Determinism/Free Will

[MikeF]

Warning! Posts are long! Only proceed if you've nothing better to do.

@vulcanlogician
Since this is definitely an new line of conversation, I have started this new thread separate from our current conversation. Our touching upon Free Will has had me thinking about it. As a consequence, I have formed a rough outline concerning my thoughts regarding the deterministic status of the universe and the capacity for human beings to exercise Free Will. Here is my speculation based on my very limited understand of cosmology and human behavior. I may use terms considered technical in a non-technical or non-standard usage. Hopefully context will supply sufficient meaning of my intent. This is a two-part post.

I do not see the cosmos as being fully deterministic, that all events are caused by and are the result of all previous events such that, once started, this chain of events will continue unaltered into the future resulting in only one possible future, the causal chain essentially making all future events preordained and inevitable. I speculate that in large systems of particles, there is an element of randomness injected into this process of cause and effect. This property of randomness means that just prior to each present moment, there is a slight possibility of variation in what may occur when the moment becomes now. If there is very slight variable outcome in the future second, the farther one looks into the future, the variability becomes cumulative and stronger the farther we project into the future from the present. The result then is that the distant future is not fixed. The present is determined strictly by the sum of all past events, and the immediate future is so strongly influence or determined by present conditions that any variability will be, or seem imperceptible. However, I speculate that there is some very small component of randomness exerting its influence. This, to me, indicates that if we were able to reset the cosmos to some prior condition, each restart from those initial conditions would exhibit some amount of drift from the first observed course or chain of cause and effect such that no two courses of observed events from the same initial conditions would be exactly the same over time, the drift becoming more apparent the longer time elapses from initial conditions. If everything is exactly the same, quantum states (whatever that is, exactly, or electron spins, etc) and there is no randomness or probability involved, then perhaps the cosmos is fully deterministic and the future is set, I don't think this is the case.

Why do I imagine this? If one considers the Big Bang, or if you prefer, the expansion of cosmos from a uniform, dense, high energy state, as this energy began to cool during expansion, matter began to precipitate out of this energy in a non-uniform way, and resulting matter began to interact in a random series of collisions, which eventually lead to the random accumulation of matter into the celestial bodies of the cosmos. What would happen if we were able to restart the Big Bang from its initial conditions? I contend that during the cooling expansion and the resulting clumping together of matter, the cosmos would not clump in exactly the same way. The resulting pattern of galaxies, stars, planets, etc would be different each time we set off the Big Bang due to the randomness in how cooling would occur and particles would interact and accumulate.

All this matter/energy, in constant motion and random interaction leads me to believe that any future state of the cosmos is not set, just the present and past. What if we wind back to only half the estimated age of the expansion? How different might the the present of that reset cosmos be to our current present? Exactly the same? Very similar, only slightly different? Different enough that life never materialized?

Is there an element of randomness in the continual change of the cosmos? Perhaps it has already been established or proven, I have no idea. Love to hear your thoughts though.

 

[MikeF]

@vulcanlogician
Part 2
If there is an element of randomness to the cosmos and the future is not inevitably pre-determined by past events, what role may this play in our ability to exercise Free Will? One way this element of randomness may effect us, we human beings, is in the way biology and prior events shape who we are at any specific moment. Consider identical twins, both starting as single fertilized eggs in the same mothers womb. We know from experience that no two identical twins are exactly the same, either physically or mentally. Yes, they may share many similarities but they are quite distinct. You may object and say that even though the two fertilized eggs ostensibly have the same genetic material, there is always the possibility that even at the single cell stage, there is some difference, they are not molecule for molecule identical. I think this is a valid point and I assume to be exactly the case. But even still, whether they are 99.9999 percent identical or 99.99 percent identical, I would suspect that we would see stronger physiological duplication if some element of randomness was not injected into the development process. This is my conjecture and I could be completely wrong. However, my conclusion is that randomness of the cosmos plays a role in our development and our existence on the whole such that our futures are not pre-determined. Not by biology, nor by our cumulative experiences, or the causal chain of the cosmos.

