Any Arguments by which to Conclude that Consciousness Is a Product of Brains?

[siti]

Now when we think of 4 dimensions of space, how can we be containing such an idea in a 3-d brain?

If there are 4-dimensions of space then the brain is not 3-dimensional but 4-dimensional - or are you suggesting that the brain does not exist in space at all? If there are 4 (or more) dimensions of space, then the 3d world is a mental construct that the brain uses as a 'visualization' tool. But it doesn't mean it is not a very useful - vitally important - approximation of 'truth'. And it doesn't mean that either the brain or its 'visualizations' are not the results of physical phenomena.

 

[Nous]

Nous - I must admit I am getting a bit p***ed off with this. First the logical fallacy you quoted in the OP does not say that we cannot infer causation from correlation - it merely says that it is inappropriate to assume that because event x always preceded event y that x is the cause of y. So you need to read up on your logic.

It is you who needs to read up on logic. What you have just stated is not cum hoc ergo propter hoc, but is post hoc ergo propter hoc. Learn the difference:

Cum Hoc is the fallacy committed when one jumps to a conclusion about causation based on a correlation between two events, or types of event, which occur simultaneously. In order to avoid this fallacy, one needs to rule out other possible explanations for the correlation:

• A third event--or type of event--is the cause of the correlation.
  
  For instance, consider the Counter-Example: Children's shoe sizes will be positively correlated with many developmental changes, because they are the common effects of growth. As children grow, so do their feet, and their shoe sizes increase, their handwriting improves, and they develop in many other ways. So, growth is the common cause of both increased shoe size and improved handwriting in children.
  
  
• The direction of causation may be the reverse of that in the conclusion.
  
  For instance, suppose that statistics show a positive correlation between gun ownership and violent crime, namely, the higher number of guns owned, the higher the rate of violent crime. It would be tempting to jump to the conclusion that gun ownership causes violent crime, but the causal relationship may be the exact reverse. High rates of violent crime may cause fearful citizens to purchase guns for protection.
  
  This type of error is what distinguishes cum hoc from its better known sibling post hoc. In a post hoc fallacy, the supposed cause temporally precedes the alleged effect, so there is no possibility that the causal relationship is the reverse.
  
  
• The correlation may simply be coincidence.
  
  Statistical lore is filled with examples of coincidental correlations, for example see the Quote-Unquote.

• 
  

Logical Fallacy: Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc

What argument have you attempted to state on this thread other than a fallacy?

Second, how, other than by inference from correlation can causality be determined.

I've answered this question several times on this thread. See #88:

The cause of black holes was not inferred from observed correlations, but was deduced from the mathematics of General Relativity.

The various effects that are the result of the Higgs field were not inferred from observed correlations. Rather, a field was hypothesized to exist and exhibit characteristics that resolved certain observed anomalies (such as by giving mass to some fundamental particles). Perhaps one can say that the detection of the Higgs boson involved observation of correlations, but causation was not inferred from such correlations.

The cause of an incident of anesthetic awareness is not inferred from observed correlations. Under normal circumstances, there are 3 possible causes: the patient received an inadequate amount of anesthetic due to doctor error, equipment failure, or characteristics of the patient (e.g., tolerance to one or more of the drugs). The possible causes are eliminated until there is only one left.

To observe that thunder often follows lightning doesn't provide much information about the cause of thunder. For thousands of years, humans presumably noticed that correlation without being able to make any correct deduction about what causes thunder--Aristotle was probably not unusual in that he didn't connect thunder as an effect of lightning (he thought thunder was a result of the wind that occurred during storms). I remember as a child being told by someone that thunder was the sound of clouds slamming back to together after being split apart by lightning. The correlation with lightning doesn't inform one that was causes the sound known as thunder is a shock wave produced by the pressure of rapidly heated gas molecules. It's understanding the mechanics of the atmosphere, the nature of molecules in it, and actions of lightning that lead to understanding what causes thunder.

That sort of coherent explanation in which consciousness (intentions, beliefs, awareness, free will, etc.) is deduced as a logical consequence of the processes and components in the brain is what is missing in the hypothesis that consciousness is produced by brain matter.​

Their brains have stopped functioning and their consciousness has ceased.

It seems that your assertions illustrate a difficulty in distinguishing between your beliefs and facts. The second clause of your sentence ("and their consciousness has ceased") wouldn't be necessarily true except if their consciousness were created by something happening in their brains. But that (that their consciousness was created by something happening in their brains) is what you haven't been able to argue non-fallaciously. Right?

Your belief and claim that consciousness ceases when a person's brain has stopped functioning is directly contradicted by the evidence of people having complex, coherent experiences, forming memories, engaging in logical thought processes, and having veridical perceptions of the external world during clinical death--when their brains are not functioning.

You also haven't addressed any of the evidence noted earlier about anomalous cognition.

