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Do you Think we have Free Will

Do you Think we have Free Will


  • Total voters
    59

muhammad_isa

Veteran Member
Do you think that mental states have nothing to do with chemical and neural activity in the brain?
I didn't say that .. I said that they are not LIMITED to physical abnormalities in the brain / nervous system.

What I said was that theology could not ultimately avoid a dependency on miracles..
I would say that 'miracles' are INCLUDED .. not dependent.

Otherwise, it would seem to reduce to forms of analysis and argument that dealt with other types of subject matter..
No, I don't agree .. the subject matter is the Divine, and not the performing of miracles.
There is a lot more to discuss/study than unusual physical manifestation.
 

Curious George

Veteran Member
That is, they use a reductionist argument to take an eliminative materialist position on the question of free will.
This is interesting. Do you think we can resolve free will without resolving materialism? Would the same apply to physicalism or does physicalism (the newer shinier version of materialism) open doors that allow for free will?
 

shunyadragon

shunyadragon
Premium Member
The problem with this is that you can simply declare anything that is not libertarian free will or determinism as compatibilism. My problem with compatibilism is the view that however we define free will has to be compatible with determinism. Hence the name compatibilism.

In my view, the universe is not determined. So if you agree with me, then you are not a campatibilist.
I disagree with the extreme views of Hard Determinism, Libertarian Free will, and the awkward deterministic belief in compatibilism.

The question of our physical existence being determined needs clarification. The overwhelming evidence is that our physical existence is determined within a range of possible outcomes by natural laws and processes, but not mechanistic Newtonian rigid determinism. The fractal nature of the cause and effect natural events occurs in a predictable limited range of outcomes results in a natural determinism that allows Methodological Naturalism to predict the nature of our physical existence. This fractal nature of our choices influence the degree of freedom of choices we potentially have.
I define free will as the ability to make choices which was not determined by past events.
Past events like all other natural circumstance externally and internally "limit" our freedom of choice, but do not fully determine our freedom of choice.

The sources I cite demonstrate through research in Neurobiology and Psychology that the nature of our freedom of choices are neither fully determined or completely free, and there is a limited degree of potential freedom of choice.,
 
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Nakosis

Non-Binary Physicalist
Premium Member
I disagree with the views of HArd Determinism, Libertarian Free will and the awkward deterministic belief in compatibilism.

The question of our physical existence being determined needs clarification. The overwhelming evidence is that our physical existence is determined by natural laws and processes, but not mechanistic Newtonian rigid determinism. The fractal nature of the cause and effect natural events occurs in a predictable limited range of outcomes results in a natural determinism that allows Methodological Naturalism to predict the nature of our physical existence.

So that leaves soft determinism? If so, what do you see soft determinism as?

Past events like all other natural circumstance externally and internally "limit" our freedom of choice, but do not fully determine our freedom of choice.

The sources I cite demonstrate through research in Neurobiology and Psychology that the nature of our freedom of choices are neither fully determined or completely free,

If it is not fully determined then determinism is false.
The doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.

If any amount of free will exists then determinism is nonsense in my view. That is why I don't particularly like trying to fit one's self to the compatibilist/incompatibilist data set as they are defined by a nonsensical value. Although if you were to accept the meaning of incompatibilist as one's views being incompatible with nonsense that might work. :D
 

shunyadragon

shunyadragon
Premium Member
So that leaves soft determinism? If so, what do you see soft determinism as?
Soft Determinism is a difficult term for me. I believe in Natural Determinism, which applies to everything in a our natural existences including our human nature and potential limited freedom of choice. If one wants to equate soft determinism with Natural Determinism OK.
If it is not fully determined then determinism is false.
This again depends on how one defines Determinism. I go with NAtural Determinism as I previously defined,
The doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.
"Some " philosophers is a weak point to argue from. I do not remotely buy this philosophical perspective. As I stated before I consider the nature of our freedom of choices as independent of the natural evolved nature human moral responsibility. The nature of moral responsibility is the evolved social behavior that is necessary for the survival of the human species, and not related to whether we have freedom of choice or not.

Many advocates of Moral Responsibility advocate the necessity of 'freedom of choice' as necessary for justice in the social consideration of moral and legal decisions. this view of justice and moral responsibility is idealistic and not the reality of our history. Idealistic justice is not necessary for justifying our ability to make moral choices.
If any amount of free will exists then determinism is nonsense in my view.