So now the question becomes, if the future is not set, are we able to make an unimpeded choice in this random universe, a choice not strictly dictated by previous events. To test this, I have devised a thought experiment. Let's imagine that we have a maze of rooms. Each room is identical in dimension, material, and color. Each room has an entrance door in the middle of one wall, and five identical doors in appearance on the wall opposite the entrance door. Each door leads to another room that is identical to all others. Once entering a room, you cannot go back, but must choose to remain in the current room, or choose one of the five doors to exit. Once a door is opened, all other doors lock and are no longer an option. Lets run an imagined experiment through the maze with ourselves as the test subject. We are tasked with entering the maze and traversing through 1,000 rooms (lets put aside biological needs during the test, it is an imaginary test after all ).

So here we have a test of choice where we are presented with a series of 1,000 identical choices. Imagine that we were able to run the experiment multiple times, such that we could reset initial conditions, go back in time if you will, and the subject (ourselves in this case) had no knowledge of repeating, that each run was experienced as being the first. Do we expect each run of a thousand choices to be exactly the same? Even if we start out with some system of choice, say starting from left to right, first room we choose is farthest left door, next room we choose the one to the right of farthest left, and so on. How long would we keep this up? Would we begin to mix it up? Would we get bored eventually and start always choosing the same door just to get the experiment over? At what iteration of rooms would these changes to attacking the problem occur? If, on the first run we hold the pattern of left to right choice for 20 rooms, for each run of the experiment, will we always end the pattern on the 20th room? Will we always start with that particular pattern? What iteration of room do we become bored? The 50th? The 173rd? Will our boredom arrive at the exact same point for each run of the experiment? My guess is no, they will not. Each run of the experiment will result in a different pattern of choices for the 1,000 rooms, even starting at identical initial conditions. I would suggest, that the mere time involved in considering our options, weighing our choices, playing things our in our mind before action is taken, all this delay, this amount of time, allows the randomness of the cosmos to exert some influence. If the choice is identical, we have an expanded ability in which we can choose freely.

We can play with this setup. We can make it such that for the 3 most left doors, there is always something unpleasant in the room beyond, and for every 2 most right doors, there is always something pleasant. Over time, we will realize this pattern and I expect this experience will influence our choices such that (for some of us anyway) we begin to only select the 2 most right doors. This would be an example of how past events influence choice even though we have freedom of choice. I can also imagine that given a long enough period of going through rooms, we might become curious as to whether the pattern of unpleasant rooms and pleasant rooms still holds. We may take a chance and pick one of the 3 left side doors. We find that it is unpleasant and it confirms in us that the pattern has not yet changed. At what iteration of rooms do we take that chance of exploring the 3 left doors again? In multiple runs of the experiment, will we take that chance at exactly the same iteration? On some runs may we never take that chance? My guess is that it will be different for each run of the experiment, to include some runs where the choice to chance the left doors again never comes.

If no two runs in both types of experiments will result in identical patterns of choice, does this indicate that there is at least some freedom to choose? I would say yes. I would say that we human beings do not have complete freedom of choice whereby any presented choice is in no way influenced by past events and experiences. I would posit that we have a limited or restricted capacity to exercise our will. Our unique neural patterns of our central nervous system creates limits, or more precisely, influences upon how we will decide any given choice. Past experience certainly influences how we decide any given choice. Of course, the choices we are even presented are dictated by all causal events leading up to the present choice. But despite all those factors narrowing and limiting how we might choose in any given circumstance, I feel that there can still be some serendipity, some expression of whim, in the exercising of some choices, and I based that idea on the speculations presented in the thought experiment. We, I surmise, are not going to do the very exact same thing, every single time, dictated strictly upon all previous causal chains.

I have one other idea as well. I think our capacity to imagine breaks causal chains. The fact that we can know that past causes lead to current events allows us to realize that changing conditions will impact future events. Our imagination however can create events within the rules of nature that are possible, yet have never happened. We can also mix and match our past experiences in a way to imagine things that are not probable or even possible. If we are making choices about our future actions, and those choices are informed by imagination instead of the present state of affairs, are we not making free choices in that instance? Certainly our past experience has influence, yet I see us as inventing choices to a degree as opposed to simply reacting to current conditions. This seems another possible expression of free will.

What do you think? Have I made a case for some modicum of free will? At the very least, I think I have a good argument to claim that the future is not set in stone. Would you agree?

