The difference between Human and animal

[Zosimus]

So, let's test it.

What is the (Bayesian) probability that if I throw a standard dice (or die) I do not get 25? How much would you bet? Is the probability limited by the amount of money in circulation today?

And by the way: P(X)= ( if X, then X ) is a tautology. It is true, no matter what, for every X. One of the simplest. Therefore, if X is true, for sure X is true. All you need to do to see that, if you don't already, is to make a tiny decision table and check it out yourself.

Therefore, if it is true that superman exists, then it is true that superman exists. Tautologically. don't you think so?

Ciao

- viole

Yes, it IS true that:

If X then X is a tautology.

However, one cannot reason:

If X, then X
Therefore X.

If God exists, then God exists does NOT logically prove that God exists.
Get this through your thick skull.

 

[viole]

Yes, it IS true that:

If X then X is a tautology.

However, one cannot reason:

If X, then X
Therefore X.

If God exists, then God exists does NOT logically prove that God exists.
Get this through your thick skull.

You are losing you cool. I would too in your situation. Probably

And who said what you claim? Please do not put words in my mouth. You are already inventing stuff as you go along, so I would not advise to do that when you can easily be proven wrong.

I never said that if superman exists then superman exists: therefore superman exists. You must have dreamed that. Or you have serious comprehension problems yourself.

I said: if superman exists, then superman exists. Period. And under this precondition, and only under this predicondition, the probability of superman existing is one. Which is a far cry from the probability of superman existing being one (without preconditions). Or from the claim that therefore the (prior) probability of superman existing is one. Which I never made, pending your counter evidence. Or data. Or whatever.

I assume here that you understand the difference between conditional probability and prior porobability.

By the way, you said it was zero (I can prove that) both for superman and no creation, under said preconditions. It is black on white on this thread.

So, my question to you is:

Can you have probability zero in Bayesian statistics? You said (I can prove that as well) that probability one does not exist in Bayesian statistics. So, what about zero?

Does it indeed exist, or did you contradict yourself? Again.

Ciao

- viole

 

[viole]

As I have already said, this is the STANDARD for a priori probability, a number that is needed in order to calculate the a posteriori probability after an experiment is done. Thus, the principle of maximum entropy is a good method for developing a starting probability distribution, that is to say, the one that reflects the least degree of knowledge about something. Since we have no knowledge about God, when presented with the possibilities that God is the God of the Bible of God is a giant invisible turtle, we should not assume information that we do not have. We should adopt indifference towards each possibility and proceed to refine our subjective probabilities over time as greater knowledge and evidence becomes available.

This is like the 5th time that I've said this to you.
http://philpapers.org/archive/RINTPO-3.pdf

Well, since your answer is equivalent to sjdhcbjshdbvjhsfbv, you can repeat it ad infinitum without answering my simple question. Since I am learning from your knowledge in this area, I want to be sure that I understood what you said.

It is very simple. It just requires two bits of information.

Do you agree that the new probabilities are now 1/4? [yes/no/maybe]

Ciao

- viole

 

[Zosimus]

You are losing you cool. I would too in your situation. Probably

And who said what you claim? Please do not put words in my mouth. You are already inventing stuff as you go along, so I would not advise to do that when you can easily be proven wrong.

I never said that if superman exists then superman exists: therefore superman exists. You must have dreamed that. Or you have serious comprehension problems yourself.

I said: if superman exists, then superman exists. Period. And under this precondition, and only under this predicondition, the probability of superman existing is one. Which is a far cry from the probability of superman existing being one (without preconditions). Or from the claim that therefore the (prior) probability of superman existing is one. Which I never made, pending your counter evidence. Or data. Or whatever.

By the way, you said it was zero (I can prove that) both for superman and no creation, under said preconditions. It is black on white on this thread.

So, my question to you is:

Can you have probability zero in Bayesian statistics? You said (I can prove that as well) that probability one does not exist in Bayesian statistics. So, what about zero?

Does it indeed exist, or did you contradict yourself? Again.

Ciao

- viole

No, the probability of 1 is reserved for necessary truths. Additionally, the sentence:

"If Superman exists, then Superman exists" means:

Let P = Superman
~P OR (P AND P)

So the statement is true if Superman does not exist.

