The Treaty of Versailles and the path to WW2

[lewisnotmiller]

Ok...a scene setter first.
In another thread, the following was posted, and it seemed worthy of it's own thread;

While I do agree with you very much in essence, and certainly applaud your stance on Hitler as opposed to Sterling, I would suggest that I am not quite sure that Germany was fated as a result of Versailles to become a fascist nationalist state, and certainly not to the extremity of National Socialism.

Nationalism yes, imperialism yes but a person looking at the TREATY objectively in 1919 would likely have considered the possibility of a resurgence of a republican version of Wilhelmine Germany rather than the ideological, biologically racist and totalitarian state that Germany became.

Had Hitler not founded National Socialism and become a politician, I believe that an authoritarian right-wing nationalist, along the lines of Hugenberg's DNVP, would have become Chancellor of Germany in the early to mid-thirties.

Versailles was hard on Germany, however that is to be expected when one loses a war, especially in the early 20th century before the foundation of the UN and international conventions. By the standards of the time it was not excessively harsh. The Germans were forced to disarm, the Rhineland was occupied by Allied troops, the war clause lay sole responsibility for the war on Germany, she was stripped of her colonies, France occupied and took the proceeds from the coal region bordering her and she had to pay reparations totalling nearly £300 billion in today's money.

Nonetheless Germany had lost the war and when France lost to Germany in the Franco-Prussian wars of the 19th century, Germany treated France a lot harsher. The new Germany had taken Alsace and Lorraine from France at the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, as well as imposing a huge financial indemnity on a defeated France. As Niall Ferguson points out, post WW1 Weimar Germany was able to afford the Reparation repayments, if only they had had the political will to pay up on time and in full and if the Great Depression had not occurred in 1929. Gustav Stresemann, had he not died, may have steered Germany down a successful, largely peaceful yet nationalist course that would have avoided WW2 and the rise of Nazism. He was enormously popular in Germany.

Compared to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, imposed on Russia by Germany in early 1918, Versailles was a "slap on the wrist" in the words of one eminent modern historian. Check it out and it will give you an idea of what a victorious Imperial Germany would have been like. Far harsher than Versailles.

The Allies could have marched into Berlin and occupied Berlin and all of Germany. They could have divided Germany up amongst themselves. The Germans only lost small amounts of territory and that was largely territory that the Germans took from other countries in the 1800's. In comparison, the Turks lost their entire Ottoman Empire and Constantinople, the capital, was even occupied by the allies.

A more moderate Nationalist leader might been radical and reactionary but also mentally balanced and negotiable. Germany could still have been a respected member of the League of Nations and capable of real diplomacy.

He would likely have pursued a quiet policy of territorial expansion, gradually but through feigned statesmanship repealing the dictates of the Treaty and re-incorporating Germans into the Reich. Such a leader would likely not have pursued the extreme lebensraum policy of the Third Reich which was directed not only towards rectifying the territorial diminutions of the Treaty but at acquiring new land that had never been part of Germany. It was this policy, more than any other, which caused the Second World War. It was entirely avoidable, and would have been even if Germany had embraced an authoritarian, nationalism but shot of Nazism IMHO.

I therefore do not think that Czechoslovakia would have been occupied after the concession of the Sudetenland to such a Germany, nor do I think that Poland and Russia would have been invaded, nor do I believe that territory expansion would have proceeded as swiftly and forcefully as it did under the Third Reich regime.

Finally, the despicable anti-Semitism and biological racism of the Third Reich would never have materialized. There would have been no Holocaust, no mass murder of disabled people and the classification of certain groups as "untermensch" (sub-humans).

I do not think that Germany was fated to become fascist. After the Wall Street Crash of 1929, coupled with the Versailles Treaty, it was uniquely positioned to become an authoritarian, nationalist state with similarities to WW1 Germany. It was not necessarily destined to embrace an amplified, German variant of Mussolini's fascist ideology, the racialism of Nazism and so forth...

It could quite easily have gone down the same path as innumerable authoritarian states that sprung up in the 1930s but which were not anything near as abhorrent and dangerous to humankind as Nazi ideology.

I find this a pretty interesting topic, and thought this was a very reasonable assessment of the impact of the Treaty of Versailles, and it's impact or otherwise on leading to the rise of the Nazi's, and hence WW2. But I also wanted to respond, which meant this warranted it's own thread.

I'll compose my thoughts on this and respond below, but obviously all are welcome.

 

[Vouthon]

Excellent stuff Lewis

I tried to frubal you but I've already done so. I'm all frubal'd out! :angel2:

I look forward to you're thoughts and will get back to you on them later after I've went about my business today.

 

[lewisnotmiller]

Okay...so as I mentioned, I think you make some excellent points about the Treaty. So the first thing I need to do is clarify what my actual position/argument is.

There are a few things I am NOT arguing for. I am not arguing that;

• The Treaty directly caused WW2.
• The Treaty ensured the rise of Nazism.
• The Treaty was harsher than what the Germans may have imposed if they won

(although I'm not sure the Treaty_of_Brest-Litovsk can be considered any indication of German intentions. Their initial peace offers were lenient, but rejected.)