If you want speculative interpretations about how a physical brain can produce consciousness try Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind or look up Stuart Hameroff's Quantum Consciousness web site. There are interpretations (look up Big Wow and/or Paola Zizzi) that make the entire universe "conscious" in one sense or another and I find these very intriguing but not at all convincing. There are also experimental results that seem to lend support to Penrose and Hameroff's ideas (you can find info about these from Hameroff's site) - not so the notion of universal or cosmic consciousness as far as I know.

I seem to have read more on the topic than you have. I haven't asked for any "speculative interpretations about how a physical brain can produce consciousness." I asked for an argument.

But the bottom line for me as far as this discussion is concerned - is its all physical (i.e. explainable - at least in principle - by physics)

If your belief here has any basis in reality, then cite the evidence and state the deduction that "[consciouness] is all physical".

 

[siti]

It is you who needs to read up on logic. What you have just stated is not cum hoc ergo propter hoc, but is post hoc ergo propter hoc.

You're right of course (well spotted!) - change "preceded" to "occurs with" so it becomes: it is inappropriate to assume that because event x always occurs with event y that x is the cause of y. So now, in the brains and consciousness causation problem, we have to rule out the alternative explanations you listed:

1. A third event (i.e. neither the brain nor consciousness itself) is the cause - presumably this is not your argument - what other cause could be proposed?

2. Switch the direction of causality so that consciousness is the cause of the brain's existence - I suppose we can't rule that out, but then we can't rule this out for anything else either and this becomes either:

(a) an appeal to supernatural agency. Fine as a religious position, dodgy as a philosophical one as it invokes a more complex cause (cosmic - or at least more expansive - consciousness) for a relatively simply effect (individual human consciousness) and unacceptable as a scientific explanation as it is, even in principle, non- falsifiable or...

(b) an endless chicken and egg regression of brain giving rise to consciousness, giving rise to brain, giving rise to consciousness...again, dodgy philosophically for the same reason (invoking complex causes for relatively simple effects) and ultimately unassailable by scientific investigation​

3. Its just a coincidence that brains and consciousness always appear together. In this case, we would then have to find separate causes for both - again, I presume this is not the position you are taking.

So, in the case at hand, a cum hoc ergo propter hoc conclusion seems to be all that is left, and (having ruled out any genuine alternatives) it is no longer a logical fallacy but an abductive inference (I think I might have mentioned that earlier) reached by inference from observed correlation to the 'best' (available) explanation: consciousness is what (physical) brains do...

...which doesn't actually rule out 2(b) above (which in this case makes brains and consciousness their own mutual proximate causes and, perhaps, has the problem of requiring a more complex ultimate cause for an explanation of a relatively more simple event - though I'm not sure this is necessarily true*, but it certainly is if we are invoking a purposeful and essentially eternal 'cosmic consciousness') and really only rules out fundamentally mysterious causation (1), supernatural agency (2(a)) and bizarre coincidence (3) - none of which could be addressed scientifically in any case.

To paraphrase Sherlock Holmes "once you have eliminated the plainly ridiculous, whatever remains, no matter how eminently sensible, obvious and contrary to our preconceptions, must be the truth".

And to quote him more directly: "There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact"

*A more radical alternative solution is to suggest that brains/consciousness are, in fact, the mutually synergistic cause of not just each other, but of the entire course of cosmic evolution. I know that sounds even more radically preposterous than what you are suggesting, but basically what I am saying is that if the cosmos is (somehow) conscious, then it itself either IS or HAS a "brain". I know I'm treading on dangerously thin ice expecting this suggestion to be even remotely understood in the sense that I mean it - but what I am suggesting is that if the explanations for some of the consciousness phenomena you have discussed is some kind of immaterial cosmic 'field' of consciousness, then there is probably an associated material 'brain' - just as there is (apparently) a particle associated with the Higgs field. (Very imperfect analogies, I know, but I am hoping you at least catch my physicalist-panexperientialist drift).

 

[Nous]

You're right of course (well spotted!) - change "preceded" to "occurs with" so it becomes: it is inappropriate to assume that because event x always occurs with event y that x is the cause of y. So now, in the brains and consciousness causation problem, we have to rule out the alternative explanations you listed:

1. A third event (i.e. neither the brain nor consciousness itself) is the cause - presumably this is not your argument - what other cause could be proposed?

Where did you rule out that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon, for which brains are receivers? How did you rule out that hypothesis, which perfectly explains the evidence that you are loathe to even speak of, namely the evidence of people having complex, coherent experiences, forming memories, engaging in logical thought processes and veridical perceptions that are not obtained through sensory organs, during clinical death? That hypothesis also explains the other evidence that you have not addressed or accounted for, namely anomalous cognition.

Where did you make a non-fallacious argument that concludes that brain activity produces the phenomena of intentions, beliefs, unified awareness, free will?

