All Facts Are Based in Faith

[Polymath257]

You're just making yourself look worse now. I'll give you a mercy pass.

OK, here's a question: what is the *definition* of 'parallel' in elliptical geometry? Can parallel lines intersect? So what is the conclusion from the fact that ALL lines intersect?

 

[Polymath257]

I thought I had explained it already, but I guess you need a better teacher.

Another way to describe the differences between these geometries is to consider two straight lines indefinitely extended in a two-dimensional plane that are both perpendicular to a third line:

• • In Euclidean geometry, the lines remain at a constant distance from each other (meaning that a line drawn perpendicular to one line at any point will intersect the other line and the length of the line segment joining the points of intersection remains constant) and are known as parallels.
  • In hyperbolic geometry, they "curve away" from each other, increasing in distance as one moves further from the points of intersection with the common perpendicular; these lines are often called ultraparallels.
  • In elliptic geometry, the lines "curve toward" each other and intersect.

Non-Euclidean geometry - Wikipedia

Sorry, but you are misreading the article here. The situation where two lines are both perpendicular to a third line is NOT the definition of parallel! Not even in Elliptical geometry! This situation is used to explain the impact of the parallel postulate.

But *even in elliptical geometry*, the definition of parallel is that the lines do not meet. In the above situation, where the two lines are both perpendicular to a third, the two lines *are not parallel*, that being the point. In hyperbolic geometry, there is a further division of parallel lines (those that do not intersect) into those that have the same limit point at infinity and those that do not, with the latter being designated as 'hyperparallel'.

 

[Polymath257]

@Polymath257 @Sunstone @Mostly Harmless too @Jayhawker Soule
The claim is made that all facts (things that we can know) are based in faith (the acceptance of propositions as being true in the absence of proof).

The three ways that we are able to know facts are:
1) By personal experience.
2) By the experience of others.
3) By the manipulation of symbols in formal systems of reasoning.

At least, that encompasses what we have been able to know so far. I don't see another way, but I don't know that there isn't one. I might ask which one religious knowledge comes from?

Each of these ways of identifying facts is based in faith:
1) Any knowledge from personal experience is based in the faith that a "real world" exists outside of our own heads, and that at least some of our perceptions and sensations are reflective of that reality.
2) Any knowledge from second-hand experience is based in the faith that the testimony of others having those experiences is reliable.
3) Any knowledge from formal systems of reasoning is based in the faith one has in the axioms underlying those formal systems.

Wrong.

1) We do NOT need to assume that an external world exists to use our personal experiences to perform observations and testing of the predictions we make about those experiences. We can determine that the experiences are consistent and predictable and *define* reality through those consistencies. No faith required.

2) As part of our testing of experiences in 1), we notice that we get information from the experience of sound that is correlated to the movements of visual areas. We hypothesize that these are from people in 'reality' (see above) and that these people have experiences of their own. Through observation and testing, we determine that some of these are reliable sources of additional information. Again, no faith required.

3. And again, wrong. The axioms of a formal system are just the initial strings used for deductions in that formal system. No assumption of truth is required. And since we *define* these things to be the starting point of the formal system, there is no 'assumption' that these are the axioms: the axioms are what we initially have in our formal system Nothing else.

So, to contradict the original claim that all facts are based in faith, one must do one of the following three things:
1) Demonstrate conclusively that the "real world" actually exists, and further, that there is a way to apprehend it directly, without the prerequisite faith in one's own nervous system to approximate the real world.

Not required. See above. We can *define* the notion of 'reality' in terms of our experiences.

2) Demonstrate conclusively that we can know for sure when other people are testifying accurately about their own experiences and when they are not (without of course resorting to personal experience or the experience of others to resolve the issue, since that would be begging the question).

Not required. Only required that they provide useful information that can be independently tested. Confidence is not the same as faith.

3) Demonstrate that the axioms of formal systems of reasoning can be proven to be true.

No truth value is assumed in a formal system. Truth or falsity only applies when there is a MODEL of that formal system. And, when dealing with 'reality', the model is what connects our observations with the formal system. We don't *assume* the truth of the model: we *test* it.

If anyone thinks they can do any of those three things, then go for it, but until then, understand that the claim itself remains unchallenged, despite all the various challenges to peripheral issues, word definitions, and ways of understanding the problem.

