During the other thread,
@F1fan brought up a good point I'd like to expound on here.
First, we must play some catch-up for the point presented here to make sense.
The Problem of Evil, as most know, is an argument that points out it is inconsistent for an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent deity to create a world in which preventable suffering exists. In a couple of other posts, I have already gone over just how physical suffering is in fact logically preventable by such a being, so I shall not do that here (I will send links to those posts in the comments if asked).
However, one theodicy that is sometimes given as a response to this observation is that perhaps suffering exists for some benevolent reason that is just unknowable to humans. This was one of the arguments examined in the first Special Pleading and the Problem of Evil post I made: if this reasoning is accepted, it can lead to a trap in which the theodicist can never escape the reasoning, and the deity could literally do any wicked thing and the theodicist would still be able to explain it away: it is a position that's impossible to be evidenced out of, in other words; and in this instance, is a form of fallacious special pleading.
There is another objection to this theodicy that I think deserves attention: the "reasoning" works both ways.
For instance, if it's a fair theodicy to say that any suffering that exists is not evidence against benevolence because it could actually be benevolent in some unknowable way, then (if such reasoning is allowed) it would also be a fair theodicy to say that any good that exists is not evidence for benevolence because it could actually be malevolent in some unknowable way: after all, in neither case is any justification actually offered by anybody since the burden of evidence is shunted into the nebulous realm of agnosticism ("we can't know
how this is actually benevolent despite appearances to the contrary").
The person that accepts one but not the other is trying to have their cake and eat it, too: they both have the exact same lack of justification, they're both the same exact kind of special pleading. If a person doesn't accept the latter then they must be able to explain why they reject it, but not the former.
(I submit that we simply shouldn't allow special pleading in the first place and avoid such problems. If something has the appearance of malevolence, it is reasonable to accept it as exactly that [evidence of malevolence], until some justification is explicit and forthcoming for how it actually isn't).