So what am I arguing? Simply that the Treaty directly and majorly contributed to creating the socio-economic breakdown required for someone like Hitler, and something like Nazism to flourish.

It's hard to tackle that in one go, so I might pull out a few key clauses or concepts from the Treaty, and start there. Hope that makes sense to anyone playing along at home...

Article 231

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

This was the legal basis for the reparations bill, and many of the other punitive clauses of the Treaty. I'll tackle financial implications at some point, but my first issue is that this lays the entire responsibility for the war at Germany's hands. That caused outrage in Germany, as well it should have. In their response to this, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau wrote the following;

The German delegation again makes its demand for a neutral inquiry into the responsibility for the war and culpable acts in conduct. An impartial commission should have the right to investigate on its own responsibility the archives of all the belligerent countries and all the persons who took an important part in the war. Nothing short of confidence that the question of guilt will be examined dispassionately can leave the peoples lately at war with each other in the proper frame of mind for the formation of the League of Nations.

The fact that Germany was initially denied a seat on that League of Nations is probably another thing worth considering. But I think there are some important things to note here.

1) Even assuming the Central Powers were solely responsible for WW1, why is Germany solely responsible for the conflict, and responsible not only for the damage caused by her armies, but those of her allies?

2) The language used was quite particular, and was written in a manner that helped legally protect and justify reparations. It also satisfied France (in particular), in casting Germany as the villain. But was it so simple?

The web of inter-related alliances in Europe virtually assured the fact that any war involving one of the key players would soon involve all of them, assuming they honoured the treaties they had signed.
To be honest, there was never much doubt they would honour the treaties they had signed, in my opinion. The whole continent was armed and ready for war, in simple terms. When war finally broke out, it was greeted with mass enthusiasm by ALL sides.
War was almost inevitable, I believe. And when the spark came, it was an Austro-Hungarian declaration which led to it. Not a German one. The Russians moved to protect their allies (Serbia) and Germany moved to protect their allies (Austro-Hungary). The Germans then knew France would declare, given the treaty between France and Russia, and the mutual 'love' France and Germany held. So the Germans took the only possible military strategy available...try and knock France out of the war as quickly as possible so as to avoid the two front war that would ultimately bleed them dry.

Oh, and note, I'm not going with the assassination of Ferdinand as a cause of the war. Austro-Hungary was itching to stamp on Serbia, and that was the excuse they needed. If it hadn't have occurred, they would soon enough have found another reason.

So how is Germany solely responsible for WW1? And more particularly, why are they responsible for the damage caused by Austro-Hungary in particular?

Capacity to pay, French pride, fear of what a united Germany could do...there are a bunch of reasons. Reparations were reduced (I believe) once the clause was added, as it somewhat mollified French and Belgium negotiators. But that doesn't change the view of this clause in Germany.

But what I believe the consequence of this clause was, was a sense of scapegoating and being harshly done by in Germany. Remember, in terms of this debate, the views and conditions within Germany are what's important, primarily...

Loss of German Lands

Nationalism was a powerful force in Europe since the start of the 20th century, and was a key factor in the commencement of WW1. The unification of Germany was still new, and was a source of nationalist pride to Germans, and some fear in Britain and France (in particular) as evidenced by the Treaty of Morroco.

The loss of land considered German under the Treaty of Versailles was a MASSIVE blow to German nationalist pride. Consider the following postcard, post-ww1, but well before the rise of Nationalist Socialism... (circa 1921)

The text translates to;
'Lost but not forgotten land'.
You must carve in your heart
These words, as in stone -
What we have lost
Will be regained!

Perhaps it's more poetic in German...??
The point is, the loss of German speaking peoples in such a wholesale manner, and the separation of East Prussia from the rest of Germany were seen as massive blows to German prestige, but also as a source of oppression. Again, if I look to the German response from Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau;

In territorial questions Germany takes up her position unreservedly on the ground of the Wilson program. She renounces her sovereign right in Alsace-Lorraine, but wishes a free plebiscite to take place there. She gives up the greater part of the province of Posen, the district incontestably Polish in population, together with the capital. She is prepared to grant to Poland, under international guarantees, free and secure access to the sea by ceding free ports at Danzig, Konigsberg, and Memel, by an agreement regulating the navigation of the Vistula and by special railway conventions. Germany is prepared to insure the supply of coal for the economic needs of France, especially from the Saar region, until such time as the French mines are once more in working order. The preponderantly Danish districts of Schleswig will be given up to Denmark on the basis of a plebiscite. Germany demands that the right of self-determination shall also be respected where the interests of the Germans in Austria and Bohemia are concerned. She is ready to subject all her colonies to administration by the community of the League of Nations, if she is recognized as its mandatory.

I'll leave it there for now, just to give you a chance to respond. I'm interested in what impact you think these clauses in particular had to the general mood in Germany. I'm not pre-judging your thoughts on this...I think it's easier with a complex issue to move one step at a time, so hope that suits.

