The Problem of Foreknowledge

[Willamena]

(a.k.a. Beating a Dead Horse)

The problem of God's foreknowledge vs. Man's free will was dealt with by past philosophers by specifying the distinction between knowledge and prediction in regards to truth, and holding that foreknowledge, even God's, is prediction.

Prior knowledge of an action seems incompatible with it being a free action. If I know that you will finish reading this article tomorrow, then you will finish tomorrow (because knowledge implies truth). But that means you will finish the article even if you resolve not to. After all, given that you will finish, nothing can stop you from finishing. So if I know that you will finish reading this article tomorrow, you are not free to do otherwise.

Maybe all of your reading is compulsory. If God exists, then he knows everything. So the threat to freedom becomes total for the theist. The problem of divine foreknowledge insinuates that theism precludes morality.

In response to the apparent conflict between freedom and foreknowledge, medieval philosophers denied that future contingent propositions have a truth-value. They took themselves to be extending a solution Aristotle discusses in De Interpretatione to the problem of logical fatalism. According to this truth-value gap approach, ‘You will finish this article tomorrow’ is not true now. The prediction will become true tomorrow. God's omniscience only requires that He knows every true proposition. God will know ‘You will finish this article tomorrow’ as soon it becomes true – but not before.

Epistemic Paradoxes (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Do you agree with this assessment? Why or why not?

 

[Kilgore Trout]

(a.k.a. Beating a Dead Horse)

The problem of God's foreknowledge vs. Man's free will was dealt with by past philosophers by specifying the distinction between knowledge and prediction in regards to truth, and holding that foreknowledge, even God's, is prediction.


Do you agree with this assessment? Why or why not?

If people are going to try and perform mental gymnastics, they might want to limber up a bit, at the very least. Knowing something is true, once it is true, doesn't require, imply, or relate to foreknowledge in any way. It doesn't take a god to know I've finished the article once I've finished it.

 

[Draka]

(a.k.a. Beating a Dead Horse)

The problem of God's foreknowledge vs. Man's free will was dealt with by past philosophers by specifying the distinction between knowledge and prediction in regards to truth, and holding that foreknowledge, even God's, is prediction.


Do you agree with this assessment? Why or why not?

No, on two fronts. To the last point I very much agree with this:

If people are going to try and perform mental gymnastics, they might want to limber up a bit, at the very least. Knowing something is true, once it is true, doesn't require, imply, or relate to foreknowledge in any way. It doesn't take a god to know I've finished the article once I've finished it.

And on the point about:

If God exists, then he knows everything. So the threat to freedom becomes total for the theist. The problem of divine foreknowledge insinuates that theism precludes morality.

This is faulty in that it presumes that all theists have a concept of deity which has foreknowledge or omniscience in the first place. This requires humanizing the concept of deity which not all theists do. It is a faulty generalization.

 

[Me Myself]

This is faulty in that it presumes that all theists have a concept of deity which has foreknowledge or omniscience in the first place. This requires humanizing the concept of deity which not all theists do. It is a faulty generalization.

Well, to be fair capital "G" God almost always knows everything I believe, be of the religious tradition it may be. There should be exceptions I would assume, but I would assume there would be little of them.

 

[Willamena]

This is faulty in that it presumes that all theists have a concept of deity which has foreknowledge or omniscience in the first place. This requires humanizing the concept of deity which not all theists do. It is a faulty generalization.

Nah, it just presumes that "problem of God's foreknowledge vs. Man's free will" has a concept of deity that's omniscient.

 

[Draka]

Well, to be fair capital "G" God almost always knows everything I believe, be of the religious tradition it may be. There should be exceptions I would assume, but I would assume there would be little of them.

whether or not someone capitalizes god really depends on the person and the belief, however that's not my point. It clearly said "theists" and "theism". Not "Christians" or "Abrahamic religion followers" or the like. Just...theists.

 

[Me Myself]

whether or not someone capitalizes god really depends on the person and the belief, however that's not my point. It clearly said "theists" and "theism". Not "Christians" or "Abrahamic religion followers" or the like. Just...theists.

NOt ony christians nor abrahamic religions followers capitalize "G"od.

As far as I know, hinduism is big in the predestination part and wheter your ishwara ("G" od) is Shiva, Krishna, etc, it is likely for the devotee to think of him as all knowing and all pervading. As such, most of the capitalization sof the term God do imply a foreknowledge. In any case, we get semantic.

I think most of us know what the OP means

 

[Draka]

NOt ony christians nor abrahamic religions followers capitalize "G"od.

As far as I know, hinduism is big in the predestination part and wheter your ishwara ("G" od) is Shiva, Krishna, etc, it is likely for the devotee to think of him as all knowing and all pervading. As such, most of the capitalization sof the term God do imply a foreknowledge. In any case, we get semantic.

I think most of us know what the OP means

I think we're just zeroing in on two different things. I couldn't care less about whether god was capitalized or not. My issue is with using the word "theists" and saying "theism" in general.

There is a lot of assuming in the statement as I read it. I honestly couldn't be sure of exactly what the person really meant who made the statement without exact specifics. However, as it is written, I simply cannot agree with it.

 

[Willamena]

whether or not someone capitalizes god really depends on the person and the belief, however that's not my point. It clearly said "theists" and "theism". Not "Christians" or "Abrahamic religion followers" or the like. Just...theists.

Nah, it says "...the theist." The theist (treated as objectively as the argument) has a side in this argument --it doesn't have to be every theist, nor any particular theist. "The theist" is simply the person, partaking of this argument, who believes in god.

