That's true. We do have it in that case. However, it is still meaningless to attribute to infants.
No, it wouldn't, because that would be jumping to conclusions.
"I don't believe" just means "I don't believe". You're making assumptions if you infer that "I don't believe" means "I don't believe because I'm undecided."
I'm not jumping to conclusions. I've seen the effects on neural activity and concept representation of those undecided, and specifically with respect to spirituality. And even if I hadn't worked on that study, the idea that one can use the word "god" as English speakers do and have no beliefs is contrary to the entirety of cognitive neuroscience, computational neuroscience, and basically the cognitive sciences in general. I've studied how beliefs and non-beliefs are physically represented in the brain not to mention my focus on modality and the linguistic representation of mental states. However, I don't need you to take my word for your being wrong you can read the neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophical literature yourself:
"atheists are simply one end of a continuum of belief. On the face of it, this is unsurprising, even an anti-climax. Like numerous other traits in nature, beliefs vary. so what?"
Johnson, D. (2012). What are atheists for? Hypotheses on the functions of non-belief in the evolution of religion.
Religion, Brain & Behavior,
2(1), 48-70.
Of course, this does not mean that terms like "non-belief" aren't useful. Although I prefer likert scales or some equivalent, there is merit in categorical answers, and despite very similar correlates for epistemic expression in general, differences in e.g., the caudate between belief and disbelief or in the ACC between both and uncertainty make a difference. The problem is not the term (well, it is but I can't do much about it and I've had to use it), it's the term applied to children when it can't be:
"Even if a proposition is not believed, it may be more or less close to being believed. We shall distinguish
non-beliefs in a narrow sense from
disbeliefs. A sentence
A is disbelieved by a person if she believes the negation of
A, and the person is in
a state of non-belief with respect to A if she is agnostic about it, i.e., believes neither A nor the negation of A."
Rott, H. (2009). Degrees all the way down: Beliefs, non-beliefs and disbeliefs. In
Degrees of belief (pp. 301-339). Springer Netherlands.
Although I would prefer a more apt word, "non-belief" is used fairly often in pretty particular contexts. However, it doesn't then apply to infants. Because when the term is used it is still used to relate one's mental state to the position of some proposition on the epistemic scale. In other words, it is technically belief. Otherwise non-belief would be synonymous with being unable to comprehend at all.
If you ask a participant a question that s/he does not understand, you will find activation in places the you would not with uncertainty, belief, or disbelief. Whatever other reasons there may be for this, one certainty is that when we are able to represent concepts we can only do so by relating them to other concepts and properties. It's not only basic to neuroimaging, it's so basic we use it to as a control. If one is interested in, for example, how participants' classify and process propositions on some epistemic scale, it is vital to weed out confounding effects/artifacts produced by e.g., generic rather than specific cognitive processes and/or unrelated memory recall. So we'd show nonsense words. And not just any, there are databases of particular nonsense words because the word has to at least
look like it could be a word otherwise this too affects processing and fails to successfully control for artifacts.
Nor (as I have already gone over) is this merely a matter of neural network activations. It's an issue in fields from philosophy to linguistics, but the result is the same. One can formulate the proposition "It is true that there are god or gods" and even if does not know, one can still assert that one does not know. And as one can assert:
"It is impossible to assert something without expressing a belief."
Davis, W. A. (2003).
Meaning, expression and thought. Cambridge University Press.
There can be a range of reasons why a person might not believe, whether it's because they've never considered the claim
You do not have to consider the claim to have beliefs. People make evaluations on beliefs they don't know they have all the time. The study of cognitive errors is a big areas of research in the cognitive sciences. I mentioned in an earlier post atheists whose actual responses questions about god did not match the biological indicators they displayed. To learn words, we place them in a conceptual network that has some mapping onto neural networks. A Christian, for example, might represent the Greek pantheon in the same way an atheist would. However, the similar representation is not true for the Christian god. A Christian classifies as distinct from "mythical" gods their god because they believe it belongs in a different category. The atheist believes it belongs in the same.
You can't tell which one of these is going on just from the statement "I don't believe in God."
It also doesn't matter. As I've repeated over and over again, the only way not to have beliefs is to not understand the word. Otherwise, your beliefs are literally shaping the way concepts are structured and related in your brain. Even without the physical realization, concepts are classes to which particular things, properties, things with particular properties, etc., are
believed to belong in. When you see some model of a car you've never seen before, you do not need to consciously determine that it has the necessary properties to be classified as an instance of the concept "car". When you read, hear, or talk about god or gods, the beliefs you have even if unknown to you will "prime" other concepts you believe to be similar or related. The priming effects, the representation, the categorization and classification, and everything else necessary to use the word "god" they way you do entails beliefs.
Also, it seems to me like you're conflating formal and colloquial language use
I've been relying on the cognitive linguistic framework because formal languages would have us believe that when I say "if you're hungry, there's food on the table" I mean "if there's not food on the table, you're not hungry". But I have no problems using a formal approach.
this doesn't mean that we can't talk about the literal meaning of the term in a formal way.
"Formal" refers to syntax. That's why everything get's reduced to symbols. It's so we can evaluate the structure, and avoid meanings to the extent possible. Nor is there an agreed upon "best way" to represent beliefs. That said, the most uncontroversial is probably that a belief is mental state, cognitive state, or cognitive act in which a proposition is taken to be true. Notice that the proposition itself does not include the mental state predicate. In other words, the predicate would be "god or gods exist" ad the belief would be the cognitive state/act in which the proposition is held to be false. Disbelief, not believe, not believing, lacking belief, etc., are all ways in which the truth value of the proposition is false. Logically, they are equivalent. There are more complicated systems, but alas the great work done for many decades now is designed for operators to act on propositions, and is no more suited for dealing with mental state predicates than classical predicate calculus.
Yes: they're making a belief claim about our ability to know God. That's what agnosticism is all about.
This is simply your word games again. First, I'm making a person claim about my knowledge, not ability. The term didn't come from the Greek "gnosis" but to define Huxley in opposition to those who did know. That just means he didn't know, and neither do I, and if you are uncertain than neither do you.
So which is it: do you believe that Spielberg is wearing a blue shirt today or not? Apparently, having no belief on the matter is "physically impossible"; please share yours.
Talk about straw man. I said you can't use the term if you don't have beliefs about it. The reason this is so is because using the term means you have a concept. It is the concept that entails belief. I have a concept of Spielberg, and this means I can consider it possible he is wearing a blue shirt. I can process the question and the concepts therein such that I can situate it on the epistemic scale. Likewise, had you said "do you believe that Spielberg is 400 feet tall?" I could do the same, only this time I would situate it on the certain disbelief side of that scale. However, I didn't say that because you use the word in sentences that means you necessarily have specific beliefs about any sentence in which the word appears. Just because it is true that if I claimed I am a god your concept of "god" is sufficient to reject this claim does not mean for any question or statement with the word "god" in it you have beliefs you didn't before. I already knew that Spielberg, as a human, can wear shirts.