What If Consciousness Comes First?

[bobhikes]

All this tells me is that you are calling something 'conscious' that I do not. So we are looking at different phenomena.

I think that is important. It means there are at least two *different* things people are inclined to call 'conscious' and perhaps we should start to distinguish them more clearly.

What you seem to be pointing to is 'sensitivity', which is some sort of reaction to an environment.

What i am talking about is the ability to model one's own internal state and react to same.

That's the problem as I said most scientific study seem's to limit what consciousness can be and then Looks at the newest model because that's the one we have at hand and can relate to. Its like taking today's computer and trying to figure out how it works without any knowledge of anything that led up to it. I mean Machine Language and DOS don't exist anymore, paper punch, 5 1/4 Floppy drives we don't need to know about them to understand how today's computer works.

 

[Howard Is]

That's the problem as I said most scientific study seem's to limit what consciousness can be and then Looks at the newest model because that's the one we have at hand and can relate to. Its like taking today's computer and trying to figure out how it works without any knowledge of anything that led up to it. I mean Machine Language and DOS don't exist anymore, paper punch, 5 1/4 Floppy drives we don't need to know about them to understand how today's computer works.

They do still exist, but have been incorporated into a higher level construct.
A flagellate is an amoeba with a tail.

The amoeba was only ‘conscious’ of the presence or absence of nutrient. A flagellate can move in the absence of nutrient.

If we don’t understand an amoeba, we don’t understand a flagellate.

 

[sun rise]

I don't think the question of what makes this a hard problem has been answered in full. Hard problem of consciousness - Scholarpedia has a great discussion.

The hard problem contrasts with so-called easy problems, such as explaining how the brain integrates information, categorizes and discriminates environmental stimuli, or focuses attention. Such phenomena are functionally definable. That is, roughly put, they are definable in terms of what they allow a subject to do. So, for example, if mechanisms that explain how the brain integrates information are discovered, then the first of the easy problems listed would be solved. The same point applies to all other easy problems: they concern specifying mechanisms that explain how functions are performed. For the easy problems, once the relevant mechanisms are well understood, there is little or no explanatory work left to do.

Experience does not seem to fit this explanatory model (though some reductionists argue that, on reflection, it does; see the section on reductionism below). Although experience is associated with a variety of functions, explaining how those functions are performed would still seem to leave important questions unanswered. We would still want to know why their performance is accompanied by experience, and why this or that kind of experience rather than another kind. So, for example, even when we find something that plays the causal role of pain, e.g. something that is caused by nerve stimulation and that causes recoil and avoidance, we can still ask why the particular experience of hurting, as opposed to, say, itching, is associated with that role. Such problems are hard problems.

 

[Twilight Hue]

This is, to me, an interesting Psychology Today piece It is a discussion of how pure consciousness is a mandatory part of existence.

Despite the success of neuroscience in establishing a wide range of correlations between brain processes and conscious experience, there is at least one question about the relationship between the brain and consciousness that continues to appear unanswerable, even in principle. This is the question of why we have conscious experience at all.


The problem is that there could conceivably be brains that perform all the same sensory and decision-making functions as ours but in which there is no conscious experience. That is, there could be brains that react as though sad but that don’t feel sadness, brains that can discriminate between wavelengths of light but that don’t see red or yellow or blue or any other color, brains that direct their bodies to eat certain foods but that don’t taste them. So why is there nevertheless something that it’s like to be us?
...
The issue is that physical properties are by their nature relational, dispositional properties. That is, they describe the way that something is related to other things and/or has the disposition to affect or be affected by those other things. Most notably, physical properties describe the way that something affects an outside observer of that thing. But there is something going on in conscious experience that goes beyond how that conscious experience affects people looking at it from the outside. For this reason, the “what it’s like” to be a conscious mind can’t be described in the purely relational, dispositional terms accessible to science. There’s just no way to get there from here.

This explanatory gap is what is now commonly referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness...

if the universe is to actually exist, its properties can’t be exclusively relational/dispositional. Something in the universe has to have some kind of quality in and of itself to give all the other relational/dispositional properties any meaning. Something has to get the ball rolling.

That something (at least in our universe) is consciousness.

I don't think consciousness is central to the universe . Consciousness is basically the emergent result of matter. Much like seeing is the emergent result of having eyes.

 

[Aupmanyav]

'Psychology Today' is not a scientific journal, it is a professional journal. That is why it starts with 'Find a therapist". You cannot take what all is published in that journal as 'scientific research'. The therapists may have any kind of belief. The writer has presented her belief. That may be her strategy. I hope the religious will throng to her - 'now here is a therapist who understands things'. However, I would not have gone to such a therapist who believes in 'paranormal', had I the need of any therapy.

