I have seen centuries of attempts to point out these glaring flaws to no avail. The argument keeps marching along from generation to generation without any loss of fidelity while it's challenges do not. I find most of these counter arguments use the grey areas of ambiguity and uncertainty which are minimal in reality but are amplified through the roof by cognitive dissonance to make up for the fact that no good argument actually exists. However do your worst and let's see what you got.
Now here is William Lane Craig’s Leibnizian formulation of the cosmological argument:
1. Every contingent thing has an explanation of its existence.
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence that explanation will be a transcendent, personal being.
3. The universe is a contingent thing
4. Therefore the universe has an explanation of its existence. (From 1, 3)
5. Therefore, the explanation of the universe is a transcendent, personal being.
(From 2, 4)
Comments:
Premise 1. “Every contingent thing has an explanation of its existence.”
We can certainly agree that things in the universe appear to have a causal explanation, that is to say where two events are observed to be linked by association as in whenever B then A, (although that does not demonstrate causal necessity).
Premise 2. “The universe has an explanation for its existence.”
If the universe as a whole is explained by a transcendent, conscious, personal being, then that being must by the same token have a reason or explanation to explain itself in terms of explaining the world.
Premise 3. “The universe is a contingent thing.”
This is not disputed.
Premise 4. “Therefore the universe has a beginning.”
This is in line with current cosmological thinking and is not disputed.
Premise 5: “Therefore the explanation of the universe is a transcendent, personal being”
In the case of a transcendent, personal being there is nothing to explain contingent existence on terms that don't run to a contradiction. Therefore there is no transcendent, personal cause.
And here is how I explain that conclusion:
The first premise, if true, can only be applied within the world. In that first premise Craig is referring to the argument from contingency, which very roughly is that anything that exists, but need not exist, will only be accounted for by something that does exist and for which there is no possibility of its non-existence; it will therefore necessarily exist. But of course that argument is itself a contingent statement. A thing can exist contingently without having to answer to a supposed necessarily existing thing, and with no contradiction implied. But anyway to say every contingent thing has an explanation for its existence can only be argued by inference from the contingent world! So the argument begins by begging the question.
However, it is true that things in worldly existence can be shown to have an explanation in terms of some other thing, so then we presume to extend this principle to things that can’t be shown to exist. So we say if things in the world have a reason or explanation, then the world itself must have a reason or explanation for being what it is. But if there is a reason or explanation for the world attributable to an intelligent personal being then that being must by the same token have a reason or explanation to explain itself in terms of explaining the world.
Leibniz said: "No fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise". According to the Argument from Contingency and the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) nothing happens by chance and a thing that doesn’t have to exist but does exist needs a reason for its existence. And this sufficient reason or explanation he said will be God, an intelligent being that freely chose to bring the world into existence. Perhaps Leibniz overstates the principle by appealing to a necessary cause, but his argument backfires on him for it is immediately evident that to say an intelligent, personal being freely choose to bring the world into existence is to assign a purpose to the act of creation, which must be the case whether or not the PSR is a criterion of truth. If, as it is argued in classical theism, God is a personal conscious being, omniscient and omnipresent, then no act of creation happens by accident, chance, or adventitiously but only by his will alone.
The world isn’t a necessary aspect of God, and while God’s eternal existence doesn’t demand an explanation, the finite world of creatures does require an explanation or a reason for its creation. And according to Christian theism, God the creator wants a personal relationship with his creation, and logically there can only be one agent that can profit or gain from this arrangement – and it isn’t the formerly non-existent creatures! And this is seemingly confirmed for us by theist philosopher William Lane Craig in his debate with Peter Millican when he speaks of “God bringing people into a relationship with himself, forever.” I think it is clear from that statement that an eternally existent God requires something he does not already have, which is an immediate contradiction even before we consider the implied emotional content, for by no amount of sophistry can it be argued that the greatest conceivable being is at the same time, or at anytime, not wholly entire or in some way incomplete. And it is utterly absurd even to think of created beings gratifying the needs or emotional requirements of the Supreme Creator.
So the contradiction becomes evident because there is a supposed Supreme Being, who, by very definition of the term, is a complete entity that wants for nothing and yet intentionally brought the world of creatures into being. But since nothing existed prior to the act of creation there was nothing that could profit, gain, or benefit from the act other than God himself. Therefore if God intentionally created the world with a purpose, that could only be for his own sake or advantage (as described above). But as the Supreme Being is a concept already augmented without limit an act of creation is purposeless, which is absurd.
There are only the two possibilities mentioned above, one contradicts the concept of a self-sufficient Supreme Being (i.e. that he has needs or desires), and the other is logically absurd for it amounts to saying a no-thing is something.
Now all the above could be easily countered by arguing that the deity isn’t supreme in all things, which would sit perfectly well with what we find in experience. But then of course there would no difference between a fallible God and no God at all.
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