siti
Well-Known Member
OK - but I already posted a link to another version of that paper. As far as I recall that was not one of the papers you actually quoted from - but it doesn't matter. What you said was that you were very familiar with Stapp's writings and that he did not propose that consciousness was a product of activity happening in brains...etc.Here is the link to the paper I quoted from, co-written by Stapp: Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: a neurophysical model of mind–brain interaction
If you believe that this paper says anything contrary to what I said ("[Stapp] does not propose that consciousness is a product [of] activity happening in brains--even at the level of quanta."), then please quote it.
There is nothing in that paper that makes that explicit - although there is plenty that implies that even if consciousness is not a product of brain activity per se it is very difficult to imagine any of the conscious 'causes' of neuroplasticity happening in the absence of a functioning brain. Be that as it may, here is another paper (Published in Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 3, Number 3, 1 March 1996, pp. 194-210(17)) in which Stapp talks more explicitly about consciousness and its possible QM explanation, and states (for example):
"What is consciousness? It is a sequence of actualizations of functional patterns of brain activity. These functional patterns are expressed in terms of a projected body-world schema, and each actualized pattern is 'facilitated' for use in later executive events."
...which is pretty much what I said in my previous post and more accurately typifies where I agree with his reasoning. Of course he has carefully avoided identifying the brain as the actual origin of the 'actualizations' but I don't believe that we have yet reached a sufficient understanding of how the (quantum-mechanical) 'brain' might really work to eliminate a physical (quantum-mechanical) explanation yet. Any appeal to 'necessary' super-physical agency is premature IMO. And Stapp's concept of consciousness here surely cannot account for NDEs (for example) even if the origin of consciousness is, somehow, aphysical and external to the brain if, as is claimed, these events happen when there is no brain activity for consciousness to actualize the functional patterns of.
My question for Stapp would be: if we accept that each "actualized pattern is facilitated for use in later executive events" how do we know that they are not also "facilitated for use in later 'conscious choice' or 'actualization' events"? If that were the case, then we need only one initial 'actualization' of functional patterns of brain activity to initiate the sequence that we call "consciousness" - the rest is a consequence (but being of a probabilistic, quantum mechanical nature, a non-deterministic consequence) of that actualization and its interaction with the world 'it' experiences.
Last edited: