An Interesting Discussion on Pascal's Wager

[Mock Turtle]

Oh, I think we are a long way from having answers to most of the really big questions - it’s our capacity to ask those questions which makes us so marvellous, so awesome, so incredible. We are the universe become conscious, looking out at itself from within.

No quibble with this, just the tendency to grab at easy solutions or answers, and which appears to be a special human trait. We should just think more long-term and be less grabby.

 

[lincoy3304]

I have often found that philosophers would do well to learn a bit of mathematics. In this case, learning about partial orders would be an immense help. In particular, the distinction between maximal and largest is relevant here. Something is maximal if there is nothing greater. It is largest is everything else is smaller.

I denounce the view that utility is quantifiable. You may wish to quantify it, but I see no reason to. In abductive arguments or criteria, it only needs to be recognized what option fills the criteria better than other options, which does not need to be quantified, mathematically expressed, or comparative; it could just be intuitive. Our intuitions can take the place of saying "Option A does not fulfill the 2nd or 1st criteria nearly as well as Option B." I don't see any reason other than that some of the criteria can't be mathematically quantified. However, that itself is even objectionable. (2) and (4) could possibly be quantified, but it would take specializations such as in psychology or environmental science. (5) is a whole other issue, and need not be debated. However, it seems intuitive that if moral realism is true, we ought to be moral in this situation.

So, exactly how to you define 'impact' and how do you compare impacts of different actions? What makes you think there *are* maximal impacts?

Impact = change resultant from an action
I don't know how to compare impacts upon nature or people, but it would be difficult to argue that such impacts do not exist. The impact of Marx's Das Kapital has been evident in large and small scales upon people and upon nature. It would be incredibly difficult to argue against that in a rational manner. Impact probably has to have a large enough effect to where it differentiates from projected models by a significant measure that compels us to think there is another force at play. It's the same thing they do in every discipline - compare current models/theories/hypotheses to new information and see how they stack up.

And this doesn't even address the possibility that a maximum for one criterion might exclude maxima for other criteria. Maybe the maximal length of impact will not be a maximum on the impact on nature, for example.

That is when various criteria must be reconsidered to see how they might stack up. If they are still equal (which seems rare) then other disciplines should step in to even further clarify how those criteria might be considered. If somehow, the two options are equal, then you should do a deep dive into how plausible each idea behind the actions are to determine the utility. If they are still equal, then it truly is free will that is between the options.

Only if such an afterlife actually exists. If not, then an atheistic world view might both be more true and more useful.

Yes, but that comes later in the progression of the question of utility, as I outlined above.

I find it rather unlikely.

And yet, why?

 

[Debater Slayer]

I try to approach Pascal's Wager differently.
I start with the question, what is the maximal good action or course of action we can take? When we go down that route, it seems that a maximally good action that could be performed by a human being has 5 separate properties: (1) maximal length of the impact, (2) maximal impact on the human being performing the action, (3) impact on a maximal amount of people, (4) maximal impact on nature, and obviously (5) is morally good.
We could debate on whether these properties are what fill the criteria of utility, but (5) seems to be the only objectionable one. (5) also includes various considerations such as the intention, conscience, and circumstances of the person performing the action.
When we get these 5 properties of the goodness of the maximally good, we can ask what the maximal action is.
This will depend on your worldview, but a religious person who believes in an eternal afterlife would have the upper hand here, as choosing the eternal, blissful, and wonderful afterlife satisfies these conditions better than choosing the maximally great action in an atheistic worldview.
However, it also seems ethically intuitive that in situations where the potential utility of doing an action is proportionally greater than the potential utility of refraining from the action, we are called to perform the proportionally greater action. Some may object by saying that there isn't a way to measure the utility of an action, but I just offered 4 categories that would measure the utility of the action. (5) is a yes or no option, so that must be fulfilled for an action to have utility. Exclude the maximal qualifiers of each, and the listed qualities are suitable for ways of measuring utility.
Some may object and say that splitting utility up into categories doesn't answer that question. These categories of utility are qualitative, not quantitative, so we can approach debates on the utility of actions through asking how actions must fulfill this criteria. To strengthen the possibility of measuring utility, we could add a fifth category--"The action must fill categories (1)-(4) greater than rival actions to be considered of better utility."
Although we may not be able to quantify these categories, it seems plausible that utility can be measurable.
Now, how can we decipher what the action with the most utility could be? This comes down to an epistemological consideration. One could say that being an atheist could fulfill those categories, but they would have a hard time doing so. Here, various arguments for and against different worldviews need to be brought up. Recall that (5) requires that the action be moral, which includes the intention of the person acting. The utility of an action also must here be distinguished between believed utility and actual utility. The actual utility is what we hope to achieve when performing the believed utility. The believed utility may or may not be greater than the actual utility, in that we identify the wrong action of greatest utility, believe the action to have different levels of fulfillment of the actual criteria of the action, or conjoin those two. We cannot guarantee what the actual utility is, but we can aspire to achieve acting for the greatest actual utility. This requires us to be epistemologically honest with what is the greatest possible action, as we must perform the greatest believed utility action. To rationally believe something requires justification. Simply saying "Action x could bring maximal utility," is not sufficient. One would need to provide a justification for that statement that surpasses the justification of, say, Action y.
From here, we can consider various hypotheses on what the greatest action of utility could be. Put forth your own!

