Simplified argument vs free will

[CarlinKnew]

1. In order to make a choice, we must have a want that we believe to be relevant to that choice. To illustrate this, imagine a being who has no wants. If you present him with two options he has no want for either. He has no want to choose and no want to not choose, so the choice is irrelevant to him.

Now imagine a being who only has one want: to drink milk. He can now make only one choice: to drink milk. If he believes milk is in his mouth he will choose to drink it every time until he explodes or something else stops him, because it's his only want.

2. When we believe we have multiple wants related to a choice we will choose what we want more. To illustrate this imagine a being who has only two wants: to drink milk and to not drink milk. These wants contradict each other, so if they are of equal importance to the being they will cancel each other out and it will be as if the being has no wants at all.

On the other hand, if the want to drink milk is more important to the being than the want to not drink milk, he will drink milk just as if he didn't have the want to not drink.

3. In order to change the importance of a want, we must have a more important want that is relevant to doing so.This is a consequence of statements 1 and 2. For example imagine a being who has only three wants: to drink milk, to not drink milk, and to be comfortable. If the want to be comfortable is most important, it will change the importance of the other two. So if the being is uncomfortable because his stomach is empty, the want to be comfortable will make the want to drink milk more important than the want to not drink milk, until the stomach becomes uncomfortably full and so on.

4. All of our choices can be traced back to our original wants. This is a consequence of statements 1, 2, and 3, the result of wants leading to choices and changing the importance of other wants.

5. We did not choose to have our original wants. This is necessary because of statement 1 and is made obvious by the fact of birth.

We are not responsible for what led to all of our choices.This is given by statements 4 and 5.

 

[9Westy9]

1. In order to make a choice, we must have a want that we believe to be relevant to that choice. To illustrate this, imagine a being who has no wants. If you present him with two options he has no want for either. He has no want to choose and no want to not choose, so the choice is irrelevant to him.

Now imagine a being who only has one want: to drink milk. He can now make only one choice: to drink milk. If he believes milk is in his mouth he will choose to drink it every time until he explodes or something else stops him, because it's his only want.

2. When we believe we have multiple wants related to a choice we will choose what we want more. To illustrate this imagine a being who has only two wants: to drink milk and to not drink milk. These wants contradict each other, so if they are of equal importance to the being they will cancel each other out and it will be as if the being has no wants at all.

On the other hand, if the want to drink milk is more important to the being than the want to not drink milk, he will drink milk just as if he didn't have the want to not drink.

3. In order to change the importance of a want, we must have a more important want that is relevant to doing so.This is a consequence of statements 1 and 2. For example imagine a being who has only three wants: to drink milk, to not drink milk, and to be comfortable. If the want to be comfortable is most important, it will change the importance of the other two. So if the being is uncomfortable because his stomach is empty, the want to be comfortable will make the want to drink milk more important than the want to not drink milk, until the stomach becomes uncomfortably full and so on.

4. All of our choices can be traced back to our original wants. This is a consequence of statements 1, 2, and 3, the result of wants leading to choices and changing the importance of other wants.

5. We did not choose to have our original wants. This is necessary because of statement 1 and is made obvious by the fact of birth.

We are not responsible for what led to all of our choices.This is given by statements 4 and 5.

Good argument. I'd make it clear that this person has no needs to avoid an answer like 'what if he starts to starve?'

 

[Skwim]

Not bad.

Not bad.
​

 

[Willamena]

What is the evidence that a want makes you choose? Also, what is the difference between #3 and #2. Isn't wanting to be comfortable just something we want more?

 

[1137]

1. In order to make a choice, we must have a want that we believe to be relevant to that choice. To illustrate this, imagine a being who has no wants. If you present him with two options he has no want for either. He has no want to choose and no want to not choose, so the choice is irrelevant to him.

Now imagine a being who only has one want: to drink milk. He can now make only one choice: to drink milk. If he believes milk is in his mouth he will choose to drink it every time until he explodes or something else stops him, because it's his only want.

2. When we believe we have multiple wants related to a choice we will choose what we want more. To illustrate this imagine a being who has only two wants: to drink milk and to not drink milk. These wants contradict each other, so if they are of equal importance to the being they will cancel each other out and it will be as if the being has no wants at all.

On the other hand, if the want to drink milk is more important to the being than the want to not drink milk, he will drink milk just as if he didn't have the want to not drink.

3. In order to change the importance of a want, we must have a more important want that is relevant to doing so.This is a consequence of statements 1 and 2. For example imagine a being who has only three wants: to drink milk, to not drink milk, and to be comfortable. If the want to be comfortable is most important, it will change the importance of the other two. So if the being is uncomfortable because his stomach is empty, the want to be comfortable will make the want to drink milk more important than the want to not drink milk, until the stomach becomes uncomfortably full and so on.

4. All of our choices can be traced back to our original wants. This is a consequence of statements 1, 2, and 3, the result of wants leading to choices and changing the importance of other wants.

5. We did not choose to have our original wants. This is necessary because of statement 1 and is made obvious by the fact of birth.

We are not responsible for what led to all of our choices.This is given by statements 4 and 5.

