Today I'd like to address a particular response often given to the Problem of Evil: that God has a good reason for allowing evil to occur, even if we're don't know what that reason is. This theodicy usually looks something like this:
This is a form of special pleading: normally when we see someone allowing suffering, we conclude that they're malevolent or at least criminally negligent. But in the case is God, a special case is made appealing to the fact that God is powerful and knowledgeable; so we can't conclude that God allowing the suffering is malevolent.
There are two objections to note here. One comes in the form of a parody:
Say that an extraterrestrial lands on planet earth and blasts a bunch of people seemingly at random with a ray gun. Inexplicably, the extraterrestrial agrees to stand trial for its actions. "I am immensely more powerful and more intelligent than you are," ET says to the judge and to the people of Earth. "You cannot say that my actions were malevolent. I have benevolent reasons for them that you couldn't possibly understand."
Intuitively, is it the case that we are incapable of arriving to the conclusion that what ET did is malevolent in a reasonable fashion? They may be more powerful and more intelligent than humans, but it seems to me as though we are still behaving reasonably by concluding the actions were malevolent in the complete absence of any evidence they were benevolent. Do you agree?[/quot]
The second objection is the consequence of allowing special pleading. Special pleading is a fallacy for a reason.
Let's say that our theodicist from the earlier conversation dies, and finds themselves in a throne room before God. God gets off His throne, whips out a holy flanged mace, and begins to mercilessly beat the everloving snot out of the theodicist.
"It's okay," the theodicist might think. "This is God, God is smarter and more powerful than me. I may not understand it, but God has a good, benevolent reason for doing this."
A day passes of beatings. A week. A month. "God must have a good reason for this," the theodicist continues to think. A year goes by. A decade. Millennia. Eons.
Is there ever a point where the theodicist can break out of their special pleading argument? Is there ever a stopping point where they may admit, "ok, maybe God is just malevolent?" No -- they can continue their special pleading argument infinitely. Can you see why that's a problem?