 

[Martin]

I don't think consciousness is central to the universe . Consciousness is basically the emergent result of matter. Much like seeing is the emergent result of having eyes.

Perhaps, though consciousness Is central to our "personal universe", ie everything we experience.

 

[Mock Turtle]

For me, consciousness very similar to what we experience as humans must exist in many other species (hard to argue it doesn't occur in our closest relatives), and hence at some point in the past whatever was the primitive precursor for consciousness must have transitioned into something more complex. So perhaps any answers we seek will come about from studying other species rather than humans. I think it highly likely that there is a continuum.

 

[PruePhillip]

This is, to me, an interesting Psychology Today piece It is a discussion of how pure consciousness is a mandatory part of existence.

Despite the success of neuroscience in establishing a wide range of correlations between brain processes and conscious experience, there is at least one question about the relationship between the brain and consciousness that continues to appear unanswerable, even in principle. This is the question of why we have conscious experience at all.


The problem is that there could conceivably be brains that perform all the same sensory and decision-making functions as ours but in which there is no conscious experience. That is, there could be brains that react as though sad but that don’t feel sadness, brains that can discriminate between wavelengths of light but that don’t see red or yellow or blue or any other color, brains that direct their bodies to eat certain foods but that don’t taste them. So why is there nevertheless something that it’s like to be us?
...
The issue is that physical properties are by their nature relational, dispositional properties. That is, they describe the way that something is related to other things and/or has the disposition to affect or be affected by those other things. Most notably, physical properties describe the way that something affects an outside observer of that thing. But there is something going on in conscious experience that goes beyond how that conscious experience affects people looking at it from the outside. For this reason, the “what it’s like” to be a conscious mind can’t be described in the purely relational, dispositional terms accessible to science. There’s just no way to get there from here.

This explanatory gap is what is now commonly referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness...

if the universe is to actually exist, its properties can’t be exclusively relational/dispositional. Something in the universe has to have some kind of quality in and of itself to give all the other relational/dispositional properties any meaning. Something has to get the ball rolling.

That something (at least in our universe) is consciousness.

Can't figure out what you are saying here. But I do like the work by Peter Fenwick. He suggests
that consciousness occurs in clinically dead brains.

 

[Polymath257]

Notice I said ‘mysterious’ thing called consciousness. It is what gives us subjective experiencing. A computer can never feel but only mimic. I don’t see complexity creating a new thing that didn’t exist when simpler.

You keep saying that a computer can never feel. I don't see why not. If it has the circuitry and enough feedback, that *is* feeling.

All that 'feeelin' is is an awareness that we are getting sensory input. I really don't see any 'new thiing' involved here.

 

[Polymath257]

What if consciousness and form are coemergent ?

Are we confusing consciousness and behaviour ?

From the article -
“The problem is that there could conceivably be brains that perform all the same sensory and decision-making functions as ours but in which there is no conscious experience. That is, there could be brains that react as though sad but that don’t feel sadness, brains that can discriminate between wavelengths of light but that don’t see red or yellow or blue or any other color, brains that direct their bodies to eat certain foods but that don’t taste them

This is also true for AI.
Conflating complex behaviour with consciousness/awareness is an error I see repeatedly in these discussions.

Maybe the dichotomy of substance and awareness is false.

My position is that I specifically deny the bold part you quoted. I really don't think it is conceivable to have a brain with the same decision making and sensory capabilities without it being conscious. If it is interacting in the same way and physically the same, then it will have *all* properties the same, including consciousness.

 

[Polymath257]

But where is there any change in type between complex Mathematical software and an complex human mimicking program for example? One needs to be treated ethically and the other like common inanimate matter???,

Where is the difference between the complex human and the less complex housefly? Why morality with one and not the other?

One major difference is that of self-consciousness--being able to model ones own internal state. Another big difference is that of 'theory of mind'--being able to model the internal state of others.

 

[Polymath257]

Yes. So that's what I'm saying - molecules clearly don't "think" - but they do 'experience' and relate to one another and to their environment (e-m fields etc.) - what I am suggesting is that perhaps what we call consciousness is just a more complex way of relating to our environment that emerges when you have sufficiently many 'experiencing' things networked in a sufficiently complex arrangement - like sufficiently many water molecules experiencing and relating to one another and to their environment makes a drop or a pool of liquid water. There is nothing 'liquid' about an individual water molecule; there is nothing 'conscious' about an individual neuron.

