"Supernatural" and Naturalism

[rational experiences]

Father said my given prophecy warning many years ago came in a man song.

Given to me by a psychic man once a criminal but was reformed.

American pie.

I never quite understood what he meant yet he was also using mind coercion as an ability.

Hence I believe it important.
Said the "good ole boys" not wine makers drinking whisky and rye would be singing this will be the day that I die.

Reading the words human themed by psyche ability in many songs prove they own written warnings whilst the topic song and song meaning is not relative. A warning or used as a warning.

Subliminal coercive Ai therefore proves itself to be life's warning.

 

[Meow Mix]

Thanks for your informative posts in this thread, I think you've been advancing a very lucid and compelling argument here.

I would say that in terms of the universe's laws, a hypothetical 'omniscient, immaterial creator God' is a claim about something that allegedly lies outside whatever we can test, quantify or reproduce through experiment / observation or even testable consequences. This is why it's often termed 'supernatural', because even if we posit that something like an immaterial disembodied 'consciousness' which is not dependant on the neuronal firing and synapses of a brain could exist, we aren't going to be able to 'test' for it using our present instruments.

It's like accepting that the particle horizon will always act as a 'barrier' to how far our telescopes can peer, such that even if the 'multiverse hypothesis' of causally disconnected 'bubble' universes arising from eternal inflation were correct, sans a bubble collision we aren't going to be able to test for it - so it remains a good empirically based philosophical hypothesis, more than a theory within the ken of 'science', so to speak.

Granted, our understanding of what constitutes "physicality" and "the natural" has evolved quite considerably since the time of the Greek atomists of the classical era and the early pioneers of mechanistic science in the 18th century.

The "physical" order of things is now understood to be - and you can correct me here if I get this wrong - at its most irreducible and fundamental level, quantum fields that interact and are described by a wave-function. That's a bit more than just "atoms in a void" as the classical authors would've understood it. Anything under the laws of quantum mechanics and the laws of the Newtonian/general relativity model of physics are de facto "physical".

But what to make of the actual "laws" themselves?

These seem to be irreducible brute facts which somehow pre-exist. In some sense, the laws of physics aren't really part of the Universe, are they? Professor Sean Carroll, a cosmologist at Caltech, explains how: “There is a chain of explanations concerning things that happen in the universe, which ultimately reaches to the fundamental laws of nature and stops… at the end of the day the laws are what they are.”

As the South African cosmologist Professor George Ellis once noted: "They [the laws of nature] underlie the Universe because they control how matter behaves, but they are not themselves made of matter. Laws of physics aren't made of lead or uranium."

Physical processes and all material objects depend upon these laws, yet the laws themselves (at least in their high-temperature version) are not affected by any physical processes.

Thus back in the 1980s, the late Stephen Hawking tried to explain the Big Bang singularity (including the origin of time) in terms of the laws of quantum gravity (i.e. the reconciliation between quantum mechanics and general relativity that's still yet to be achieved). For this type of explanation to function, the laws need to be presupposed?

Laura Mersini-Houghton, professor of cosmology and theoretical physics at the University of north Carolina-Chapel Hill, argued as follows in a 2015 paper:


The Multiverse, the Initial Conditions, the Laws and, Mathematics by Laura Mersini-Houghton

I use implications of the work of Gödel and Cantor to demonstrate that limitations of mathematics may suggest it is contained within the realm of laws. I reason laws need to be in an independent realm from the universe, which is space and time independent.​

I came back, remembering I owed you a response. Yet the only response I can conceive of is just some form of agreement and appreciation.

I will try to add to the reasoning, then. I think it is clear that laws need to be independent of the physical universe because "laws" are really just limits: they are just ways that we express things' limitations. A thing is what it is because it isn't what it is not, it's limited. And we must agree that if there were no physical things, then that state of affairs (if it could be called that, I think it's fair) would still be limited: after all, it couldn't be the existence of some physical things if it's the absence of them all.

There's something to that limitation, a je ne sais quoi that some professional philosopher could probably better elucidate, that feels substantial. I want to colloquially put it like this: limitations are like rules, and those rules exist independently of physicality. This is why, when asked, I say that despite my nontheism and general skepticism, I am not an ontological materialist. (Though I would also not call myself a Platonist; as I think there are illogical problems with some conceptions of Platonic Forms. For instance, how can a Platonic triangle embody different kinds of triangles like isosceles and right triangles at the same time and in the same respect? I feel like this would be noncognitive nonsense.)

 

[atanu]

I've found myself posting this in response to a few things lately, so I thought I would type out a post that I could then later refer to (and discuss the topic here without going off-topic in other threads).

People will ask me if atheists are "naturalists," if I'm a "naturalist," and so on, and I'm never quite sure how I want to answer the question. This is because I'm not sure that the term is useful or even meaningful.

Why? Because the context of the term is in direct opposition to the term "supernatural." But what is the "supernatural?"

Consulting a dictionary tells us something like this:
"(of a manifestation or event) attributed to some force beyond scientific understanding or the laws of nature."

But what does this really mean, and how do we distinguish it? There are a lot of things that are "beyond scientific understanding" at any given time. For instance, if I were to go back in time with basically any piece of technology, it might appear supernatural to the inhabitants of that time: but we wouldn't say it's supernatural since we understand it.

What about "the laws of nature?" I'm not sure it's really fair to say that unknown things "break the laws of nature." It seems more fair to just say that if something seems to, then we didn't fully understand the laws of nature.

I am reminded by Feynman's description of how we sometimes learn about new physics. He likens it to a couple of people playing chess in the park while a third person (that does not know the rules of chess) observes.

Over time, the observer begins to pick up what they might call "The Laws of Chess": they learn that bishops move diagonally, rooks move laterally, and so on.

But every now and then, something strange might happen: someone might move two pieces at once, where the king moves more than one space, and two pieces pass through each other (castling)! Our observer might think, "the Laws of Chess have been broken!" But that's not the case: they just didn't fully understand the "laws" in the first place.

So, consider something like a ghost, if such a thing would exist. Ghosts still obey "laws:" they are ostensibly capable of doing some things but not others. Really, if such things exist (I doubt it, but if), then it only means that we had not previously fully understood "the laws of nature."

Whence, then, is there any room for something to be "supernatural?" It must mean something more than the definition provided above to have any use or meaning. And until it does, it will be a meaningless term, and "naturalism" will be too.

A great post. I have the following to say.

I will not use the term ‘supernatural’. If I am forced to use a word to denote that which always will be beyond ‘intellect’, I may use the term ‘pre-natural’.

…

 

[rational experiences]

Father said to our brother.

Cold gases own no image.
Burning gas owns no image.

Cold gases burnt gained transmitted image as the law voiding vacuum owned the presence of the natural light constant.

Machine used changed earth mass. Heavens gas came out of earth stone or space cooled pressured stone as replacement of gas burnt. No images in any of those natural bodies or natural states.

What you see is correct natural mass is holy first. It's image what you see.

Gases clear no image.

Therefore living observing as above became as below when science burnt earths stone gases.

The law voiding vacuum was taught stated to be the only owner of natural light.

Ignored by scientists burning our atmosphere nuclear converting earths gods gas spirits of stone.

 

[Magical Wand]

I reason laws need to be in an independent realm from the universe, which is space and time independent.

Well, this is just Platonism, which is extremely controversial in philosophy.

 

[Meow Mix]

Well, this is just Platonism, which is extremely controversial in philosophy.

It’d strictly be Platonism if it argued there are perfect Forms; but these aren’t self-consistent (e.g. the “triangle Form” must be both right and isosceles at the same time and in the same respect, which is all kinds of nonsense).

I think considering laws space and time independent is just called “not being an ontological materialist.”

 

[Magical Wand]

It’d strictly be Platonism if it argued there are perfect Forms; but these aren’t self-consistent (e.g. the “triangle Form” must be both right and isosceles at the same time and in the same respect, which is all kinds of nonsense).

I think considering laws space and time independent is just called “not being an ontological materialist.”

Yeah, I think you're right. But it is a kind of Platonism about the laws of physics. I mean, Plato postulated the Forms didn't exist in space and weren't made of matter. So, it seems Mersini is arguing something similar about the laws of physics.

By the way, my research has revealed to me that Plato is the guy who came up with the idea that our minds are immaterial (because only something immaterial can grasp immaterial forms, according to him). Augustine, then, incorporated this philosophy into his Christian theism. I argued this is another objection to the Kalam because this wasn't a prediction of theism; it was just a coincidence that this was postulated and the cause of the universe is allegedly immaterial.

 

[Meow Mix]

Yeah, I think you're right. But it is a kind of Platonism about the laws of physics. I mean, Plato postulated the Forms didn't exist in space and weren't made of matter. So, it seems Mersini is arguing something similar about the laws of physics.

You callin’ my boi @Vouthon Macaroni or whatever? (Sorry this is a dumb joke, I’m in the process of waking up)

Edit: actually I think we’re supposed to be enemies or something because he’s a dirty Scot, so Macaroni it is

By the way, my research has revealed to me that Plato is the guy who came up with the idea that our minds are immaterial (because only something immaterial can grasp immaterial forms, according to him). Augustine, then, incorporated this philosophy into his Christian theism. I argued this is another objection to the Kalam because this wasn't a

 

[Meow Mix]

Wow, I managed to delete the relevant part of the post, the part that seriously responded to the point. Sigh.

i’ll post when I’m awake and at a keyboard. Now I’m really annoyed.