 

[Nimos]

Since this is definitely an...

Just a friendly advice

You might want to add some paragraphs, its extremely difficult to read, to the point where I at least wouldn't bother to.

 

[The Hammer]

Just a friendly advice

You might want to add some paragraphs, its extremely difficult to read, to the point where I at least wouldn't bother to.

Yup, it hurts my eyes.

 

[Shadow Wolf]

Just a friendly advice

You might want to add some paragraphs, its extremely difficult to read, to the point where I at least wouldn't bother to.

It's not about adding them, it's about knowing when to start a new one.

 

[AlexanderG]

The best approach to free will I've heard is that every effect either happens for reasons, in which case it is caused by those reasons, or happens for no reason, in which case it happens randomly. This is a true dichotomy. There is no space for free will as some third option.

The consensus in physics is that randomness is a fundamental aspect of reality, in certain circumstances. So I agree that our world is probably mostly deterministic with some small random elements on atomic scale events. Free will is something we subjectively feel like we have, but it's an illusion. We can still hold people accountable for having a mind/personality that makes harmful choices, given sets of stimuli that don't induce harmful behavior in most other people. But the theology of Abrahamic faiths is totally unjustifiable.

 

[Nimos]

It's not about adding them, it's about knowing when to start a new one.

Yeah, I suck at writing and spelling in general, I more or less just throw stuff in randomly or where I think it, at least are somewhat pleasant to read, so im not trying to "correct" him or sound clever or anything, its just very difficult to read text like that in my opinion.

 

[MikeF]

Sincere apologies to all.

 

[Shadow Wolf]

What do you think? Have I made a case for some modicum of free will? At the very least, I think I have a good argument to claim that the future is not set in stone. Would you agree?

I don't think you have. In your thought experiment, though it allows for the possibility of choice, we do have to address if we actually have a choice or just the illusion of choice. Regardless of how we feel or view things, in a deterministic world we would expect the results of the test to be the same every single time. In a world of free will we would expect the results to appear randomized and having no significant trends that are not explainable as many more than random chance and coincidence. In a compatibilist setting we could predict some variation among the results but nothing too drastic.
And it still must be asked even if the results did vary greatly, did we really have choice or just the illusion of choice? After all, our brain knows of our decisions before we consciously aware of them.

 

[MikeF]

The best approach to free will I've heard is that every effect either happens for reasons, in which case it is caused by those reasons, or happens for no reason, in which case it happens randomly. This is a true dichotomy. There is no space for free will as some third option.

The consensus in physics is that randomness is a fundamental aspect of reality, in certain circumstances. So I agree that our world is probably mostly deterministic with some small random elements on atomic scale events. Free will is something we subjectively feel like we have, but it's an illusion. We can still hold people accountable for having a mind/personality that makes harmful choices, given sets of stimuli that don't induce harmful behavior in most other people. But the theology of Abrahamic faiths is totally unjustifiable.

My approach here is off-the-cuff. I am wholly unconcerned with the role of free will in Abrahamic faiths. I am simply pondering based on a mention of the topic of free will.

My conclusion, for the most part, lines up with your comments. However, I still have a feeling that this notion of choice not bound by causal chain exists to a small degree, and I think our capacity to imagine and imagine possible futures opens the door to some true choice. Could still be illusion, I suppose.

 

[MikeF]

I don't think you have. In your thought experiment, though it allows for the possibility of choice, we do have to address if we actually have a choice or just the illusion of choice. Regardless of how we feel or view things, in a deterministic world we would expect the results of the test to be the same every single time. In a world of free will we would expect the results to appear randomized and having no significant trends that are not explainable as many more than random chance and coincidence. In a compatibilist setting we could predict some variation among the results but nothing too drastic.
And it still must be asked even if the results did vary greatly, did we really have choice or just the illusion of choice? After all, our brain knows of our decisions before we consciously aware of them.

I am suggesting the results *would* vary greatly over time. If the choice is an "illusion" isn't the expectation that each run of the experiment would instead be exactly the same?

What of the issue of contemplating strategies? We are not automatons, simply opening successive doors with no consideration, right? We consider possible approaches and then choose. Will we always start with the same choice every time the series is run? Maybe often. But I also think that there will be variation. Does this not speak to a choice being made?

