going to depend on one's views on the aesthetic. There are schools of thought that are dedicated to art as the most objective a representation as possible of an artist's previsualization as possible.

 

[Mycroft]

Wasn't that your whole point, though. That spiritual truths shouldn't have to be backed up scientifically?

Use of the word 'scientism' is basically the religious equivalent of a five year old calling someone a booby-head and stomping off to their mother.

 

[Windwalker]

Use of the word 'scientism' is basically the religious equivalent of a five year old calling someone a booby-head and stomping off to their mother.

You mean like calling someone's beliefs woo?

 

[Mycroft]

You mean like calling someone's beliefs woo?

Exactly so.

 

[1137]

Use of the word 'scientism' is basically the religious equivalent of a five year old calling someone a booby-head and stomping off to their mother.

Same with calling the Phelps family "fundamentalist". Oh, wait, that's not true.

 

[FunctionalAtheist]

I’ve been criticized a lot for using the term “scientism”, and I would like to argue that this criticism is unwarranted and mistaken. When I do a quick Google search for the definition of scientism I see that it is “excessive belief in the power of scientific knowledge and techniques”. I do not think this definition does it much justice. More appropriately, scientism is a religious exaltation of science and anti-theism.


I want to give an example of what I am talking about here. Say that you are presenting a research experiment that found mystical meditation benefits one more than secular meditation ((Pargament, K.), A. (2013, March 22). What role do religion and spirituality play in mental health? Retrieved fromhttp://What Role Do Religion and Spirituality Play In Mental Health? What does this mean? Does it imply that mysticism is true? Absolutely not. Does it tell us that god exists? Nope. What it tells us is that mystical meditation is more beneficial than secular. The logical conclusion then, if you are going to meditate, is to engage in mystical meditation, even if you’re simply feigning belief. I, who fall under “scientism”, tell you that you are absolutely wrong that mystical meditation is more beneficial. It is impossible because no benefits can come from religion. Mysticism is pseudo-science and, as such, should be avoided at all costs.


Do you see what happened there? I reject empirical evidence based on experimental research because it contradicts with my belief that there can be no benefits from anything religious of any kind. This is the religious anti-theistic side of scientism. Another example is gnostic atheism, the belief that one knows there is no god. A major problem when it comes to science and spirituality is that the spiritual realm is, by definition, beyond science. The gods exist beyond the dimensions of time and space. We are simply third-dimensional beings on one planet with all information being gathered by a single, rather moronic species. To claim then, based simple on a lack of evidence (which itself is a pseudo-scientific route) that one knows that there is not something beyond detection is a pure – and rather massive – leap of faith. This is scientism, a religious exaltation of science.


Anyways, this is something I tend to see more and more. I have no idea if there are any sort of studies on it or anything, I’m just giving my two cents.

Sorry I'm so far behind! Cant' be bothered to read all the interim responses. I will say this....paradigmes shift...keep it coming and someone OTHER THAN YOU, A GENERATION OR TWO AWAY, will refer to you when they actually shift the paradigme (which would be awesome, 50 yr after you die,) or you will never be heard of again. Stay with it.

Paradigme shift is a *****!!!

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I’ve been criticized a lot for using the term “scientism”, and I would like to argue that this criticism is unwarranted and mistaken. When I do a quick Google search for the definition of scientism I see that it is “excessive belief in the power of scientific knowledge and techniques”.

I can do a quick search on holocaust denial and find justification or a quick search on any pseudoscience and find support. This is not justification, it is the nature of the internet.

This is not to say you have know justification for your use. But you ought to have better justification for use your use and understanding of the sciences than shown here thus far.

I reject empirical evidence based on experimental research because it contradicts with my belief that there can be no benefits from anything religious of any kind.

You implicitly reference two related, long-investigated forms of epistemic justification and reject them because they conflict with your epistemic stance that you don't justify. I do not see your point.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Why does it "drive you up the wall"? I feel like it is pretty reasonable to rely completely on empirical evidence

It is utterly impossible. All empirical evidence depends upon interpretations and assumptions, making such reliance never wholly based upon "empirical evidence."

 

[leibowde84]

It is utterly impossible. All empirical evidence depends upon interpretations and assumptions, making such reliance never wholly based upon "empirical evidence."

Well ... beyond "trusting our senses" and using already present dispositions, empirical evidence is surely attainable. If we are going to be stopped by Platonian arguments about experience, we aren't ever going to get anywhere.