So no, just making the statement that Superman exists does not give one a probability of 1. The probability of 1 is reserved for necessary truths, and Superman is not a necessary truth.

 

[viole]

No, the probability of 1 is reserved for necessary truths. Additionally, the sentence:

"If Superman exists, then Superman exists" means:

Let P = Superman
~P OR (P AND P)

So the statement is true if Superman does not exist.

So no, just making the statement that Superman exists does not give one a probability of 1. The probability of 1 is reserved for necessary truths, and Superman is not a necessary truth.

You still don't get it. Do you?

i never concluded that superman is a necessary truth. I said that if superman exists, then superman is necessarily true. It is not a statement, it is a precondition. It is a restriction of the search set. I am not saying that the probability of the claim "if superman exists then superman exists" is one. i am sayng that if the precondition is true, then the conclusion is necessarility true. And necessarily true means probability = 1. Not zero. Not even remotely zero.

If dice have only six faces numbered one to six, then the probability of getting a number between 1 and six is one. ONE. Not zero. If they are numbered from 5 to 10 then the probability of getting a number between 5 and 10 is one. ONE. That does not prove that the probability that dice are numbered from 5 to 10 is one. obviously.

Is that really so difficult?

Ciao

- viole

 

[Zosimus]

You still don't get it. Do you?

i never concluded that superman is a necessary truth. I said that if superman exists, then superman is necessarily true. It is not a statement, it is a precondition. It is a restriction of the search set. I am not saying that the probability of the claim "if superman exists then superman exists" is one. i am sayng that if the precondition is true, then the conclusion is necessarility true. And necessarily true means probability = 1. Not zero. Not even remotely zero.

If dice have only six faces numbered one to six, then the probability of getting a number between 1 and six is one. ONE. Not zero. If they are numbered from 5 to 10 then the probability of getting a number between 5 and 10 is one. ONE. That does not prove that the probability that dice are numbered from 5 to 10 is one. obviously.

Is that really so difficult?

Ciao

- viole

The probability is not 1. Conclusive Reasons are required for that. The probability of 1 is reserved for necessary truths, and Superman is not a necessary truth. Even the claim that a die cannot roll 7 is not a necessary truth.

 

[viole]

The probability is not 1. Conclusive Reasons are required for that. The probability of 1 is reserved for necessary truths, and Superman is not a necessary truth. Even the claim that a die cannot roll 7 is not a necessary truth.

Ha. Do you think it can roll 7?

How much money would you bet that it does?

If all thought like you I could stop working right now. Lol.

Ciao

- viole

 

[Zosimus]

Ha. Do you think it can roll 7?

How much money would you bet that it does?

If all thought like you I could stop working right now. Lol.

Ciao

- viole

 

[viole]

Haha. I am talking of a standard die.

How much would you bet?

Ciao

- viole

 

[Zosimus]

Haha. I am talking of a standard die.

How much would you bet?

Ciao

- viole

That's not what you said, actually. You said:

"If dice have only six faces numbered one to six, then the probability of getting a number between 1 and six is one. ONE. Not zero. If they are numbered from 5 to 10 then the probability of getting a number between 5 and 10 is one. ONE. That does not prove that the probability that dice are numbered from 5 to 10 is one. obviously."

First of all, DICE is plural. So if you throw some DICE I have no idea what numbers you might get. If it's two DICE then you might easily throw a 7.

Second, as I've already stated and linked you to, probabilities of 1 are reserved for LOGICAL TRUTHS. In fact, as pointed out here there are people who rationally argue that even LOGICAL TRUTHS can be assigned a value less than 1 with no problem of coherence.

If you don't like that, don't argue with me. I didn't invent the system. I don't even agree with the system. However, that is the system.

 

[viole]

That's not what you said, actually. You said:

"If dice have only six faces numbered one to six, then the probability of getting a number between 1 and six is one. ONE. Not zero. If they are numbered from 5 to 10 then the probability of getting a number between 5 and 10 is one. ONE. That does not prove that the probability that dice are numbered from 5 to 10 is one. obviously."

First of all, DICE is plural. So if you throw some DICE I have no idea what numbers you might get. If it's two DICE then you might easily throw a 7.

Second, as I've already stated and linked you to, probabilities of 1 are reserved for LOGICAL TRUTHS. In fact, as pointed out here there are people who rationally argue that even LOGICAL TRUTHS can be assigned a value less than 1 with no problem of coherence.

