A definition of "determinism"

[George-ananda]

Why not? What else produces them?

Some posit, we can not get behind what consciousness is. To science, it is a mystery.

In my tradition, it is something fundamental and matter is derivative from the fundamental.

 

[Skwim]

Some posit, we can not get behind what consciousness is. To science, it is a mystery.

Fine, but whatever its operation, it is either a matter of cause/effect or not cause/effect (a random event). Take your pick. In any case, we're not discussing the nature of consciousness.

 

[Penumbra]

The following is an off-hand definition I made on another thread, and was asked to re-post it separately. So do what you will with it, or not.

Determinism is the concept that all events, human actions and thought in particular, happen because they had antecedent causes that insure they will be exactly what they are and nothing else. All events absolutely have to be the way they are. Determinism and absolute randomness, are the only two agents of action, which give lie to freewill. Freewill is an illusion. ​

Merriam-Webster defines determinism as "the belief that all events are caused by things that happened before them and that people have no real ability to make choices or control what happens."

That second part has a lot of nuance and semantics, imo, so I'd personally just stick with the first half: "the belief that all events are caused by things that happened before them"

And then of course there's the well-evidenced quantum mechanics observation that probability pervades the universe.

So in the OP quote, it says all events absolutely have to be the way things are, which doesn't seem correct if probability exists, because things could have turned out a different way even if the preceding state was identical. And then talking about determinism as you defined it along with "absolute randomness" occurring, doesn't really seem to work together. As far as I understand physics, it's more like, a given event leads to certain probabilities of which events happen next. It's neither absolute randomness or a case where things have to be the way they are, but rather, just this ongoing chain of probability.

I don't see much room for free will in physics, if it's all a combination of determinism and probability. There could be additional variables we do not yet understand, since the scientific understanding of consciousness is still very limited. The way I tend to view it is not that free will itself is an illusion, but more fundamentally, I've never even seen a definition of free will that seems intelligible.

 

[Bunyip]

Your definition looks at determinism, not as a sort of philosophical perspective - a lens through which to consider the world. But as some sort of absolutist position - reducing all aspects of existence to a simple polarity.
I don't think it really works. Generally notions like determinism are applied to assist us in considering a position, they give a certain perspective. I don't think they work when equated to some sort of absolute ideological stance.
Philosophical approaches and absolute ideologies are very different things. Notions like materialism, determinism, libertarianism and so on are the former.

 

[Bunyip]

Merriam-Webster defines determinism as "the belief that all events are caused by things that happened before them and that people have no real ability to make choices or control what happens."

That second part has a lot of nuance and semantics, imo, so I'd personally just stick with the first half: "the belief that all events are caused by things that happened before them"

And then of course there's the well-evidenced quantum mechanics observation that probability pervades the universe.

So in the OP quote, it says all events absolutely have to be the way things are, which doesn't seem correct if probability exists, because things could have turned out a different way even if the preceding state was identical. And then talking about determinism as you defined it along with "absolute randomness" occurring, doesn't really seem to work together. As far as I understand physics, it's more like, a given event leads to certain probabilities of which events happen next. It's neither absolute randomness or a case where things have to be the way they are, but rather, just this ongoing chain of probability.

I don't see much room for free will in physics, if it's all a combination of determinism and probability. There could be additional variables we do not yet understand, since the scientific understanding of consciousness is still very limited. The way I tend to view it is not that free will itself is an illusion, but more fundamentally, I've never even seen a definition of free will that seems intelligible.

That is very true, generally debates about free will are about as incomprehensible as theoretical physics.

 

[Skwim]

Merriam-Webster defines determinism as "the belief that all events are caused by things that happened before them and that people have no real ability to make choices or control what happens."

Actually, for non-philosophical definition that ain't too bad.

So in the OP quote, it says all events absolutely have to be the way things are, which doesn't seem correct if probability exists, because things could have turned out a different way even if the preceding state was identical.