No, actually, we (at least I) simply think your system is flawed and not corresponding to the reality of how things are justified. You also fail to distinguish the HUGE difference between ordinary confidence (supported by observation and testing) with religious faith (not so supported). They are *very* different types of things so confusing the two is problematic.

 

[Axe Elf]

My goodness you people are prolific! (I'm looking at you primarily, Polymath.) Don't you have jobs? Lives? Can you type a thousand words a minute or something? Sheesh. I'm two pages of posts behind already! I need a nonsense-blower like a snowblower or something. But in the absence of that, let me try to shovel through another batch of it this evening....

And we notice that this is a testable hypothesis. All I have to do to negate it is to give an example of a fish that does not live in water. We can also argue the vagueness of the phrase 'living in water' and precisely what it means to be a 'fish'. For example, do you mean that all fish must live all of their lives in water? Or is it enough for them to live only *part* of their lives in water? In the latter case, how do they differ from amphibians? In the former case, there are actual counter-examples.

True, and irrelevant. Well, I guess it might be relevant to the extent that it shows that you know how negation works. So when I make the claim, "All facts are based in faith," you should understand that the thing you have to do to disprove my claim is to present a fact that is not based in faith (or at least a way of determining fact that is not based in faith) as a counterexample.

Still waiting on that...

Your example is messed up: the definition of parallel is that the lines do not intersect.

That is only the definition in Euclidean geometries. In non-Euclidean geometries, there are other definitions of parallel lines.

And you are right that an absence of evidence allows for the possibility of both the truth and the falsity of any given statement. But there *are* times when the absence of evidence is sufficient to show non-existence. For example, the absence of evidence of an adult elephant in my room is quite sufficient to show there is no adult elephant in my room: if one existed, then there would be evidence.

So, there are some issues that arise when there is an absence of evidence: 1) if the object did, in fact, exist, would we *expect* to see evidence given the extent of our investigation? 2) is the object well defined enough that we would recognize evidence if we found it? 3) is it even theoretically possible to find evidence for the object? 4) what are the theoretical reasons for suspecting the existence of the object?

So, as I already pointed out, if there has been an extensive investigation of the sort that would be expected to give evidence, then the lack of evidence can be quite enough to demonstrate non-existence. In the case of deities, the long history of unjustified claims to evidence along with the literally thousands of years of investigation tilts towards non-existence for this reason alone.

As for the second, this i a significant issue with the concept of a deity. Given the number of different religions, and all the different claims to the properties of a deity, it isn't clear that the idea is even well enough defined to have a meaningful question on the table. Do you mean the Gnostic Christian deity? or the Islamic deity? One or more of the Hindu deities?

The third is an interesting issue: the lack of evidence has been enough that some have proposed the 'hiddenness' of God. This is a fancy trick to negate the impact of the lack of evidence. But it is a clear case of special pleading. In NO other situation would we allow someone to claim the existence of something while saying it is impossible to actually detect it in some way. I would go further and say that the existence of something *requires* that it be detectable in some way: hiddenness cannot be a way to avoid the requirement of evidence.

It is a general principle that the one making a positive existence statement is the one having the burden of proof of the existence. This is universally the case. Except, of course, those who claim that God exists and want an argument for the non-existence. Again, this is an obvious ploy to avoid the inconvenience of the lack of evidence and is another case of special pleading.

Finally, the theoretical aspects in favor of the existence of God are all based on philosophies that are now seen as invalid. Any claims of necessary existence, for example, harken back to Aristotelian ideas and are no longer part of modern philosophy, and for good reason. The standard 'proofs' for the existence of God are all generally acknowledged to be deeply flawed.

There is some truth here, and there are some questionable claims here, but all of it is outside the scope of this thread. The question of God's existence is an interesting one, to be sure, but this thread is not for its discussion. This is not a religious topic, it is an epistemological one--and that's why it's posted in the "Philosophy" section.

 

[Axe Elf]

We do not have to take the existence of an outside reality on faith. Even if there is no outside reality, we can still do observation, hypothesis formation, and testing concerning the observations we make. We can still deduce that these 'illusions' have a consistency and the information we get from 'others' is reliable through our own testing. And that is quite enough to do science.

But then you are doing observation, hypothesis formation, and testing (science) regarding the internal state of your brain, rather than regarding the "real world." Yes, you can arrive at subjective "facts" (usually called "opinions") regarding the state of your own mind without an appeal to faith, but I think most people would understand that a "fact" in the usual sense is objective, rather than subjective. Before you can know anything at all about the "real world"--before you can determine objective facts--you have to have faith that a real world exists outside of your own mind, and that at least some of your perceptions and sensations are reflective of that reality.

