Transcendental Argument for Nonexistence of God

[cottage]

However, this really raises the most hair-raising question: if God wasn't necessary to cause identity, then we have at least one non-God thing that exists independently of God's creation that even theists must logically admit given the argument is sound. There goes theistic arguments that God is necessary to explain any non-God existence at all! While it doesn't follow from the argument, it does set the stage for the question: why should we assume the existence of the material universe must be explained as "created" or "beginning" in the first place?

You decide.

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EDIT: Oh yeah, PS. I forgot to mention that this argument also undercuts the basis for the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God. Whoops! Tiny oversight.

I think it is time to reprise the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God:

“Logic presupposes God, therefore all arguments against his existence are fallacious”

With or without belief in God we must agree that there are, or there are not, principles known as the laws of thought. To propose a transcendental argument as an acceptable logical method to argue from experience to the existence of God is to confirm the laws of thought as unequivocally correct. God must be assumed in order to make the argument, and to do that we must call upon logic. So of course God must be logically possible for believers, and if the concept is logically possible then God is subject to the laws of thought.

Transcendental arguments are anti-sceptical and inform us that some form of experience must be assumed in order to argue against experience. On that basis it must be accepted that there is something rather than nothing. The question, then, is what is true of the ‘something?’ We may begin with Descartes Cogito, correctly modified: ‘There is thinking’. But from ‘There is thinking’ it doesn’t follow that ‘whatever is thought is true’ when nothing in the external world is demonstrably certain. The universe exists, we say, and yet it can be conceived as non-existent (The Problem of Induction); and the universe, therefore, as with any other element of the contingent world, has no necessary existence. Therefore the only certain truths are those that are self-evident. So if ‘God exists’ were a certain truth then of course a direct contradiction would be involved if denied. The concept of ‘God’ is that of an Absolutely Necessary Being, a personal deity that causes and sustains all existence and cannot fail to exist, and yet the non-existence of such a supernatural being is a proposition as clear and distinct in the understanding just as it is for any contingent thing that can be conceived not to exist. Hume and Descartes, empiricist and religious sceptic on one side, and rationalist and believer on the other, both identified the impossibility of supposing any necessity in an object always remaining in existence: God cannot be demonstrated a priori.

And crucially, if the argument is that God is the cause of logic then it follows that God is outside logic, and if God is outside logic then no argument to God can be made since the argument wants to say God is logically possible. And on that account the argument doesn’t even get out the starting gate.

We can conclude if, according to TAG, logic presupposes the existence of God then it is a demonstrably empty or meaningless presupposition.

 

[Quiddity]

Way late but, I wanted to note what a fellow a buddy responded about this (as he is more trained in philosophy then I):

...God is being itself, on which the principle of contradiction and identity is based. She errs by giving an ontological status to a concept apart from its existence in the mind or the foundation it is based on. In short, Truth is convertible with a being. It is based on reality. Since God is existence itself, He is that ultimate reality. For Him to be contingent on some "truth" outside of Himself would entail being contingent on another Being other than He, because again the principle of identity, or contradiction, or what have you do not exist except as a concept in the mind or as that reality which that concept apprehends. This does not mean that these principles are arbitrary and that God could choose them to be otherwise, anymore than God could make a square circle.

...there is more but I'll come back and wait for this to be digested first.

 

[Meow Mix]

Way late but, I wanted to note what a fellow a buddy responded about this (as he is more trained in philosophy then I):

...God is being itself, on which the principle of contradiction and identity is based. She errs by giving an ontological status to a concept apart from its existence in the mind or the foundation it is based on. In short, Truth is convertible with a being. It is based on reality. Since God is existence itself, He is that ultimate reality. For Him to be contingent on some "truth" outside of Himself would entail being contingent on another Being other than He, because again the principle of identity, or contradiction, or what have you do not exist except as a concept in the mind or as that reality which that concept apprehends. This does not mean that these principles are arbitrary and that God could choose them to be otherwise, anymore than God could make a square circle.


...there is more but I'll come back and wait for this to be digested first.

There is an immediate problem with your friend's (Thomistic) argument. If God is separate from self-identity then God must exemplify it; and cannot create or cause it. Here your friend, like Aquinas before (in a sense), is asserting that rather than exemplifying self-identity that God is self-identity.

There is more than one problem with this line of thinking. Let's start with the epistemic/evidential problem: how do we come to know that self-identity is God? We can abstract the truth of self-identity, much like Aristotle and others did, by looking at the world around us: things, if they are at all, are what they are. It doesn't take very much to fully understand what self-identity is.

Is self-identity equivalent to God? I don't see how we can make that assertion. God has properties such as omnipotence, consciousness, perfect love, etc. I would normally say God also has the property of being self-identical, but we're running with the ball that maybe God and self-identity are the same.

When we think of self-identity as simply being that state of affairs in which things are what they are, do we have an exhaustive idea of what self-identity is? Prima facie, that seems to be the case: at no point when we think about self-identity do we find evidence of any sort that leads us to believe it has the properties of being conscious, omnipotent, etc. So whence comes this epistemic leap of saying that self-identity is equivalent to God?

