Well, the information here was still a state of a physical device. It is still true that information is 'tied to a physical representation'. The crucial fact here is that information isn't simply negative entropy. And that is a very significant fact. It may well open things up to 'zero-energy' computation.
On the contrary, that is precisely what is at the heart of his scenario: the question is the difference between logical irreversibility and physical irreversibility. The latter does always produce an entropic effect. The former is now know not to in some cases.
In any case, the topic of this thread concerns what “physical” means. Does Landauer's assertion that “information is physical” contradict Norbert Wierner's statement in Cybernetics, “Information is information, not matter or energy”?
Weiner was considering a mathematical analysis and divorced himself from the physical aspects in order to do his analysis. There will still be the question of how information is produced or exists in the real world.
I see the term 'physical' as being defined inductively: start with any particular material thing (like the chair in my room). Declare that to be physical. Then, anything that interacts with something physical is also defined to be physical. So, light, neutrinos, bosons, etc are all physical.
I see information as being our description of a physical situation. When the system changes, so does our description, and hence the information does also. Furthermore, we assign certain physical states to have meanings *we* give to them: in the experiment mentioned above, the information was the amount of twist in a piece of material. In modern computers, the information is the voltage in certain electrical lines.
Finally, the phrase 'useful purpose in the context of metaphysics' is self-contradictory: metaphysics is never useful.
This best describes my understanding also. Very nice description.