*A more radical alternative solution is to suggest that brains/consciousness are, in fact, the mutually synergistic cause of not just each other, but of the entire course of cosmic evolution. I know that sounds even more radically preposterous than what you are suggesting, but basically what I am saying is that if the cosmos is (somehow) conscious, then it itself either IS or HAS a "brain". I know I'm treading on dangerously thin ice expecting this suggestion to be even remotely understood in the sense that I mean it - but what I am suggesting is that if the explanations for some of the consciousness phenomena you have discussed is some kind of immaterial cosmic 'field' of consciousness, then there is probably an associated material 'brain' - just as there is (apparently) a particle associated with the Higgs field. (Very imperfect analogies, I know, but I am hoping you at least catch my physicalist-panexperientialist drift).

I believe I have understood your meaning here. It is perhaps beginning to sound more like Whitehead (and maybe Hartshorne), which I approve of. And it would seem to help explain the evidence of NDEs and anomalous cognition--or at least not leave such phenomena utter mysteries.

 

[dust1n]

So, again, those of us who do have the ability to choose to assert true statements rather than false ones (and even to assert false ones when we desire to do so) know that your (and the 8 Ball's) assertions have no truth value. You (according to you) are unable to choose to state what is true about free will. The denial of having free will is self-stultifying, like the thesis of epiphenomenalism. As explained in the OP here: Like Epiphenomenalism, Denial of Free Will is Self-Stultifying.

Still a little shocked you are still fascinated with the free will question here. Like every time I keep trying to bring back the conversation to the topic of your OP "Does consciousness arrive from the brain?" you just bring up the free will again. In my mind, the topic of free will is wholly irrelevant from the OP, and I only ever mentioned it because you asked, "Is there an argument somewhere in what you have written by which to conclude that consciousness (intentions, beliefs, awareness, free will, etc.) is produced by brains?" I was more than happy to address that question, I just had no interest in bringing free will into the conversation because I don't believe it in regardless if thoughts arise from the brain or not. If you want to argue over free will, I'd think it be better to have a separate thread for it, opposed to just sidelining the topic of this thread to bring up another.

(1) "The guy" is Paul Davies, a physicist. (2) Energy, just as noted in the quoted passage, is a quantity. It's a conserved quantity. You can calculate the exact quantity by the equation E=mc^2.

Okay. This reply pretty much did absolutely nothing to answer the question it was addressing...

(1) It would never occur to me to try to get an 8 Ball to conclude something.

It wouldn't necessarily occur to me either. I already have an 8 Ball.. it's called a brain. It functions differently, but it's just as effective as obtaining epistemological certainty.

(2) I never suggested that energy is a fundamental phenomenon because it is not an object with spatial extension that one can see or touch or otherwise detect. The most ready conclusion that energy is a fundamental phenomenon is due to the fact that it is a conserved quantity in closed systems--energy is neither created or destroyed by any activity happening in the closed system. My question as to whether there is any reason to deny that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon "like energy" was just a reiteration or restatement of my first question.

Your question in the OP "Is there any logical or empirical reason to dispute that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon (like energy)?"

This, for all intents and purposes, would appear to most readers to be suggesting that "energy" is an example of "fundamental phenomenon" (by the way, still completely undefined by you despite my requests for such a definition).

I see no difference between your question and this: "Is there any logical or empirical reason to dispute that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon (like, for example, energy)?"

Your question is essentially asking for a reason to dispute that consciousness is like energy (in the sense they are both fundamental phenomenon).

If I'm misunderstanding what you OP is asking for, that one is totally on you. I spent 4 posts or so trying to address this question in your OP, to have you come back and say the words don't literally mean what they seem to suggest...

 

[Nous]

Still a little shocked you are still fascinated with the free will question here.

The ability to choose between available options is one of the most important aspects of our conscious abilities. (If consciousness were not causally efficacious, then it couldn't have been selected for in the organism generation after generation.) Short of self-stultification, one cannot deny the existence of free will, yet no component of or phenomenon found in any brain accounts for the ability to choose between available options.

I just had no interest in bringing free will into the conversation because I don't believe it in regardless if thoughts arise from the brain or not.

Why would anyone who is able to choose between available options be interested in what the Eight Ball says?

Your question is essentially asking for a reason to dispute that consciousness is like energy (in the sense they are both fundamental phenomenon).

The OP asks two questions: (1) for an argument that concludes that consciousness (including the various phenomena such as intentions, beliefs, unified awareness, free will); and (2) whether there is any reason for ruling out the proposition that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon.

You might want to notice that no one here has articulated any such arguments.

 

[dust1n]

The ability to choose between available options is one of the most important aspects of our conscious abilities.

Sure, I just don't call that free will. It's a being acting out a will.

Regardless if free will exists or not; it doesn't really pertain to the OP.. which is does consciousness arrive from the brain (or specifically what evidence exists that it does). Why would I need to show free will arrives from the brain, as opposed to any other facet of consciousness, like simple awareness, or emotional feelings?

(If consciousness were not causally efficacious, then it couldn't have been selected for in the organism generation after generation.)