 

[Meow Mix]

Yeah, I think you're right. But it is a kind of Platonism about the laws of physics. I mean, Plato postulated the Forms didn't exist in space and weren't made of matter. So, it seems Mersini is arguing something similar about the laws of physics.

By the way, my research has revealed to me that Plato is the guy who came up with the idea that our minds are immaterial (because only something immaterial can grasp immaterial forms, according to him). Augustine, then, incorporated this philosophy into his Christian theism. I argued this is another objection to the Kalam because this wasn't a prediction of theism; it was just a coincidence that this was postulated and the cause of the universe is allegedly immaterial.

A lot of my response to this got eaten, but I went back and copied my response to Vouthon because it applies here:

I will try to add to the reasoning, then. I think it is clear that laws need to be independent of the physical universe because "laws" are really just limits: they are just ways that we express things' limitations. A thing is what it is because it isn't what it is not, it's limited. And we must agree that if there were no physical things, then that state of affairs (if it could be called that, I think it's fair) would still be limited: after all, it couldn't be the existence of some physical things if it's the absence of them all.

There's something to that limitation, a je ne sais quoi that some professional philosopher could probably better elucidate, that feels substantial. I want to colloquially put it like this: limitations are like rules, and those rules exist independently of physicality. This is why, when asked, I say that despite my nontheism and general skepticism, I am not an ontological materialist. (Though I would also not call myself a Platonist; as I think there are illogical problems with some conceptions of Platonic Forms. For instance, how can a Platonic triangle embody different kinds of triangles like isosceles and right triangles at the same time and in the same respect? I feel like this would be noncognitive nonsense.)

 

[Magical Wand]

I think it is clear that laws need to be independent of the physical universe because "laws" are really just limits: they are just ways that we express things' limitations. A thing is what it is because it isn't what it is not, it's limited. And we must agree that if there were no physical things, then that state of affairs (if it could be called that, I think it's fair) would still be limited: after all, it couldn't be the existence of some physical things if it's the absence of them all. ... I want to colloquially put it like this: limitations are like rules, and those rules exist independently of physicality.

I would say, contra you, that a law is simply a regularity of nature instead of a "limit". This idea of limits (like rules or laws) seem to arise from the commonsensical concept of prescriptive laws and rules restricting/limiting what people can do. However, why should this concept extend to the dead/inanimate universe? Perhaps it has these regularities because that's just the way it is -- perhaps there is no thing outside of it to impose order. After all, the universe as a whole isn't intelligent to be able to obey rules/laws/restrictions. So, I just don't get your idea (btw, this is not your first thread directed to me in which you talk about your idea of limits).

 

[Meow Mix]

I would say, contra you, that a law is simply a regularity of nature instead of a "limit". This idea of limits (like rules or laws) seem to arise from the commonsensical concept of prescriptive laws and rules restricting/limiting what people can do. However, why should this concept extend to the dead/inanimate universe? Perhaps it has these regularities because that's just the way it is -- perhaps there is no thing outside of it to impose order. After all, the universe as a whole isn't intelligent to be able to obey rules/laws/restrictions. So, I just don't get your idea (btw, this is not your first thread directed to me in which you talk about your idea of limits).

I think you're not understanding my idea (or the way I'm phrasing it), because I'm not talking about something imposing it prescriptively: I am talking about things just being the way they are.

When I say there is a limitation, I mean that a basketball is a basketball because it isn't a horse, and it's unable to be a basketball and a horse at the same time and in the same respect because, since it's a baseketball and not that, it can't be that: it's limited. It's just the way that it is.

But there's substance to this fact: materiality doesn't seem to be required for there to exist limits of this kind. If we consider a possible world with no material things, it seems as though this world would have limits (it would not have material things: it has a definable feature). Limits are about properties and absences of properties; they don't require minds to exist to think about them to exist.

I would say there is something about reality that just includes limits, but I'm not sure that language is right: it may be that limits are what reality is, what it means to be real.

 

[Magical Wand]

I think you're not understanding my idea (or the way I'm phrasing it), because I'm not talking about something imposing it prescriptively: I am talking about things just being the way they are.

When I say there is a limitation, I mean that a basketball is a basketball because it isn't a horse, and it's unable to be a basketball and a horse at the same time and in the same respect because, since it's a baseketball and not that, it can't be that: it's limited. It's just the way that it is.

But there's substance to this fact: materiality doesn't seem to be required for there to exist limits of this kind. If we consider a possible world with no material things, it seems as though this world would have limits (it would not have material things: it has a definable feature). Limits are about properties and absences of properties; they don't require minds to exist to think about them to exist.

I would say there is something about reality that just includes limits, but I'm not sure that language is right: it may be that limits are what reality is, what it means to be real.

I see. I'll have to think more about it to form an educated opinion on the subject.