Why was consciousness naturally selected?

[Gambit]

it is merely an assumption that consciousness is an epiphenomenon. it can also be assumed that consciousness is both effect and cause.

This presupposes free will and thus dualism, not materialism.

 

[Gambit]

Well, you can't, lol. They are two completely different things. You cannot define one in terms of the other without introducing an indirect logical circularity.

It is actually pretty easy to see why you cannot interchange them.

You said subjectivity presupposes consciousness. If the two things are interchangeable, then I can replace one with the other without changing the meaning of the sentence, can't I?

If I do that, then I come to the conclusion that subjectivity presupposes subjectivity. Or consciousness presupposes consciousness. Which are obviously logically absurd. Nothing presupposes its existence in order to exist.

Is that correct? If not, why not?

Perhaps I employed the wrong term. Subjectivity is consciousness; consciousness is subjectivity.

 

[Gambit]

I just don't understand what you mean.

What exactly is it that you don't understand?

 

[LuisDantas]

What exactly is it that you don't understand?

For one thing, in which sense does a thermostat not sense temperature?

 

[Ouroboros]

Of course, all living organisms are conscious because conscious is a brute fact of existence. Anyone who has given this a modicum of intelligent reflection would come to the same conclusion.

Thank you. I actually agree.

I see consciousness as an integral part of reality. Not separate, however, as some people think (like dualism), but in a unity.

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

On the materialist view, consciousness is considered an epiphenomenon. That is, it is a causally inert by-product. (To argue otherwise is to presuppose free will and therefore dualism.) So, this raises the question: Why was consciousness naturally selected?

Materialism is a canard for this issue.

But to answer the question, free will, choosing, is the optimal solution to many survival problems. Choosing provides unpredictability for prey and predators, in escape and attack. Varying the use of muscles freely, reduces wear and tear on them. etc. the capability to choose is an essential survival trait in many ways.

But just choosing is spirit, not yet consciousness IMO. To speak of consciousness an organism should have a representation of the environment, and be able to choose within that representation of the environment.

I am not sure if that would be a very complicated task. It seems to me you kind of automatically get a representation from the environment because the environment sends the information by light and such. And the receiving system would only just be a sort of empty set to be filled with environmental information. Making something empty doesn't seem so complicated. So I would expect many simple organisms to also have variations of consciousness, maybe down to bacteria.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Shouting expletives at me does not qualify as a counterargument.

I can’t counter something you haven’t provided. Making claims does not constitute an argument, especially when you contradict yourself:

On the materialist view, consciousness is considered an epiphenomenon.

Technically speaking, epiphenomenalism actually qualifies as a form of dualism

Consciousness is inherently subjective, not objective. As such, it is not amenable to the methodology of the physical sciences which require objectivity. This fact alone invalidates materialism.

What is that methodology? Because on the one hand we have your claims and references to dictionaries and wikipedia. On the other, we have those who actually work in the physical sciences and other sciences and their actual research and actual methods, such as that in or reviewed in e.g.,:


Bob, P. (2011). Brain, Mind and Consciousness: Advances in Neuroscience Research. Springer.


Green, H. S. (2000). Information Theory and Quantum Physics: Physical Foundations for Understanding the Conscious Process.Springer.


Irvine, E. (2013). Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective (Studies in Brain and Mind Vol. 5). Springer.


Klemm, W. R. (2011). Atoms of Mind: The" Ghost in the Machine" Materializes. Springer.


Laureys, S. (Ed.). (2006). The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology (Progress in Brain Research Vol. 150). Elsevier.


Libet, B. (2009). Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness (Perspectives in Cognitive Neuroscience). Harvard University Press.


Perlovsky, L. I., & Kozma, R. (Eds.). (2007). Neurodynamics of Cognition and Consciousness (Understanding Complex Systems). Springer.