By saying that consciousness was casually selected for through generations, wouldn't that imply there was at one time: beings with brains who had no consciousness, and then consciousness suddenly appeared in one of these brained-beings? Where did the consciousness arrive from in order for it to be genetically selected for? There were brained beings with no consciousness... and then what happened? Take the story from there.

Short of self-stultification, one cannot deny the existence of free will, yet no component of or phenomenon found in any brain accounts for the ability to choose between available options.

Ironic you would imply I've stultified myself; all the meanwhile, failing to ever use logic or deduction to arrive at any conclusion you claim to be truth. Here it is again, if you are really dead set on talking about free will, even though it has nothing to do with the OP:

Define "free will":

Prove "it exists" by deduction from an agreeable set of premises. I'll wait.

Why would anyone who is able to choose between available options be interested in what the Eight Ball says?

I'm not particularly interested in what the 8 ball says-- just noting its effectiveness is equivalent to a humans as far as epistemological certainty is concerned.

The OP asks two questions: (1) for an argument that concludes that consciousness (including the various phenomena such as intentions, beliefs, unified awareness, free will); and

Um...

(2) whether there is any reason for ruling out the proposition that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon.

So really the "like energy" part of your original question was a mistake?

Well, sure I mean, I can answer that question... as soon as you define "fundamental phenomenon" as does not appear in the dictionary at all... so... I literally have no idea what you mean by "fundamental phenomenon" because you've provided no definition.

I can't provide an argument that the "mind" is something other than a "fundamental phenomenon" when you are refusing to define the difference between a "fundamental phenomenon" and a non-fundamental one.

You might want to notice that no one here has articulated any such arguments.

Except you... "I used energy as an example of a fundamental phenomenon because it is just that;"

 

[Jonathan Ainsley Bain]

If there are 4-dimensions of space then the brain is not 3-dimensional but 4-dimensional - or are you suggesting that the brain does not exist in space at all? If there are 4 (or more) dimensions of space, then the 3d world is a mental construct that the brain uses as a 'visualization' tool. But it doesn't mean it is not a very useful - vitally important - approximation of 'truth'. And it doesn't mean that either the brain or its 'visualizations' are not the results of physical phenomena.

Excellent Point Siti! Thank-you kindly.

We normally consider the word 'physical' to mean existing in 3-d space.
But if you wish to use 'physical' to also include 4-d space, then I agree with you.
Its a valid semantic point, because often people may mistakenly use the word 'meta-physical'
for notions such as 4-d space. 'Metaphysics' is a noisy nebulous word with far too many meanings
for my liking. Still it may be more accurate to use a word like 'para-physical' or perhaps 'quasi-physical'
when referring to 4-d space.

I still think that the physical world is actually 3-d, because in physics the inverse of the square law
is so widespread. The inverse-of-the-square-law is vital in both gravity and electromagnetics
so it is almost certain that these forces are spread out in only 3 dimensions of space.

Consider this diagram:

Hopefully it can be clearly seen that the force in that diagram is spread out in 3-d space
and thus as the distance triples, so the area it covers multiplies by 9.

So the mind being more than 3 dimensions is part of a para-physics that
would not contain electromagnetic forces. If electromagnetic forces were in 4-d space
then they would follow an inverse-of-the-cube law instead. (As would gravity)

Of course we need to take into account the uncertainty identified by Heisenberg
as being a likely candidate for an affect that comes from the 4th dimension of space.

 

[Nous]

Sure, I just don't call that free will. It's a being acting out a will.

Regardless if free will exists or not; it doesn't really pertain to the OP.

Free will:

1. free and independent choice; voluntary decision:​

the definition of free will

Again, free will is one of the most important aspects of consciousness, therefore it unequivocally pertains to the questions of the OP. If you can't argue that free will is a product of something happening in brains, then you can't provide the first argument the OP asks for.

Why would I need to show free will arrives from the brain, as opposed to any other facet of consciousness, like simple awareness, or emotional feelings?

Free will is only one of the many phenomena that constitute consciousness that you need to argue are products of something happening in brains.

By saying that consciousness was casually selected for through generations, wouldn't that imply there was at one time: beings with brains who had no consciousness, and then consciousness suddenly appeared in one of these brained-beings?

No.

Ironic you would imply I've stultified myself; all the meanwhile, failing to ever use logic or deduction to arrive at any conclusion you claim to be truth.

What conclusion are you referring to?

Prove "it exists" by deduction from an agreeable set of premises. I'll wait.

It apparently takes you a while to catch on, as I already explained once that such commonplace activities as people entering into contracts, such as a mortgage, and fulfilling their agreements (to write a check for a particular amount by a particular day of each month for the next 30 years) are only accounted for as willful acts, since people cannot predict involuntary body acts 30 years in advance.

P1: All my finger movements that are predictable by me are voluntary (willful) acts.
P2: Typing “Yoko Ono” in purple font in my next post on this thread is a finger movement that is predictable by me.
C: Therefore, typing “Yoko Ono” in purple font in my next post on this thread is a voluntary (willful) act.