 

[vulcanlogician]

@MikeF

Awesome topic.

Reading now.

Hopefully I can get something worked up before the assignment's due.

 

[joe1776]

The best approach to free will I've heard is that every effect either happens for reasons, in which case it is caused by those reasons, or happens for no reason, in which case it happens randomly. This is a true dichotomy. There is no space for free will as some third option.

And a free will choice isn't a cause because....?

 

[MikeF]

The best approach to free will I've heard is that every effect either happens for reasons, in which case it is caused by those reasons, or happens for no reason, in which case it happens randomly. This is a true dichotomy. There is no space for free will as some third option.

The consensus in physics is that randomness is a fundamental aspect of reality, in certain circumstances. So I agree that our world is probably mostly deterministic with some small random elements on atomic scale events. Free will is something we subjectively feel like we have, but it's an illusion. We can still hold people accountable for having a mind/personality that makes harmful choices, given sets of stimuli that don't induce harmful behavior in most other people. But the theology of Abrahamic faiths is totally unjustifiable.

It is nice to see that there my be some scientific support for my notion of an element of randomness in the cosmos.

 

[AlexanderG]

And a free will choice isn't cause because....?

You make choices by considering reasons for and against. How you weigh those reasons is determined by other causes like your past experience, personality, current mood, how hungry or tired or cold you are, etc. It's reasons behind causes behind reasons, all the way down. Alternatively, something happens for no reasons, which is by definition random. Again, I don't see any logical space for "free"ness bringing about choices or effects.

 

[blü 2]

@vulcanlogician
Part 2
If there is an element of randomness to the cosmos and the future is not inevitably pre-determined by past events, what role may this play in our ability to exercise Free Will? One way this element of randomness may effect us, we human beings, is in the way biology and prior events shape who we are at any specific moment. Consider identical twins, both starting as single fertilized eggs in the same mothers womb. We know from experience that no two identical twins are exactly the same, either physically or mentally. Yes, they may share many similarities but they are quite distinct. You may object and say that even though the two fertilized eggs ostensibly have the same genetic material, there is always the possibility that even at the single cell stage, there is some difference, they are not molecule for molecule identical. I think this is a valid point and I assume to be exactly the case. But even still, whether they are 99.9999 percent identical or 99.99 percent identical, I would suspect that we would see stronger physiological duplication if some element of randomness was not injected into the development process. This is my conjecture and I could be completely wrong. However, my conclusion is that randomness of the cosmos plays a role in our development and our existence on the whole such that our futures are not pre-determined. Not by biology, nor by our cumulative experiences, or the causal chain of the cosmos.

So now the question becomes, if the future is not set, are we able to make an unimpeded choice in this random universe, a choice not strictly dictated by previous events. To test this, I have devised a thought experiment. Let's imagine that we have a maze of rooms. Each room is identical in dimension, material, and color. Each room has an entrance door in the middle of one wall, and five identical doors in appearance on the wall opposite the entrance door. Each door leads to another room that is identical to all others. Once entering a room, you cannot go back, but must choose to remain in the current room, or choose one of the five doors to exit. Once a door is opened, all other doors lock and are no longer an option. Lets run an imagined experiment through the maze with ourselves as the test subject. We are tasked with entering the maze and traversing through 1,000 rooms (lets put aside biological needs during the test, it is an imaginary test after all ).

So here we have a test of choice where we are presented with a series of 1,000 identical choices. Imagine that we were able to run the experiment multiple times, such that we could reset initial conditions, go back in time if you will, and the subject (ourselves in this case) had no knowledge of repeating, that each run was experienced as being the first. Do we expect each run of a thousand choices to be exactly the same? Even if we start out with some system of choice, say starting from left to right, first room we choose is farthest left door, next room we choose the one to the right of farthest left, and so on. How long would we keep this up? Would we begin to mix it up? Would we get bored eventually and start always choosing the same door just to get the experiment over? At what iteration of rooms would these changes to attacking the problem occur? If, on the first run we hold the pattern of left to right choice for 20 rooms, for each run of the experiment, will we always end the pattern on the 20th room? Will we always start with that particular pattern? What iteration of room do we become bored? The 50th? The 173rd? Will our boredom arrive at the exact same point for each run of the experiment? My guess is no, they will not. Each run of the experiment will result in a different pattern of choices for the 1,000 rooms, even starting at identical initial conditions. I would suggest, that the mere time involved in considering our options, weighing our choices, playing things our in our mind before action is taken, all this delay, this amount of time, allows the randomness of the cosmos to exert some influence. If the choice is identical, we have an expanded ability in which we can choose freely.

