What is the Definition of Atheism?

[blü 2]

The problem with defining atheism succinctly is that there are many kinds of theism of various amounts of definitional rigor.

For instance if someone believes in a god that specifically has the property "flooded the world mere thousands of years ago," this is a concept of a god that can easily be refuted with empirical evidence. It's easy to say that this god does not exist.

However if someone defines their god much more nebulously, such as if they only say "god is an omnipotent, omniscient being that created the universe," this is much more difficult to outright refute. So a reasonable person in this instance doesn't say "this thing does not exist," they may merely sit on the position that they're not convinced it does exist until more evidence is forthcoming.

For these reasons, the most widely encompassing definition of atheism would simply be to at least abstain from affirming any theistic propositions as true.

To which we could add that God's essential qualities ─ omnipotence, omniscience, as you mention, omnipresence and perfection often included ─ are, as far as our knowledge of reality is concerned, all imaginary, all lacking even a hypothetical basis by which they could be elements of reality.

But all consistent with the observation that the only way supernatural beings and magic are known to exist is as concepts and things imagined in individual brains.

 

[Meow Mix]

To which we could add that God's essential qualities ─ omnipotence, omniscience, as you mention, omnipresence and perfection often included ─ are, as far as our knowledge of reality is concerned, all imaginary, all lacking even a hypothetical basis by which they could be elements of reality.

But all consistent with the observation that the only way supernatural beings and magic are known to exist is as concepts and things imagined in individual brains.

These terms can be defined reasonably well enough; they can be logically possible. Among my list of complaints about theism, that one would be pretty low, personally. But I understand the sentiment.

 

[blü 2]

These terms can be defined reasonably well enough; they can be logically possible. Among my list of complaints about theism, that one would be pretty low, personally. But I understand the sentiment.

I don't see how ─ in the light of what we presently know about reality ─ any being could be omnipotent. Nor how the data constituting omniscience could be obtained, ordered, stored and retrieved. In both cases problems of self-reference will arise, Gödel's theorems being one kind of example. Nor do I see how a being could know there was nothing [he] didn't know [he] didn't know. Imaginable isn't the same as possible.

 

[Meow Mix]

I don't see how ─ in the light of what we presently know about reality ─ any being could be omnipotent. Nor how the data constituting omniscience could be obtained, ordered, stored and retrieved. In both cases problems of self-reference will arise, Gödel's theorems being one kind of example. Nor do I see how a being could know there was nothing [he] didn't know [he] didn't know. Imaginable isn't the same as possible.

Possible is imaginable at least, but there are sometimes problems where a person thinks they have imagined a thing but they have really not (such as sets of all sets in Russell’s paradox: initially thought to be a meaningful concept, but shown to be cognitively empty).

But I maintain that if something is actually imaginable (with cognitive content, as an addendum) then it is logically possible.

So for instance with omnipotence, usually this is sterilized of inconsistency by being defined as the capacity to actualize any logically possible states of affairs (so no immovable objects meeting irresistible forces).

Similar constraints are placed on the other omni-traits.

I don’t dismiss your arguments at all though, they’re quite good and interesting. Objecting to omni-traits is just low on my list of complaints about theism unless they’re egregiously poorly defined, such as with the self-refutations and inconsistencies you’ve made explicit.

 

[Audie]

Seems simple to me.
I don't believe in "god".
Name one, I don't believe in it.

 

[blü 2]

Possible is imaginable at least, but there are sometimes problems where a person thinks they have imagined a thing but they have really not (such as sets of all sets in Russell’s paradox: initially thought to be a meaningful concept, but shown to be cognitively empty).

But I maintain that if something is actually imaginable (with cognitive content, as an addendum) then it is logically possible.

So for instance with omnipotence, usually this is sterilized of inconsistency by being defined as the capacity to actualize any logically possible states of affairs (so no immovable objects meeting irresistible forces).

Similar constraints are placed on the other omni-traits.

I don’t dismiss your arguments at all though, they’re quite good and interesting. Objecting to omni-traits is just low on my list of complaints about theism unless they’re egregiously poorly defined, such as with the self-refutations and inconsistencies you’ve made explicit.

Thanks.