If god (or God) "knows" in regards to a proposition, then the implication is that what will happen is true, because knowledge is "justified true belief." If the proposition is that "god knows the future," it's the same as saying it's true that it will happen that way.

The article says that for the person who believes in god in this way and partakes of this argument, the threat to his freedom is total --logically, there can be no "free will" for him.

 

[Riverwolf]

The way I see it, free will exists as far as we're concerned. Even if it is just an illusion (Maya, as we say) ultimately, well, as a Shavia panentheistic Hindu, I believe that the entire transitory universe is ultimately Maya, anyway. Within the confines of that Maya, free will exists. That's good enough for us to operate our societies under it.

 

[Draka]

Nah, it says "...the theist." The theist (treated as objectively as the argument) has a side in this argument --it doesn't have to be every theist, nor any particular theist. "The theist" is simply the person, partaking of this argument, who believes in god.

If god (or God) "knows" in regards to a proposition, then the implication is that what will happen is true, because knowledge is "justified true belief." If the proposition is that "god knows the future," it's the same as saying it's true that it will happen that way.

The article says that for the person who believes in god in this way and partakes of this argument, the threat to his freedom is total --logically, there can be no "free will for him.

Read it how you want I guess. I saw this: "The problem of divine foreknowledge insinuates that theism precludes morality." I still say that it is generalization and it is faulty. It needs to be specific if it is meant to be specific and if it isn't...it is flat out wrong.

As to the last point, I believe supposedly the main crutch point, KT is right.

 

[Willamena]

Read it how you want I guess. I saw this: "The problem of divine foreknowledge insinuates that theism precludes morality." I still say that it is generalization and it is faulty. It needs to be specific if it is meant to be specific and if it isn't...it is flat out wrong.

"Theism" being simply the belief in god held by the theist. The argument is being treated objectively.

As to the last point, I believe supposedly the main crutch point, KT is right.

The "main crutch point" is that a counter-argument has been raised against the argument that god has absolute knowledge, and asks if you agree that the counter-argument is valid. Is the distinction between prediction and knowledge enough to counter this argument and restore a concept of "free will"?

 

[Me Myself]

"Theism" being simply the belief in god held by the theist. The argument is being treated objectively.

I am surprised, you may actually be confused?

to clarify foreknowledge is not an intrinsic assumption of every form of theism.

The "main crutch point" is that a counter-argument has been raised against the argument that god has absolute knowledge, and asks if you agree that the counter-argument is valid. Is the distinction between prediction and knowledge enough to counter this argument and restore a concept of "free will"?

this counter argument basicaly says that God doesn´t know the future? While I wouldn´t believe that in itself to be true, I would say if such is the argument it would "poetically" solve the "problem" of non free will.

Of course, there really is no free will, and as someone who believes that you can completely know every moment if you completely know this moment I would deem such posture fundamentally incorrect. But that seems to be up for another kind of debate. So ultimately:

Yes, I do believe that if you say God doesn´t know the future and there is no perfectly accurate prediction of it then the notion of free will is not directly affectd by this.

 

[Willamena]

I am surprised, you may actually be confused?

to clarify foreknowledge is not an intrinsic assumption of every form of theism.

It doesn't have to be. It only has to be practiced by "the theist."

this counter argument basicaly says that God doesn´t know the future? While I wouldn´t believe that in itself to be true, I would say if such is the argument it would "poetically" solve the "problem" of non free will.

Of course, there really is no free will, and as someone who believes that you can completely know every moment if you completely know this moment I would deem such posture fundamentally incorrect. But that seems to be up for another kind of debate. So ultimately:

Yes, I do believe that if you say God doesn´t know the future and there is no perfectly accurate prediction of it then the notion of free will is not directly affectd by this.

Thank you. Can there be a "perfectly accurate prediction" or would that be "knowledge"?

 

[idav]

Do you agree with this assessment? Why or why not?

I agree with god knowing every possible proposition but this would also entail knowing which propositions would be taken. In this way god has the ability to influence which course will be taken.

 

[Kilgore Trout]

Thank you. Can there be a "perfectly accurate prediction" or would that be "knowledge"?

Does the predictor know their prediction will come true?

Does the predictor know that their predictions always come true?

 

[Willamena]

Does the predictor know their prediction will come true?

Does the predictor know that their predictions always come true?

Regardless of "what the predictor knows," we are talking about prediction, i.e. is accuracy enough to identify prediction with knowledge?

 

[Kilgore Trout]

Regardless of "what the predictor knows," we are talking about prediction, i.e. is accuracy enough to identify prediction with knowledge?

Yes, we are talking about what the predictor knows about his predictions. If you want to know whether it can be called knowledge, you have to identify whether the predictor knows that his prediction will come true. If he knows this prediction will come true, or if his predictions will always come true, then you can clearly say that the prediction is the same as knowledge.

 

[Willamena]

Yes, we are talking about what the predictor knows about his predictions.

Well, I'm not.

If you want to know whether it can be called knowledge, you have to identify whether the predictor knows that his prediction will come true.

No; you just have to know that it is true.

If he knows this prediction will come true, or if his predictions will always come true, then you can clearly say that the prediction is the same as knowledge.

His knowing that his prediction will come true doesn't change the fact that it is true. And if it is true, it's knowledge. The question is, is it still prediction?

 

[Kilgore Trout]

No; you just have to know that it is true.

Right, if anyone knows that the prediction will come true, then it is knowledge.

His knowing that his prediction will come true does change the fact that it is true. And if it is true, it's knowledge. The question is, is it still prediction?

Not in any meaningful sense. At least, it offers less useful information about its nature, than by calling it knowledge.