 

[Vouthon]

Now Lewis it is my time to say...Wow!! That was an awesome post, clearly stating your position in no uncertain terms.

There are a few things I am NOT arguing for. I am not arguing that;

• The Treaty directly caused WW2.
• The Treaty ensured the rise of Nazism.
• The Treaty was harsher than what the Germans may have imposed if they won

Great stuff. It was very good of you to clearly lay out what you are and are not arguing for. On these points we are agreed. I always get chills when I read someone trying to overly emphasise the long-term ramifications of the Versailles terms, to the extent of claiming that it was a "direct cause of WW2". To claim such a thing disturbs me, since it is ludicrous to blame Allied drafters of a Treaty for the Nazi ideology that actually did cause the war.

I'm not sure the Treaty_of_Brest-Litovsk can be considered any indication of German intentions. Their initial peace offers were lenient, but rejected

I disagree, with all due respect my friend Allow me to explain why. I would like to take this first post to do so. In my second post I will address the Versailles Treaty directly. I appreciate very much how you have gone straight to the provisions of the Treaty itself.

From the perspective of the Entente Powers (Allies), the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was one of the primary factors which led to a very negative assessment of German post-war aims for Europe. It precipitated the tough terms of the Versailles Treaty and was fresh in the minds of the drafters. It is therefore historically significant because numerous historians have referred to the fact that the knowledge of this Treaty and its reputed severity, even that it was greatly exploitative in nature, hardened the attitude of the Entente. If we can understand what Germany did at Brest-Litovsk, we can have a window into interpreting the intentions of the Allies and the very different reactions between them and the public perception both in Germany and in the Allied countries.

(Don't forget, in Britain after WW1 there was much sympathy for Germans which emboldened the appeasement of Adolf Hitler. Many ordinary Britons felt that the German Reich had been hard done by as a result of Versailles. This was the popular opinion and it led to such ventures as the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935. It reinforced the German public's conviction that they had been unfairly treated ie "If the Brits feel that way, then it must be true".)

On Brest-Litovsk, the negotiations which led to it are rather complex. In December 1917, the Soviets laid out the terms of their foreseen peace. They called upon the Germans, in accordance with the Soviet government's stated opposition to the imperialism of the overthrown Tsars, for a peace without war indemnities or annexations by any parties, the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from occupied territories and free referendums to achieve national self-determination. The Soviet demands were, I must say in all honesty despite my distaste for the Bolshevik Revolution, enlightened.

The Germans initially expressed positive comments towards these calls. To this effect the Central Powers issued a statement in December acceding to the Russian demands in theory, if only the allies accepted it too. However the German government did not seriously expect the Allies to accede to this nor did they themselves wish too. What they wanted was to use self-determination against the Soviets, by claiming that they had already conducted plebiscites in the occupied territories and the people wanted "freedom" from Russia. It was a propaganda coup, carefully articulated, to hide the very real debates about annexation of Eastern European provinces that were going on between Ludendorff and the other members of the German High Command, as well as in the Reichstag. I would not view it as expressive of any genuine attempts at concluding peace with the Soviets. The Soviet negotiators completely saw through the seeming initial German positivity towards their proposal, they had no illusions as to the real aim of the negotiations, as Lev Kamenev stated in his report to the Russian parliament, "the Germans have transformed the principle of self-determination from a formula for national liberation into a disguise for annexation". The Bolsheviks were proven right at the next, second, round of negotiations.

When peace negotiations were resumed, with Trotsky now heading the Soviet delegation, "the Central Powers dropped the mask", as David Stevenson wrote in his book on WW1, "They rejected demands to evacuate the occupied territories...They stipulated that Russia's frontier should run from Brest-Litovsk to the Gulf of Riga - in other words depriving it of most of Poland, Lithuania and Western Latvia. Moreover south of this line was the Ukraine". The Ukraine was the "money-shot" for Ludendorff and other would-be expansionists in the German high command, since its innumerable reserves of grain would give the Reich a surplus of food and profit. The peace treaty concluded with the Ukraine mandated that more than a million metric tons of grain would be delivered to Germany by August 1st. To me, as to many at the time including some of the main political parties in the German Reichstag, that seems to be obviously exploitative.

Trotsky naturally refused to recognize the stifling demands of the blatantly annexationist treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

While the German high command was led by the expansionist Ludendorff, many ordinary Germans and politicians were more moderate. Germany had not entered the war with publically expansionist aims. Germany was thought to be cornered by the Entente - Britain, France and Russia. It supposedly needed to free itself of this Allied-imposed prison system. The German public saw the war, always, as a war of defence on behalf of the Fatherland and not chiefly of territorial aggrandizement. (The work of Fischer in the 1960s, however, in his seminal book, "Germany's Grab for World Power" which has largely in most of its points and exact evidence formed the consensus opinion that Germany shares the greatest blame for creating the war situation out of an ill-planned attempt to create an empire in Europe, has exposed the true aims of the military high command and Kaiser. Hence why some historians have since the 60s viewed 1914-1945 as a European Civil War with a long stalemate between 1919-1939, although this is naturally a controversial view and not one that I would generally accede to in any way.)