You need to consider my description of Natural Determinism to fully understand my view and the references I cite. Natural determinism does not relate to the Hard or Soft Determinism described in the philosophies that define compatibilism or incompatibilism.
That is why I don't particularly like trying to fit one's self to the compatibilist/incompatibilist data set as they are defined by a nonsensical value. Although if you were to accept the meaning of incompatibilist as one's views being incompatible with nonsense that might work. :D
I do not try and fit my view in the any of the above. I go by Natural Determinism as I defined, and the research in Neurobiology and Psychology I cited.
 

wellwisher

Well-Known Member
The easiest way to solve the riddle of free will, is with the notion of two centers of consciousness. Conceptually, if we had two centers of consciousness and both centers had their own determinism; two sets of determinism pulling or pushing in opposite direction, then all determinism will stall, like the rope in the tug of war below. If we have two forces, pushing/pulling a wall in opposite directions, all movement stops, even though we will expend lots of mental energy.

c2167ee03671871898505f9aae97668c.jpg


What remains, above, is tension in the rope, or compression at a wall, as the case may be. This builds up potential, like damming a stream. This obstruction impacts the second law; entropy has to increase, but now it is not. This can lead to a creative solution, that may not be deterministic to either program, until it becomes accepted by both, as part of the new potential lowering routine.

In the other case, of two opposing forces pushing a plane and the plane not moving, say they both shift, one to the left and one to the right. Now the stagnation becomes a rotation of the plane. This rotation may not have been possible, with either determinism, all by itself.

The current assumption is we only have one center of conscious, that is partially conscious and partly unconscious. This would conceptually lead to only determinism, since one may not be aware of the whole single deterministic package; one big force. For example, the young person driving a car, may only know about the superficial workings of the car; ignition, radio, steering wheel, brakes and gas. The entire experience involves things, like the engine, that the teen is not aware of. The unconscious things are still part of the full deterministic experience. He may ask what is that noise on my newly installed radio. I can make happen, if I play the radio too loud? Lack of grounding is part of the full package.

Once you add two separate layers of conscious determinism; innate instinct versus learn knowledge; these two forces of human nature can cancel and cause all determinism to come to a halt. The ancients, like in the Bible, by saying humans have free will and choice, logically implied a secondary center had appeared, to counter the primary determinism of natural instinct.

It is basic physics. Determinism is like a force, while a secondary force, can counter or deflect the initial deterministic path, even if the first force and its vector, are sustained. If we have one force, this is not an option.

Projectile motion on the surface of the earth, curves back to the earth, due to the downward pull of gravity. Natural determinism would be like the red gravity free path; high road of nature. The ego determinism of learn knowledge is like the gravitational force for a downgrading path; lower road of learned human nature. Gravity lowers entropy. The blue path is the product of these two determinisms, with this middle path not the deterministic product of one or the other, but the result of a two member team. This can, over time, alter nature and/or make the artificial more natural; new cooperative determinism added to genetic based human nature.

f-d%3Abb024be6673110b31e78b46819e792adaed8dc661e082a61f0a6d64e%2BIMAGE_THUMB_POSTCARD_TINY%2BIMAGE_THUMB_POSTCARD_TINY.1



Say we use the blue line force vector. This compromise determinism; more domesticated, is now in our human DNA; effect of long term compromises. We can use that blue force vector, to defect the gravity free path of natural instinct, less. This will get us a purple path, not shown, that is even closer to eternal natural determinism. However, the change to full purple average determinism, may take time before it is engrained in our human genetics. For now, this hypothetical purple determinism is subject to free will and choice, since not yet our second nature.
 
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Nakosis

Non-Binary Physicalist
Premium Member
Soft Determinism is a difficult term for me. I believe in Natural Determinism, which applies to everything in a our natural existences including our human nature and potential limited freedom of choice. If one wants to equate soft determinism with Natural Determinism OK.

This again depends on how one defines Determinism. I go with NAtural Determinism as I previously defined,

"Some " philosophers is a weak point to argue from. I do not remotely buy this philosophical perspective. As I stated before I consider the nature of our freedom of choices as independent of the natural evolved nature human moral responsibility. The nature of moral responsibility is the evolved social behavior that is necessary for the survival of the human species, and not related to whether we have freedom of choice or not.

Many advocates of Moral Responsibility advocate the necessity of 'freedom of choice' as necessary for justice in the social consideration of moral and legal decisions. this view of justice and moral responsibility is idealistic and not the reality of our history. Idealistic justice is not necessary for justifying our ability to make moral choices.


You need to consider my description of Natural Determinism to fully understand my view and the references I cite. Natural determinism does not relate to the Hard or Soft Determinism described in the philosophies that define compatibilism or incompatibilism.

I do not try and fit my view in the any of the above. I go by Natural Determinism as I defined, and the research in Neurobiology and Psychology I cited.

Ok, I should probably say I don't agree with causal determinism.

As I said previously there is no need to bring in moral responsibility here. I was just referring to a definition of determinism but ok causal determinism to distinguish it from other form of determinism.

Natural determinism I don't yet understand the concept well enough to know if I have any criticisms.
 

Copernicus

Industrial Strength Linguist
...That is, they use a reductionist argument to take an eliminative materialist position on the question of free will.

This is interesting. Do you think we can resolve free will without resolving materialism? Would the same apply to physicalism or does physicalism (the newer shinier version of materialism) open doors that allow for free will?

I see no significant difference between physicalism and materialism in this discussion. I do think that the question of free will can be resolved in a deterministic framework, but it is obvious that the resolution that satisfies me doesn't satisfy everyone here.

It might help to give an example of how control relates to the concept of free will. We can use a simple example of how choice works in a deterministic framework. Consider the visual ambiguity inherent in the so-called Necker Cube, two overlapping squares in which the corners are connected by lines:

Necker.jpeg

We observe the illusion of a transparent 3D cube that can skew right (down) or left (up), but it is easy to control what we see by simply choosing whether to see the right or left square as the closer face of the cube. That is, we can freely choose to make the cube skew right or left at will. (Notice that your eyes shift position when you do that, because you are choosing one square or the other as the foreground of the image.)

But is the choice of an agent free in every sense of the word? Our choice is caused by events inside our heads that we are simply unaware of. Hence, we can fulfill our goal of making the cube pop right or left, just not the desire to make it pop one way or the other. Some observer with awareness of those events would not see the making of the choice as free, because that observer lacks the perspective of the agent making the choice. To that observer, the optical illusion loses its ambiguity, because such an observer lacks the perception of alternative future outcomes. There is no optical illusion for that omniscient observer, but there is for the agent faced with a choice. We are not omniscient, so free will is a product of our role as agents facing an uncertain future made up of different imaginary outcomes. That's how I think of compatibilism.
 
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Copernicus

Industrial Strength Linguist
I didn't say that .. I said that they are not LIMITED to physical abnormalities in the brain / nervous system.

Whether brain activity is normal or abnormal, is irrelevant. What happens in the nervous system is all physical, and so is the physical environment that triggers actions in the nervous system. All mental activity correlates with that activity in the nervous system, whether it is under conscious control or not. In that sense, mental activity is limited to physical activity, but you are free to explain where you think it is not. I know of no mental activity that cannot be associated with neural activity, but I am willing to entertain the possibility that there is some that is not limited in that way. You just need to say what you think it is.


I would say that 'miracles' are INCLUDED .. not dependent.

Well, if miracles must ultimately be included in theological discussions, then they are ultimately dependent on them. That's what I said.


No, I don't agree .. the subject matter is the Divine, and not the performing of miracles.
There is a lot more to discuss/study than unusual physical manifestation.

There may be a lot more to discuss, but without the possibility of miracles there is no Divine.
 

muhammad_isa

Veteran Member
Whether brain activity is normal or abnormal, is irrelevant..
Huh?
we were discussing 'mental health states' , and not brain activity per se.

I know of no mental activity that cannot be associated with neural activity..
..and that is irrelevant. :)

You cannot show that mental health problems are ONLY precipitated by physical factors.
You might believe that they are, but that is only a belief.

Merely saying that there is no thought without brain activity does NOT imply that
'bad thoughts' cannot precipitate a mental health problem.

It works both ways .. we need a healthy mind & a healthy body .. and a problem with one of them can cause the other to deteriorate.

There may be a lot more to discuss, but without the possibility of miracles there is no Divine.
I don't see why .. it is not necessary for a Holy person to perform miracles, to teach
about the Creator (Our Father).

Miracles are merely an additional 'ornament'.
I don't believe in Jesus and Muhammad because they performed miracles.
 

wellwisher

Well-Known Member
I see no significant difference between physicalism and materialism in this discussion. I do think that the question of free will can be resolved in a deterministic framework, but it is obvious that the resolution that satisfies me doesn't satisfy everyone here.

