There is no consensus regarding the nature of free will and agency in dharmic traditions. Here is an excerpt from a book. What do you think?
Traditions of contemplative practice are inherited and developed by
a number of classical schools including Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Buddhism,
Vedānta, and Kashmiri Śaivism. These schools’ analyses of free will and agency are profoundly influenced by such practice, which is taken to reveal a more accurate picture of selfhood and its capacities than ordinary experience. By appeal to both meditational experience and philosophical analysis, these schools deconstruct the empirical ego into various components and tie such components to more fundamental metaphysical realities and causal processes. Given such a deconstruction, where, if anywhere, are agency and responsibility to be located?Where is the seat of human willing and the origin of human action?
Abhidharma Buddhists argue personal agency and free will make sense from the conventional perspective but not according to the fundamental reality of momentary dharmas . Part of their challenge is to navigate between both registers to make sense of our felt sense of agency and its importance in the pursuit of enlightenment.
Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta conclude that the will is ultimately extrinsic to selfhood, part of a psychological apparatus covering the ā tman with which we identify in our unenlightened way of thinking. These schools typically say that mistakes about agency are a fundamental part of spiritual ignorance. The notion that we are in control, that we are beings who act, is somehow a crucial aspect of the cognitive and affective disorders collectively called avidyā , existential ignorance.
Though it too is a monistic school, Kashmiri Śaivism radically differs from Advaita Vedānta over the issue of individual freedom. For the Advaitins, Brahman, the ultimate reality, does not act, as action implies change and Brahman does not undergo modification of any kind. Therefore, since we are identical to that fundamental reality, the notion of ourselves as volitional beings that can generate change is an illusion. For the Śaivas, however, our individual freedom is an expression of the creative spontaneity of the single reality of Śiva. The error that belies our unenlightenment is not our sense of volitional freedom, but rather our failing to see the identity of our
freedom with God’s own power.
Somewhat akin to the Śaivas, a number of theistic Vedāntins argue that our problem is not that we think we are agents, but rather that we ignore the fact that our agency is derivative of, and in constant negotiation with, the agency of God, who is the supreme Self. They further reflect on individual freedom in relation to a God who creates, sustains, and oversees the universe, yet responds to the loving entreaties of his devotees.