Take, for example, the response of the German Socialists to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

The USPD representatives in the German Reichstag in 1918 issued a manifesto explicitly attacking the German war aims "openly laid down at Brest-Litovsk":

"...We were assured again and again in the past that the German government wanted only to protect the frontiers of the Empire and that it did not intend to make any annexations. No thinking person can believe this assertion any longer. Germany wants the annexation of Russian territory...If Germany succeeds in making a peace of conquest against the Russian people, it will be a misfortune for Russia, the Poles, the Lithuanians and Latvians. But it would be an even greater misfortune for ourselves. The result would be a postponement of a general peace, new threats and a desire for revenge, increased armaments and intensified reaction in our land...Only a peace without annexations and indemnities and on the basis of self-determination of peoples can save us..."

Nevertheless, the Nationalists in the Parliament and the Liberal Nationalists enthusiastically supported the annexationist intentions of the Treaty.

Gustav Stresemann, who was then a national liberal, "explained that only the union of the Baltic territories with the German Empire would secure the Eastern German border" (Annemarie Sammartino). This is important, because as you see from this, if Stressemann had survived he could have steered the country away from the appeal of Nazism post-1929 Wall Street Crash and the ending of aid from the US, towards an authoritarian Nationalist government more in line with Wilhelmine Germany that would have pursued expansionism but in a more diplomatic, piecemeal manner and with genuine attempts to safeguard peace on the continent.

The SPD abstained from the vote because it was concerned about the expansionism of the treaty and could not support it even though it feared vocally opposing it when Ludendorff and Nationalists were so intent on annexation. Sammartino notes that, "even those SPD members wary of Lenin and Trotsky were uncomfortable with Germany's plans to annex large portions of Russian territory".

In this respect, I believe that Brest-Litovsk can be considered an indication of German intentions.

 

[lewisnotmiller]

You know, I'm almost willing to just concede on the Brest-Litovsk treaty, since it's really not central to any of my beliefs on the impact of Versailles. My reasoning is that even if German intentions were to bludgeon the Entente into submission and force humiliating terms, it really doesn't matter in terms of the impact of Versailles from a German point of view. I don't think there would be many 'voices of reason' in post-WW1 Germany saying 'Well...to be fair, we would have done this to them, you know...'
But, given you've taken the time to make argument on it, it seems only fair that I respond...

I would like to take this first post to do so. In my second post I will address the Versailles Treaty directly.

Sounds good!

From the perspective of the Entente Powers (Allies), the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was one of the primary factors which led to a very negative assessment of German post-war aims for Europe. It precipitated the tough terms of the Versailles Treaty and was fresh in the minds of the drafters. It is therefore historically significant because numerous historians have referred to the fact that the knowledge of this Treaty and its reputed severity, even that it was greatly exploitative in nature, hardened the attitude of the Entente. If we can understand what Germany did at Brest-Litovsk, we can have a window into interpreting the intentions of the Allies and the very different reactions between them and the public perception both in Germany and in the Allied countries.

I can see where Brest-Litovsk may have informed decisions around the Treaty of Versailles. I can also see how Brest-Litovsk could be considered exploitative. The final treaty was harsh. To be somewhat fair to the Germans, Russia was a political and military mess, and they probably could have taken the country without undue difficulty (although the implications for the Western Front would have been huge, obviously).

The Bolsheviks were quite convinced Germany was rife for socialist revolution, and some of the initial stalling of talks were with the hopes that this would occur, rather than awaiting Allied assistance.

On the 18th February, which was the day of one of the Central Powers ultimatums (there were several) Lenin spoke to the Central Committee (as close to government as existed in Russia at that time)

Yesterday there was an especially characteristic vote when everyone recognised the need for peace if a [revolutionary] movement in Germany weren't to supervene and an offensive were to occur. Doubt exists whether the Germans want an offensive with a view to overthrowing the Soviet government. We stand before a situation where we must act!

But they didn't sign the peace treaty. The Germans advanced on a massive scale, and quickly moved to within 400 miles of Petrograd. Lenin was convinced the revolution was destined to die at it's very birth. The situation, in my opinion, was simply vastly different to a Western peace treaty. The Germans faced a brand new regime, which was a clear political adversary, even if militarily it was not. That regime was actively promoting and hoping for revolt within German borders. That regime also deliberately stalled talks.

The Soviets themselves were barely even in control. It was a fluid situation. Germany was faced with a situation where they could create buffer states to help protect them from an unknown and almost certain to be (eventually) hostile regime. They took it. I think the whole treaty, and the amount of pressure the Germans placed on Russia to sign it, smacked of military and political expediency rather than expansionism.

