Do Concepts Exist Apart from Physical Processes in the Brain?

[1137]

So far as I know, no materialists deny the existence of non-physical things such as concepts. The question is rather in what way, sense, or manner they exist. For instance, I think Legion made a pretty good case for the claim that concepts exist as emergent properties of a physical system involving, among other things, the brain, spinal cord, senses, etc.

Saying concepts don't exist is the same as saying that the processes that create the experience don't exist.

 

[Bunyip]

So the non-physical exists independent of the physical?

How does that follow?

 

[Bunyip]

Saying concepts don't exist is the same as saying that the processes that create the experience don't exist.

Nobody is saying that concepts do not exist, they exist as concepts - abstract, non physical products of the mind. That is what 'concept' means.

I'm really sorry, I don't see the confusion here - honestly I don't.

 

[Sunstone]

Saying concepts don't exist is the same as saying that the processes that create the experience don't exist.

Who said concepts don't exist?

 

[Rick O'Shez]

So are you willing to say that concepts are an emergent property of, say, the central nervous system plus a few things (e.g. experience)?

I would suggest that concepts are an emergent property of consciousness, which is in turn an emergent property of biological life.

 

[Sunstone]

I would suggest that concepts are an emergent property of consciousness, which is in turn an emergent property of biological life.

There are no subconscious ideas, notions, images -- in short, concepts?

 

[Bunyip]

There are no subconscious ideas, notions, images -- in short, concepts?

How did you get - 'there are no concepts' from that?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

However, I'm not yet at all convinced that concepts are separate or distinct from physical processes in a metaphysical or trans-physical sense.

Hence the nuanced nature of the question. At least for me, it comes down to how (if possible) can something that is entirely the product of physical processes not reducible to these. Interestingly, the most serious challenges (providing that one is more inclined towards empirical results and deems less concinving philosophical arguments on e.g., the nature of consciousness and so forth) comes from particle physics. This is where many a devout proponent of physicalism who rejections supernatural/spiritual/religious explanations can still assert reductionism fails. Not that the fall of reductionism means that concepts can't be reduced to physical neuronal processes or that there aren't many cases in which reductionist approaches are extremely successful.

However, if I want to assert that there is a physical "definition" for some phenomenon, which is in this case concepts (e.g., the concept "barn" corresponds to a set of physical processes), then I would like to be able to claim two things:
1) I can identify all processes that I can equate to (i.e., that produce or represent) that concept
&
2) What I identify corresponds to that concept only.

This is impossible. So what is my basis for asserting that any concept is the sum of physical processes? Only that the sum of all concepts is the result of physical processes, but if I can't define this set processes such that there exists an element that I can define as a concept and as unique within the set, can I say that concepts belong in the set?

But maybe that's because I haven't had enough coffee yet.

Try crystal meth! It's everything your body needs and is food for thought! (Sponsored by the Society for Severely Sever Cerebral Connections)

 

[Rick O'Shez]

There are no subconscious ideas, notions, images -- in short, concepts?

Eh? I didn't suggest that. I suggested that all this mental activity is an emergent property of consciousness, including self-view and ego.

 

[1137]

Nobody is saying that concepts do not exist, they exist as concepts - abstract, non physical products of the mind. That is what 'concept' means.

I'm really sorry, I don't see the confusion here - honestly I don't.

I agree, I don't comprehend how people can call something observable with measurable effect nonexistent. I'm sick to death of this topic.

 

[Bunyip]

I agree, I don't comprehend how people can call something observable with measurable effect nonexistent. I'm sick to death of this topic.

What are 'they' calling non-existent I missed that?

 

[Laika]

This is a really complicated question but I'll do my best to give you a straight answer from a materialist philosophical position. I cannot tell you if it is scientifically valid (but it sounds plausible).

Concepts do not exist apart from the physical processes in the brain. The sensation of thought is the product of the Brain. The mind and the brain are identical. Concepts "exist" as neurological signals in the brain, not as something separate from the brain. Materialism therefore does not subtract the existence of ideas; only the belief that these ideas exist independently on the mind.

Concepts are electrical signals in the brain and are therefore the result of the physical processes of the brain. But these concepts are also a reflection of the our sense data. So the concept of reality is not identical with objective reality. Hence our ideas are always an imperfect reflection of the real world. "Truth" is this correspondence of our ideas/electrical signals in the brain to the properties of the objective world and this can be established by science.