We can play with this setup. We can make it such that for the 3 most left doors, there is always something unpleasant in the room beyond, and for every 2 most right doors, there is always something pleasant. Over time, we will realize this pattern and I expect this experience will influence our choices such that (for some of us anyway) we begin to only select the 2 most right doors. This would be an example of how past events influence choice even though we have freedom of choice. I can also imagine that given a long enough period of going through rooms, we might become curious as to whether the pattern of unpleasant rooms and pleasant rooms still holds. We may take a chance and pick one of the 3 left side doors. We find that it is unpleasant and it confirms in us that the pattern has not yet changed. At what iteration of rooms do we take that chance of exploring the 3 left doors again? In multiple runs of the experiment, will we take that chance at exactly the same iteration? On some runs may we never take that chance? My guess is that it will be different for each run of the experiment, to include some runs where the choice to chance the left doors again never comes.

If no two runs in both types of experiments will result in identical patterns of choice, does this indicate that there is at least some freedom to choose? I would say yes. I would say that we human beings do not have complete freedom of choice whereby any presented choice is in no way influenced by past events and experiences. I would posit that we have a limited or restricted capacity to exercise our will. Our unique neural patterns of our central nervous system creates limits, or more precisely, influences upon how we will decide any given choice. Past experience certainly influences how we decide any given choice. Of course, the choices we are even presented are dictated by all causal events leading up to the present choice. But despite all those factors narrowing and limiting how we might choose in any given circumstance, I feel that there can still be some serendipity, some expression of whim, in the exercising of some choices, and I based that idea on the speculations presented in the thought experiment. We, I surmise, are not going to do the very exact same thing, every single time, dictated strictly upon all previous causal chains.

I have one other idea as well. I think our capacity to imagine breaks causal chains. The fact that we can know that past causes lead to current events allows us to realize that changing conditions will impact future events. Our imagination however can create events within the rules of nature that are possible, yet have never happened. We can also mix and match our past experiences in a way to imagine things that are not probable or even possible. If we are making choices about our future actions, and those choices are informed by imagination instead of the present state of affairs, are we not making free choices in that instance? Certainly our past experience has influence, yet I see us as inventing choices to a degree as opposed to simply reacting to current conditions. This seems another possible expression of free will.

What do you think? Have I made a case for some modicum of free will? At the very least, I think I have a good argument to claim that the future is not set in stone. Would you agree?

There appear to be two kinds of determinism.

Theological determinism (though I don't know of any church that admits to it) is the necessary consequence of postulating a god who is omnipotent, omniscient and perfect, the Abrahamic God being Exhibit 1. As such, it follows ineluctably that when this god made the universe, [he] already perfectly knew everything that would ever happen, hence necessarily intended it to happen, so that it's impossible for anyone or anything to deviate from what what [he] perfectly foresaw, even to the tiniest extent.

Physical determinism arises from chains of physical causes and effects. (There are various definitions, but I'd say a 'cause' is the movement of energy from a region of higher energy to a region of lower energy, and 'effect' is the change that results.) The other relevant thing is quantum randomness ─ the quantum world doesn't readily respond to analysis by cause+effect so is described in terms of probability. Examples of random events include the emission of any particular particle in the course of radioactive decay, and the quantum-level events that bring about the Casimir effect.

The functioning of the human brain is by sequences of interacting biochemical and bioelectrical chains of cause+effect, so that memory, speech, sensory perception and monitoring, the sense of self, awareness, sleep, all the phenomena of the brain, nervous system and body, are brought about by sequences of physical states, and thus underneath that enormous complexity are simply those interacting chains.

What is not clear is the extent (if any) to which the brain's functions can be diverted from their physical courses by events that arise from quantum randomness.