The only place where probability arises is within the limitations of our ability to know outcomes. We say a thing has a probability of 1 in 4 in happening because we don't know the outcome; however, our lack of knowledge in no way means the outcome is not determined. The process of cause/effect determines exactly what will happen.

And then talking about determinism as you defined it along with "absolute randomness" occurring, doesn't really seem to work together.

They don't work together. Determinism works on the super-atomic level whereas absolute randomness seems to occur at the quantum level, and neither impacts the other.

As far as I understand physics, it's more like, a given event leads to certain probabilities of which events happen next. It's neither absolute randomness or a case where things have to be the way they are, but rather, just this ongoing chain of probability.

Please consider what I've said here.

I don't see much room for free will in physics, if it's all a combination of determinism and probability. There could be additional variables we do not yet understand, since the scientific understanding of consciousness is still very limited. The way I tend to view it is not that free will itself is an illusion, but more fundamentally, I've never even seen a definition of free will that seems intelligible.

The operational definition I typically use for free will is "The ability to have done differently." Could one have done differently than they did? No. They did what they did because there was no way they could have done differently. To have done differently the causes that led up to the point of doing would have to have been different, but they weren't, so one had no choice but to do what they did. (BTW, there's is no such thing as true choice or choosing.)

 

[Skwim]

Your definition looks at determinism, not as a sort of philosophical perspective - a lens through which to consider the world. But as some sort of absolutist position - reducing all aspects of existence to a simple polarity.

But it can be "a lens through which to consider the world."

Not sure what you have in mind with "simple polarity." Care to explain?

I don't think it really works.

What would you suggest as an alternative? Things happen randomly?

 

[Bunyip]

But it can be "a lens through which to consider the world."

Not sure what you have in mind with "simple polarity." Care to explain?

Sure, your definition is absolute - a person is either utterly determinist and denies even chaos/random or is not a determinist at all. I don't think that works.

What would you suggest as an alternative? Things happen randomly?[/QUOTE]I suggested that materialism and determinism are both useful tools, not some sort of ideological stance.
Science for example looks through the lens of materialism because it produces results, but that does not mean it denies/eliminates/rejects anything outside of it's current understandings.
Materialism seeks a natural explanation, it is not an ideological stance that denies the immaterial.
Determinism seeks to establish an ontology of cause and effect, it is not an ideological stance that denies randomness.

 

[Skwim]

Sure, your definition is absolute - a person is either utterly determinist and denies even chaos/random or is not a determinist at all. I don't think that works.

What does a person's perception of the operation of events have to do with the reality? I find that the universe functions deterministically regardless of what people think.

I suggested that materialism and determinism are both useful tools, not some sort of ideological stance.

Gotta agree that determinism isn't an ideological stance, but not so much a tool.

Determinism seeks to establish an ontology of cause and effect, it is not an ideological stance that denies randomness.

Of course not. Absolute randomness appears to be very real on the quantum level.

 

[Bunyip]

What does a person's perception of the operation of events have to do with the reality? I find that the universe functions deterministically regardless of what people think.

Gotta agree that determinism isn't an ideological stance, but not so much a tool.

Of course not. Absolute randomness appears to be very real on the quantum level.

Sure, and doesn't really conflict with determinism.

 

[Willamena]

They're not purpose driven, but simply the result of previous causes.

A particular result. What specifies that particular? (It doesn't matter what the answer is--the specification of a particular result implies a purpose. That's fate.)

Determinism needs no particular result. Determinism is simply the statement that events had an external cause, specifically a cause external to the will.

Edit: To clarify, determinism is not about "this" particular cause making "that" particular result. It's about that there is an external cause at all.


Note, I do believe in determinism ("this thing had an external cause"), as contrasting to free will ("I caused this thing"). I just don't put much stock in fate ("this particular thing had that particular cause"). It's too akin to superstition ("this particular cat walking under that particular ladder produces this particular result").

 

[Skwim]

A particular result. What specifies that particular? (It doesn't matter what the answer is--the specification of a particular result implies a purpose. That's fate.)