Disagree again, although better argument. Still isn't causing much trouble though for my belief in free will. Our original desires are subconscious. Our subconscious wants cannot be controlled, it is not possible. Free will deals with what we can choose, and our subconscious desires do not fit the category. I used this example in the other thread: just because you want to jump off a building and fly, but cannot, does not mean there is no free will. The choice to do such a thing never existed.

 

[idav]

There is a struggle within our minds where what we want fights against what is logical. With knowledge, logic can trump an emotional response. The way to make a real choice is to go beyond cause and see influence for what it really is.

 

[Nakosis]

Disagree again, although better argument. Still isn't causing much trouble though for my belief in free will. Our original desires are subconscious. Our subconscious wants cannot be controlled, it is not possible. Free will deals with what we can choose, and our subconscious desires do not fit the category. I used this example in the other thread: just because you want to jump off a building and fly, but cannot, does not mean there is no free will. The choice to do such a thing never existed.

Yes, exactly. Say you desire/like vanilla and hate chocolate. When asked to choose between the two you choose vanilla. You freely choose vanilla because that is what you want. The choice of choosing chocolate for you, because of your desires, likes/dislikes never existed.

You could imagine choosing chocolate. You can imagine jumping off a building and flying. Neither could have actually happened.

 

[Koldo]

What is the evidence that a want makes you choose?

Free will?

 

[Copernicus]

I think that you oversimplify the nature of making choices when you try to reduce it to want to 'do X' and to 'not do X'. All choices involve a desired goal and satisfaction of that desire. What we face in reality is a large number of conflicting goals that we rank in terms of hierarchy of importance, where the strength of desire determines the ranking. In other words, every action you undertake voluntarily is compelled by the highest ranking goal among competing goals. You can do nothing other than what you most desire to do at any given moment. Choice is fully determined by that which satisfies the highest ranked desire. You can program a robot to exhibit that kind of "free will".

 

[idav]

.....Choice is fully determined by that which satisfies the highest ranked desire. You can program a robot to exhibit that kind of "free will".

I can understand the logic with this and it makes sense. However humans are not really like computers and can't really determine by percentages on the fly. There is actually a mechanism in our brain that assists us on not going into a state of being indecisive. I know the jeopardy machine works in much the same way as you described but I feel like sometimes our choices are 50/50 just cause we are indecisive by nature and not really able to calculate to the degree required to make the correct decision based even if we instinctively know the correct answer. This indecisiveness could give rise to real will depending on the type of loops we might get stuck in. I think about these things anytime someone talks about going by their gut or when they say don't second guess yourself.

 

[Skwim]

Everyone,

Please reread what Copernicus has said here, it goes to heart of the free will problem. There are reasons (causes) we do what we do, and ultimately we can do no differently.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

1. In order to make a choice, we must have a want that we believe to be relevant to that choice. To illustrate this, imagine a being who has no wants. If you present him with two options he has no want for either. He has no want to choose and no want to not choose, so the choice is irrelevant to him.

Now imagine a being who only has one want: to drink milk. He can now make only one choice: to drink milk. If he believes milk is in his mouth he will choose to drink it every time until he explodes or something else stops him, because it's his only want.

2. When we believe we have multiple wants related to a choice we will choose what we want more. To illustrate this imagine a being who has only two wants: to drink milk and to not drink milk. These wants contradict each other, so if they are of equal importance to the being they will cancel each other out and it will be as if the being has no wants at all.

On the other hand, if the want to drink milk is more important to the being than the want to not drink milk, he will drink milk just as if he didn't have the want to not drink.

3. In order to change the importance of a want, we must have a more important want that is relevant to doing so.This is a consequence of statements 1 and 2. For example imagine a being who has only three wants: to drink milk, to not drink milk, and to be comfortable. If the want to be comfortable is most important, it will change the importance of the other two. So if the being is uncomfortable because his stomach is empty, the want to be comfortable will make the want to drink milk more important than the want to not drink milk, until the stomach becomes uncomfortably full and so on.

4. All of our choices can be traced back to our original wants. This is a consequence of statements 1, 2, and 3, the result of wants leading to choices and changing the importance of other wants.

5. We did not choose to have our original wants. This is necessary because of statement 1 and is made obvious by the fact of birth.

We are not responsible for what led to all of our choices.This is given by statements 4 and 5.

Let's grant all 5 propositions just for the sake of argument. So what? There is a difference between "we are not responsible to what led to all of our choices" and "we are not responsible for are choices." Consider the milk example. Perhaps I'm lactose intolerant, but I REALLY like the taste of milk. So for some time I've been drinking milk any way, and as a result I was recently informed by my doctor that I have serious GI problems and if I don't want to cause permanent damage I have to stop drinking milk. I sit down at a table, and someone offers me milk. It could be that my desire to drink milk is so great that although in general my "want" to not permanently damage my body is greater than my "want" for milk, in the moment I'm overwhelmed by immediate desire.
That does not mean I lack the capacity for self-control, or that I am not capable of deciding the immediate desire for milk isn't worth the greater but less immediate desire for health. Nothing in propositions 1-5 necessitates that my decision to damage my body to satisfy my immediate desire was inevitable.

