Even if we pretend this is anything but a fallacious preassumption of materialism, care to address any of the much more grueling questions from that list?
Folk psychology
Folk astronomy had been extremely effective (in helping people plan their lives, agriculture, sailing etc, etc.) for thousands of years despite being completely wrong about almost everything (the sky was not a blue dome that rotates around a fixed earth, and the sun is not bright lamp that is driven around the earth by a god before sinking in the water..etc.) Same for folk physics (Aristotelian) and folk medicine. They are rough models that get the job done within certain limits. Indeed it because we have not progressed yet beyond folk psychology is that our grasp in the human mind, its diseases and ways to improve it beyond what it naturally can do has been far less limited when compared to what we can do with nature where we have transcended folk theories centuries ago.
Solipsism
I have addressed this in a post to atanu. Here it is again
You are arguing from idealism. I can construct a theory that is identical to materialism based on first person idealistic framework alone. In such a situation all "objects" are entities in the phenomenological space and my theory of how to categorize them is based on pragmatic considerations of self-interest. So external objects are seperated from internal object by virtue of emotional and interest valence (it hurts if this toe is crushed but does not when that toe over there is crushed etc.) Similarly the identity inference between the bones I feel directly and the pictures in the X-ray is based on similar pragmatic considerations. In such a situation I make no ontological commitments at all, rather every theory is a model whose "truthfulness" is based on its impact in the quality of my first person experience upon adopting it.
In such a stance, the self is also just another object in this phenomenological space. Its a persistent object, but so are many other things, like time, only it is the object with the highest valence in the phenomenology of the conscious field
I can discuss the phenomenological stance in detail if you like. But I may point you to excellent introductory books like
"The Phenomenological Mind" by Dan Zahavi .
Mechansim
I can address the advances made so far by neurosciences on the mechanism that makes consciousness possible as a brain process, but I feel it is a waste of time until you accept the plausibility of the identity theory based on the arguments for equivalency I presented before which you have simply refused to accept despite failing to refute them.
Axiomatic Self
I do not consider the self to be an axiom. It is an object who presence is felt in the phenomenological field, but it may disappear as well. (I have experience this in meditation as well as in trance or in-the-zone type experiences). The self becomes ubiquitous when I am doing verbal reasoning or conversing, which is why the "I" is so prominent in language, but other times this is not the case. The only thing that is certain is that the conscious field exists when its active in the waking and the dream states. Everything else is up for grabs.