No it doesn't. It implies an individual item, as contrasted with a universal quality.

Determinism needs no particular result. Determinism is simply the statement that events had an external cause, specifically a cause external to the will.

No it doesn't.

"Determinism is the philosophical position that for every event, including human action, there exist conditions that could cause no other event."
Source: Wikipedia​

Edit: To clarify, determinism is not about "this" particular cause making "that" particular result. It's about that there is an external cause at all.

Right, as corrected.

Note, I do believe in determinism ("this thing had an external cause"), as contrasting to free will ("I caused this thing"). I just don't put much stock in fate ("this particular thing had that particular cause"). It's too akin to superstition ("this particular cat walking under that particular ladder produces this particular result").

The cause need not be known or even identified. It's enough to simply recognize that every event is caused, and cannot be other than what it is. If you took out the trash this morning you had no choice to do otherwise.

 

[Willamena]

No it doesn't. It implies an individual item, as contrasted with a universal quality.

No it doesn't.

"Determinism is the philosophical position that for every event, including human action, there exist conditions that could cause no other event."
Source: Wikipedia​

Right, as corrected.

The cause need not be known or even identified. It's enough to simply recognize that every event is caused, and cannot be other than what it is. If you took out the trash this morning you had no choice to do otherwise.

In this case, an individual is a particular. Not to dispute the Great Wiki, but that people have added an unnecessary dimension to the discussion doesn't detract from determinism's origins.

"Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature."
Causal Determinism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)"

The idea of an external cause is integral to determinism. External causes include thoughts, feelings and circumstances which are the result of brain activity. They include everything apart from the "self" (which is to say every external thing).

Free will only allows one thing as cause (self for "it's" actions), and that is the "self."

 

[Willamena]

What does a person's perception of the operation of events have to do with the reality? I find that the universe functions deterministically regardless of what people think.

If I may answer this: "regardless of what people think" doesn't mean regardless that people think. People think, and that's a part of the universe.

 

[Skwim]

In this case, an individual is a particular. Not to dispute the Great Wiki, but that people have added an unnecessary dimension to the discussion doesn't detract from determinism's origins.

What unnecessary dimension do you see people adding?

The idea of an external cause is integral to determinism. External causes include thoughts, feelings and circumstances which are the result of brain activity. They include everything apart from the "self" (which is to say every external thing).

???????? Don't thoughts, feelings and circumstances which are the result of brain activity, pretty much describe the self, and would therefore hardly be apart from it?

Free will only allows one thing as cause, and that is the "self."

Define "free will."

So, how does the self operate if it isn't a matter of cause/effect? The only other operation I can imagine is pure randomness. And just how does free will "allow" anything anyway? Is it simply a random "allowing" or is there something that causes it to allow?

 

[Willamena]

What unnecessary dimension do you see people adding?

Fatalism, that idea that there can be only one outcome for any event, and that it could not have happened any other way, which of course implies a fixed time-line.

An odd way to designate it,

Define "free will."

"Self" determination, the idea that a "self" determines the actions that are in regard to itself.

This is a one that I favour: Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

So, how does the self operate if it isn't a matter of cause/effect? The only other operation I can imagine is pure randomness. And just how does free will "allow" anything anyway? Is it simply a random "allowing" or is there something that causes it to allow?

It's self-governed--not governed within any operation, which is necessarily external--in the same way a self-evident thing is not evidenced by anything external.

The implication of this is the philosophical liberty/freedom.

???????? Don't thoughts, feelings and circumstances which are the result of brain activity, pretty much describe the self, and would therefore hardly be apart from it?

No, they are part of the world, and so external to self. For instance, "I had a thought today," describes something apart from self. "I'm feeling conflicted," describes something of the world.

They are the experience. Self is the experiencer.

 

[Skwim]

Fatalism, that idea that there can be only one outcome for any event, and that it could not have happened any other way, which of course implies a fixed time-line.