Neither of which is technically an axiom (although the second is in some ways closer). The first is a definition: to say two lines are parallel *means* that they never intersect. The second is a rule of deduction. it allows us to go from one set of strings in our formal system to another set of strings in our formal system.

Your first sentence is false, but both of the following sentences are true. This suggests to me that you don't fully understand the concept of axioms yet, since you don't seem to understand that definitions and rules of deduction are axiomatic (faith statements). I have tried presenting a simple definition of axioms, but this has not proven sufficient to guide you into understanding, so I will instead present a longer passage from Axioms and Proofs | World of Mathematics

"Mathematicians assume that axioms are true without being able to prove them. However this is not as problematic as it may seem, because axioms are either definitions or clearly obvious, and there are only very few axioms. For example, an axiom could be that a + b = b + a for any two numbers a and b."

So now can we have no more nonsense about how axioms are not assumed to be true, or that definitions are not axioms, or any of the other incorrect smokescreens you have been throwing out?

Not quite correct

No, actually, what I said IS correct: "it is not necessary for axioms to have any correspondence to an ontological state of affairs in order to determine facts from them."

For instance, from the axioms that "Begour is canate" and "Quezzence is canate" and "If a=b and c=b, then a=c" we can determine the "fact" (theorem) that "Begour is quezzence."

Quibble: it is NOT the case in elliptical geometry that parallel lines intersect. To be parallel *means* that the lines do not intersect. What happens in elliptical geometry is that *no* pair of lines is parallel.

I guess the Wikipedia article didn't do it for you, so I'll try a different source: Non-Euclidean Geometry - Introduction

"Apart from postulates, the theorems in the Elements of Euclid are also built on a number of definitions. Definition number 23 states that two lines are parallel if they never meet. There is nothing in the definition indicating that the distance between two parallel lines is the same everywhere. The parallel postulate is seemingly obvious only if you assume that parallel lines look like railroad tracks. If you redefine what you mean by a line, you may have that two parallel lines either converge towards each other, or diverge from each other."

I think part of the problem is that I introduced this example in an informal context, and now we are up against the "formal" concept of parallel lines. The important concept here is that for formal systems of reasoning, where there is no proof, you can merely DECIDE which axioms to have faith in, depending on the kind of reasoning you want to do--the facts you can determine are based on the axioms in which you have faith.

Unfortunately, I tried to illustrate this in a casual way, and that has led us all astray. There really is no axiom in ANY geometry that says, "two parallel lines never intersect." So here's an idea. Let's scrap all the confusion that has resulted from my inexactitude, and go back to the actual parallel postulate in Euclidean geometry, which can be expressed as...

"Given any straight line and a point not on it, there exists one and only one straight line which passes through that point and never intersects the first line, no matter how far they are extended."

Now, if you take out the phrase "exists one and only one straight line which passes" and replace it with "exists no line which passes," then you will be doing elliptic geometry. If you take out that phrase and replace it with "exist at least two lines which pass," then you will be doing hyperbolic geometry.

The POINT, of course, is that none of these axioms are objectively "true"; each can be assumed to be true depending on if one wants to calculate the area of a rectangle, plot a Great Circle route, or decribe the flight path of an object in space. The FACTS one can determine from the system of geometry one is using are based on the axiom in which one places their FAITH.

And this is wrong. One chooses based on which set of axioms is consistent with the observations that have been made. So, we use elliptical geometry (as an approximation) for routes on the Earth because observation and testing show it to be better at making predictions that other axiom systems.

No, it is still correct. One chooses the axioms in which one has faith because of the destination they are trying to reach. Obviously, they determined what destination they were trying to reach (Euclidean, elliptic or hyperbolic) because of the observation that one or another model is better suited to flat surfaces, curved surfaces and open space--but of course observation itself is based in faith (the faith that a "real world" exists outside of one's own mind, and that at least some of their perceptions and sensations are reflective of that reality).

If you want to work in the respective formal systems, this is correct. if you want to model something about reality, you choose the one that is consistent with observations.

Yes, one usually chooses to have faith in those axioms which faith in their observations has indicated they should.

 

[Axe Elf]

Lewis Carroll would be proud.