Exactly. Emergent phenomena are very common. No atom has a pressure, but a roomful of atoms does. No single atom has a temperature, but a roomful of atoms does.

In a more complex situation, no single molecule in the human body is alive, but the collection of them is. It is how they are organized and interact that determines whether we are alive.

And, for the case in point, no single neuron is conscious. But the collection of them in the brain is. It is a matter of how the neurons are organized and interact with themselves and the outside world that determines whether they are conscious.

These are ALL emergent phenomena.

 

[blü 2]

This is, to me, an interesting Psychology Today piece It is a discussion of how pure consciousness is a mandatory part of existence.

Despite the success of neuroscience in establishing a wide range of correlations between brain processes and conscious experience, there is at least one question about the relationship between the brain and consciousness that continues to appear unanswerable, even in principle. This is the question of why we have conscious experience at all.


The problem is that there could conceivably be brains that perform all the same sensory and decision-making functions as ours but in which there is no conscious experience. That is, there could be brains that react as though sad but that don’t feel sadness, brains that can discriminate between wavelengths of light but that don’t see red or yellow or blue or any other color, brains that direct their bodies to eat certain foods but that don’t taste them. So why is there nevertheless something that it’s like to be us?
...
The issue is that physical properties are by their nature relational, dispositional properties. That is, they describe the way that something is related to other things and/or has the disposition to affect or be affected by those other things. Most notably, physical properties describe the way that something affects an outside observer of that thing. But there is something going on in conscious experience that goes beyond how that conscious experience affects people looking at it from the outside. For this reason, the “what it’s like” to be a conscious mind can’t be described in the purely relational, dispositional terms accessible to science. There’s just no way to get there from here.

This explanatory gap is what is now commonly referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness...

if the universe is to actually exist, its properties can’t be exclusively relational/dispositional. Something in the universe has to have some kind of quality in and of itself to give all the other relational/dispositional properties any meaning. Something has to get the ball rolling.

That something (at least in our universe) is consciousness.

Two interesting things about consciousness.

First, to speak of consciousness is not to know in any firm sense what you're talking about. Many have tried to define it, and many reading their definitions have nodded ─ see eg the opening two paras here ─ but none of them can tell us what evidence would establish whether an ant, or an oak, or your computer, is conscious or not.

Second, consciousness in the sense of self-awareness or knowing you're being, is greatly overrated. The real heavy lifting in the brain is done by the nonconscious parts. For a simple example, where are these words in the quarter-second before I type them? Not in my consciousness; nor is the editor that suppresses my fingers when they move to indelicacy of expression (though the conscious me may notice afterwards that this happened). Or these noted experiments from 2008 showing that it may be many seconds before your conscious brain finds out what your unconscious brain has already decided and may already be acting on.

It never hurts to be careful of the woo factor in discussions on science.

 

[Samantha Rinne]

You are right. Consciousness does come first. We are Spiritual beings in our true natures. We are installed in our physical bodies after birth when long term memories become possible.

Here is where the real problem stems. When we are in our physical bodies, there is so much sensory input that soon one is seduced into thinking this physical world is all there is. Some of the youngest children can still tell the difference.

After learning about this physical world and convinced through the sensory belief this physical world is all there is, one starts to define oneself based on the laws of this physical universe. One ignores the spiritual world because from within a physical body, it simply is.

Since, one tries to base things within this physical world, one quickly discovers the spiritual world comes with an entirely different set of parameters. It is almost impossible to place physical laws on a Spiritual being. On the other hand, there is an interface. The connection is in the brain. Perhaps further study is required.

Even with people's solid belief this physical world is all there is, science is reaching further. Quantum physics is bringing a much different look at this solid physical universe. I see the interconnect as being at the quantum level. On the other hand, after being seduced by the input of this physical world, it is hard for many to conceive of a place without time and space where there are no physical limits.

We can run but we can't hide who we are. People struggle and struggle to acquire so many physical things but aren't the Spiritual ones, the things that really count? Example: Look back at all the gifts you received throughout your life. Which ones do you remember? Which are more important to you? It will always be the ones that touched you spiritually.

As I see it, this physical world exists for only one reason. It's time based causality nature is Perfect for learning. It supplies the foundation by which we can Discover what our choices really mean. It's education at it's best. We are living our lessons. This physical world supplies the structure by which we can not avoid the learning.

Not just that, it's blatantly obvious.

Think about life and death for a second.

A dead body is inert carbon-based matter, a body which while living had water, body heat, the ability to sweat, the growth of hair, etc, etc, etc. Some of these, like growth of hair and nails continue past death, but for the most part things general stop working.

