I agree. I think the debate does center on the right to life and whether an early term fetus has it. The Hindu perspective is complex, so let us look at the issue from a Buddhist perspective which is more tractable. The Buddhist view of the self is that it is a psycho-physical complex, the union of the 5 skandas and their continual dependently originated causal interaction that provides the sense of self in a person. I think it is a good first stab to consider this complex as the "person" that holds the "rights" in a social context. Now, I would argue that an early term fetus to too immature a brain for it to have the capacity to become a "locus" of such a psycho-physical complex. The inter-neural connections that will kickstart this dependently causal nexus only begins to form near the end of the 2nd trimester (23rd week), but then in proceeds very rapidly such that all neural connections that will be present in the adult brain has been completed by the middle of the third trimester. Therefore, a third trimester fetus can serve as a locus of the complex and hence is psychologically continuous with the person who has rights, while a second trimester fetus is not continuous with the person who holds rights and therefore does not enjoy such protection.
The Hindu perspective brings in the Atman that stands behind such a psychophysical complex and "grounds" its continuity. But since the Atman cannot be harmed at all, saying it has a right to be not harmed seems meaningless.
Thanks for your view. You are right, the Hindu view is certainly complex. I would argue, from a Hindi viewpoint, that abortion after conception is harming the atma, not physically, but spiritually, because you are deriving it of a human life which is very rare to attain and which leads to moksha. The
puranas mirror this statement. That is essentially how the schools of Vedanta will argue on this issue.
As for the right to life, I will briefly go over my opinion on this. While psychophysical complex which you are describing is
sufficient for a right to life, it is not
necessary .I believe that right to life can extend to those beings who have the potential (and by this I don't mean
may become, but rather
will become allowed to continue) for such a complex
. There was a
philosophical paper by Bertha Alvarez in defense of this argument. Another argument I like is the argument from deprivation (by ending the fetus' life, we are depriving it of its future as a rational agent). My personal argument goes as follows:
Imagine there are 3 human beings in deep coma. In such a coma only the autonomic functions of the body work. Rational and conscious thought have stopped, and the individual has no sentience. Now the first human being (being A) has no chance ever of coming out of this deep coma. The second one (being B) has a possibility of escaping the coma over a unknown period of time. The third one however (person C) will come out of the Coma and resume life after a known period of time.
Now, I would argue, that person A has does not have a right to life, while persons B and C do. As far as I see, if person A has no way resuming life, she is simply a burden on medical resources, so it would not be morally wrong to end her life. Person B's case is more interesting, but I am of the view that if the possibility exists, it must be preserved. Person C I think clearly has a claim to life, and it would be morally wrong to end her life. Now in person C case, would the time matter. If it was only a matter of seconds before she awoke from the coma, would it make a difference to her right to life, compared to if say, it was 10 years?. In any case, the situation of person C is analogous to the situation of an embryo. If left unhindered, will grow into a rational agent (human being) and therefore, like person C, has a right to life. There are objections to this view (and if anyone can come up with them I would be happy to respond). The right to life definition varies quite alot from philosopher to philosopher.