I'm not particularly interested in what the 8 ball says

According to your claims of lacking the ability to choose, for instance, between stating a true proposition rather than a false one, it is your posts that are nothing more than the answers the Eight Ball gives.

So really the "like energy" part of your original question was a mistake?

No.

Well, sure I mean, I can answer that question... as soon as you define "fundamental phenomenon" as does not appear in the dictionary at all... so... I literally have no idea what you mean by "fundamental phenomenon" because you've provided no definition.

I haven't used any terms in any idiosyncratic sense.

Fundamental:

1. serving as, or being an essential part of, a foundation or basis; basic; underlying:
fundamental principles; the fundamental structure.
2. of, relating to, or affecting the foundation or basis:
a fundamental revision.
3. being an original or primary source:
a fundamental idea.

the definition of fundamental

 

[Nous]

Yoko Ono

 

[Nous]

Yoko Ono

I almost forgot to willfully prove my ability to choose to perform those finger movements.

 

[dust1n]

Free will:

1. free and independent choice; voluntary decision:​

the definition of free will

I find this still incredibly vague, but I do like the phrase "independent choice." Humans do not make independent choices. Every choice is dependent on an overwhelming number of factors; for starters, a brain.

Again, free will is one of the most important aspects of consciousness

Disagreed. Just cause you say something is an important aspect doesn't make it so.

therefore it unequivocally pertains to the questions of the OP.

I'd agree with your conclusion here if it wasn't built off a premise of a personal value judgment.

If you can't argue that free will is a product of something happening in brains, then you can't provide the first argument the OP asks for.

It's true. I cannot argue that things I don't believe exists are tied to anything that I believe does exist. I can make the argument that the rest of the functions of consciousness as you've described them are.

Free will is only one of the many phenomena that constitute consciousness that you need to argue are products of something happening in brains.

It's not even a phenomena that exists outside a narrative people tell to themselves, let alone do I need to argue it's a product of anything.

No.

Okay, so elaborate...

You said
"(If consciousness were not causally efficacious, then it couldn't have been selected for in the organism generation after generation.)"

Alright, if consciousness isn't casually efficacious, which you are suggest it is, then it couldn't been selected for in the organism generation after generation, which you suggesting it was.

Okay, if consciousness has been selected for in the organism generation after generation, by what mechanism is "consciousness" being selected for? Genetic, correct? So in order for "consciousness" to be selected in a generation, the information coded in the DNA, which specifically does nothing but give instructions for creating proteins that can be read by enzymes and transmitted to RNA, where RNA is read by enzymes to make amino acids... etc. Okay, so in this process... "how does consciousness" arrive from the parents?

Is the DNA conscious?
Is the fertilized egg immediately conscious?
Is the zygote?
Is the fetus?
Is the baby at birth immediately conscious?
If not, when does it become conscious?
Where does this conscious arrive from? We know it travels through the genetic information in DNA, as this is the only way a favorable trait can possibly be selected for, and DNA is just used to make amino acids, which are used to make proteins, which are used to make up everything in the human body, including the brain and the nervous system coincidentally. At what point does the consciousness come into play here?

Thanks for elaborating on this specific issue, btw, because it's the most germane to the original argument I made regarding the OP.

What conclusion are you referring to?

Well, I shouldn't call them conclusions, because you didn't arrive at them. You state plenty of things as if I should take it for granted that the reasoning for accepting a fact as true has already been established when it hasn't... EXP:

"It's the willful acts that are unaccounted for by any known mechanics."

This was stated as a fact despite it was never deduced from premises.

Another:

"There are 2 possible ways to account for these acts that people promise to perform far into the future and then fulfill: Those are either willful acts or they are involuntary bodily movements."

Was a premise for your first argument, which I stated was based on assumption that only said 2 possible ways exist...

For the sake of moving past the small things though, I'm willing on move on from it, since you did give one below.

It apparently takes you a while to catch on, as I already explained once that such commonplace activities as people entering into contracts, such as a mortgage, and fulfilling their agreements (to write a check for a particular amount by a particular day of each month for the next 30 years) are only accounted for as willful acts, since people cannot predict involuntary body acts 30 years in advance.

Alright since we are on free will anyways, I'm fine with talking about it more in depth, but I still think it's really a necessary condition to prove free will to have the discussion the

I can give it another shot.

". . . agreeing to perform a particular act or set of acts--such as paying a mortgage company a certain amount of money by a certain date each month--is quite common. People can and do say that they will perform such a series of acts for 30 years, and 30 years later have done exactly what they said they would do.

There are 2 possible ways to account for these acts that people promise to perform far into the future and then fulfill: Those are either willful acts or they are involuntary bodily movements..."

Ignoring the fact that just saying there 2 possible ways to do something doesn't make it so, I'm just nothing that what you are saying here is one can make a plan to write a check to pay their mortgage on a specific day 30 years in the future.