If self-identity is not exactly equivalent to God, then we have trouble with your friend's comments. If we try to say that self-identity is just one part of what God is then we're either saying something nonsensical or we're again reducing self-identity to a property of God. Since I've tackled the latter, let's look at the former.

If self-identity is somehow one part of what God is, even though we can imagine what self-identity is without ever thinking about omnipotence or consciousness, then we're speaking of something non-cognitive: what does it mean to be "part of something," and not being equivalent to it, without being a property of it? Can you name any cognitive examples of how this could be the case?

Cognitive issues aside, a microcosm of the original dilemma shows up. Let's say that it's fair to say we can conceive of what it means for something to be "part of" something else -- without being identical to it -- without being an exemplified property. In fact, this paradox would plague us even if we decided that self-identity "is" God (and vice versa); since God has properties like consciousness.

Can God decide not to be self-identity, or in the other context, can God decide not to have self-identity as a part of Him?

1) If yes, then logic is broken and we have no business even discussing anything -- since God can decide to do absurd things like create Euclidean square-circles or decide to omnisciently "know" that He does not exist at the same time as necessarily existing.

2) If no, then we have a microcosm of my original assertion: if God has no control over whether or not He is self-identity (or part self-identity), then ostensibly God is, again, subject to some higher law of identity: that which makes God the way that He is!

 

[Quiddity]

There is an immediate problem with your friend's (Thomistic) argument. If God is separate from self-identity then God must exemplify it; and cannot create or cause it. Here your friend, like Aquinas before (in a sense), is asserting that rather than exemplifying self-identity that God is self-identity.

There is more than one problem with this line of thinking. Let's start with the epistemic/evidential problem: how do we come to know that self-identity is God? We can abstract the truth of self-identity, much like Aristotle and others did, by looking at the world around us: things, if they are at all, are what they are. It doesn't take very much to fully understand what self-identity is.

Is self-identity equivalent to God? I don't see how we can make that assertion. God has properties such as omnipotence, consciousness, perfect love, etc. I would normally say God also has the property of being self-identical, but we're running with the ball that maybe God and self-identity are the same.

When we think of self-identity as simply being that state of affairs in which things are what they are, do we have an exhaustive idea of what self-identity is? Prima facie, that seems to be the case: at no point when we think about self-identity do we find evidence of any sort that leads us to believe it has the properties of being conscious, omnipotent, etc. So whence comes this epistemic leap of saying that self-identity is equivalent to God?

If self-identity is not exactly equivalent to God, then we have trouble with your friend's comments. If we try to say that self-identity is just one part of what God is then we're either saying something nonsensical or we're again reducing self-identity to a property of God. Since I've tackled the latter, let's look at the former.

If self-identity is somehow one part of what God is, even though we can imagine what self-identity is without ever thinking about omnipotence or consciousness, then we're speaking of something non-cognitive: what does it mean to be "part of something," and not being equivalent to it, without being a property of it? Can you name any cognitive examples of how this could be the case?

Cognitive issues aside, a microcosm of the original dilemma shows up. Let's say that it's fair to say we can conceive of what it means for something to be "part of" something else -- without being identical to it -- without being an exemplified property. In fact, this paradox would plague us even if we decided that self-identity "is" God (and vice versa); since God has properties like consciousness.

Can God decide not to be self-identity, or in the other context, can God decide not to have self-identity as a part of Him?

1) If yes, then logic is broken and we have no business even discussing anything -- since God can decide to do absurd things like create Euclidean square-circles or decide to omnisciently "know" that He does not exist at the same time as necessarily existing.

2) If no, then we have a microcosm of my original assertion: if God has no control over whether or not He is self-identity (or part self-identity), then ostensibly God is, again, subject to some higher law of identity: that which makes God the way that He is!

Meow Mix,

We may have hit a wall rather quickly. Note that I am by no means a trained philosopher and I’d be willing to bet you could kick my booty in a debate without much trouble. However, I read enough of this stuff to get by and comprehend more then the laymen at best. So, I naturally talk to more trained folks then I and hence my response above. The following is what was responded to your latest post:

……her response shows only this: she is ignorant of classical theism. E.g., there are no parts in God. Just because a logical concept is not identical with another logical concept (for instance, omnipotence is not the same thing as omnipresence) doesn't mean the reality described by those concepts is itself multifaceted. God is utterly simple. She is far far far out of her league here.

The difficulty with critiquing this person for not really understanding classical theism is that even people like Plantinga don't really understand it. Plantinga makes arguments that aren't that different from some of the stuff that she responded. And Plantinga is among the five or six smartest philosophers alive, without any doubt. Thomists have a long history of using language that nobody else understands, and publishing in journals that nobody else reads. Moreover, we have a long history of profoundly (and usually angrily) disagreeing with one another. How is someone like Plantinga--a person of good will, who genuinely wants to be fair to his philosophical opponents--supposed to feel confident he's got St. Thomas right, when the Thomists can't even agree on it?

