No it is not silly. On the contrary you seem uncharacteristically shallow in this case. When we say that gold has a particular property, it signifies that irrespective of shape-form of gold that property holds. One may say that ‘property of a car is movement’, but surely a car has has no inherent property of movement. It has been designed by humans to move (or stop) under some conditions.
Similarly, brain or body does not possess the property of consciousness ‘intrinsically’. We do not know what ‘life’ exactly is and how it imparts consciousness.
So, to assert that consciousness is generated in brain is wrong.
Again, no more so than to say that digestion happens in the stomach. In both cases, a *living* organ is required for function.
And why is a living organ required? Because the basic chemical properties of a living organ and one that has died are quite different. The process of death means that waste chemicals are made that make reversal of the process impossible.
And yes, we *do* know that life is a chemical process.
We had discussed this earlier when I had pointed out the word ‘EVEN’ in Godel’s own words. Incompleteness theorems apply to simplest of formal systems, what to talk of human system? And in any case, to understand human system we apply formal knowledge systems only. So, you are wrong both ways.
Sorry, but this isn't correct. Godel's results apply to first order logical systems that have a recursively defined axiom system. Biological systems are, at the very least, second order and do NOT have a recursively defined set of rules. And we *know* that Godel's results do not apply to second order logic.
Please see Godel’s own argument below and please note the word‘EVEN’ in Godel’s own writing. Also note that Godel rejects the materialistic paradigm. Godel drew the following disjunctive conclusion from the incompleteness theorems:
"either ... the human mind (even within the realm of pure mathematics) infinitely surpasses the power of any finite machine, or else there exist absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems." (Godel 1951).
Furthermore, Godel concludes that philosophical implications are, under either alternative:
"very decidedly opposed to materialistic philosophy" (Godel 1951).
Godel further continues:
However, as to subjective mathematics, it is not precluded that there should exist a finite rule producing all its evident axioms. However, if such a rule exists we could never know with mathematical certainty that all propositions it produces are correct ... the assertion ... that they are all true could at most be known with empirical certainty .... there would exist absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems .... where the epithet 'absolutely' means that they would be undecidable, not just within some particular axiomatic system, but by any mathematical proof the human mind can conceive (Godel 1951).
Godel’s result shows that either (i) the human mind is not a Turing machine or (ii) there are certain unsolvable mathematical problems. Gödel implied that there are ALWAYS more things that are true than you can prove.
And I agree that the mind is not a Turing machine. In particular, the fact that it is an interactive system in the real world means that a Turing machine model isn't even appropriate for *computers* that are interacting int he real world.
How that works for Materialism-Naturalism, which is defined below?
“Naturalism is the hypothesis that the natural world is a closed system, which means that nothing that is not part of the natural world affects it.”
As per Gödel’s theorem, no logical system can be known within the system. Materialists still insist that there is nothing outside the universe. But if that’s true, then the universe itself is illogical. In that case, the paradigm of materialism leads to the conclusion that science itself is invalid.
Again, only if the universe is merely a first order system with a recursively defined axiom system. In all likelihood, though, neither is the case.
References
GODEL, Kurt (1951) "Some basic theorems on the foundations of mathematics and their implications" (Gibbs Lecture). In Godel 1995, pp. 304-323.
GODEL, Kurt (1995). Collected Works III. Unpublished Essays and Lectures, ed. S. Feferman et al., Oxford University Press, Oxford.
The philosophical implications of Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems can be found at:
https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-philosophie-2005-4-page-513.htm#
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Yes, I know of Godel's biases in this regard. I think he was mistaken in this (as well as his Platonism). Furthermore, the *reason* he was wrong is as I have said above: that biological systems do not have a recursively defined set of rules and are not first order logical systems.
And, like I noted, we *know* that second order systems are not subject to Godel's results. For example, there are infinitely many non-isomorphic models of first order number theory, but only one second order model.