Great, so far. Then you state:

"But people can't correctly predict their involuntary bodily movements 30 years into the future. People can't predict such involuntary bodily movements even hours into the future. People can't accurately predict the day or hour they are going to have a heart attack or stroke. People can't accurately predict the day or hour they are going to have their next headache or hiccup."

Alright, so you are arguing here, that because one can predict what they say are going to do in the future, and they cannot predict what are involuntary bodily acts in the future, that there is a difference between these two humanly actions, and the former can only be accounted for by "free will" (just as a note, I like "independent" better than "voluntary"...).

Originally I had noted: "Also, I can correctly predict my involuntary bodily movements 30 years into the future. Assuming I have not died by then, I will take at least 100 breathes, January 7th, 2053."

So when you say:
"People can't predict such involuntary bodily movements even hours into the future."

I claim I can... I just did.

You tried to address the predicting of involuntary bodily movements:

"People can't accurately predict the day or hour they are going to have their next headache or hiccup."

So now there is a new caveat. Now only does on have to predict the involuntary bodily movement, but it most also be arbitrarily accurate...

So let's take this back to your mortgage example... You can claim 30 years from now on a single day, you will pay your mortgage payment. I can claim 30 years from now on a single day, I will take at least 100 breathes. I can't claim the specific seconds each of those breathes begin (though I bet I could get pretty damn accurate... within a minute)... but also you can't claim that you will pay your mortgage payment on an exact second. Or if you can second, can't do microsecond...

So I'm saying the argument is fallacious because you arbitrarily set a standard for accuracy for involuntary movements that do you do not maintain for supposedly non-involuntary movements. A hiccup you claim is involuntary because I can't predict the exact moment I'll have a hiccup 30 years in advance. But the fact that one can't make a mortgage payment with that degree of accuracy either seems to suggest to me that this would also qualify it as an involuntary movement.

(Like I said, I'd prefer independent/dependent movements over voluntary/involuntary movements, as I don't see voluntary movements as an indication of independent movements.

This argument is also faulty because it is just assuming that the ability to predict one's own actions makes it have free will. When I stated that a computer could predict it's own actions 30 years in the future with far more accuracy than any being writing a check to a mortgage company can, you didn't respond to this objection.

P1: All my finger movements that are predictable by me are voluntary (willful) acts.
P2: Typing “Yoko Ono” in purple font in my next post on this thread is a finger movement that is predictable by me.
C: Therefore, typing “Yoko Ono” in purple font in my next post on this thread is a voluntary (willful) act.

The argument is nicer... however, because it's sort centered around the notion of "voluntary (willful)" act, instead of independent act, it's just not showing me some sort of a free will, but on a person acting on a will, a will that is dependent...

But it also makes this weird assumption that any action I take in the future that I can predict automatically makes it a voluntary action... I will show this isn't the case: Hence:

P1: Starting in the next second, and ending at midnight tonight, I will day at least 100 predictable breathes by me, involuntarily.
P2: Me taking 100 breathes from the next second to midnight is a bodily action that is predictable by me.
C1: Therefore, breathing 100 times between the next second and midnight is a predictable yet involuntary action.
C2: Someone predicting their own action in the future, does not actually make it voluntary by virtue of being predicted.

According to your claims of lacking the ability to choose, for instance, between stating a true proposition rather than a false one, it is your posts that are nothing more than the answers the Eight Ball gives.

Just to clarify here, when you ask:
"Do you or do you not believe that you have the ability to choose to assert a true proposition rather than a false one?"
And I say:
"..I don't have the ability to choose to assert a true proposition rather than a false one.."

I'm only using "I" here because you asked about me specifically. What I really mean is that you and I are both incapable to knowingly asserting true or false claims about the state of existence with more epistemological certainty than an 8-ball. I'm not just applying it to myself here. So my claim isn't so much "that I lack the ability to choose," but rather "we both do and so does everyone else."

No.

As soon as you gave a definition for fundamental, I immediately figured out what you were talking about in regards to energy, so I'm glad at least got past that part. Yeah, in that case energy is a fundamental energy. Consciousnesses, not so much.

3. being an original or primary source:
a fundamental idea.

You mean all three at the same time?

the definition of fundamental[/QUOTE]

I'm assuming you mean No. 3, and thanks, finally. Now that I actually have the definition I asked for, I can remove the word "dualism" from my original argument, and represent now... which I will do in time. I can specifically address how consciousness isn't a "fundamental property."

We disagree plenty, or at least it appeared to be the case, so thanks for you willingness to engage in discussion despite the fact isn't wasn't smooth all the way through.

 

[Nous]

I find this still incredibly vague, but I do like the phrase "independent choice." Humans do not make independent choices. Every choice is dependent on an overwhelming number of factors; for starters, a brain.



Disagreed. Just cause you say something is an important aspect doesn't make it so.

I have also used the terms "volition" and "will" interchangeably with "free will":

the definition of volition

1. the act of willing, choosing, or resolving; exercise of willing:
She left of her own volition.

2. a choice or decision made by the will.