Parenthetically, that was from "Godel, Escher, Bach" by Douglas Hofstadter--but Lewis Carroll might also be proud, who knows?

 

[Polymath257]

Your first sentence is false, but both of the following sentences are true. This suggests to me that you don't fully understand the concept of axioms yet, since you don't seem to understand that definitions and rules of deduction are axiomatic (faith statements). I have tried presenting a simple definition of axioms, but this has not proven sufficient to guide you into understanding, so I will instead present a longer passage from Axioms and Proofs | World of Mathematics

"Mathematicians assume that axioms are true without being able to prove them. However this is not as problematic as it may seem, because axioms are either definitions or clearly obvious, and there are only very few axioms. For example, an axiom could be that a + b = b + a for any two numbers a and b."

So now can we have no more nonsense about how axioms are not assumed to be true, or that definitions are not axioms, or any of the other incorrect smokescreens you have been throwing out?

Sorry to inform you, but your references are not accurate. i have been a professional mathematician for the last 32 years, so I have a bit of experience in the area. I know how math works. In the case of commutativity (a+b=b+a), that is a typical assumption in certain aspects of group theory (abelian groups) or in ring theory (where it is actually derivable from the distributive and cancellation laws). As such, it is part of the *definition* of what it means to be an abelian group or a ring.

No, actually, what I said IS correct: "it is not necessary for axioms to have any correspondence to an ontological state of affairs in order to determine facts from them."

For instance, from the axioms that "Begour is canate" and "Quezzence is canate" and "If a=b and c=b, then a=c" we can determine the "fact" (theorem) that "Begour is quezzence."

Yes, you can, because that is how models are set up: to respect certain *assumptions* like this.

I guess the Wikipedia article didn't do it for you, so I'll try a different source: Non-Euclidean Geometry - Introduction

"Apart from postulates, the theorems in the Elements of Euclid are also built on a number of definitions. Definition number 23 states that two lines are parallel if they never meet. There is nothing in the definition indicating that the distance between two parallel lines is the same everywhere. The parallel postulate is seemingly obvious only if you assume that parallel lines look like railroad tracks. If you redefine what you mean by a line, you may have that two parallel lines either converge towards each other, or diverge from each other."

And I nowhere said that parallel lines have to maintain the same distance between them. What I said is that the *definition* of parallel is that the lines do not intersect. YOu have said nothing to contradict that.

I think part of the problem is that I introduced this example in an informal context, and now we are up against the "formal" concept of parallel lines. The important concept here is that for formal systems of reasoning, where there is no proof, you can merely DECIDE which axioms to have faith in, depending on the kind of reasoning you want to do--the facts you can determine are based on the axioms in which you have faith.

And once again, that is a misuse of the word 'faith'. I do not have to think the axioms are true to verify that certain results follow from them. I do not need to have faith in a formal system to berify that deductions are done correctly in that formal system.

Unfortunately, I tried to illustrate this in a casual way, and that has led us all astray. There really is no axiom in ANY geometry that says, "two parallel lines never intersect." So here's an idea. Let's scrap all the confusion that has resulted from my inexactitude, and go back to the actual parallel postulate in Euclidean geometry, which can be expressed as...

"Given any straight line and a point not on it, there exists one and only one straight line which passes through that point and never intersects the first line, no matter how far they are extended."

Now, if you take out the phrase "exists one and only one straight line which passes" and replace it with "exists no line which passes," then you will be doing elliptic geometry. If you take out that phrase and replace it with "exist at least two lines which pass," then you will be doing hyperbolic geometry.

Good. You are at least admitting that your previous statement is incorrect: the notion that two lines do not intersect is the *definition* of being parallel. it does NOT take any sort of faith to use that definition. And I do agree that the parallel postulate is what separates Euclidean from non-Euclidean geometries.

And, neither does it take any 'faith' to use the axioms of Eucliden geometry to verify that certain results are proved in that system, nor to have faith in non-Euclidean geometries to verify that some other results are derived in them At NO point is there any requirement that a truth value be assigned to any axiom or theorem.

The POINT, of course, is that none of these axioms are objectively "true"; each can be assumed to be true depending on if one wants to calculate the area of a rectangle, plot a Great Circle route, or decribe the flight path of an object in space. The FACTS one can determine from the system of geometry one is using are based on the axiom in which one places their FAITH.