(Don't forget, in Britain after WW1 there was much sympathy for Germans which emboldened the appeasement of Adolf Hitler. Many ordinary Britons felt that the German Reich had been hard done by as a result of Versailles. This was the popular opinion and it led to such ventures as the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935. It reinforced the German public's conviction that they had been unfairly treated ie "If the Brits feel that way, then it must be true".)

Actually, I'm glad you mention this. I think it's extremely important to understanding the linkage between Versailles and the rise of National Socialism. I'm sure we'll get back to this at some point, though...

I won't quote your explanations as to the complexities of the negotiations, except to say that you articulated them well, and I don't really have any issue with them. I think you sounded a little pro-Soviet and anti-German, whereas I think both sides were playing each other for fools, to be honest. The Soviets were hoping for an expansion of revolution, and sent what could only be described as an unorthodox negotiating party who were quite open in admitting to this. The Germans had the added consideration of being a nation at war. This is something the Entente did not have to deal with when formulating the Treaty of Versailles. German 'resource-grabs' let's say, were at least partially driven by a need to feed the war machine.

The quotes and information you sourced from Germany were very interesting for me, and actually a little new (in terms of my knowledge). I have to admit, almost all the reading I have done of Brest-Litovsk has been from the Soviet viewpoint.

In any case, like I said at the start of this post, I think I can pretty much concede on this. What if we agreed to the following;

Brest-Litovsk was an undeniably harsh treaty, and was seen by the Western Allies as an indication of the nature of the German hierarchy. It was important in informing decisions made on the Treaty of Versailles for this reason.

I'm still not convinced it IS an indication of what would have occurred if the Germans managed to force the Western allies to the table whilst holding a strong upper-hand. But since that never happened, it's not really important to the topic at hand. Just a hypothetical argument, really...

Anyways...I'm looking forward to your next post.

 

[Flankerl]

Interesting that no one mentions the hundred thousands of people that actually starved to death from 1914 to 1919 because of the British Naval Blockade that didnt let any food inside the country.

Why 1919 and not 1918? Well the blockade was kept going to ensure that Germany would sign any Treaty even if it would be insane to sign it.

Some scientists argue that you can still see the effects of this time in modern germany. Especially around the older people who got it hammered into their heads by their parents and grandparents that your basement has to be full of food. Otherwise you starve.



Also one might remember that Germany signed an Armistice. That is not a peace treaty but merely a cease fire. Up to that point no foreign soldier had even set foot into germany. And all of the sudden Germany was declared the greatest evil of mankind, pay insane sums of money(a couple of years ago Germany finished the payments of WW1), lose land that was considered german by the people who lived there(for example Danzig) and be stripped of the entire colonial empire.

And by all means the treaty was downright anti-german. The french and british always rambled about how the treaty is to ensure that the people were important. But then German-austria actually wanted to join now smaller Germany out of free will. But obviously they werent allowed to. So much for that.
On top of that there was anti-german agitation in the regions where a vote should decide wether it should stay with germany or join another country.




And they actually thought all of this wouldnt come back to bite them in the butt.

 

[lewisnotmiller]

Hey Flankerl,

First off, welcome to the thread. Glad to see we're not the only two interested in the subject matter.
We're kinda taking things slowly. I have been involved in threads where complex topics get brushed over, with both sides digging in. Vouthon and I have avoided that to this point, but the down side is the thread might be a slow burn.

You make some really relevant points. It's certainly not something I'd neglected to mention, or wouldn't include in my case. Just that I'd focused purely on a couple of points, just to keep things manageable, and then would seek to add more.

If you think of it in terms of a timeline, I'm trying to establish that there were clauses within the Treaty which directly led to a sense of oppression or victimization by the German people. The pressure under which it was signed is a very important factor in this.

I want to then move to the post-Treaty societal breakdowns in Germany, and try to show causal link between the Treaty and the issues faced (at least , partially...obviously there were other factors at play also).

Finally, I want to show how this breakdown prepared the turf (so to speak) in which Nazism could flourish.

Like I said, welcome.

 

[Flankerl]

Well the starvation of the german population had direct consequences on the tenets of Nationalsocialism. Its basically the reason the whole idea of the "Ostsiedlung" got a new meaning.
Germany had to be self-sustaining to never make a new starvation possible.

 

[Vouthon]

Dear Lewis

My post is already too long, so I will have to split it up and post it in segments.

Sorry for my delayed response! I have been ever so busy over the last few days and this is the first chance I've had to type a proper response.

I think that given Frankerl's post, my argument will sit far less cordial with her than yours will. So Frankerl I apologize in advance


The Treaty of Versailles that ended WW1 officially had 440 clauses. Of these 414 were directed towards punishing Germany and her allies. I am there not going to deny its punitive nature. What I rather wish to do is understand why it was such, the degree of its harshness relative to the time and other treaties of the period, its impact upon public opinion in the Allied countries and Germany, and finally to assess its culpability concerning the rise of Nazism in Weimar Germany.

I will explore a range of historiographical opinions, demonstrating the lack - even today - of a consensus.