And that's what it is.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

This is a one that I favour: Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

I assume you're referring to

"“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives."
​

Thing is, the free will advocate never says how this capacity operates. What does the operation of choosing consist of?

It's self-governed--not governed within any operation, which is necessarily external--in the same way a self-evident thing is not evidenced by anything external.

And just how does it "self-govern" itself, randomly or through cause/effect? (Those are your only two alternatives.)

The implication of this is the philosophical liberty/freedom.

All of which depends on your definition of liberty/freedom.

No, they are part of the world, and so external to self. For instance, "I had a thought today," describes something apart from self. "I'm feeling conflicted," describes something of the world.

They are the experience. Self is the experiencer.

If self is the experiencer, then how do these experiences of the self arise, randomly or are they caused? How does the illusion that one has chosen A instead of B arise?

 

[Willamena]

And that's what it is.

Thing is, the free will advocate never says how this capacity operates. What does the operation of choosing consist of?


And just how does it "self-govern" itself, randomly or through cause/effect? (Those are your only two alternatives.)

I see naturalistic determination and the superstitious fatalism as two distinct things.

The author's not an advocate, just a paper writer.

Self-determination has no operation, per se, other than self, which determines. If self-determination had an operation describable by things external to it, it wouldn't be self-determination, it would be determination, which happens in the world. Both determination and randomness are descriptors of the external world.

All of which depends on your definition of liberty/freedom.

If self is the experiencer, then how do these experiences of the self arise, randomly or are they caused? How does the illusion that one has chosen A instead of B arise?

No, liberty/freedom depends on it.

Experiences don't arise--rather, the world is us, experiencing. The illusion that one has chosen A instead of B happens because of memory: we organize experiences into a narrative of sorts and place A and B in their proper places.

 

[Penumbra]

The only place where probability arises is within the limitations of our ability to know outcomes. We say a thing has a probability of 1 in 4 in happening because we don't know the outcome; however, our lack of knowledge in no way means the outcome is not determined.

For most interpretations of quantum mechanics, that's not how it works. What you're describing is hidden variable theory which has generally not faced well in experimentation.

This really short video gives a brief explanation:

Here's a more detailed explanation by Stephen Hawking:
Does God play Dice? - Stephen Hawking

There's a fundamental difference between an example of dice and something that is actually on the quantum level. When you throw a die and there are six possible outcomes, the wave equation is so insignificant due to the amount of mass that, if you had near-perfect knowledge of the starting position of the die, the exact motion it is thrown, with all info about winds or other forces that may act on it while it falls, and the properties of the surface it lands on, you could predict accurately how it would land every time. The probability doesn't come from inherent randomness; it comes from lack of knowledge.

But on the quantum level, where things exist as probability waves, probability is more fundamentally a part of what's going on. It's for a fundamentally different reason than lack of knowledge of macroscopic events such as dice rolls.

The process of cause/effect determines exactly what will happen.

Not when taking into account most interpretations of quantum mechanics, no. Hidden variable theories have been a topic of debate in quantum mechanics since its inception over a century ago.

The operational definition I typically use for free will is "The ability to have done differently." Could one have done differently than they did? No. They did what they did because there was no way they could have done differently. To have done differently the causes that led up to the point of doing would have to have been different, but they weren't, so one had no choice but to do what they did. (BTW, there's is no such thing as true choice or choosing.)

Even if they could have done differently, I would require an explanation of exactly how/why it was done differently.

If, for example, you could tie a macroscopic event to a quantum event (like Shrodinger's cat), then there could potentially be scenarios where given the same initial state, macroscopic things could turn out one way or another. If something like this could occur in the brain, with a choice ultimately being tied to a quantum event, it may be possible to have acted differently in the same scenario, and yet if that difference is tied simply to the probability outcome of a particle, it still wouldn't be free will.

 

[Skwim]

For most interpretations of quantum mechanics, that's not how it works.

And I'm not interested in the probabilities that occur in quantum mechanics. I'm talking about events at the super-atomic level.