निताइ dasa
Nitai's servant's servant
the fetus does not have any higher or significant brain function, only core basics. In any case, it is not a "person", "baby", or even a human, I would argue. They are fated to be a human, but at that point they are, scientifically, parasites.
It seems to me that mere brain function is not sufficient to grant any object, 'personhood' rights. Animals also have developed brain functions yet the law does not provide them with inalienable rights like we do with humans. This definition of personhood seems to be at odds with our considered moral intuitions.
d. This also allows one to expand rights to proto-persons like higher mammals that share some properties of the mind that make one a person. I would broadly agree with the psychological continuity view of personhood that was first proposed by John Locke and on which most of the language of rights is based.
It is not necessary to be a 'person' currently in order to have the rights given to that particular class. Sometimes eventuality is enough. Assuming Locke's definition of personhood (i.e a being that is rational, conscious and self aware), there are several groups who do not fit. In particular, Coma patients, Brain-dead patients etc. Even newborn infants, are not rational, nor self-aware. Therefore these groups do not qualify as "persons". Yet we still grant them certain rights (right of life, autonomy ). From this it seems to me that these rights extend not only to persons, but also eventual persons (note potential is different from eventual. Eventual means, if left naturally, without willful interaction from another conscious agent, one enters into that state. Potentially means that there needs to be a willful incident or event to bring about the state.)
Locke called the period from conception to the development of a rational mind as the "imperfect state of childhood" and argued that while individuals in such a stage were not rational persons, there is a strong duty and moral imperative to protect them.
Locke's idea of "self ownership" was that it is not an absolute right but a limited one that is bound by our natural duties to others.. For example he adds in his second treatise:
"But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence, though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone. And reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. (II.6)".
Although I will admit, the line does get blurry.