Nobody knows much about Manning, rotting in silence as he is in a military prison cell. Best not speculate, especially unkindly.
I don't think that I was being unkind to him. I genuinely pity him, because I do not think he will look back on this act with a sense of pride. He has thrown his future away for very little in return.
Yes, this! Exactly! Those who criticize the sheer volume of the leaked information due to their expectation that every leaked document should constitute a "smoking gun" relating to illegal activity miss the point the indiscriminate application of extreme government secrecy, even pertaining to mundane and non-controversial matters, is a problem (and in some states a crime) in and of itself.
But I criticize the indiscriminate and irresponsible nature of the leak, and I never expected "every leaked document should constitute a 'smoking gun'". Quite the opposite. The government "secrecy" in this case was not extreme at all. A secure database will always contain a mixture of sensitive and innocuous materials. They exist for the purpose of information extraction, not to hide embarrassing information. Perhaps we ought to hire people to scan them for embarrassing information that could be passed out to the news media, but do you really think that that would be a practical possibility? Good luck getting politicians to support that idea.
It doesn't quite work like that. I recently worked in the information management dep't of a government organization. I was the privacy officer and I worked with a freedom of information officer (I handled policy and requests re. personal information, she handled policy and requests re. government information and we collaborated wherever these requests overlapped). I don't think either of us were particularly "expensive", judging by the state of my bank accounts.
Yes, it does work that way. It doesn't sound like you worked with classified materials. The government has recently switched from "need to know" to "need to share", and the administration has issued orders to declassify large amounts of information in the future. The problem with that is that information flows to higher networks freely and cheaply. Flowing from high to low requires expensive "downgrading". Downgrading requires a set of security policies and a person trained to recognize the information. Even when that is done, lots of sensitive information can slip out. The data in SIPRNet was supposed to be sharable, but not everything in it is properly classified. It was a very sloppy response to the "need to share" requirement.
Look, Assange himself realized that he lacked the expertise to declassify the materials. He tried to blackmail the US government into helping him declassify secret documents that had been stolen from them. Even if it were feasible to declassify that amount of material quickly (not likely), the criteria for declassification are themselves classified, and there is no possibility that a government could accept such an offer and survive the political firestorm.
Nothing needs to be "moved into the public domain" by the government. Anybody can request documentary evidence from the government, and assuming there are no legislative barriers to disclosure (which I could get into if you like), the information is released. The cost in our organization (representing half a million citizens): Four salaries. One FOI officer, one Privacy officer and two administrative assistants.
Just to be clear, we are talking about
SIPRNet (Secret Protocol Router Network), here, not just personal medical or financial records. I have no doubt that a foreign government would have paid Manning handsomely for that data. He gave it away to all hostile governments for free.
Now, what happened to our department is symptomatic of what seems to be happening everywhere these days: our entire department (all four of us) was eliminated, and the "Communications" department (read: propaganda) was expanded enormously. The result: requests for documentary information are no longer being met in accordance with the UK's FOI legislation, and all requests for information are now channeled through this new, enormous army of professional propagandists.
Look, I've got no idea what your situation was in the UK. The laws regarding secrecy are different there, and I have no way to judge the nature of what you are talking about. SIPRNet data is definitely not material that should be leaked to governments hostile to US interests. Manning knew that, but he didn't really think clearly about what he was doing. (At least, I hope he wasn't.)
In effect, this means that everything is now classified "secret" unless otherwise advised by the propaganda arm of the government, none of whom have any expertise in the correct application of FOI or privacy legislation. Before, everything was classified as "public domain" unless a legal justification could be found for withholding information.
Again, "Secret" in the US is a classification that means "grave damage to national security". Getting that classification does not mean that the information really would have that effect. Sometimes it is just material that is mixed in with more dangerous information.
As a trend in a society that claims to be democratic, this development sure sucks.
Maybe it does in the UK, but I'm confining my comments to this specific story. I think that you are transferring some of your personal experiences onto a completely different situation. Some of the records released contained the names of individuals whose lives might be endangered by the disclosures, but they also provided some insight into the condition of troops and effectiveness of battlefield tactics. That is not information that should be released in the midst of a war and without any serious attempt to redact it.
Incorrect. In fact, Wikileaks only published around 900 cables, all of which had been previously reported on by mainstream news organizations. They are sitting on the rest, presumably pending the outcome of this illegal persecution of the site and its founder. (They've released all 250,000 leaked cables as a very secure encrypted file, the password for which could be released at any time. I assume this is a negotiating tactic, and that I'll never see what's in most of those cables unless no agreement can be reached.)
I think that your count of the released materials is off. They have released 3 batches of documents so far. 70,000 records were released on the Afghan war in the summer, and those were very poorly redacted. They made an effort to remove names, but they did not get them all, which is not surprising, given the sheer volume of data. Unfortunately, removing names is not really effective at hiding identities. Text contains lots of descriptive information other than names that can be used to identify individuals. I had heard that the 250000 files were released, not that they were the encrypted blackmail threat. I cannot find any information to confirm that the 250K are still encrypted. Assange, of course, has retained materials as an "insurance policy", but he was saying that even before the 250K were released. BTW, the encryption on those files will be broken easily by the Chinese and Russians.
See above. The 900-odd cables (out of 250,000 or so) that were published were reviewed, redacted and reported by mainstream news organizations before being published by Wikileaks. I can only assume they are intended to be a fact-checking supplement to the reporting we see in the mainstream media.
I'm sorry, but it is you who are misinformed. The government does not even know everything that is in those cables. They are raw information. The attempts by amateurs like Assange and news journalists to redact them were ludicrous. They have no policy guides, and they don't even know what they are looking for to redact. They seem to think that just eliminating names--a monumental task in itself for so many records--is sufficient.
You're misinformed. Correct yourself and report back.
I know what I am talking about. From what you have said so far, I do not think that you understand the nature of what has been done here. That material is a godsend for foreign intelligence agencies and academics. I don't mind the academics getting it after a decade or two, but it should not be given to foreign governments, who will use sophisticated text mining techniques to analyze it.