There is certainly no shortage of theological opinions concern theodicy.
What Soelle suggests, therefore, is that we should become people who can practically strive to abolish suffering, including
gratuitous suffering, instead of staying as apathetic bystanders: “It is axiomatic for me that the only humanely conceivable goal
is the abolition of circumstances under which people are forced to suffer, whether through poverty or tyranny.” [96]
How, then, can we abolish suffering? Soelle’s answer as a Christian is that we go to the sufferers and bear their pain with them,
like Jesus Christ did on the cross. She finds this answer particularly in the stance of Alyosha, Ivan’s younger brother in
Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. A novice in a monastery,
Alyosha directs his attention not to the power above but to the sufferers. He puts himself besides them. He bears their pain with them.
During this conversation he says almost nothing. He listens in agony as Ivan introduces examples of suffering he had assembled as
witnesses against the compassion of God. Later Alyosha arises, goes up to Ivan, the rebel and insurrectionist, and kisses him silently on
the lips. It is the same gesture with which Christ departed in the legend of the Grand Inquisitor. [97]
It is in this imitatio Christi stance of Alyosha that Soelle finds at least two amazing things: 1) “Alyosha’s strength is the silent
sharing of suffering,” and 2) “God is not over Alyosha… [but] within him.” [98]
Jürgen Moltmann, too, takes seriously Ivan Karamazov’s rebellious complaint that traditional aesthetic theodicy harmonizes evil
with a greater purpose of an omnipotent and perfectly good God. The German Reformed theologian says: “The suffering of an
innocent child is an irrefutable rebuttal of the notion of the almighty and kindly God in heaven.” [102]
In this context he criticizes any aesthetic explanation for its inability to obliterate suffering from the world: “There is no
explanation of suffering which is capable of obliterating his [the sufferer’s] pain, and no consolation of a higher wisdom which
could assuage it.” [103] Again, with this “highly questionable” traditional explanation, the sufferer has to “come to terms with”
his suffering, without being able to overcome it:
The desire to explain suffering is already highly questionable in itself. Does an explanation not lead us to justify suffering and give it
permanence? Does it not lead the suffering person to come to terms with his suffering, and to declare himself in agreement with it? And
does this not mean that he gives up hope of overcoming suffering? [104]
Moltmann therefore proposes an entirely new approach which is both “practical” and “eschatological.” It is practical in that we,
together with God, strive to overcome suffering, and it is eschatological in that it seeks a future when the overcoming of
suffering will be completed, i.e., “the future in which the desire for God will be fulfilled, suffering will be overcome, and what
has been lost will be restored.” [105]
His approach involves a theologia crucis (theology of the cross), which he believes to be the only answer to the question of
severe torments in places like Auschwitz:
Any other answer [than the theologia crucis] would be blasphemy. There cannot be any other Christian answer to the question of this
torment. To speak here of a God who could not suffer would make God a demon. To speak here of an absolute God would make God an
annihilating nothingness. To speak here of an indifferent God would condemn men to indifference. [106]
http://www.tparents.org/UTS/JUS-17-2016/JUS-17-03.pdf