Wandered Off
Sporadic Driveby Member
If the future can be known, doesnt that mean it cannot change? This seems incompatible with free will. If were just playing out the inevitable conclusion, then the so-called Great Commission (or any other commandment, for that matter) is a complete waste of time. If your future can be known, can you change it? No. If you cannot change your future, do you really have free will?
Im not saying necessarily that foreknowledge is the cause of the future. Instead, the fact that foreknowledge is possible only means that the future must already exist somewhere. It is the existence of a future, not the foreknowledge, that seems to contradict free will. The knowledge is a by-product or effect of a fixed outcome, not the other way around. If the outcome can be known, it necessarily exists. That someone could become aware of this is incidental. The choice is fixed and cannot be changed.
For a mortal analogy, let's think about a history book, say a biography. I can read the outcome and know how the person's life ends. If I know the ending, I also know that the person can't change the end. My knowledge was not causal, but the person no longer has free will for a different outcome.
Some who think foreknowledge eliminates free will believe in a different form of omniscience: God knows all that can be known, but the future does not exist yet, so it cannot be known. The only part of the future God knows in this view is that part He will directly create. Omniscience, in this definition, is forward-limited. The main benefit to this position is that it bypasses the free will objection entirely. In addition, it does away with the pointlessness of creation.
Others argue that this is terribly demeaning to their concept of almighty God. Knowing the future is an integral part of the job description. If God didnt know the future, they say, that would somehow imply a lack of total control, which is simply bad form for an almighty deity. It also seems to make God as bound by time as the rest of us schmucks.
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Maybe there's a compromise that might make both sides happy. No doubt someone else has thought of this already, but I havent seen it elsewhere, so Ill call it Wandereds Compromise. Its kind of a Heisenberg variation on Molinism (or maybe not).
What if the future is made up of an infinite number of possible paths, for each of which God knows exactly what the outcome would be, but doesn't know which one you'll pick? For example, God knows exactly what the future would look like if you made choice "A" and exactly what it would look like if you made choice "B", but doesn't know which you'll choose or how others will react. That kind of plays both sides of the argument... It gives the foreknowledge contingent an all-knowing image of God without surrendering free will, all in one convenient package. God specifically knows exactly what will happen and how IN EVERY POSSIBLE SITUATION and still retains the uncertainty about which of those completely known futures will occur. God doesn't have to know which one will occur to know EXACTLY what the future would look like. Foreknowledge proponents get their 'rewindable video' (an infinite number of them, in fact) and opponents get their free will. Win win! : hamster :
OK, it's all hypothetical, but any thoughts? Am I out in left field again?
Im not saying necessarily that foreknowledge is the cause of the future. Instead, the fact that foreknowledge is possible only means that the future must already exist somewhere. It is the existence of a future, not the foreknowledge, that seems to contradict free will. The knowledge is a by-product or effect of a fixed outcome, not the other way around. If the outcome can be known, it necessarily exists. That someone could become aware of this is incidental. The choice is fixed and cannot be changed.
For a mortal analogy, let's think about a history book, say a biography. I can read the outcome and know how the person's life ends. If I know the ending, I also know that the person can't change the end. My knowledge was not causal, but the person no longer has free will for a different outcome.
Some who think foreknowledge eliminates free will believe in a different form of omniscience: God knows all that can be known, but the future does not exist yet, so it cannot be known. The only part of the future God knows in this view is that part He will directly create. Omniscience, in this definition, is forward-limited. The main benefit to this position is that it bypasses the free will objection entirely. In addition, it does away with the pointlessness of creation.
Others argue that this is terribly demeaning to their concept of almighty God. Knowing the future is an integral part of the job description. If God didnt know the future, they say, that would somehow imply a lack of total control, which is simply bad form for an almighty deity. It also seems to make God as bound by time as the rest of us schmucks.
- - - - - -
Maybe there's a compromise that might make both sides happy. No doubt someone else has thought of this already, but I havent seen it elsewhere, so Ill call it Wandereds Compromise. Its kind of a Heisenberg variation on Molinism (or maybe not).
What if the future is made up of an infinite number of possible paths, for each of which God knows exactly what the outcome would be, but doesn't know which one you'll pick? For example, God knows exactly what the future would look like if you made choice "A" and exactly what it would look like if you made choice "B", but doesn't know which you'll choose or how others will react. That kind of plays both sides of the argument... It gives the foreknowledge contingent an all-knowing image of God without surrendering free will, all in one convenient package. God specifically knows exactly what will happen and how IN EVERY POSSIBLE SITUATION and still retains the uncertainty about which of those completely known futures will occur. God doesn't have to know which one will occur to know EXACTLY what the future would look like. Foreknowledge proponents get their 'rewindable video' (an infinite number of them, in fact) and opponents get their free will. Win win! : hamster :
OK, it's all hypothetical, but any thoughts? Am I out in left field again?