I read more on it and it just might work. I thought that they were going to tell other states how to vote when I see now that all states that make the agreement pool their votes that get awarded an masse.
Thank you for reading and understanding more about the NPVIC. I wish more people would follow your example (on all matters).
I've just now tried to do a little more reading and understanding of the case law concerning interstate compacts. In recent decades the Court has several times reaffirmed, and expounded upon, its holding in
Virginia v. Tennessee with respect to Congressional approval of interstate compacts. In
US Steel v. Multi-state Tax Commission (1978), the Court restated its holding in
New Hampshire v. Maine (1976), in which an agreement between states is not a compact that requires Congressional approval if the agreement does not tend to increase the political power of the states so as to threaten the supremacy of the federal government. Importantly, in
Multi-state Tax, petitioners specifically asked the Court to abandon its precedent that not all interstate agreements or compacts require Congressional approval. The Court stuck with its precedent, and further clarified that when states form a compact or agreement to do something that they have the power to do on their own, it does not tend to increase the states' power such that it may encroach upon federal power (and therefore the compact does not need Congressional approval).
It is clearly within any state's power to direct the appointment of electors who have all agreed to vote for the candidate who gets the most votes in the state, or, alternatively, who have each agreed to vote for the candidate who gets the most votes in particular assigned districts, as Maine and Nebraska currently do. As noted above, it wasn't until well into the 19th century that any state appointed electors who voted for the candidate who got the most votes in the entire state. States are exercising this same power when they appoint their electors who agree to vote for the winner of the national popular vote. Thus, the NPVIC is merely an agreement between states to exercise this power that each state may exercise on its own.
It seems one couldn't come up with a simpler, more direct argument for the constitutionality of a non-Congressionally-approved interstate compact. Nevertheless, given the overwhelming support among the electorate for electing the President by national popular vote, I think it would be a slightly dangerous decision for a member of Congress to vote against approving it or otherwise refuse to approve it (such as a committee chair or the Speaker refusing to bring it for a vote).
You mentioned above that the NPVIC would face a long battle in the courts if enough states enacted it to go into effect. But presumably what will happen is that enough states will enact it to effectuate it, and if Congress doesn't give its approval, the electors in those member states will vote for the winner of the national popular vote in the next election--which, in most elections, would be the winner of the ordinary state-winner-take-all electoral vote anyway. But, even without changing what would be the ultimate outcome of the ordinary electoral college vote, it could easily be a situation such as noted above about California, where the winner of the national popular vote is the Republican candidate, but the Democratic candidate got the most votes in California. Some Californian would surely challenge the constitutionality of the NPVIC then, and the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over such matters, and could quickly issue a
per curiam--although, as it wouldn't change the ultimate outcome of the election in this scenario, it wouldn't be an emergency such as happened in 2000 where the antique Justices have to be roused out of bed and made to decide the case before December 16th or whatever the date is.
On the other hand, it could be a situation in which whether California's electoral votes go to the Republican or Democratic candidate would determine the winner of the national election, and, with California's electors abiding by the non-Congressionally-approved NPVIC and giving their votes to the Republican candidate rather than to the Democratic winner of the state, the NPVIC would immediately be challenged. So the Court would have to rule on the constitutionality of the compact before the December cut-off date. It wouldn't be a long drawn-out case, and there seems to be nothing equivocal in the case law about when Congressional approval is required for an interstate compact. The lawyers for the state would begin and end their defense with the argument that the NPVIC does not entail that a state do anything with respect to its appointment of electors that states cannot ordinarily do on their own, therefore Congressional approval is not required.
I just haven't been able to find any case law by which a plaintiff or court would even begin to argue that a non-Congressionally-approved NPVIC is an unconstitutional exercise of a state's power.
So far it is almost all Democrat states, but it just might work if disappointment in Trump is strong enough.
Although several of the states where it has passed one House presumably have large portions of Republicans (e.g., Arkansas).