joelr
Well-Known Member
Yes, that’s what I just said.
The question isn’t whether or not Greek speakers were influenced by Greek culture as it would be inane to think otherwise, the question is the nature of the influence and what can be derived from a story containing common cultural tropes.
If there was a human who was deified in such a culture would you:
A) expect the mythological narratives that developed around him to contain common cultural tropes surrounding deification
B) Not contain common cultural tropes surrounding deification
The fact that the myths contain common cultural tropes around deification say absolutely nothing regarding the likelihood of his existence or otherwise.
I don't care about mythicism. Carrier's reasons are none of the above.
The idea they reflect direct imitation is certainly debated, as claiming a similarity reflects direct imitation requires far more than saying both things have common features.
It's a start. Mark would have known this story.
Romulus
1- The hero son of god
2 - His death is accompanied by prodigies
3 - The land is covered in darkness
4- The heroes corpse goes missing
5 - The hero receives a new immortal body, superior to the one he had
6 - His resurrection body has on occasion a bright shining appearance
7 - After his resurrection he meets with a follower on the road to the city
8 - A speech is given from a summit or high place prior to ascending
9 - An inspired message of resurrection or “translation to heaven” is delivered to witnesses
10 - There is a great commission )an instruction to future followers)
11- The hero physically ascends to heaven in his divine new body
12 - He is taken up into a cloud
13 - There is an explicit role given to eyewitness testimony (even naming the witnesses)
14 - Witnesses are frightened by his appearance and or disappearance
15 - Some witnesses flee
16 - Claims are made of dubious alternative accounts
17 - All of this occurs outside of a nearby but central city
18 - His followers are initially in sorrow over his death
19 - But his post-resurrection story leads to eventual belief, homage and rejoicing
20 - The hero is deified and cult subsequently paid to him (in the same manner as a God)
Christianity was influenced by its cultural environment in some way. So? What does this matter to anyone who isn't a hardline Christian?
Yes, it took the basic Mystery religion package of ideas and used them, like all the mysteries did.
Uh, which mystery religion has a savior demigod based on a real person?"Unless you respond to every assumption in an 800 page book you can't disagree with it" is a particularly vapid argument.
I've already explained why I don't accept many of his arguments as making his non-existence more probable, given his exosytence is easily explained by what we know of human psychology around apocalyptic cults (when their premise is destoyed, they find new ways to keep it going), Why mythic similarities would be equally expected if he was a real person. How he would be absolutely unique in being a whole cloth mythic god invented by those whose lives overlapped with his purported life (all 'gods' deified in this time frame were real people and you have failed to produce a single counter example), etc.
You can certainly question the validity of Bayes' theorem as actually relating to any meaningful probability
Historical events are unique and non-repeatable, assigning probabilities is by definition massively subjective. It is simply a means of formally documenting your own assumptions and beliefs. It says nothing about actual probabilities, just your personal reason for believing as you do.
Who said anything about Bayes. Carrier uses it but it's his argument.
That is one small piece. Let me know when you read OHJ and understand what you are talking about.Using Rank-Raglan, a literary theory regarding the development of narratives, as being evidence for or against historicity
The maths has been critiqued by multiple people more familiar with Bayes than you, me or Carrier:
By apologists. How is a mathematician better qualified at history? Carrier has answered critiques. People like to attack him, they feel smart. Doesn't seem to work out when they directly attack him.
I don't follow the Bayes stuff, if you want to challenge Carrier go ahead, a lot of the criticism has been dealt with.
How Not to Be a Doofus about Bayes’ Theorem
How Not to Be a Doofus about Bayes' Theorem • Richard Carrier Blogs
I’ve been dealing with a bunch of doofuses lately. And I can’t tell if they are alone in their quackery, or if their disease is afflicting anyone else. So here’s a primer on how not to be a total doofus about Bayes’ Theorem. I define a doofus here as someone who not only reasons illogically, […]
www.richardcarrier.info
So each term in our Bayes’s formula acquires errors from all of these three factors. And each factor compounds the errors in the others. As a result, for questions that are potentially vague, with a range of possible reference classes, each with poor quality or incomplete data, we should expect to have large errors.
for example,
Not only is Bayes’ Theorem frequently used with ranges of numbers (representing margins of error, degrees of uncertainty, and sensitivity tests), in every field of science, commerce, and industry that it is used in (thus refuting the doofus). But it can also be used with no numbers at all.
