BSM1
What? Me worry?
Oh come on, don't be lazy! Gotta include the gif!
My bad...
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xray
- Thread starter esmith
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My bad...
BSM1
What? Me worry?
Ohh I’m sure you are.
But for this purpose it is not about what I personally consider common sense gun laws (I would blow your mind), but what the majority of Americans consider common sense gun laws, like background checks for example.
I would be very interested in hearing your views. BTW, if I am not mistaken background checks are already required in most, if not every state.
BSM1
What? Me worry?
I truly wish this made sense on some level...you don't think Trump was elected because of his policies and not his fancy words?
esmith
Veteran Member
Ohh I’m sure you are.
But for this purpose it is not about what I personally consider common sense gun laws (I would blow your mind), but what the majority of Americans consider common sense gun laws, like background checks for example.
I would rather see harsher penalties and mandatory sentencing for crimes when a firearm is involved. I know you are advocating for universal background checks, which only affect private sales and gun show sales because holders of a FFL must conduct a background check by federal law. So, the question is would they work, maybe yes maybe no. The Rand researchers couldn't conclude requiring background checks on private sales had any effect..
"Exactly"? By it's very nature, most -- but not all -- of what uber-rich people and corporations do to influence politics is purposely hidden from public view. So to ask for exact details more or less amounts to asking for insider information. Some of that is available -- because people talk, or they get investigated and things come out in court -- but I suspect most of what happens is unknown to the public.
In general, though...
I'm not an expert, but so far as I know, political influence tends to take more than one form. For instance, you can gain influence with a politician by substantially contributing to his or her campaign. I am privately told that, before Citizens United, you could gain influence with a relatively modest campaign contribution, but that since the caps came off on dark money, the price of influence has been driven way up -- out of reach for most people.
You can also gain influence by providing political services, such as pre-written legislation for him or her to introduce, "fact papers" that "inform" the politicians on the issues, and other such "support services". If you're really rich, you can create think tanks dedicated to persuading people -- including politicians -- to support your positions. For instance, the Cato Institute is largely funded by the Koch brothers and their friends and is dedicated to promoting libertarian ideas and policies, and the billionaire Pete Peterson founded a think tank dedicated to privatizing social security.
And you can, of course, "simply" bribe the politician -- which I think is far more common than most of the public is aware of. But then, bribing politicians on behalf of various interests was how certain members of my family used to earn their living . They were not called "crooks" -- they were called "lobbyists" and -- now and then -- "back room boys". I grew up on family stories of how this or that politician or bureaucrat was successfully bribed to vote and/or support various bills or regulations. Often enough, the process is not as simple as it sounds.
In part because of those stories, I consider myself under few illusions about the influence of money in politics, and how money is often at odds with what the average middle class, working class, or poor person wants.
Other people, of course, are free to harbor whatever other notions they might have about the significance of money in politics.
Not all the votes are counted yet, but as of about six or seven this morning (Mountain Time), the following two things were the case:
Voters cast 44.7 million votes for Democratic Senate candidates and 32.9 million votes for Republican Senate candidates — in other words 57 percent of Senate votes went for Democrats.
Democrats flipped at least seven governorships from red to blue last night: Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico and Wisconsin. No governorships flipped the other direction.
Voters cast 44.7 million votes for Democratic Senate candidates and 32.9 million votes for Republican Senate candidates — in other words 57 percent of Senate votes went for Democrats.
Democrats flipped at least seven governorships from red to blue last night: Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico and Wisconsin. No governorships flipped the other direction.
esmith
Veteran Member
Those figures are/may be factual but, and it's a big but, it only reflects the population of various areas of the U.S. (mainly the large population centers which include states and cities). So, looking at the voting trends throughout the U.S. it still says the Dems have a major problem obtaining the White House.
That is an interesting idea that I haven't considered, and I agree!
I think allegations of wrongdoing and bribery need to be based on facts. I know of no reason to merely assume that someone has improperly "influenced" an elected official by contributing to her campaign, meeting with her, or writing a bill one wishes she would propose and support.
I agree with you that individuals should not be accused of bribery without evidence, but I don't see how that point is logically relevant here. Could you please explain how you reason from it to the conclusion that bribery is not much of a factor in influencing politicians?
I don't deduce the conclusion “bribery is not much of a factor in influencing politicians” from the proposition “individuals should not be accused of bribery without evidence.”
Bribery is not an easy crime to prove -- the quid pro quo necessary to establish a bribe is invariably offered and accepted in what the parties believe to be a private or confidential conversation. So, if there were evidence of a lot of bribery happening among politicians, we would see a lot prosecutions of politicians for bribery. We don't see such large numbers of prosecutions, therefore we spectators cannot conclude from the available evidence that such bribery occurs.
Further, in a 2014 review article, Milyo discusses evidence from “event studies” that examined the effect of corporate contributions to politicians and political campaigns on various outcomes. I wish to quote some of the summary paragraphs from that article, especially since I am aware how everyone here loves for me to demonstrate my ability to copy and paste:
For many political observers, the source of political corruption is obvious: privately financed political campaigns facilitate a market for political favors (Grossman and Helpman 1994). Advocates for campaign-finance reform have long asserted that campaign contributions are bribes and that only full public financing of political campaigns can address the problem of political corruption. However, it also has long been recognized that although there is some superficial evidence consistent with the view that campaign contributions are the functional equivalent of bribes, upon closer inspection that hypothesis is not well supported by the scholarly literature (e.g., Sorauf 1992).