3. the power of willing; will.​

the definition of will

1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions:
the freedom of the will.

2. power of choosing one's own actions:
to have a strong or a weak will.

3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition:
My hands are obedient to my will.​

David Chalmers' online collection of papers on consciousness includes a section on free will: http://www.consc.net/online

Free will (volition, will) is not an aspect of digestion; it is an aspect of consciousness. Everything we do involves making choices; making such choices is one of the most important aspects of consciousness. Obviously one cannot account for consciousness by excluding free will.

You haven't provided any argument that concludes that any aspect of consciousness, including the ability to choose between available options, is a product of something happening in brains.

You haven't even explained why you believe the answers the Eight Ball gives are of any value whatsoever.

You said
"(If consciousness were not causally efficacious, then it couldn't have been selected for in the organism generation after generation.)"

Alright, if consciousness isn't casually efficacious, which you are suggest it is, then it couldn't been selected for in the organism generation after generation, which you suggesting it was.

Okay, if consciousness has been selected for in the organism generation after generation, by what mechanism is "consciousness" being selected for? Genetic, correct? So in order for "consciousness" to be selected in a generation, the information coded in the DNA, which specifically does nothing but give instructions for creating proteins that can be read by enzymes and transmitted to RNA, where RNA is read by enzymes to make amino acids... etc. Okay, so in this process... "how does consciousness" arrive from the parents?

Is the DNA conscious?
Is the fertilized egg immediately conscious?
Is the zygote?
Is the fetus?
Is the baby at birth immediately conscious?
If not, when does it become conscious?
Where does this conscious arrive from? We know it travels through the genetic information in DNA, as this is the only way a favorable trait can possibly be selected for, and DNA is just used to make amino acids, which are used to make proteins, which are used to make up everything in the human body, including the brain and the nervous system coincidentally. At what point does the consciousness come into play here?

Why the hell are you asking me these inane questions? It's like you're stuck in terminal confusion. I think I did link to the thread arguing that, like the belief in epiphenomenalism, the denial of free will is self-stultifying. And that OP does link to the SEP article on epiphenomenalism, which explains the James/Eccles/Popper evolutionary argument for mental causation. If you wish to argue that consciousness is not causally efficacious, you won't need to ask me a string a inane questions, you will only need to begin with a fact, and state the deduction.

"It's the willful acts that are unaccounted for by any known mechanics."

This was stated as a fact despite it was never deduced from premises.

If you were to open and read a physics book, you would see that willful acts are not accounted for by any known mechanics. If willful acts were accounted for by mechanics, all you would need to do to show that premise to be false is merely cite this mechanical property or effect.

So I'm saying the argument is fallacious because you arbitrarily set a standard for accuracy for involuntary movements that do you do not maintain for supposedly non-involuntary movements. A hiccup you claim is involuntary because I can't predict the exact moment I'll have a hiccup 30 years in advance. But the fact that one can't make a mortgage payment with that degree of accuracy either seems to suggest to me that this would also qualify it as an involuntary movement.

The argument I stated says nothing about involuntary movements:

P1: All my finger movements that are predictable by me are voluntary (willful) acts.
P2: Typing “Yoko Ono” in purple font in my next post on this thread is a finger movement that is predictable by me.
C: Therefore, typing “Yoko Ono” in purple font in my next post on this thread is a voluntary (willful) act.

If you wish to make an argument that concludes that you cannot act willfully, voluntarily, and then actually succeed in making such an argument, you will be refuting your conclusion by accomplishing that argument.

P1: Starting in the next second, and ending at midnight tonight, I will day at least 100 predictable breathes by me, involuntarily.
P2: Me taking 100 breathes from the next second to midnight is a bodily action that is predictable by me.
C1: Therefore, breathing 100 times between the next second and midnight is a predictable yet involuntary action.
C2: Someone predicting their own action in the future, does not actually make it voluntary by virtue of being predicted.

Is this supposed to be a deduction? Identify your terms.

If you can't make an argument, you can't answer the challenge of the OP. In all that you've written on this thread, you haven't stated an argument that concludes that consciousness is created by something happening in brains. Right?

 

[siti]

Excellent Point Siti! Thank-you kindly.

We normally consider the word 'physical' to mean existing in 3-d space.
But if you wish to use 'physical' to also include 4-d space, then I agree with you.
Its a valid semantic point, because often people may mistakenly use the word 'meta-physical'
for notions such as 4-d space. 'Metaphysics' is a noisy nebulous word with far too many meanings
for my liking. Still it may be more accurate to use a word like 'para-physical' or perhaps 'quasi-physical'
when referring to 4-d space.

I still think that the physical world is actually 3-d, because in physics the inverse of the square law
is so widespread. The inverse-of-the-square-law is vital in both gravity and electromagnetics
so it is almost certain that these forces are spread out in only 3 dimensions of space.

Consider this diagram:

Hopefully it can be clearly seen that the force in that diagram is spread out in 3-d space
and thus as the distance triples, so the area it covers multiplies by 9.