To this end, I also will not be denying the psychological impact it had on German national conciousness, particularly the hated war guilt clause. German public opinion labelled Versailles as a 'Diktat' by foreign powers.

First a little self-biography:

I am actually descended from Germans on my mother's side. My great-great grandfather Christian Louis Maass left Germany when he was 17 and moved to Britain. During the First World War he lost contact with his relatives in the Fatherland. Prior to this he had visited them frequently and exchanged letters. It was not exactly ideal should we say being a German in wartime Britain. He had his own small family business and owned a fruit shop. When war was declared in 1914, a mob of xenophobic young people attacked his shop. They smashed his windows in and threatened his family with violence, labelling him a "Kaiser supporter" or such. There were repeated assaults on his business the following year. His business was essentially ruined by the end of this ordeal.

He even changed the family name from Maass to Moss out of desperation to show his loyalty to Britain and his removal from his German roots.

Then in 1916, an inspector was sent to his home on behalf of the government, enquiring as to whether he was a "spy" for Germany. Apparently, no German Briton was to be trusted. The shame this brought upon him resulted in his premature death that year aged 57.

I should add that Christian's mother, Marie Lange, was either Jewish herself or of Jewish descent. My great-grandmother, bless her, told me that the family had Jewish roots - although Christian's father was Catholic and he himself was raised Catholic.

My great-Uncle died in the Battle of the Somme, fighting for Britain...My grandfather's German relatives had sons fighting on the German side....
After the war, the families met back up again. Christian's wife, Kathleen, sent her sons over to Germany in the 20s to meet their relatives. They even, apparently, made trips into the Nazi era (Christian's father's family were obviously not of Jewish descent and I imagine my great-uncles must have kept quite about Marie Lange's ambiguous ancestry).

My distant cousin Marie has letters written by the eldest Moss son (my great-grandmother's elder brother) to the German relatives in the late 30s.
Again, they lost contact in WW2. My family was now wholly naturalized to Britain so we never faced any discrimination as in the first world war, thank God.
After the war, Willy, one of the other sons, met up with the surviving Germans post-WW2. They still live in Germany today.

I give you this information, so that no one thinks I am anti-German or in any way pro-Soviet as you said at one point concerning my evaluation of Brest-Litovsk

If anything, I am saying what I am saying in spite of my bias towards my German roots and attempting to take an impartial view of the situation as I see it, based on the primary and secondary sources that I have read.

I must apologize for spending so much time on Brest-Litovsk. I'm going to get on to Versailles proper in this post, after just a bit more on Brest-Litovsk.

My rationale is that this Treaty was controversial even within Germany, and it was greatly in the minds of the Allied drafters of Versailles. You see, the Germans were reminded of the harshness of Brest-Litovsk when they complained about the severity of the Treaty of Versailles. There is therefore an unbreakable link between the two, certainly even in the public consciousness in 1919-1920.

The reason I am focusing upon this is because I am going to address the infamous war guilt clause and the undeniably punitive nature of the Treaty in my next post. To do so, I must demonstrate what the Allies thought based upon various factors that Germany had intended to do with Europe, why they entered the war and why (from the Entente perspective) they deserved to be disciplined.

My question is: from the perspective of the Allies, could this punitive nature have been avoided, without the gift of hindsight?

Likewise, while conceding the negative shadow cast by the Treaty over the Weimar republic, it is my contention that without the Great Depression the republic would have survived and Hitler would not have come to power. Therefore I do not think that Versailles directly caused the rise of the Nazis, although it was one of the main factors, nor that it made Nazi Germany an unavoidable fete accompli. Rather I posit that eventually a Nationalist government, along the lines of a more robustly annexationist Gustav Stresemann, could just as well have been established and through diplomacy alone Germany could have repealed some of the harsher dictates of the Treaty and European peace could have been retained. I think that this Nationalist Germany would have become the economic powerhouse of Europe, as it is today. I place the greatest blame upon the Wall Street Crash of 1929 for Hitler's triumph.

I hope that my reasoning will make sense at the end of this post, I assure you that there is method in my apparent madness After this post I will be away from Brest-Litovsk entirely.

The Bolsheviks were quite convinced Germany was rife for socialist revolution, and some of the initial stalling of talks were with the hopes that this would occur, rather than awaiting Allied assistance.

That is true for Trotsky and Kamenev, among others, although not for Lenin. The Bolsheviks did drag out the negotiations in the hope that the November Revolution in Russia would spark war-weary European populations to revolt against their governments and therefore render a separate peace unnecessary, that I will whole-heartedly concede. Germany was thought by Trotsky to be the first domino that would ignite a worldwide revolution.

Lenin, and like-minded fellow Bolsheviks, believed that a world revolution would occur over many years and felt that Russia needed an imminent cessation of the war with Germany at any cost so as to create stability in the country. Lenin vigorously protested against Trotsky's more radical opinion and won through in the end.
The idea that Germany was ripe for a Socialist Revolution was of course widely believed even by Western liberal academics of the period. Karl Marx had been German and Socialists, whether of the moderate SPD or the more resolute USPD, had great representation in Parliament even during the war.