Perry, E. K., Collerton, D., LeBeau, F. E., & Ashton, H. (Eds.). (2010). New Horizons in the Neuroscience of Consciousness (Advances in Consciousness Research Vol. 79). John Benjamins.


Peruzzi, A. (Ed.). (2004). Mind and Causality (Advances in Consciousness Research Vol. 55). John Benjamins.


Seager, W. (2012). Natural Fabrications: Science, Emergence and Consciousness. Springer.


Taylor, J. G. (2013). Solving the Mind-Body Problem by the CODAM Neural Model of Consciousness (Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems Vol. 9)


Tuszynski, J. A. (Ed.) (2006). The Emerging Physics of Consciousness. Springer.


Van Loocke, P. (Ed.). (2001). The physical nature of consciousness (Advances in Consciousness Research Vol. 29). John Benjamins.


And for a sample of research/review papers:


Augustenborg, C. C. (2010). The Endogenous Feedback Network: A new approach to the comprehensive study of consciousness. Consciousness and cognition, 19(2), 547-579.


Edelman, D. B., Baars, B. J., & Seth, A. K. (2005). Identifying hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species. Consciousness and cognition, 14(1), 169-187.


Hameroff, S. (2001). Consciousness, the brain, and spacetime geometry. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 929(1), 74-104.


John, E. R. (2002). The neurophysics of consciousness. Brain Research Reviews, 39(1), 1-28.


Perlovsky, L. I. (2006). Toward physics of the mind: Concepts, emotions, consciousness, and symbols. Physics of Life Reviews, 3(1), 23-55.


Taylor, J. G. (2005). Mind and consciousness: Towards a final answer? Physics of Life Reviews, 2(1), 1-45.


Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC neuroscience, 5(1), 42.


Why, if consciousness “is not amenable to the methodology of the physical sciences”, do we find edited volume after edited volume in series dedicated to the application of such methods to the study of consciousness, multiple journals of the same, various monographs by those in the physical sciences presenting in-depth research, and countless research paper (and reviews of the research) within the physical sciences? What methods are lacking in such studies that are found everywhere else such that your statement is defensible?

Quantum entanglement (nonlocality) and quantum indeterminism have simply rendered materialism obsolete. Why? Because if some phenomenon doesn't have a physical cause, then it doesn't have a physical explanation

First, phenomena in general do not lend themselves to causal explanations and never have. Particular dynamics of a particular system may require a causal model for materialists, but as I already said I think physicalism is not just a better term but the more frequent one and in it we deal with modern physics, in which not every physical system is made up of or out of “material” or “matter.” Second, Newtonian gravity was nonlocal, and unlike entanglement in which under certain assumptions we can assert there is some unknown nonlocal “connection” (a causal link), in Newtonian physics gravity exerted a clear, strongly nonlocal effect (hence Einstein’s problem with it- if the Sun were to disappear, Newtonian physics would have us believe that we’d feel effects of the Sun’s vanished gravitational force several minutes before we could even see that the Sun was not there). So were you correct, materialists have been obviously wrong since natural philosophy turned into physics and other natural sciences. Third, Newtonian gravity (along with potential energy, work and most of the explanations for motion within classical mechanics) were not physical. Gravity in classical physics is a measure of a nonlocal causal effect of “attraction” between bodies with mass, while in general relativity it is explained physically through spacetime curvature. Fourth, quantum indeterminism doesn’t say anything about a cause or an explanation but the precision with which we can measure properties of systems. Fifth, the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics is that of a procedure whereby we can predict the outcomes of experiments. Quantum systems are mathematical entities and QM irreducibly statistical. I think this is a cop-out and while in practice it works well it means abandoning much of what physics is. However, nothing about what physics is says we must have a physical explanation for all phenomena, as physics involved non-physical explanations since before it was “physics.”

If a phenomenon does not reduce to the physical, then it is not physical.