The source of our ideas- objective reality- is absolute (edit: because it is objective). But given the physical limitations of the cognitive process and the means to identify truth, the correspondence of our ideas to that objective reality is relative to our technological and scientific capacity to identify it. (edit: So our ideas are a product of the brain and material processes, but can only ever imperfectly reflect them and are an approximation of the truth.)

 

[Sunstone]

However, if I want to assert that there is a physical "definition" for some phenomenon, which is in this case concepts (e.g., the concept "barn" corresponds to a set of physical processes), then I would like to be able to claim two things:
1) I can identify all processes that I can equate to (i.e., that produce or represent) that concept
&
2) What I identify corresponds to that concept only.

This is impossible.

Granted that it is impossible. Which is to say, I no longer hold that concepts are entirely reducible to physical processes in the brain, but are instead emergent properties of a system that is largely, if not wholly, physical. The non-physical parts would be the concepts themselves.

So what is my basis for asserting that any concept is the sum of physical processes?

It would seem to me in my currently groggy state that concepts are emergent properties of physical processes because (1) they appear to be dependent on those processes in so far as it may be supposed they cease to exist when those processes are interrupted by, say, death, severe brain damage, being knocked unconscious, etc; and (2) to posit they are in some significant way independent of those physical properties in more than an emergent sense would appear to require a plunge into metaphysical speculations (Metaphysical speculations, however, are distasteful and ultimately inconclusive).

At least, that's how I see it at this hour of the morning.

Try crystal meth! It's everything your body needs and is food for thought! (Sponsored by the Society for Severely Sever Cerebral Connections)

LOL! If only you knew how strong I brew my coffee! It has been known to stun even meth addicts, and my brewer is certified by the U.S. Government as a superfund site.

 

[Sunstone]

This is a really complicated question but I'll do my best to give you a straight answer from a materialist philosophical position. I cannot tell you if it is scientifically valid (but it sounds plausible).

Concepts do not exist apart from the physical processes in the brain. The sensation of thought is the product of the Brain. The mind and the brain are identical. Concepts "exist" as neurological signals in the brain, not as something separate from the brain. Materialism therefore does not subtract the existence of ideas; only the belief that these ideas exist independently on the mind.

Concepts are electrical signals in the brain and are therefore the result of the physical processes of the brain. But these concepts are also a reflection of the our sense data. So the concept of reality is not identical with objective reality. Hence our ideas are always an imperfect reflection of the real world. "Truth" is this correspondence of our ideas/electrical signals in the brain to the properties of the objective world and this can be established by science.

The source of our ideas- objective reality- is absolute (edit: because it is objective). But given the physical limitations of the cognitive process and the means to identify truth, the correspondence of our ideas to that objective reality is relative to our technological and scientific capacity to identify it. (edit: So our ideas are a product of the brain and material processes, but can only ever imperfectly reflect them and are an approximation of the truth.)

We're in some agreement. For instance, like you, I subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth -- at least most days of the week. However, see Legion's posts #13 and #23 in this same thread. It would appear to me he makes a very strong case for the notion that concepts cannot be entirely reducible to brain processes because -- among other reasons -- they are emergent properties of a much larger, mostly physical, system.

Second, I would question the notion there is an objective reality knowable to us, unless by "objective reality", you mean intersubjectively verifiable facts, etc.

 

[Sunstone]

Eh? I didn't suggest that. I suggested that all this mental activity is an emergent property of consciousness, including self-view and ego.

But if all of it is an emergent property of consciousness, how can some of it be merely subconscious? Or am I not following you?

 

[Rick O'Shez]

But if all of it is an emergent property of consciousness, how can some of it be merely subconscious? Or am I not following you?

I meant the property of consciousness in the broader sense, not just the stuff we are conscious of.

 

[Sunstone]

I meant the property of consciousness in the broader sense, not just the stuff we are conscious of.

Thanks for the clarification.

 

[Laika]

We're in some agreement. For instance, like you, I subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth -- at least most days of the week. However, see Legion's posts #13 and #23 in this same thread. It would appear to me he makes a very strong case for the notion that concepts cannot be entirely reducible to brain processes because -- among other reasons -- they are emergent properties of a much larger, mostly physical, system.