Without whatever is inside the body ("soul", "consciousness", "vital energy", etc) actually inside the body, the body very quickly breaks down. How quickly? Well, first off, you do not hear of homeless people getting eaten alive by insects or worms. I suppose it happens in the Amazon, but in Central Park of NYC they have to kind of die first. This means that the healthy body has a sort of protection beyond what we see as skin. But not just that. Without ummmm we'll call this thing soul to offend as many as possible, the body literally explodes from its own gases (a bit after 3 days), turns green (10 days), and completely liquifies (about a month). 70 years intact while alive, completely decayed in about a month with no intervention from others.

The Stages Of Human Decomposition | Aftermath Services

We haven't even talked about afterlife, and I've already shown just how silly the notion that all we are is physical matter is.

 

[cladking]

I think the problem is that scientist don't look at intelligence right. If I told you batrium, mushrooms or grass blades all have intelligence you'd look at me funny. They only see animal intelligence which limits there ability to view consciousness. Many forms of intelliegence do not share our emotions or discriminate different forms of light many forms eat without tasting and can't see or hear. If you follow the intelligence trail you will see it and consciousness developed in all life.

I think if we are ever to learn about consciousness and study it we must first define it "that which nature bestows upon all living things to assure the survival of the individual".

We can't see this for a multitude of reasons from our indirect understanding of reality and our own thought to beliefs about "intelligence" and "lower life forms". Despite the fact that no two identical things exist in the universe we believe in "species" and even "consciousnesses". We overlook the individual whether we're counting apples or aliens. The fact that our consciousness is different than that of any squirrel or oak tree is hardly apparent which leaves the oak tree better at understanding consciousness than any human.

Humans are the odd man out. We are too far removed from our own consciousness to understand its nature and simplicity. We must experience the complexity of our beliefs to experience thought. Thought is the complexity of everything we believe but squirrels and oak trees have no beliefs.

 

[George-ananda]

You keep saying that a computer can never feel. I don't see why not. If it has the circuitry and enough feedback, that *is* feeling.

All that 'feeelin' is is an awareness that we are getting sensory input. I really don't see any 'new thiing' involved here.

How does the computer feel differently if someone tells then they love them or they hate them. It all looks like electrons taking somewhat different paths through logic gates. Where is the 'feel'? Where is a 'part' in that process that can 'feel'? The same logic circuits are used by both processes.

Yes I am saying with animate beings there is something 'More'. That mysterious thing called qualia. What is it? This life force ANIMATES and its essence can not be understood as a process. It is fundamental (not created through matter). We can try to understand something that is fundamental but in the end 'it just is'.

 

[George-ananda]

Where is the difference between the complex human and the less complex housefly? Why morality with one and not the other?

There is morality towards even the animal world. Yes, pest creatures must be dealt with and sometimes killed but there should never be an uncaring disposition to needless suffering. Like a teacher scolding boys on a playground that are picking parts off a live grasshopper for example. Can you envision a similar type of concern for an old computer or something?

 

[cladking]

Where is the 'feel'? Where is a 'part' in that process that can 'feel'?

In humans it's called the "amygdala". It simply provides the net vector sum of experience on the individual.

We can't see it from here.

 

[George-ananda]

In humans it's called the "amygdala". It simply provides the net vector sum of the effects of experience on the individual.

We can't see it from here.

But that is still side-stepping the 'hard' problem. Is not this amygdala composed of individual pieces of matter. What experiences this activity? You must still be postulating a mysterious step to find an 'experiencer' of this activity.

 

[Polymath257]

How does the computer feel differently if someone tells then they love them or they hate them. It all looks like electrons taking somewhat different paths through logic gates. Where is the 'feel'? Where is a 'part' in that process that can 'feel'? The same logic circuits are used by both processes.

How do *we* feel different when we love versus when we hate? It's just a neural impulse going one way as opposed to another, after all.

The point is that that pattern of firing of the neurons *is* the feeling.

Yes I am saying with animate beings there is something 'More'. That mysterious thing called qualia. What is it? This life force ANIMATES and its essence can not be understood as a process. It is fundamental (not created through matter). We can try to understand something that is fundamental but in the end 'it just is'.

And I see no evidence of such a mysterious thing. A quale is simply the state of responding to some sensory input, right? When you respond, that *is* the feeling.

There is no such 'life force' other than chemistry. This *is* how matter works in complicated situations such as in living things. EVERYTHING we know about life shows that it is ultimately a matter of the atoms interacting with each other--physics and chemistry.