If you don't like that, don't argue with me. I didn't invent the system. I don't even agree with the system. However, that is the system.

Well, according to my sources you can use dice also for the singular, nowadays. Please note that I mark any remark on my English as a clear sign that you try desperately to divert attention from that little corner you find yourself in.

So, let's make it simple and unambiguous.

If you take a standard die, or dice or whatever...You know, the little cube with six faces numbered from 1 to 6:

How much would you bet that by throwing it, you get 7. Or 25. Or pi?

How much?

Ciao

- viole

 

[Zosimus]

Well, according to my sources you can use dice also for the singular, nowadays. Please note that I mark any remark on my English as a clear sign that you try desperately to divert attention from that little corner you find yourself in.

So, let's make it simple and unambiguous.

If you take a standard die, or dice or whatever...You know, the little cube with six faces numbered from 1 to 6:

How much would you bet that by throwing it, you get 7. Or 25. Or pi?

How much?

Ciao

- viole

First of all, I don't bet at all. So I wouldn't be willing to bet anything.

Second, the Dutch Book Argument is designed as a mental experiment to illustrate what is rationally required of you not an argument that anyone who understands the system must automatically go bankrupt.

As previously mentioned, For there is a good sense in which you may be susceptible to sure losses without any irrationality on your part. For example, it may be rational of you, and even rationally required of you, to be less than certain of various necessary a posteriori truths—that Hesperus is Phosphorus, that water is H20, and so on—and yet bets on the falsehood of these propositions are (metaphysically) guaranteed to lose. Some sure losses are not at all irrational; in §4 we will look more closely at which are putatively the irrational ones.

That's the system that underpins science. That's how science works. Don't blame me for it.

 

[viole]

First of all, I don't bet at all. So I wouldn't be willing to bet anything.

Second, the Dutch Book Argument is designed as a mental experiment to illustrate what is rationally required of you not an argument that anyone who understands the system must automatically go bankrupt.

As previously mentioned, For there is a good sense in which you may be susceptible to sure losses without any irrationality on your part. For example, it may be rational of you, and even rationally required of you, to be less than certain of various necessary a posteriori truths—that Hesperus is Phosphorus, that water is H20, and so on—and yet bets on the falsehood of these propositions are (metaphysically) guaranteed to lose. Some sure losses are not at all irrational; in §4 we will look more closely at which are putatively the irrational ones.

That's the system that underpins science. That's how science works. Don't blame me for it.

Yeah. You might be right after all.

i have been visiting the CERN in Geneva recently.

All the scientists, and sponsors (including the European Community), there are losing their sleep because of what is written in the Dutch Book or because of what chair philosophers do in their free time. I can tell.

Ciao

- viole

 

[Zosimus]

Yeah. You might be right after all.

i have been visiting the CERN in Geneva recently.

All the scientists, and sponsors (including the European Community), there are losing their sleep because of what is written in the Dutch Book or because of what chair philosophers do in their free time. I can tell.

Ciao

- viole

All right, Viole. Let's play a game. You're certain that a die, when rolled, will surely land between 1 and 6 inclusive. You are willing to assign a probability of 1 to that. So here's the thing. Let's agree that I'll bet 0, and you'll bet $1,000 on every roll of the die.

So every time you roll that die and it comes up between 1 and 6, no money changes hands. However, should the die ever roll something other than 1-6, you'll pay me $1,000. Is that fair?

If you say yes, then remember... anytime the die falls into a crack and doesn't roll a 1-6 because it's on a point, you owe me $1,000. If a stray bullet comes through destroying the die, you owe me $1,000. Any strange, unpredicted event that prevents the die from falling right and showing a number 1-6 means that you're willing to pay me $1,000.

Do you consider that rational? Are you willing to play the game?

 

[viole]

All right, Viole. Let's play a game. You're certain that a die, when rolled, will surely land between 1 and 6 inclusive. You are willing to assign a probability of 1 to that. So here's the thing. Let's agree that I'll bet 0, and you'll bet $1,000 on every roll of the die.

So every time you roll that die and it comes up between 1 and 6, no money changes hands. However, should the die ever roll something other than 1-6, you'll pay me $1,000. Is that fair?