First, what is “the physical”? Is energy physical? What about fields (i.e., field theory as it is used by mathematicians and physicists within physics but not mathematics in general)? Second, reductionism need not be constructivist. If, for example, I can’t tell you the final configuration state of a sandpile but can, given that configuration, explain it within the constraints of the laws of physics, I have reduced the explanation of the outcome without being able to reduce the dynamics of the system such that I could have “constructed” a model in advance that would give me the final configuration state. Third, as a philosophical or metaphysical position, reductionism (especially in its most extreme forms) had little evidence going for it before the 18th & 19th centuries, was never generally accepted as the only model other than dualism, and was a by-product of the concept of a deterministic universe (itself simply a by-product of the success of mechanics which seemed to be deterministic and which certainly largely was, but as classical physics was never completed the best that could be argued was there was no empirical evidence for ontological indeterminacy). Models of systems which involve functional processes by definition invoke causal, non-physical factors governing a system’s dynamics, but these kinds of phenomena have been accepted as part of physicalism for a long time. Finally, when with Susskind we recognize that "from what we've learned, both from string theory, from the quantum mechanics of gravity, and so forth, that modern theories really do spell the end of reductionism" it isn’t because of phenomena not having physical causes necessarily but due to other aspects of the reductive program, such as that not only is the whole entirely explained by the dynamics of its parts but that these parts are simpler and ultimately atomistic (in the Atomism of ancient Greece, i.e., there is some ultimately irreducible component or set of components out of which all physical systems are made) as we go from the top down. Even were we able to explain behavior & nature of the most fundamental constituents of all physical systems in terms of physical causes and such that we could predict absolutely (at least in theory) the dynamics of any physical system, reductionism can still fail because these fundamental constituents are not simpler and are themselves capable of being explained in terms of one another.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

Choosing provides unpredictability for prey and predators, in escape and attack. Varying the use of muscles freely, reduces wear and tear on them. etc. the capability to choose is an essential survival trait in many ways.

But such choices are only consciously made in the higher mammals. It's mostly instinctual, and even humans retain a strong instinctual response, eg "fight or flight". This all results from the evolutionary principle of survival of the fittest.

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

But such choices are only consciously made in the higher mammals. It's mostly instinctual, and even humans retain a strong instinctual response, eg "fight or flight". This all results from the evolutionary principle of survival of the fittest.

Since you previously rejected the creationist concept of choosing, what you are talking about is sorting processes of what an organism is to do, not choosing.

Sorting is forced not free. The result of sorting is inevitable given the sortingcriteria and the data to be sorted. No doubt there are sortingprocesses taking place, but this would not require consciousness, because nothing needs to be decided in a sortingprocess, it only needs to be computed. One can ofcourse combine sorting with choosing.

Forced behaviour does not provide for unpredictability in escape and attack, choosing does. And when organisms make such choices, then we can, subjectively, form the opinion that the spirit in which such a choice is made expresses fear, or courage or whatever. It is social darwinism to say otherwise, the naturalistic fallacy.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

Forced behaviour does not provide for unpredictability in escape and attack, choosing does

I didn't say that choices weren't being made, I said they were being made instinctively and unconsciously. When a lion is stalking a zebra for example, the zebra doesn't stand there and think "Oooh a lion, what should I do."

 

[Revoltingest]

I didn't say that choices weren't being made, I said they were being made instinctively and unconsciously. When a lion is stalking a zebra for example, the zebra doesn't stand there and think "Oooh a lion, what should I do."

The Revoltingifarian Pamphlet Of Original Parables states that consciousness is a phenomenon which occurs at some point on the continuum of intelligence between a virus & a human. At which point? That is beyond the scope of the pamphlet because of problems in defining & then measuring "consciousness". We can observe that the great apes (even the lesser apes) & cetaceans have it, but that viruses & amoebas don't.

The POOP gives you THE TRUTH...not every truth.

 

[Guy Threepwood]

I think we all know there is clearly a vast gulf between the awareness of humans and animals. Describing the differences as all on a sliding scale might be technically true, but this doesn't mean our awareness is not fundamentally unique. The is one heck of a drop-off after #1 on that scale..