A flaw in the logic leading to what I believe you want your conclusion to mean is proposition 3. Specifically, there is nothing which states that we ourselves cannot change the importance of "wants" or decide which "want" is more relative or important.

 

[Koldo]

All choices involve a desired goal and satisfaction of that desire. What we face in reality is a large number of conflicting goals that we rank in terms of hierarchy of importance, where the strength of desire determines the ranking. In other words, every action you undertake voluntarily is compelled by the highest ranking goal among competing goals. You can do nothing other than what you most desire to do at any given moment. Choice is fully determined by that which satisfies the highest ranked desire. You can program a robot to exhibit that kind of "free will".

Exactly my thoughts. And much better written than i would have.

 

[Koldo]

That does not mean I lack the capacity for self-control, or that I am not capable of deciding the immediate desire for milk isn't worth the greater but less immediate desire for health. Nothing in propositions 1-5 necessitates that my decision to damage my body to satisfy my immediate desire was inevitable.

If you accept the premise #1, then self-control in itself is an action that requires a want, because every conscious action requires a choice. Therefore, your decision to damage your body to satisfy your immediate desire was inevitable unless you wanted to control yourself. And then if you accept premise #4 as well you have to concede the point.

Specifically, there is nothing which states that we ourselves cannot change the importance of "wants" or decide which "want" is more relative or important.

This is partly true.
However, even though we can indeed change the importance of 'wants' or decide which 'want' is more relevant or important, we need to perform an action to achieve this goal which in itself involves a choice, which in turn requires a want.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

This is partly true.
However, even though we can indeed change the importance of 'wants' or decide which 'want' is more relevant or important, we need to perform an action to achieve this goal which in itself involves a choice, which in turn requires a want.

The issue here as I undestand it (given the title of the thread) is "free will." Of course, that notion is itself problematic given varying definitions, but from the OP I gather that the issue is one of determinism. That is, the choices we think we make of our own volition are determined by what we want at particular moments, which are themselves determined by things which preceded our choices, and therefore our choices are determined by things we do not control. Ergo, no "free will."

However, if I have the capacity to consider, weigh, and contemplate the choices I have available at a particular time, then I am the agent responsible for "changing the importance of particular wants." I can determine, given (as in proposition 2) "multiple wants," which "want" I decide to make my choice. That agency is one conception of free will: given all the conditions preceeding a moment wherein an individual determines a course of action, the choice that individual makes is at least partly the result of their capacity to "change the importance of a want." Or to use a different phrasing, free will is the capacity of an individual, by virtue of their volition, intellect, and cognitive abilities to decide that out of the total possibility space (or, if you prefer set theory, the set of all possible outcomes), X choice is the one that individual decides to make.

 

[Koldo]

However, if I have the capacity to consider, weigh, and contemplate the choices I have available at a particular time, then I am the agent responsible for "changing the importance of particular wants." I can determine, given (as in proposition 2) "multiple wants," which "want" I decide to make my choice. That agency is one conception of free will: given all the conditions preceeding a moment wherein an individual determines a course of action, the choice that individual makes is at least partly the result of their capacity to "change the importance of a want." Or to use a different phrasing, free will is the capacity of an individual, by virtue of their volition, intellect, and cognitive abilities to decide that out of the total possibility space (or, if you prefer set theory, the set of all possible outcomes), X choice is the one that individual decides to make.

In other words, you disagree with premise #1.
You are saying that it is possible to select which 'want' to act upon without a want.
That is, there is at least one kind of choice possible without a want.

Considering desired goals are rooted in the 'want', answer the following question:

What is the purpose of a choice if it is unrelated to a desired goal?

 

[Willamena]

Everyone,

Please reread what Copernicus has said here, it goes to heart of the free will problem. There are reasons (causes) we do what we do, and ultimately we can do no differently.

Self-determination doesn't deny reasons. We do things for reasons. The important part is that we do them, not some exterior causal agent.

 

[idav]

What is the purpose of a choice if it is unrelated to a desired goal?

Sometimes people do things that they don't really want to do. We are able to choose against the strongest influences, which is what makes us highly illogical creatures to say the least.

 

[Willamena]

If you accept the premise #1, then self-control in itself is an action that requires a want, because every conscious action requires a choice. Therefore, your decision to damage your body to satisfy your immediate desire was inevitable unless you wanted to control yourself. And then if you accept premise #4 as well you have to concede the point.

That's rationalization, though: you are introducing "want" to satisfy the picture you paint.

 

[Willamena]

I think that you oversimplify the nature of making choices when you try to reduce it to want to 'do X' and to 'not do X'. All choices involve a desired goal and satisfaction of that desire. What we face in reality is a large number of conflicting goals that we rank in terms of hierarchy of importance, where the strength of desire determines the ranking. In other words, every action you undertake voluntarily is compelled by the highest ranking goal among competing goals. You can do nothing other than what you most desire to do at any given moment. Choice is fully determined by that which satisfies the highest ranked desire. You can program a robot to exhibit that kind of "free will".

Are all goals desired, and are we motivated to satisfy all goals? If not, what role does volition play in advancing events towards a desired goal?