If you say yes, then remember... anytime the die falls into a crack and doesn't roll a 1-6 because it's on a point, you owe me $1,000. If a stray bullet comes through destroying the die, you owe me $1,000. Any strange, unpredicted event that prevents the die from falling right and showing a number 1-6 means that you're willing to pay me $1,000.

Do you consider that rational? Are you willing to play the game?

Mmh. Nope. That is not my original bet. You should give more attention to what I write.

The bet is: the die will not show 7, 25 or pi.

And betting zero, is not acceptable obviously, in your scenario. I am rational to accept that only if your probability of winning is zero. No net return for both of us. . You should really read your Dutch book and understand it.

Ciao

- viole

 

[Zosimus]

Mmh. Nope. That is not my original bet. You should give more attention to what I write.

The bet is: the die will not show 7, 25 or pi.

And betting zero, is not acceptable obviously, in your scenario. I am rational to accept that only if your probability of winning is zero. No net return for both of us. . You should really read your Dutch book and understand it.

Ciao

- viole

You're the one who has claimed to have a P(H) = 1 not I.

 

[viole]

You're the one who has claimed to have a P(H) = 1 not I.

Yes, and?

Look. I never read your Dutch book, but it is perfectly clear in my mind what it says.

What it says is: the probability of event X is a function of the money that TWO rational players would be ready to bet. And when are two players rational? When the expected win for each of them is zero. Why? Bacause if one has a net expected loss, then he was not rational to start with.

But that does not rule out that there are events with probability one. It just entails that the two players, if rational, will play: one an unlimited amount of money (the one playing for the occurence of the event), and the other zero money.

And everythink is hunky dory. Because the expected return is still zero for each of them, and they both guessed the right probability. Being rational and so.

Everything under the assumption that playing such boring bets is rational, of course

Ciao

- viole

 

[Zosimus]

Yes, and?

Look. I never read your Dutch book, but it is perfectly clear in my mind what it says.

What it says is: the probability of event X is a function of the money that TWO rational players would be ready to bet. And when are two players rational? When the expected win for each of them is zero. Why? Bacause if one has a net expected loss, then he was not rational to start with.

But that does not rule out that there are events with probability one. It just entails that the two players, if rational, will play: one an unlimited amount of money (the one playing for the occurence of the event), and the other zero money.

And everythink is hunky dory. Because the expected return is still zero for each of them, and they both guessed the right probability. Being rational and so.

Everything under the assumption that playing such boring bets is rational, of course

Ciao

- viole

Yes and, of course, that's the reason that it is irrational to have a P(H) of 1 for anything. I mean, even if you're staring at God in a burning bush, he's saying, "Moses take off your shoes" and you've pinched yourself repeatedly, there's still got to be some part of you that doubts.

 

[viole]

Yes and, of course, that's the reason that it is irrational to have a P(H) of 1 for anything. I mean, even if you're staring at God in a burning bush, he's saying, "Moses take off your shoes" and you've pinched yourself repeatedly, there's still got to be some part of you that doubts.

I don't think that having probability one is influenced by our rationality or lack thereof.

And this is why I now think that defining "being rational" in order to assess what the real probability is, is a circular argument, or an argument that reduces to frequentism.

If it is true that the objective probability is defined by the zero sum game played by two rational players, how do we, or they, know that they are rational if we/they do not know already the probability of what they are betting on? And how do we know that it is really a zero sum game? How many tries should we accept?

Ciao

- viole

 

[Zosimus]

I don't think that having probability one is influenced by our rationality or lack thereof.

And this is why I now think that defining "being rational" in order to assess what the real probability is, is a circular argument, or an argument that reduces to frequentism.

If it is true that the objective probability is defined by the zero sum game played by two rational players, how do we, or they, know that they are rational if we/they do not know already the probability of what they are betting on? And how do we know that it is really a zero sum game? How many tries should we accept?

Ciao

- viole

The point that you are missing is that these rules are NORMATIVE. We're not describing how people actually do things. We're saying that there are sets of standards about how these things should be done. In reality, someone who needs to set an a priori probability for something will just make up a number and plug it in. Yet the a priori probability that a Christian will use will be radically different from that selected by an atheist. This is the problem of the priors, and it's one of the reasons I reject Bayesian epistemology as a solution to the logical shortcomings of the scientific method.