As late as 1932 Germans who desired a radical solution to the economic crisis essentially had two choices: Communism or National Socialism.

To be fair to the Soviets, representatives from the Allied powers were meant to have attended the peace negotiations but failed to show up. Russia, therefore, had to negotiate a peace settlement by herself, while in the fractured state of affairs that you mention and under a fragile, ideological regime.

The Germans had the added consideration of being a nation at war.

True, although the Entente had to deal with a war-weary, war-torn Europe and essentially set the boundaries of numerous new states left over from the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. They had the task of forming a peace that would be lasting on a worldwide scale. They also had to contend with angry populations who wanted justice for their war-dead and for years had been fed anti-German propaganda about the "barbarians" who butchered Belgian babies with bayonets

German 'resource-grabs' let's say, were at least partially driven by a need to feed the war machine

This is true to an extent. However the criticism from within Germany was that Ludendorff and Hindenburg's "land-grabs" diverted troops and civilian personnel from the Western Front and actually hampered the "war machine" as they sought to maintain occupation in these countries. Had they simply demanded grain or food resources, but not been so intent upon annexation for annexation's sake, Germany might have had a better fighting chance at defeating the Western Allies. Hubris was the fault for me here. The Generals should have listened to more moderate voices in the Reichstag.

For the allies it represented annexationist goals:

"...The resulting Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ignored Wilson’s Fourteen Points of January and confirmed in Western eyes the insatiable appetite of German militarism..."

- Denis E.Showalter

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(continued...)

 

[Vouthon]

The situation, in my opinion, was simply vastly different to a Western peace treaty...That regime was actively promoting and hoping for revolt within German borders. That regime also deliberately stalled talks.

But what of the Treaty of Bucharest? It was even harsher than Brest-Litovsk, and Germany need not have feared any communist threat from a stable monarchy such as Romania. A country I might add that was rather small and which played so marginal a role in the Great War:

"...Even harsher than Brest-Litovsk was the Treaty of Bucharest against Romania. Signed on May 8, 1918, the Treaty made Romania a vassal of the Central Powers. Terms included military occupation, German control both of Romania's oil reserves for ninety-nine years and of navigation on the Danube, as well as the ceding of substantial swathes of Romanian territory to Austria-Hungary.

To enforce the terms, Germany had to keep three dozen divisions in the east. Even as trench holders these units would have been better employed in the great offensive pending in the west. After extended exposure to Bolshevik propaganda, many of these units became politically unreliable and had to be kept in the east in the political equivalent of a quarantine. In coercing sweeping concessions from Russia and Rumania, Hindenburg and Ludendorff ’s reach exceeded their grasp. Thoughtful minds on the kaiser’s staff recognized their hubris. Russia’s collapse “had been a boon of immeasurable value to us and should have been exploited to release troops for the West,” Admiral Müller noted. Instead, Hindenburg and Ludendorff “conquered Latvia and Estonia and became involved with Finland—the results of an excess of megalomania.” In supplanting civilian statesmen and Foreign Service professionals, Hindenburg and Ludendorff perpetrated “acts of violence” against the German people, Müller confessed to his diary..." ​

- William J. Astore, Dennis E. Showalter (Hindenburg), p.72-3​

Recall that while Germany mandated occupation of Romania, the Entente did not occupy Berlin nor did the Versailles Treaty intend to occupy Germany other than the Rhineland. Even the Saarland coal fields were permitted to return to Germany after a plebiscite, which was held eventually in 1935. The Allies did occupy Constantinople, the capital of Turkey. Germany could have been occupied and divided into a series of smaller units as happened after WW2, and as happened to Palestine and the Arab lands of the former Ottoman Empire after WW1. IMHO They might even have had more to complain about than Germany. Indeed the French and Belgians attempted to go beyond the Versailles Treaty and set up a puppet state in the Ruhr under French rule. This was, I think, much more unpopular in Germany than the Versailles Treaty which this illegal action broke (and the Versailles Treaty, irrespective of the reality, was perceived, particularly the guilt clause, as unjust by Germans). Britain did not even support France. In fact, this led to francophobia in Britain and sympathy for the Germans.

Why must Germany have been so harsh with Romania? Romania was quickly defeated and occupied by German and Austro-Hungarian forces, including Bucharest and the strategically important oil fields. It was forced to be indebted to Germany economically for another 99 years, extending well beyond the war and the battle on the Western Front. Why? If as you say the "land-grabs" were intended only out of political expediency and to finance the war in the West, I would like an explanation of this. What had Romania done to deserve such punitive measures for merely being a minor, late-entering participant in the Eastern Front?

Goethein, of the Independent People's Party in the Reichstag, argued that Rumania deserved the harsh punishment for its "frivolous and treacherous entry into the war". Surely that is as incredulous as any punitive allegations against Germany in Allied parliaments?