In other words, observations determine which axiom system is best used to model reality. I agree. But that is NOT an assumption! It is an observation subject to testing. And it is not faith based. We don't rigorously hold to Euclidean geometry when the observations go against it, nor for elliptical geometry when the observations go again it. Math is a language when applied to reality.

No, it is still correct. One chooses the axioms in which one has faith because of the destination they are trying to reach. Obviously, they determined what destination they were trying to reach (Euclidean, elliptic or hyperbolic) because of the observation that one or another model is better suited to flat surfaces, curved surfaces and open space--but of course observation itself is based in faith (the faith that a "real world" exists outside of one's own mind, and that at least some of their perceptions and sensations are reflective of that reality).

Sorry, but once again, we don't place 'faith' in those axioms. If anything we test and test and test again to be sure when they do and when they do not apply. That is based on observation.

Yes, one usually chooses to have faith in those axioms which faith in their observations has indicated they should.

OK, I can only say that you use the word 'faith' in a much different way than I do. In particular, there is a HUGE difference between the confidence of science and logic and the faith of reliigon.

 

[Polymath257]

Parenthetically, that was from "Godel, Escher, Bach" by Douglas Hofstadter--but Lewis Carroll might also be proud, who knows?

Hofstadter got it originally from Carroll. he then extended the story for his own purposes in hos book. And a wonderful book it is!

 

[Axe Elf]

Hofstadter got it originally from Carroll. he then extended the story for his own purposes in hos book. And a wonderful book it is!

I have faith in your testimony.

The rest of the nonsense I will get to in the order in which it was conceived; I'm only a page and a half behind now!

 

[Polymath257]

I have faith in your testimony.

The rest of the nonsense I will get to in the order in which it was conceived; I'm only a page and a half behind now!

As I recall, he gives a reference in that little dialog. it is one of the first, I think. It has been a while since I read the book, but I had read the Carroll story long before GEB came out.

As for 'faith', once again. the claim is testable.

 

[Axe Elf]

As for 'faith', once again. the claim is testable.

Yes, it is. I could choose not to have faith in your testimony in favor of faith in my own perceptions, if I wanted to take the time to pursue them--or I might choose to have faith in the testimony of a Carroll expert, if I wanted to take the time to pursue one--but I am content to have faith in your testimony of that in which you have faith instead.

In all cases, the fact of Carroll's authorship is based in my faith in some source of that knowledge.

 

[ImmortalFlame]

That is only the definition in Euclidean geometries. In non-Euclidean geometries, there are other definitions of parallel lines.

How are you still confused about what "parallel lines" means when it has been defined for you multiple times? "Parallel" doesn't mean "something else" in elliptical geometry, parallel lines don't exist in elliptical geometry:

"Elliptic geometry is a non-Euclidean geometry with positive curvature which replaces the parallel postulate with the statement "through any point in the plane, there exist no lines parallel to a given line.""
Elliptic Geometry -- from Wolfram MathWorld

In other words, if you take a pair of parallel lines in Euclidean geometry and express them instead in elliptical geometry they cease to be parallel lines. This does not mean that there is a definition of parallel lines that includes the lines intersecting at any point, it means that when you change the geometry of parallel lines they cease to be parallel. There is no definition of "parallel lines" that says they intersect.

Do you understand?

 

[LukeS]

Discuss.

Well its a case of reduction ad absurdum. (A or not-A. Not-A is shown to be absurd, therefore A).


If facts require faith, really and truly, then that faith is a fact (i.e. an item of truth).

So presuppose facts need faith. Its actually absurd, because the existence of faith presupposes at least one fact, namely that of faith's existence. So facts cant depend on faith but the existence of faith entails the fact of faith.

So facts must exist, in other words they be logically prior, for any such reasoning process (about faith or about anything else) to be valid.

 

[Axe Elf]

If you perhaps mean you did not endorse using the term "scientific faith", then I agree with you. But if you really do mean you "didn't call anything 'scientific faith'", then I think you are either giving the word "call" a peculiar meaning, or you are quite clearly confused about that. Choosing your terms with care will help to prevent miscommunication, and you should have the courtesy to define any terms you are using in unique ways.

No, I mean I did not call anything "scientific faith" in the usual sense of the word "call"--I did not denote or describe anything as being "scientific faith." Someone else (Polymath maybe?) said that there was a big difference between the kind of faith that expects a perseverence in detected patterns and "religious faith" that isn't supported by observation. My response was that I did not see a difference among "kinds" of faith, that I did not distinguish between (as examples) "religious" faith, "mathematical" faith or "scientific" faith. I didn't speculate as to what those "kinds" of faith might be, as I did not even recognize them as legitimate descriptors. So I did not call anything "scientific faith."

I would not think that I would need the courtesy to define simple words like "call"; if these terms are confusing for you, I can understand the difficulty you are having with the larger epistemological principle at hand.

I do not believe it is true that scientific facts require us to have faith in the existence of an independent reality.

Your faith statement is noted, yet irrelevant.

So far as I can see, you have yet to demonstrate your thesis that scientific facts do require us to have faith in the existence of an independent reality. If that's so, please offer your reasons for believing that. On the other hand, if you have already laid out your reasons somewhere in this thread, please point me to where you have done so. As it is, I see you repeating your belief over and over, but I don't see where you've actually defended it.

I realize the discussion has been sprawling, both on and off topic, so I took the time to refocus the conversation on the topic itself in post #66. I will copy and paste it here for your convenience.

The three ways that we are able to know facts are:
1) By personal experience.
2) By the experience of others.
3) By the manipulation of symbols in formal systems of reasoning.

Each of these ways of identifying facts is based in faith:
1) Any knowledge from personal experience is based in the faith that a "real world" exists outside of our own heads, and that at least some of our perceptions and sensations are reflective of that reality.
2) Any knowledge from second-hand experience is based in the faith that the testimony of others having those experiences is reliable.
3) Any knowledge from formal systems of reasoning is based in the faith one has in the axioms underlying those formal systems.

So, to contradict the original claim that all facts are based in faith, one must do one of the following three things:
1) Demonstrate conclusively that the "real world" actually exists, and further, that there is a way to apprehend it directly, without the prerequisite faith in one's own nervous system to approximate the real world.
2) Demonstrate conclusively that we can know for sure when other people are testifying accurately about their own experiences and when they are not (without of course resorting to personal experience or the experience of others to resolve the issue, since that would be begging the question).
3) Demonstrate that the axioms of formal systems of reasoning can be proven to be true.

Could you elaborate on that, please? It's my own understanding that "peers" tend to be skeptical -- even extremely skeptical -- when reviewing each other's work. How does faith enter into the picture?

The aspects of the scientific method involving replication and peer review require faith in the testimony of others regarding their own personal experiences (observations) in replicating an experiment, or faith in the reported credentials of a potential reviewer which would qualify them as a "peer."

Again, you keep repeating this claim, but you provide no argument for it so far as I've seen.

To the extent that it is a recognized and accepted epistemological principle, I would not think that it needs to be re-established for purposes of this thread. Numerous philosophers have expounded upon it, including Rene Descartes and David Hume. If it's a difficult topic for you, I recommend some remedial reading on the topic before attempting to critique it.

In this case, let's assume for the moment that what you said is true. Would that logically require us to believe that "all facts are based on faith"? Couldn't I establish by myself that X was a fact? And if I could, then not all facts are based on faith in the experiences of others.

You are correct. Not all facts are based on faith in the experience of others (or in their testimony thereof). Some facts are based on faith in personal experience (faith in the existence of a "real world" outside of your own mind, and that at least some of your perceptions and sensations are reflective of that reality), which would be the case if you were to determine for yourself that X is a fact. Still other facts are based on faith in the axioms of formal systems of reasoning. But all facts are based on faith in SOMEthing.

I think your statement here is a bit muddled. I am guessing you meant once again to claim that "all facts are based on faith", or something to that effect. However, in my opinion your statement -- on close examination -- is vague and possibly ambiguous. If you were trying to say anything besides "all facts are based on faith", then please clarify your meaning. On the other hand, if that's all you meant, then please ignore this.

I would say that it is more the lens through which it was viewed that is muddled, rather than the statement itself. What I meant to say is exactly what I did say, "there is absolutely NOTHING you can know about the "real world" until you have faith that a "real world" exists outside of your own head, and that at least some of your perceptions and sensations are reflective of that reality."

I make a conscientious effort to express my points clearly. If you come across a term you are unfamiliar with, my advice is to google it or to ask how I am using the term.

I do know how to use resource materials on those rare occasions that I come across a term with which I am unfamiliar, but as a former state spelling champion and a published author with an IQ that has to be expressed in scientific notation, the likelihood of confusion is minimal.

Case in point...