Second, I would question the notion there is an objective reality knowable to us, unless by "objective reality", you mean intersubjectively verifiable facts, etc.

Noted.

Materialism blurs the distinction between subjective and objective reality. So 'objectivity' does not have the absoluteness in a materialist philosophy that it would have in a more conventional scientific thinking. This is why materialism is generally rejected in Science because it constitutes a 'dogma' and a form of apriori reasoning because it begins with this consciously subjective and philosophical assumption that ideas are the product of matter which is not subject to any scientific proof- only a philosophical one.

This can have some really bizarre implications since it means eliminating the concept of free will; then of course if choice is determined, did I choose to be a materialist or was it determined? I'm still thinking on this one as the balance between the two is very subtle.

This is an excellent and subtle question which requires a nuanced answer regardless of whether one if a physicalist, non-reductive physicalist (which, at least in the philosophical literature is often the same or pretty close to what scientists mean by "physicalist"), duelist, etc.

First nuance: let's grant that (and not just because I think it to be true). The physical processes that create them are in constant flux and there is no one-to-one correspondence between any concept and any physical process (that is, imagine that all concepts are the result of neural activity, as I believe. In order to refer to the activity that represents the concept "car", one has to involve so many networks and the intra- & inter-network activity that in doing so one is also referring to large parts of thousands of concepts, memories of different types, and more). In fact, essential to conceptual processing is the ways in which related concepts overlap in how neural activity is able to represent them.

Thus there is never any actual physical representation of a concept, even though all concepts are represented physically. It is a small (albeit dangerous, epistemically radical, and ontologically questionable) step to say that even though concepts do not exist apart from the physical processes that create them, all concepts exist apart from physical processes. One way to think about this (it's not the best analogy but it's 2 in the morning and I've been sick) is to think about the number two. Is it identical to 2? How about II? 8/4? Here, different representations correspond to the same entity. In the brain, we have the reverse in some sense. The same concept is represented in no small part in how it relates to related concepts, memories we have, sensorimotor experiences, and so forth. We can't identify any physical processes that represent any concepts, but we can understand concepts abstractly as well as the result of physical processes.

This first nuance is really about the origin of ideas and where we can say they originated from the Brain. The explanation that I've come accross is that concepts are not wholly the product of the brain in itself, but are the product of developing the faculty of language. hence we develop the ability to speak, vocalize sounds and then words and abstract concepts follow. Our scientific and technological development changes the language and therefore our ideas.

When Orwell said 2+2=5 as a form of double think in 1984, he was making a direct reference to dialectical materialism (as in the Soviet Union) because the concept of "2" does not necessarily correspond to the reality of "2". Therefore 2+2 can equal 5 in dialectical materialism but only if you ignore the requirement that the concept has practical implications. it's a real abuse of the philosophy, but it is possible to pull it off.

Second nuance: some of those physical processes involve light, barns you've seen (in images, in real life, both, in movies, etc.), the conceptual network you rely on to create the image which itself relies on passed experiences an related concepts, and the representation via neural activity of this network. Most importantly, the representation cannot exist apart from the perceptual experiences you've had, and these require physical processes that are not in the brain (like those that have allowed you to see, hear, smell, read, and/or touch some external example of a barn).

Most of the physical processes that allow your mental image do not cease when your mental image does.

This is about the separation of the concept of reality from the objective existence of reality itself. the distinction between the two is blurred because we can only ever had a concept of reality or 'Ideology' as it is known in Marxism, not a perfect or absolute reflection of reality.

So, to some extent all concepts contain an element of subjectivity and illusion as they are derived from individual experience even if they reflect an objectively existing object.

I think Bertrand Russell used the example of a person looking at a table with four legs and being in a position where you could see only 3. Our knowledge of the objective world is constantly battling the subjective limits, and in overcoming these limits (moving round the table and seeing leg number 4) do we increase our knowledge.

