I wish to "defend" pantheism in the same way, employing exactly the ideas and assertions, as Daniel Stoljar has in "defending" physicialism in the SEP article (bolded below). In the end, you will presumably agree that I have argued for the thesis of pantheism as well (in the same way) as Stoljar has argued for the thesis of physicalism.
Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical.
Pantheism is the thesis that everything in its most fundamental nature is deific, or that everything supervenes on the deific.
I turn now to the condition question, the question of what it is for something (an object, an event, a process, a property) to be physical.
[. . . ]
The theory-based conception:
A property is physical iff it either is the sort of property that physical theory tells us about or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property that physical theory tells us about.
[. . .]
The object-based conception:
A property is physical iff: it either is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents.
I turn now to the condition the question of what it is for something (an object, an event, a process, a property) to be deific.
The theory-based conception:
A property (object, process, event) is deific iff it either is the sort of property (object, process, event) that deific theory tells us about or else is a property (object, process, event) which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property (object, process, event) that deific theory tells us about.
The object-based conception:
A property (object, process, event) is deific iff: it either is the sort of property (object, process, event) required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic deific objects (properties, processes, events) and their constituents or else is a property (object, process, event) which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property (object, process, event) required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic deific objects (properties, processes, events) and their constituents.
One might object that both conceptions are inadequate because they are circular, i.e., both appeal to the notion of something physical (a theory or an object) to characterize a physical property. But how can you legitimately explain the notion of one sort of physical thing by appealing to another?
However, the response to this is that circularity is only a problem if the conceptions are interpreted as providing a reductive analysis of the notion of the physical. But there is no reason why they should be interpreted as attempting to provide a reductive analysis. After all, we have many concepts that we understand without knowing how to analyze (cf. Lewis 1970). So there seems no reason to suppose that either the theory or object conception is providing anything else but a way of understanding the notion of the physical.
One might object that both conceptions are inadequate because they are circular, i.e., both appeal to the notion of something deific (a theory or an object) to characterize a deific property. But how can you legitimately explain the notion of one sort of deific thing by appealing to another?
However, the response to this is that circularity is only a problem if the conceptions are interpreted as providing a reductive analysis of the notion of the deific. But there is no reason why they should be interpreted as attempting to provide a reductive analysis. After all, we have many concepts that we understand without knowing how to analyze (cf. Lewis 1970). So there seems no reason to suppose that either the theory or object conception is providing anything else but a way of understanding the notion of the deific.
What a convenient rationalization for the fact that one has provided a circular definition for the one and only sort of "stuff" that is essential to one's metaphysical thesis and that requires a coherent definition in order for one's metaphysical thesis to be coherent!!
Stoljar goes on to claim that the idea of "physical" is somehow analogous to the idea of "water":
Earlier we said that the condition question was perfectly legitimate because it is legitimate to ask what the condition of being physical is that, according to physicalism, everything has. But this legitimate question should not be interpreted as the demand for a reductive analysis of the notion of the physical. Consider Thales again: it is right to ask Thales what he means by ‘water’ — and in so doing demand an understanding of the notion of water -- but it is wrong to demand of him a conceptual analysis of water.
But, unlike the idea of "physical," water is not a vacuous idea that rests on a circular definition. We don't have difficulty defining what water is:
"a transparent, odorless, tasteless liquid, a compound of hydrogen and oxygen, H 2 O, freezing at 32°F or 0°C and boiling at 212°F or 100°C, that in a more or less impure state constitutes rain, oceans, lakes, rivers, etc.: it contains 11.188 percent hydrogen and 88.812 percent oxygen, by weight."
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/water?s=t
When Stoljar achieves such clarity and specificity about what the term "physical" refers to, he may be excused from engaging in any further "reductive conceptual analysis". Until then, all he has done is promote a corny metaphysical thesis whose fundamental entity (object, property, process, event) can only be defined circularly, and which has no relationship whatsoever to any scientific discipline or theory. The metaphysical thesis of physicalism is empty at its very core.