Methodological naturalism is the claim that there is no need to invoke the supernatural, including God, a god, or gods, in giving scientific explanations.

Yeah, that's what I said.

 

[Naama]

Discuss.

Um...Your assertion is probably wrong....?

 

[Axe Elf]

Um...Your assertion is probably wrong....?

Am I supposed to take that on faith, or do you have reasons for negating the assertion?

 

[Axe Elf]

Yeah, bit of a contradiction there. (from Collins)

Belief is a feeling of certainty that something exists, is true, or is good.
Your religious or political beliefs are your views on religious or political matters.
If it is your belief that something is the case, it is your strong opinion that it is the case.

If you have faith in someone or something, you feel confident about their ability or goodness.
A faith is a particular religion, for example Christianity, Buddhism, or Islam.
Faith is strong religious belief in a particular God.

Note the difference between believing your religious or political views are correct and your faith in such beliefs - not the same - one being a choice and the other a gamble on the quality of this belief.

I still don't see any distinction between the two. I could just as easily say that "all facts are based in belief" without changing the meaning of the claim.

 

[Naama]

Am I supposed to take that on faith, or do you have reasons for negating the assertion?

I'm not an expert in debate or logic, but I'm pretty sure I'm warranted to doubt your assertion until you come up with some sort of proof honey.

 

[Axe Elf]

Are you seriously going to pretend you didn't misread that wiki page?

No, I'm not going to pretend that I didn't misread it, because I didn't. I did, however, make two errors in illustrating my point with the example of parallel lines (neither of which affect the point I was making, though). First of all, I oversimplified it for the sake of brevity, without realizing how finely toothed the combs would be dissecting it, and I ended up being caught in my own inexactitude. The second error was giving you a reference with too much to digest at once, so you read a part of the article that I wasn't referring you to, then assumed that I was talking about THAT, and if I was, then I must have misunderstood what it was saying--when in fact I wasn't talking about THAT at all.

I tried to correct my first error in post #85, which I will copy and paste for your convenience:


Unfortunately, I tried to illustrate this in a casual way, and that has led us all astray. There really is no axiom in ANY geometry that says, "two parallel lines never intersect." So here's an idea. Let's scrap all the confusion that has resulted from my inexactitude, and go back to the actual parallel postulate in Euclidean geometry, which can be expressed as...

"Given any straight line and a point not on it, there exists one and only one straight line which passes through that point and never intersectsthe first line, no matter how far they are extended."

Now, if you take out the phrase "exists one and only one straight line which passes" and replace it with "exists no line which passes," then you will be doing elliptic geometry. If you take out that phrase and replace it with "exist at least two lines which pass," then you will be doing hyperbolic geometry.

The POINT, of course, is that none of these axioms are objectively "true"; each can be assumed to be true depending on if one wants to calculate the area of a rectangle, plot a Great Circle route, or decribe the flight path of an object in space. The FACTS one can determine from the system of geometry one is using are based on the axiom in which one places their FAITH.

 

[Axe Elf]

I'm not an expert in debate or logic, but I'm pretty sure I'm warranted to doubt your assertion until you come up with some sort of proof honey.

Have you read the thread?

Here is an encapsulation of the argument, and the challenge for anyone who wishes to contest it.

The claim is made that all facts (things that we can know) are based in faith (the acceptance of propositions as being true in the absence of proof).

The three ways that we are able to know facts are:
1) By personal experience.
2) By the experience of others.
3) By the manipulation of symbols in formal systems of reasoning.

Each of these ways of identifying facts is based in faith:
1) Any knowledge from personal experience is based in the faith that a "real world" exists outside of our own heads, and that at least some of our perceptions and sensations are reflective of that reality.
2) Any knowledge from second-hand experience is based in the faith that the testimony of others having those experiences is reliable.
3) Any knowledge from formal systems of reasoning is based in the faith one has in the axioms underlying those formal systems.

So, to contradict the original claim that all facts are based in faith, one must do one of the following three things:
1) Demonstrate conclusively that the "real world" actually exists, and further, that there is a way to apprehend it directly, without the prerequisite faith in one's own nervous system to approximate the real world.
2) Demonstrate conclusively that we can know for sure when other people are testifying accurately about their own experiences and when they are not (without of course resorting to personal experience or the experience of others to resolve the issue, since that would be begging the question).
3) Demonstrate that the axioms of formal systems of reasoning can be proven to be true.