Carrier addressed those arguments here:Bias Error
So far I’ve assumed that errors are just random. We are as likely to be higher than lower in our estimates. But this isn’t true.
Carrier, for example, seems to recognize this, and decides to use ‘a fortiori’ reasoning. Which is a way of saying “I’m going to bias the error in a way that doesn’t support my case, so I avoid the criticism that I may have accidentally biased it towards my conclusions.” This is admirable, and (barring the caveats around small values above) reasonable. But that only looks at bias from one source: bias from the available data. In reality Carrier (and anyone else doing this) will also be choosing the definitions, and choosing the reference classes, and there is no similar a fortiori process for determining which are the least favourable definitions to ones cause, and which reference classes are the most troubling, and adopting those[3].
Conclusion
So, what can we learn?
Well, for one, the inputs to Bayes’s Theorem matter. Particularly small inputs. When we’re dealing with rare evidence for rare events, then small errors in the inputs can end up giving a huge range of outputs, enough of a range that there is no usable information to be had.
And those errors come from many sources, and are difficult to quantify. It is tempting to think of errors only in terms of the data acquisition error, and to ignore errors of choice and errors of reference class.
These issues combine to make it very difficult to make any sensible conclusions from Bayes’s Theorem in areas where probabilities are small, data is low quality, possible reference classes abound, and statements are vague. In areas like history, for example....
Carrier joins that latter debate too, in what he describes as a “cheeky” unification of Bayesian and Frequentist interpretations, but what reads as a misunderstanding of what the differences between Bayesian and Frequentist statistics are... But given the lack of mathematical care demonstrated in the rest of the book, to me it came off as indicative of a Dunning-Kruger effect around mathematics.
I had many other problems with the mathematics presented in the book, I felt there were severe errors with his arguments a fortiori (i.e. a kind of reasoning from inequalities — the probability is no greater than X); and his set-theoretic treatment of reference classes was likewise muddled (though in the latter case it coincidentally did not seem to result in incorrect conclusions)...
But ultimately I think the book is disingenuous. It doesn’t read as a mathematical treatment of the subject, and I can’t help but think that Carrier is using Bayes’s Theorem in much the same way that apologists such as William Lane Craig use it: to give their arguments a veneer of scientific rigour that they hope cannot be challenged by their generally more math-phobic peers. To enter an argument against the overwhelming scholarly consensus with “but I have math on my side, math that has been proven, proven!” seems transparent to me, more so when the quality of the math provided in no way matches the bombast.
I suspect this book was always designed to preach to the choir, and will not make much impact in scholarly circles. I hope it doesn’t become a blueprint for other similar scholarship, despite agreeing with many of its conclusions.
Source 1 and 2
Understanding Bayesian History
So far I know of only two critiques of my argument in Proving History that actually exhibit signs of having read the book (all other critiques can be rebutted with three words: read the book; altho...
web.archive.org
As I stated, it's different in math than in historical sciences
"When Ian isn’t ignoring the refutations of his own arguments in the very book he’s critiquing, he is ignoring how applications of Bayes’ Theorem in the humanities must necessarily differ from applications in science (again for reasons I explain in the book), or he is being pointlessly pedantic and ignoring the fact that humanities majors need a more colloquial instruction and much simpler techniques than, for instance, a mathematical evolutionist employs."
This math person "Ian" wrote this BEFORE OHJ CAME OUT?????? I mean, people love to attack Carrier and usually fall flat when doing it because they don't actually read his work or they make weird assumptions and imagine he must be wrong.
Lataster, who did read his book, wrote another monograph on the same subject, and agrees with the conclusion.
But again, I don't care about mythicism enough. The argument is good but no one ever argues against it, just random pieces of it they find online.
Rank Ragalin is like a side note?