It may have occurred to you that one thing an omnipotent being can't do is occupy the same reality as another omnipotent being; and for that reason, likewise can't make a perfect copy of [him]self.

 

[PureX]

@PureX

I could argue that the term has come to mean differently for many (most?) self-described atheists; and I could probably get somewhere with that. However, I have been in atheism-defining discussions for so much of my life that I'm well past it.

Many atheists try to make distinctions like soft or weak atheism vs. hard or strong atheism, explicit vs. implicit atheism, so on and so forth. There are people that insist that atheism must be a blanket denial of all theistic propositions, even ones for which they don't have evidence either way for.

Even agnosticism can be disputable as a term. Some maintain that, as Huxley defined it, agnosticism isn't just a lack of knowledge but specifically the position that a thing can't be known.

So I think I was arguing less that "this is what these terms definitely mean" and more that "nobody anywhere agrees on these terms, so I try to just be explicit when I describe my situation." I also just avoid the terms at all to avoid that huge mountain of baggage they come with in the first place.

Yes, I agree. Sadly, the more positions we allow the term "atheism" to include, the less actual information the term conveys, until it becomes nearly useless at conveying any pertinent information at all. Which is why I suggest that we all use those OTHER terms that already convey the more specific individual positions: like 'indifferent', skeptical', 'undecided', 'undetermined', 'indeterminate', 'non-religious', anti-religious', and then 'atheism' only for the negation of theism as a whole.

 

[Revoltingest]

Seems simple to me.
I don't believe in "god".
Name one, I don't believe in it.

I'd have made "god" plural....because I'm so multi-cultural.

 

[PureX]

Seems simple to me.
I don't believe in "god".
Name one, I don't believe in it.

And yet the possible existence of God remains, regardless.

 

[Revoltingest]

And yet the possible existence of God remains, regardless.

But we just don't believe in it / him / her / them.

 

[McBell]

And yet the possible existence of God remains, regardless.

And?
I mean, so what?
What does the possibility of god existing have to do with lacking belief in god?

 

[PureX]

But we just don't believe in it / him / her / them.

I really don't see how that matters. Believing doesn't make anyone right, or wrong. God either is or is not, and we have no way of knowing if, or how. So "believing" is just self-deception. Nothing more.

On the other hand, we can choose to trust in the possibility, or to reject it. Each of which will have consequences for us.

 

[Revoltingest]

I really don't see how that matters. Believing doesn't make anyone right, or wrong. God either is or is not, and we have no way of knowing if, or how. So "believing" is just self-deception. Nothing more.

On the other hand, we can choose to trust in the possibility, or to reject it. Each of which will have consequences for us.

It seems that you object to our disbelief.
Meh....

 

[PureX]

And?
I mean, so what?
What does the possibility of god existing have to do with lacking belief in god?

"Belief" is just self-deception. There's little value in that, if any. Forget "belief", and focus on the possibility, and the choices that the possibility affords us. The choice to imagine the absolute best 'god-possibility', and then to trust in it through our actions. Or not to. Because these have will real consequences in our lives.

 

[PureX]

It seems that you object to our disbelief.
Meh....

I don't care about your belief or your 'disbelief'. It's all just silly hubris, to me. I'm interested in acts of faith. Because they have real consequences.

 

[McBell]

"Belief" is just self-deception. There's little value in that, if any. Forget "belief", and focus on the possibility, and the choices that the possibility affords us. The choice to imagine the best possibility, and then to trust in it through our actions. Or not to. Because these have will real consequences in our lives.

ROTFLMAO
Your belief in the possibility....

 

[PureX]

ROTFLMAO
Your belief in the possibility....

I have no "belief" in any gods. I am agnostic. But I can see the value in trusting in the ideal possibility, via action.

 

[McBell]

I have no "belief" in any gods. I am agnostic. But I can see the value in trusting in the ideal possibility, via action.

That is nice and all, but what does it have to do with the post it is in reply to?

 

[PureX]

That is nice and all, but what does it have to do with the post it is in reply to?

It is correcting a misconception.

 

[McBell]

It is correcting a misconception.

A "misconception" that you put in it.
I said nor implied anything about god.
YOU jumped there all on your own.

I was merely pointing out your inconsistency:

Forget beliefs, believe in possibility....​