The best illustration of this assumed equivalence between contributions and bribes is found in analysis of corporate PAC campaign contributions and roll-call votes on issues of interest to those same corporations. Firms in industries that are more highly regulated or dependent on government contracts are more likely to form PACs (Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994). Those PACs make contributions to party leaders and members that sit on committees with relevant policy jurisdictions (Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1991). More to the point, PAC contributions are also highly correlated with the likelihood that a firm will benefit from government investment and with roll-call votes on legislation favored by the sponsors of corporate PACs (Duchin and Sosyura 2012). Even the timing of contributions -- coincident with major steps in the legislative process -- suggests a market for favors (Stratmann 1998). All of this is consistent with the notion that campaign contributions are like bribes, or, as Fred McChesney (1987) argues, extortionary payoffs. But this evidence is also consistent with the phenomenon that PACs support politicians that hold beliefs most beneficial to the employees and investors in the associated firms (Bronars and Lott 1998; Levitt 1998).
In fact, both theory and evidence favor the latter interpretation, at least in the pre–super PAC era. First, bribery, influence peddling, and extortion are crimes, so it is not possible to make legally enforceable promises regarding exchanges of money for favors, which at least hinders such exchanges. Further, contributions made directly to federal candidates are limited by law, so the amounts of money being contributed from any one source may not justify the opportunity cost of illicit behavior. Moreover, contributions to candidates must be disclosed; the activities of politicians are closely monitored by competing candidates and watchdog groups eager to make accusations of impropriety. And several studies show that marginal campaign expenditures have negligible effects on federal election contests (Levitt 1994; Gerber 1998; Milyo 2001), which implies that political contributions to high-spending incumbents are particularly inefficient in-kind gifts and unlikely to win much gratitude. These facts do not preclude illegal transactions, but they do suggest a limited scope for such activities.
Empirical evidence also raises doubts about the efficacy of corporate PAC contributions as the functional equivalent of bribes (Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000). The amounts of money transferred to politicians in the form of PAC contributions are not only well below the legal maximum but in the aggregate are also dwarfed by corporate lobbying expenditures, which at least suggests that contributions are less effective at influencing policy than lobbying. In turn, corporations devote far more resources to charity than all to political activities combined, which again suggests that both contributions and lobbying have limited impact. Given all this, it is not surprising that most careful research studies find no causal impact of campaign contributions on legislators’ roll-call votes (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003).
The best illustration of this assumed equivalence between contributions and bribes is found in analysis of corporate PAC campaign contributions and roll-call votes on issues of interest to those same corporations. Firms in industries that are more highly regulated or dependent on government contracts are more likely to form PACs (Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994). Those PACs make contributions to party leaders and members that sit on committees with relevant policy jurisdictions (Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1991). More to the point, PAC contributions are also highly correlated with the likelihood that a firm will benefit from government investment and with roll-call votes on legislation favored by the sponsors of corporate PACs (Duchin and Sosyura 2012). Even the timing of contributions -- coincident with major steps in the legislative process -- suggests a market for favors (Stratmann 1998). All of this is consistent with the notion that campaign contributions are like bribes, or, as Fred McChesney (1987) argues, extortionary payoffs. But this evidence is also consistent with the phenomenon that PACs support politicians that hold beliefs most beneficial to the employees and investors in the associated firms (Bronars and Lott 1998; Levitt 1998).
In fact, both theory and evidence favor the latter interpretation, at least in the pre–super PAC era. First, bribery, influence peddling, and extortion are crimes, so it is not possible to make legally enforceable promises regarding exchanges of money for favors, which at least hinders such exchanges. Further, contributions made directly to federal candidates are limited by law, so the amounts of money being contributed from any one source may not justify the opportunity cost of illicit behavior. Moreover, contributions to candidates must be disclosed; the activities of politicians are closely monitored by competing candidates and watchdog groups eager to make accusations of impropriety. And several studies show that marginal campaign expenditures have negligible effects on federal election contests (Levitt 1994; Gerber 1998; Milyo 2001), which implies that political contributions to high-spending incumbents are particularly inefficient in-kind gifts and unlikely to win much gratitude. These facts do not preclude illegal transactions, but they do suggest a limited scope for such activities.
Empirical evidence also raises doubts about the efficacy of corporate PAC contributions as the functional equivalent of bribes (Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000). The amounts of money transferred to politicians in the form of PAC contributions are not only well below the legal maximum but in the aggregate are also dwarfed by corporate lobbying expenditures, which at least suggests that contributions are less effective at influencing policy than lobbying. In turn, corporations devote far more resources to charity than all to political activities combined, which again suggests that both contributions and lobbying have limited impact. Given all this, it is not surprising that most careful research studies find no causal impact of campaign contributions on legislators’ roll-call votes (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003).
The facts noted in this last paragraph seem to me highly important and persuasive.
At the time of this review there were evidently not a lot of published post-Citizens United event studies. But in the section “Campaign-Finance Law,” Milyo reviews a few, which collectively found “no positive impact of corporate political activity [of corporate contributions to politician or political campaigns] after Citizens United “. In this context, Milyo also cites a study by Coates, which was not an event study, where it was found that such corporate contributions were detrimental to shareholder value.
I am simply unaware of sufficient evidence to conclude that corporate contributions to politicians or political campaigns generally have great effects on the politician's votes. Corporate contributions to politicians or political campaigns is not, in my mind, a very admirable expenditure, but at least it keeps the money circulating and distributes wealth to a certain degree. If asked, I would undoubtedly say that I would much prefer that corporations and "the uber-rich" distribute their wealth to charitable organizations. But no one asked.