However a minority of Socialists even mustered the strength to vote against the Treaty of Bucharest because it "proved" according to them "that the war was not a war for defence, but a war of conquest, with imperial ambitions".

Romania only entered the war in late August 1916. She played an absolutely minimal role and was easily defeated by Germany. She had not caused Germany any great suffering, had taken no land from her, nor had she had any hand in provoking the war at all since she was not one of the original participants in 1914. In fact it is agreed by every historian, virtually, that her entry benefitted Germany very much.

IMHO The Entente had a greater justification for being punitive with Germany after 4 years of war, than Germany did with Romania. Yet punish her via that Treaty, Germany did.

Romania had to provide a 90-99 year lease of its oil fields. Already a small nation compared to the empire surrounding it, significant parcels of its land were ceded to Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary and the country was rendered a "vassal" of the Central Powers, with Hindenburg and Ludendorff intent on annexing it entirely to Germany and keeping it that way once victory was won on the Western Front. They were supported by a large number of annexationists in the Reichstag, including even Gustav Stresemann.

Can you not understand how this made Germany look in the eyes of the Entente, who already believed that Germany had the greatest share of blame for leading their countries into the war?

As another historian notes:

"...The one-sided terms of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest Litovsk eroded any lingering Allied sentiment for a lenient peace toward the Central Powers. But even these terms were not enough for the German military. Generals Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg demanded outright annexation of Romania..."
- Michael S. Neiberg

Hence why I say that Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest cannot be divorced from Versailles, since they directly influenced the Allied planners. If the Allies' interpretation of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest were correct, then it helps us understand the punitive nature of the Treaty. If not....

I should add that Russia only stalled talks when it became clear that Germany was going to exploit the Soviets' calls for self-determination against them in the Baltic countries, by claiming that plebiscites had been held in the occupied territories that demanded "independence" from Russia, which the Soviets rightly understood was guarded speech for the maintenance of German occupation in these regions.

As you yourself concede, the Soviets had no forces to export a world revolution, let only maintain order in the revolutionary regime they had just established in Russia. The Tsarist Army had completely disintegrated and the economy was devastated.

Brest-Litovsk was an undeniably harsh treaty, and was seen by the Western Allies as an indication of the nature of the German hierarchy. It was important in informing decisions made on the Treaty of Versailles for this reason.

Agreed

the whole treaty...smacked of military and political expediency rather than expansionism.

Hindenburg would have disagreed with you, as would Muller and the USPD, as well as the German socialists and liberals in the Reichstag in 1918. In fact, the Treaty caused public concern as to Germany's war aims. A "French & German Public Opinion on Declared War Aims: 1914-1918" was published in 1933 by Stanford University and in the German section we find this:

"...The Russian peace was of intense concern to the [German] public. Hasse declared in February 1918 that the strike in January took place because the people knew, since Brest-Litovsk and the ultimatum to the Russian government, that this was not a defensive war.

...

As early as November 1917, the Berliner Tageblatt [newspaper] protested against the annexation of Lithuania and Courland..."

For them, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had genuinely expansionist aims. Hindenburg, for instance, said to the Bavarian politician Hertling on January 9th 1918 that he was glad “it has now been decided to be firm at Brest-Litovsk and to speak to the Russians in the language of the conqueror.” The USPD certainly saw it that way too, which is why they condemned it as a betrayal of Germany's war effort which the people had been told was a war of national self-defence against encroachment by the Entente Powers.

If Germans themselves by 1917-18 were beginning to doubt the justness of their cause (or at least how Hidenburg and Ludendorff had transformed war aims), can one fault the Allies, with public consciousness in their countries fed with propaganda, for Versailles?

Now onto some of my observations concerning the Treaty of Versailles proper, in the next post which is coming up today god willing

(continued...)

 

[natstew]

Interesting that no one mentions the hundred thousands of people that actually starved to death from 1914 to 1919 because of the British Naval Blockade that didnt let any food inside the country.

Why 1919 and not 1918? Well the blockade was kept going to ensure that Germany would sign any Treaty even if it would be insane to sign it.

Some scientists argue that you can still see the effects of this time in modern germany. Especially around the older people who got it hammered into their heads by their parents and grandparents that your basement has to be full of food. Otherwise you starve.



Also one might remember that Germany signed an Armistice. That is not a peace treaty but merely a cease fire. Up to that point no foreign soldier had even set foot into germany. And all of the sudden Germany was declared the greatest evil of mankind, pay insane sums of money(a couple of years ago Germany finished the payments of WW1), lose land that was considered german by the people who lived there(for example Danzig) and be stripped of the entire colonial empire.

And by all means the treaty was downright anti-german. The french and british always rambled about how the treaty is to ensure that the people were important. But then German-austria actually wanted to join now smaller Germany out of free will. But obviously they werent allowed to. So much for that.
On top of that there was anti-german agitation in the regions where a vote should decide wether it should stay with germany or join another country.




And they actually thought all of this wouldnt come back to bite them in the butt.

Yes to all of the above:yes::clap