Only we have the level of awareness to be aware of creation itself.
Only we can explore, understand, appreciate it to the level that we consciously conclude a creator and give thanks to them.

That's what is ultimately relevant, consistent with our being the primary beneficiaries of that creation.

 

[LuisDantas]

I think we all know there is clearly a vast gulf between the awareness of humans and animals.

Quite on the contrary. Many animals have awareness that is from all appearances very similar to the human variety. Some mammals have even shown a clear capability for language.

No other animal has so far shown clear evidence of capability of abstract thought, but that does not necessarily mean they don't have it or that they can't develop it eventually.

Describing the differences as all on a sliding scale might be technically true, but this doesn't mean our awareness is not fundamentally unique. The is one heck of a drop-off after #1 on that scale.

I don't know why you think so. Do you have some evidence or argument to present?

 

[Mohammad Nur Syamsu]

I didn't say that choices weren't being made, I said they were being made instinctively and unconsciously. When a lion is stalking a zebra for example, the zebra doesn't stand there and think "Oooh a lion, what should I do."

....I know that what you are saying must be incoherent with the definitions you use, because the only functional concept of choosing is the creationist concept of it, which you rejected.

 

[Guy Threepwood]

Quite on the contrary. Many animals have awareness that is from all appearances very similar to the human variety. Some mammals have even shown a clear capability for language.

No other animal has so far shown clear evidence of capability of abstract thought, but that does not necessarily mean they don't have it or that they can't develop it eventually.




I don't know why you think so. Do you have some evidence or argument to present?

I just did, our unique capacity for learning is unambiguous, no animal comes close, that's hardly a controversial observation..

Of course we can't prove the negative, perhaps Jellyfish are far more intelligent than we are, and have this all figured out already

But honestly, how much are you willing to bet that dolphins, dogs or monkeys are questioning the meaning of their existence as we are?

 

[viole]

Perhaps I employed the wrong term. Subjectivity is consciousness; consciousness is subjectivity.

I don't want to be pedantic, but I am mathematician, after all, lol, and clear cut definitions are essential for amy meaningful discussion, I believe.

Here you seem to define consciousness in terms of subjectivity and subjectivity in terms of consciousness. Which does not define anything.

When you say that consciousness is not objective, I presume you mean it is subjective, unless there is a third alternative. So, assuming that there is no third alternative, what do you mean when you say that consciousness is subjective? Is it part of the consciousness of someone else?

Maybe you mean that they are the same thing. I don't see how; one (consciousness) seems to be the precondition of the other (subjectivity). But let's bite the bullett and assume that they are the same thing. What causes it/them then? Is the cause, if any, objective or subjective (if there are no third alternatives)? Or are we witnessing something that can begin to exist without a cause?

Ciao

- viole

 

[LuisDantas]

I just did, our unique capacity for learning is unambiguous, no animal comes close, that's hardly a controversial observation.

Wrong, just wrong.

 

[Ouroboros]

No other animal has so far shown clear evidence of capability of abstract thought, but that does not necessarily mean they don't have it or that they can't develop it eventually.

Also, even with the brain capacity to deal with abstract thoughts and reasoning, a person needs to be trained in a sense in doing so, by their social interactions. We have a certain ability in our brain, but that's just the platform. It's very important to imprint the actual experience in a child growing up to use their reasoning and abstractions, or it won't work. I've noticed that there are quite many humans I've met and discussed with who has very limited ability to reason or think in abstractions. It might be something lacking physically or biologically, but I suspect it's also upbringing.

 

[Guy Threepwood]

Wrong, just wrong.

hmmm, I see, a very insightful counter argument, I'll have to ponder that one!

 

[LuisDantas]

hmmm, I see, a very insightful counter argument, I'll have to ponder that one!

It is not my fault that you like to make categorical yet unsupported assertions, now is it?