(I'll be coming back to edit this, but I already recognize one thing that must be explained further - Should we perform actions that give more utility even though they may seem irrational? I have a deeper understanding of this question, but I do not have enough time tonight to finish my response to that. Let me just say for now that the answer is not yes or no.)

Welcome to the forum! I hope you like it here.

 

[Polymath257]

I denounce the view that utility is quantifiable. You may wish to quantify it, but I see no reason to. In abductive arguments or criteria, it only needs to be recognized what option fills the criteria better than other options, which does not need to be quantified, mathematically expressed, or comparative; it could just be intuitive. Our intuitions can take the place of saying "Option A does not fulfill the 2nd or 1st criteria nearly as well as Option B." I don't see any reason other than that some of the criteria can't be mathematically quantified. However, that itself is even objectionable. (2) and (4) could possibly be quantified, but it would take specializations such as in psychology or environmental science. (5) is a whole other issue, and need not be debated. However, it seems intuitive that if moral realism is true, we ought to be moral in this situation.

The difficulties rise when option A satisfies the first criterion very well, but doesn't fit the second at all, while option B satisfies the second criterion very well, but not the first. You don't need to quantify to be able to order, but your scenario doens't even seem to have all scenarios be comparable.

In that context, maximal and largest are not the same concept.

Impact = change resultant from an action
I don't know how to compare impacts upon nature or people, but it would be difficult to argue that such impacts do not exist. The impact of Marx's Das Kapital has been evident in large and small scales upon people and upon nature. It would be incredibly difficult to argue against that in a rational manner. Impact probably has to have a large enough effect to where it differentiates from projected models by a significant measure that compels us to think there is another force at play. It's the same thing they do in every discipline - compare current models/theories/hypotheses to new information and see how they stack up.

And once again, I am not saying the impacts do not exist. i am saying that there is no consistent way to compare impacts.

That is when various criteria must be reconsidered to see how they might stack up. If they are still equal (which seems rare) then other disciplines should step in to even further clarify how those criteria might be considered. If somehow, the two options are equal, then you should do a deep dive into how plausible each idea behind the actions are to determine the utility. If they are still equal, then it truly is free will that is between the options.

And that is why the idea of a partial order is so useful. it allows that some things might not be comparable at all. The down side is that there may not be a 'largest'.

Yes, but that comes later in the progression of the question of utility, as I outlined above.

And yet, why?

 

[lincoy3304]

The difficulties rise when option A satisfies the first criterion very well, but doesn't fit the second at all, while option B satisfies the second criterion very well, but not the first. You don't need to quantify to be able to order, but your scenario doens't even seem to have all scenarios be comparable.

In that context, maximal and largest are not the same concept.

I can understand your critique, but I would change my position in response to this. These facets of utility I will call ontologically measured, but they may be difficult to measure epistemically or quantify to us. Utility may or may not be epistemically measurable, but that does not get rid of the fact that there are grades of it or remove the fact that actions that may seem to have the same utility to us may have slightly different utilities ontologically. I agree that there are situations in which we cannot determine different levels of utility. However, that does not get rid of the fact that we can determine a range of options that meet/exceed the conditions.
I could add another condition - "An option must exceed the other options in conditions (1)-(5) to be considered the best option."

And once again, I am not saying the impacts do not exist. i am saying that there is no consistent way to compare impacts.

Maybe the impacts are not measurable on a fine level, but that does not mean that differences in impacts exist. The impacts may be so large that they are noticeable even without in-depth research. As I mentioned before, Karl Marx's influential beliefs are such an example. Another is the life, teaching, and surrounding beliefs of Jesus Christ. Impacts may not be quantifiable or distinguishable on fine levels, but I could point to numerous disciplines that can't consistently compare the differences of impacts. All of history is one; financial statistics is another; political science; all of philosophy; most of abstract reasoning; grammar; literature; etc...

To your supposed repost of my question "And yet, why?" to
What I am seeking to answer is the question "What is the greatest possible action one can take?" Your objection takes the soundness of the reasoning behind the action into question. I've said earlier I'll be making a post on this, but right now I'm still developing my idea there.

 

[lincoy3304]

Welcome to the forum! I hope you like it here.

Thanks!

 

[PearlSeeker]

Perhaps not, initially. But subsequent experience will either confirm or invalidate the utility of our faith. In other words, we put our faith to the test, refining our beliefs as we learn through experience.

How do you put your faith to test? Isn't this a contradiction?

 

[paarsurrey]

Is Atheism (et al) a Worldview?

Atheism is not robust enough to be a worldview.

Yes, it is as week as a bubble, please, right?

Regards

 

[paarsurrey]

Is Atheism (et al) a Worldview?

one single tenet

of negativity, having no basis of its own, born in counter reaction to Pauline mythology (aka Christianity) in the West, please, right?

Regards