Third nuance: although many concepts have no basis in the external world the way barns and cars do, they are often still based on sensorimotor experience and made abstract via metaphor (in the scientific, not literary, sense). Additionally, none exist in isolation and I doubt any exist that are not in some way connected to bodily experience. However, how we categorize perceptual stimuli (such as calling something a barn instead of a house, a building, wooden blanks and a roof, etc.) is itself a conceptual process almost as much as it is a perceptual process. But there is no universal way that humans categorize perceptual experiences such that given any two people exposed to the same stimuli, they would conceptualize it the same way. Put simply, someone who has never heard of computers, TV, or similar devices would, having seen my laptop, perceive it in terms of parts in a way that I do not, and subsequently form concepts I don't have. Basically, just as we develop concepts based upon perceptual experiences, so to do concepts exist in many ways as perceptual experience. As perceptual experiences require physical processes outside the brain, the concepts we have exist as they do because of other concepts we have formed from prior perceptual experiences in a sort of loop that always involves processes outside the brain.

The relationship between our knowledge of the objective world and our subjective limitations is 'dynamic' (or dialectical). there is a contradiction between them. As we increase our productive powers through science and technology, we create new concepts and meanings which are then added to our existing body of knowledge. our instruments to manipulate the therefore act as a defacto extension of our perception because they increase the possibilities of how far we can change the world and therefore gain knowledge of it.

I have no idea what the answer to that may be (so luckily it wasn't intended for me to answer), by I will use it to hijack the thread because I thought of a better metaphor.

Let us generalize the enormous variations amongst various cells of living systems to one dynamical system in such a way as to avoid loss of generality (i.e., whatever is said of this idealized cell applies to all o them). Most of the dynamics of a cell involves metabolism. By involve, I mean the dynamics of the constituents of the cell that interact in some sense with the metabolic process. This is most of the cell. The problem is that the same constituents "determine" the metabolic process are governed dynamically by the metabolic process. Put more simply, parts of the cell determine a process that itself determines the process of these parts.

Call it circular cauality, an [M,R] system, or Heffalumpian Hamiltonians, the result is the same: we get a process that is function, not physical. If we try to reduce it to the physical processes that produce it, we find that we are relying on the very things that give "metabolism" meaning in that metabolic processes determine the activity of the constituent parts we seek to reduce it to. It is completely the result of cellular processes, but is functionally emergent (it is a function of the cell that exists as the circular interactions among parts of the cell).

In dialectical materialism this circular reasoning is referred to as 'mechanistic materialism' (I vague reference to Newton's mechanics). There is more than one kind of materialism. Dialectical Materialism kills god and the belief in consciousness as the original cause. Mechanical materialism doesn't and is (supposedly) the underlying philosophy of our current scientific understanding.

Mechanical Materialism relies on the assumption of that the world consists of permanent parts that had to be created and could not move of their own violation and therefore require an original or motive cause to set it in motion (generally god).
dialectical materialism eliminates this problem by saying the universe changes according to it's own "internal contradictions" rather than requiring the intervention of an external force to set it in motion; this has wide ranging and profoundly heretical implications across all scientific disciplines.

The 'parts' of a cell are not static, they are not in a fixed state by are constantly evolving, even if they are at an infinitesimally small pace. If you can accept that it may appear static but is in fact changing at a rate so slow we cannot observe it, I think this provides the solution to this problem.

 

[Sunstone]

@LegionOnomaMoi: Would you agree that the fact concepts appear to be emergent properties of largely physical systems nevertheless does not allow us to safely conclude that they exist as more than emergent properties? Can we say that, while they are not entirely reducible to the system that gives rise to them, they are still not independent of it? I'm trying to clarify your position for me.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

This first nuance is really about the origin of ideas and where we can say they originated from the Brain.

Not really. It's functional. That is, the assertion that concepts don't exist apart from the brain requires a basis for concepts in terms of neural activity. However, for all concepts, there is no neural activity that corresponds or will ever correspond to any concept. Moreover, every single representation of a concept (which is necessarily mostly represented in relation to other concepts, memory, etc.) is not static. It is active and continuously mutable. Thus to say that physical processes correspond to a concept is to equate processes which don't correspond to the concept and which are continuously
y changing with that concept.It's a bit like saying the Ace of Spades is the definition of a playing card because decks of cards contain these.

This is about the separation of the concept of reality from the objective existence of reality itself.

Rather, it is that representations of concepts depend upon physical processes that cannot and do not exist in the brain yet are vital for the development of concepts.

In dialectical materialism this circular reasoning

It is not circular reasoning but circular causality. There is a vast and vital distinction between the two.