- A-"atheism"-ism
- A-"non-theism"-ism
- A-"I-have-a-position"-ism
etc. We have multiple formally defined (and empirically applied) systems of belief functions (e.g., those found in subjective or Bayesian analysis or modal logics), epistemology, epistemic modality (in cognitive science/linguistics, linguistic typology, etc.), epistemic logics, and so forth, yet all this is thrown aside in order to define an inconsistent, self-contradictory notion of default positions in terms of a grammatical device (affixation) and the following algorithm...
As important to genuine philosophical inquiry as Bayesian analysis, modal logics "and" epistemology are (an oddly redundant catch-all for you to throw into the middle of a list of specifics---but at six syllables it certainly complemented that tactical broadside of intimidating jargon!), the default belief when presented with a claim of existence is
hardly a question that requires anyone to go bravely adventuring into such dark and tangled woods (I wonder, how many people have fallen for this ploy of yours?).
1) Let P be any proposition or lexeme N.
Now. Since the principle of charity means nothing to you (no offense---this
is the Internet, after all), I see I'll have to be much more careful with my phrasing.
For starters, P cannot be "any proposition or lexeme." It's true, I didn't explicitly
state this---my bad!---but all three of my examples shared a common and obvious trait (one that you shrewdly neglected in each of your counterexamples)
*(EDIT: This is neither true nor fair, and I apologize. Please see footnote.)
Premise (1), clarified, is this:
1) Let [P] be any existential proposition---i.e., any claim proposing the existence of thing [N], for which the statements "[N] exists" and "[N] does not exist" are both (a) intelligible/meaningful and (b) mutually exclusive
Note, as an aside, that this immediately excludes all of your fun counterexamples---they
rely on grammar, whereas I'm merely
using grammar as a illustrative device. Anywho, I'm quite happy with your interpretation of (2) and (3)...
2) Prefix "A" to N.
3) Post-pose/suffix "-ism" to N
... but your hilarious (I'm serious: "agglutination" is the greatest word ever) dismissal of the rest of my argument ...
4) Conclude that this agglutination procedure provides the default epistemic stance relative to the truth value/existence of the proposition/lexeme N.
... missed a few steps, to say the least.
In my third (and final) attempt to engage you with the meat of my argument, I'll restate it... again:
Because the set of all possible [N]'s (i.e. all possible things that could exist) is infinite---practically-speaking, if not mathematically so---it follows that, when presented with the proposed existence of any single member of that set, you have two choices:
- Distinguish that single [N] from the infinite set of all possible [N]'s, using any form of evidence or reasoning
- e.g. "Gravity [a thing that could exist] is distinguished from invisible leprechauns holding my feet to the floor [another thing that could exist] because satellites are affected by gravity despite the fact that they lack feet."
- Or DON'T distinguish that single [N] from the infinite set of all possible [N]'s.
- e.g. "Gravity is a thing that could exist, and leprechauns are a thing that could exist, and fairies are a thing that could exist, and air is a thing that could exist, and the sedatives you're injecting into my arm is a thing that could exist, and this padded room is a thing that could exist, and ..."
Behind Door #1: By admitting that each member of the infinite set of possible [N]'s must be distinguished from its neighbours before it can be believed, you establish a
prerequisite for belief. And in the
absence of this prerequisite, the default position is lack of belief.
Behind Door #2: If you don't distinguish one [N] from its infinite set, then you have no basis to treat one [N] any differently from any other: If you "maybe" believe in one [N], then you "maybe" believe in all of them---a transparently absurd position (and we've only set the bar at "maybe"!). Indeed, when faced with an infinite set of possibilities, all of which must be treated equally (remember, you aren't distinguishing any one from any other), only one position
isn't transparently absurd: the default position is lack of belief.
See? We didn't need to break out the machetes and go hacking through the underbrush of Bayesian analysis, for in this case, all roads lead to Rome.
* EDIT: I was wrong, and worst of all, I was wrong while being all snide and combative (the air was a bit thin up on my high horse). I did
not phrase all my "A-[N]-ism" examples such that all the [N]'s satisfied my revised premise, and so my accusation that you deliberately ignored those non-existent commonalities was unfounded and unfair. I do apologize.
However, I maintain that each of my examples does
reference an
existential claim that satisfies revised premise (1), and that's of key importance: I'm not trying to win via word games, but by proving that, when faced with virtually infinite possibilities, the only default position that makes sense is non-belief.
Here is how I would have rephrased those earlier examples (and, indeed, how I was remembering them when I originally wrote this post):
- A-"firebreathing-dragons-are-real"-ism = A-"fire-breathing dragons"-ism
- A-"there's-an-invisible-leprechaun-on-my-shoulder"-ism = A-"invisible shoulder-leprechauns"-ism
- A-"I'm-a-robot"-ism = A-"the wires and circuitry under my skin"-ism
.... Hell, a-
"Theory of Gravity"-ism
(= a-"gravity"-ism) is the default....