However, through that, I don't see how the dignity we like to wish on human thought can be maintained between the strictly caused and the random (if any).

It's nonetheless the case that we humans have a strong sense of owning our decisions. Our society, politics, legal system, and so on, proceed very largely on that assumption. However, every now and again a little recognition that we're constructed from biology creeps in. An example is SCOTUS's decision in Roper v Simmons (2005) which cleared up, apparently finally, legal doubts and forbade the death penalty for offenders under 18. The court in so doing specifically cited evidence of changes in the brain from adolescence into adulthood.

 

[MikeF]

You make choices by considering reasons for and against. How you weigh those reasons is determined by other causes like your past experience, personality, current mood, how hungry or tired or cold you are, etc. It's reasons behind causes behind reasons, all the way down. Alternatively, something happens for no reasons, which is by definition random. Again, I don't see any logical space for "free"ness bringing about choices or effects.

What if we considered invention. Let's say we are Thomas Eddison and we want to create an electric light bulb which currently doesn't exist. We ponder multiple ways in which this might be accomplished, and at some point, we must make a choice as to which option to test first. Do you imagine that the list of choices are fixed such that when the process started, those options considered were the only options possible? If we wound back time, the list of options created will always be the same and in the same exact order? I'm not sure if this is true. I still see some choice that is not fixed and pre-determined. I am not saying that there is no influence from the factors you suggest, such that the range of invented options will be restricted. But I would argue that the list will not always be the same if one could reset the process. Is that not some form of limited choice, which is what I am arguing.

 

[MikeF]

There appear to be two kinds of determinism.

Theological determinism (though I don't know of any church that admits to it) is the necessary consequence of postulating a god who is omnipotent, omniscient and perfect, the Abrahamic God being Exhibit 1. As such, it follows ineluctably that when this god made the universe, [he] already perfectly knew everything that would ever happen, hence necessarily intended it to happen, so that it's impossible for anyone or anything to deviate from what what [he] perfectly foresaw, even to the tiniest extent.

Physical determinism arises from chains of physical causes and effects. (There are various definitions, but I'd say a 'cause' is the movement of energy from a region of higher energy to a region of lower energy, and 'effect' is the change that results.) The other relevant thing is quantum randomness ─ the quantum world doesn't readily respond to analysis by cause+effect so is described in terms of probability. Examples of random events include the emission of any particular particle in the course of radioactive decay, and the quantum-level events that bring about the Casimir effect.

The functioning of the human brain is by sequences of interacting biochemical and bioelectrical chains of cause+effect, so that memory, speech, sensory perception and monitoring, the sense of self, awareness, sleep, all the phenomena of the brain, nervous system and body, are brought about by sequences of physical states, and thus underneath that enormous complexity are simply those interacting chains.

What is not clear is the extent (if any) to which the brain's functions can be diverted from their physical courses by events that arise from quantum randomness.

However, through that, I don't see how the dignity we like to wish on human thought can be maintained between the strictly caused and the random (if any).

It's nonetheless the case that we humans have a strong sense of owning our decisions. Our society, politics, legal system, and so on, proceed very largely on that assumption. However, every now and again a little recognition that we're constructed from biology creeps in. An example is SCOTUS's decision in Roper v Simmons (2005) which cleared up, apparently finally, legal doubts and forbade the death penalty for offenders under 18. The court in so doing specifically cited evidence of changes in the brain from adolescence into adulthood.

Can we alter our future? Can we invent possibilities that are not strictly informed by the causal chain of physical events, and then subsequently, make a true choice from those possibilities?

 

[joe1776]

You make choices by considering reasons for and against. How you weigh those reasons is determined by other causes like your past experience, personality, current mood, how hungry or tired or cold you are, etc. It's reasons behind causes behind reasons, all the way down. Alternatively, something happens for no reasons, which is by definition random. Again, I don't see any logical space for "free"ness bringing about choices or effects.

You have defined "free-will" as uncaused. And since there's nothing uncaused, you can't be wrong. But, your argument depends on that definition of free will.

 

[blü 2]

Can we alter our future? Can we invent possibilities that are not strictly informed by the causal chain of physical events, and then subsequently, make a true choice from those possibilities?

For myself, I don't see how it could be done. If you can think of way we can do this, please let me know.