But that doesn't undercut in the least the point that too few philosophers have any grasp on Aristotle, and still less on St. Thomas. You can easily get a PhD without ever encountering any medieval philosophy (except maybe the 5 Ways if you take a philosophy of religion class as an undergrad--where they will inevitably be misleadingly presented anyway). And while you're sure to have had to do some ancient Greek philosophy, probably at both the undergrad and graduate level, you can get through that pretty easily without ever feeling you've got a real grasp on Aristotle, especially when the professors are likely to focus in on detailed scholarly problems in Aristotle interpretation, rather than on giving a good overview of what he actually seems to believe.

With that said; It is patently obvious that I am also out of my league. I'd be surprised if most people in this thread understood the complexity of this argument and beyond. Back to reading....

 

[Meow Mix]

Meow Mix,

We may have hit a wall rather quickly. Note that I am by no means a trained philosopher and I’d be willing to bet you could kick my booty in a debate without much trouble. However, I read enough of this stuff to get by and comprehend more then the laymen at best. So, I naturally talk to more trained folks then I and hence my response above. The following is what was responded to your latest post:





With that said; It is patently obvious that I am also out of my league. I'd be surprised if most people in this thread understood the complexity of this argument and beyond. Back to reading....

Hmm, now you've just sort of piqued my interest. Is your friend willing to make a full argument that I might respond to? For instance, can they specify how the concept they argue for is cognitive?

 

[cottage]

quote……'her response shows only this: she is ignorant of classical theism. E.g., there are no parts in God. Just because a logical concept is not identical with another logical concept (for instance, omnipotence is not the same thing as omnipresence) doesn't mean the reality described by those concepts is itself multifaceted. God is utterly simple. She is far far far out of her league here. '

Blimey! That's a rather superior attitude, and it hasn’t answered any of Meowmix’s points.:sad4:

Either God has some controlling power over identity or he does not. If it is said that God has control over self-identity then we’re obliged to speak nonsense, and if does not then he is subject to it.

 

[Quiddity]

Hmm, now you've just sort of piqued my interest. Is your friend willing to make a full argument that I might respond to? For instance, can they specify how the concept they argue for is cognitive?

I've already asked him. He may not want to engage you here however. He hasn't responded yet.

Happy Thanksgiving.

 

[Meow Mix]

I've already asked him. He may not want to engage you here however. He hasn't responded yet.

Happy Thanksgiving.

I can do some other format unless it's Facebook, which I loathe. E-mail maybe? Also, happy thanksgiving to you too

 

[Quiddity]

Blimey! That's a rather superior attitude, and it hasn’t answered any of Meowmix’s points.:sad4:

I know. Not necessarily my style but this guy knows what he's talking about. He feels Meow Mix's argument is not something that renders a response. As his response shows, not many people even understand classical theistic arguments. This is best settled if they dialogue within proximity.

 

[Quiddity]

I can do some other format unless it's Facebook, which I loathe. E-mail maybe? Also, happy thanksgiving to you too

You too? I can't stand it either and I can't imagine he'd want to either. He's kind of a hermit and I'm lucky enough to get to talk to him myself. Let's see what he says.

 

[Meow Mix]

I know. Not necessarily my style but this guy knows what he's talking about. He feels Meow Mix's argument is not something that renders a response. As his response shows, not many people even understand classical theistic arguments. This is best settled if they dialogue within proximity.

I agree that we'd have to settle it in proximity considering I feel the same about his argument that he does about mine -- but who doesn't in a debate, anyway?

 

[Quiddity]

I agree that we'd h ave to settle it in proximtaity considering I feel the same about his argument that he does abou t mine -- but who doesn't in a debate, anyway?

In general that is true, but we may give more credence to certain individuals.

 

[Meow Mix]

In general that is true, but we may give more credence to certain individuals.

Individually we may. I'm not trying to sound like I'm in a peeing contest because this is totally just for fun, but he did sort of neglect to actually respond to my points other than nebulously declaring that I don't understand Thomism.

We'll just have to debate and see. "Sorry, you don't understand this and my knowledge far surpasses your own" doesn't really fly for me as a response or an argument

Again, hard to express that sentiment without sounding defensive. I'm not. I'm just saying.

 

[Quiddity]

Individually we may. I'm not trying to sound like I'm in a peeing contest because this is totally just for fun, but he did sort of neglect to actually respond to my points other than nebulously declaring that I don't understand Thomism.

We'll just have to debate and see. "Sorry, you don't understand this and my knowledge far surpasses your own" doesn't really fly for me as a response or an argument

Again, hard to express that sentiment without sounding defensive. I'm not. I'm just saying.

Honestly, I don't think he ever intended to respond to you directly. It was a response for me to get direction and understanding. So I can understand why you'd take it that way. I doubt a more direct conversation would go this way.