So the mind being more than 3 dimensions is part of a para-physics that
would not contain electromagnetic forces. If electromagnetic forces were in 4-d space
then they would follow an inverse-of-the-cube law instead. (As would gravity)

Of course we need to take into account the uncertainty identified by Heisenberg
as being a likely candidate for an affect that comes from the 4th dimension of space.

Assuming that all four (or more) dimensions exhibit Euclidean geometry. If one, or more, do not, then all we really have is an approximation in three Euclidean dimensions. We have no way of knowing whether this is actually true or just a perfectly repeatable observation because that's the only way we can see it.

 

[siti]

Where did you rule out that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon, for which brains are receivers?

I didn't - I assumed that you would rule it out. But if this is the case, then how does (for example) volition work? Are our "minds" made up for us by the "cosmic consciousness" like some kind of automaton operated by remote control? Or does this "cosmic consciousness" induce individual consciousness in its receivers? And if our consciousness is dependent on a much higher level of consciousness, what is the explanation for the existence of that consciousness? Surely in this case, we would be resorting to an even more complex phenomenon ("cosmic consciousness") in order to explain a relatively simpler one (individual human consciousness). Of course it might be right, but apart from a relatively few outliers of human experience close to the boundary between life/death or conscious/non-conscious, what would it really explain?

I believe I have understood your meaning here. It is perhaps beginning to sound more like Whitehead (and maybe Hartshorne), which I approve of. And it would seem to help explain the evidence of NDEs and anomalous cognition--or at least not leave such phenomena utter mysteries.

My views are very much Whiteheadian up to the point where he turns back to a kind of theistic dualism. Hartshorne was a brilliant expositor of Whitehead's thought but even more explicitly theistic. I enthusiastically accept their process-relational view of reality, I reject their theism.

 

[SpiritQuest]

It appears that a brain might not be needed for consciousness to exist.

How quantum brain biology can rescue conscious free will

Single cell organisms like Paramecium swim about, avoid obstacles and predators, find food and mates, and have sex, all without any synaptic connections. They utilize cytoskeletal structures such as microtubules (in protruding cilia and within their internal cytoplasm) for sensing and movement. The single cell slime mold Physarum polycephalum sends out numerous tendrils composed of bundles of microtubules, forming patterns which, seeking food, can solve problems and escape a maze (e.g., Adamatzky, 2012). Observing the purposeful behavior of single cell creatures, neuroscientist Charles Sherrington (1957) remarked: “of nerve there is no trace, but perhaps the cytoskeleton might serve.”

 

[siti]

It appears that a brain might not be needed for consciousness to exist.

How quantum brain biology can rescue conscious free will

Indeed, and perhaps the brain uses the same kind of structures to produce the far more complex level of consciousness that humans display. So another way of looking at this is that the cytoskeletons are just a different kind of 'brain'.

 

[Milton Platt]

The clumsy Latin phrase cum hoc ergo propter hoc ("with this, therefore because of this") denotes the fallacy of inferring causation from correlation. I am unsure if such fallacious reasoning is the primary method by which people infer that something in brains produces consciousness. In any case, there is no need to bother with that kind of argument here.

It would seem that one really needs to be able to argue that the properties of brain components or processes logically give rise to mental phenomena (self-consciousness, free will, beliefs, etc.). But it also seems that we already know that they don't--e.g., there is just no amount or complexity of neuronal electrical activity that logically produces mental phenomena.

So what are any arguments that something in the brain produces consciousness?

Is there any logical or empirical reason to dispute that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon (like energy)?

Provide an instance where consciousness can scientifically be demonstrated to exist without a brain and you have my attention.

 

[idav]

It appears that a brain might not be needed for consciousness to exist.

How quantum brain biology can rescue conscious free will

A quantum brain doesn't eliminate the brain from creating consiousness, just makes it more feasible. Similarly creating a quantum computer doesn't mean we learned how to violate natural law.

 

[Nous]

Where did you rule out that consciousness is a fundamental phenomenon, for which brains are receivers?

I didn't - I assumed that you would rule it out.

Why would you assume that? It's part of the challenge of the OP.

But if this is the case, then how does (for example) volition work?

How does volition work in the context of the idea that consciousness is produced by something happening in brains?

Of course it might be right, but apart from a relatively few outliers of human experience close to the boundary between life/death or conscious/non-conscious, what would it really explain?

Actually there are more than a few reported incidents of people having complex, coherent experiences, forming memories, engaging in logical thought processes and having veridical perceptions not gotten through their sense organs during clinical death.

There is also the evidence of anomalous cognition, which you haven't addressed.

My views are very much Whiteheadian up to the point where he turns back to a kind of theistic dualism.

Whitehead turned back to a kind of theistic dualism? When did he do that? I thought Whitehead's God was (at least partly) the collective consciousness of the universe.

But I must admit it's been a long while since I've anything by Whitehead, and little of that then. Whitehead is hard work.