It might help to give an example of how control relates to the concept of free will. We can use a simple example of how choice works in a deterministic framework. Consider the visual ambiguity inherent in the so-called Necker Cube, two overlapping squares in which the corners are connected by lines:

View attachment 90579
We observe the illusion of a transparent 3D cube that can skew right (down) or left (up), but it is easy to control what we see by simply choosing whether to see the right or left square as the closer face of the cube. That is, we can freely choose to make the cube skew right or left at will. (Notice that your eyes shift position when you do that, because you are choosing one square or the other as the foreground of the image.)

But is the choice of an agent free in every sense of the word? Our choice is caused by events inside our heads that we are simply unaware of. Hence, we can fulfill our goal of making the cube pop right or left, just not the desire to make it pop one way or the other. Some observer with awareness of those events would not see the making of the choice as free, because that observer lacks the perspective of the agent making the choice. To that observer, the optical illusion loses its ambiguity, because such an observer lacks the perception of alternative future outcomes. There is no optical illusion for that omniscient observer, but there is for the agent faced with a choice. We are not omniscient, so free will is a product of our role as agents facing an uncertain future made up of different imaginary outcomes. That's how I think of compatibilism.
You are assuming logic. Say we assume, like the Life Sciences and Evolution, we assume we live in a statistical universe. That universe says nothing is 100% deterministic. Anything can happen or not, but all have some finite odds. All choices need to be done inside a black box where the edges cannot be seen.

In this statistical universe, if you able to do anything in a willful, logical and repeatable way, that would be free will, in the world of chaos. It should not happen. How can anyone who argues determinism, also accept the chaotic assumptions of casino math?

I prefer look at determinism, as a logical force, since like a force, determinism have a potential; desire, and a sense of direction; vector. I have an urge for chocolate cake. I get up and slice a large piece; force and vector.

If we had two opposing forces, pushing against each other, both of these deterministic forces will cancel. The total determinism is zero, even though energy is being applied; compression or shear stresses. I want the cake, but I am on a diet. Neither determinism can lead to its goal, until the barrier shears. Now have to have to choose which forced to follow at that time; both deterministic.

On another day, since my lack of determinism; two canceling forces are both stopped; internal tug of war, and I cannot let fate choose; flip the coin, I decide to shift the angle of my willful deterministic force, to push against the other chocolate cake force at 90 degree, from its direction of motion. We now have a new combined vector that is neither of the two original determinisms. This innovative vector is willful, even if takes two deterministic forces. I eat a small slice. This is not satisfying either way; partial determinism.

If we had two centers of consciousness; ego and inner self, each could have its own rules of determinism; natural instinct and personal unconscious, versus conscious mind and ego centric choices from learned knowledge. The natural instinct and personal unconscious might push the same way under similar circumstances. The ego, on the other hand, can choose to fight this head on, or at an a new angle to get something new, that neither determinist force, had in mind or even expected; hunger for knowledge. I read a book.

Once this becomes second nature; practice, then this new vector becomes deterministic; personal unconscious mind. It now can be used to deflect other things, to get new short term vectors, that were not yet part of my new set of deterministic vectors; building skills.

Children cannot do a quad summersault the first time they try. But if they practice, their level of inner determinism builds, until one day, they step outside the box of their own natural determinism; new Olympic and personal record. Such as this, often takes everything in alignment, all coming together. The crowd cheers, since this was thought to be impossible.

I you assume there is one center of conscious and one force, then there is no will for deflection and choice.
 

Curious George

Veteran Member
I see no significant difference between physicalism and materialism in this discussion. I do think that the question of free will can be resolved in a deterministic framework, but it is obvious that the resolution that satisfies me doesn't satisfy everyone here.

It might help to give an example of how control relates to the concept of free will. We can use a simple example of how choice works in a deterministic framework. Consider the visual ambiguity inherent in the so-called Necker Cube, two overlapping squares in which the corners are connected by lines:

View attachment 90579
We observe the illusion of a transparent 3D cube that can skew right (down) or left (up), but it is easy to control what we see by simply choosing whether to see the right or left square as the closer face of the cube. That is, we can freely choose to make the cube skew right or left at will. (Notice that your eyes shift position when you do that, because you are choosing one square or the other as the foreground of the image.)

But is the choice of an agent free in every sense of the word? Our choice is caused by events inside our heads that we are simply unaware of. Hence, we can fulfill our goal of making the cube pop right or left, just not the desire to make it pop one way or the other. Some observer with awareness of those events would not see the making of the choice as free, because that observer lacks the perspective of the agent making the choice. To that observer, the optical illusion loses its ambiguity, because such an observer lacks the perception of alternative future outcomes. There is no optical illusion for that omniscient observer, but there is for the agent faced with a choice. We are not omniscient, so free will is a product of our role as agents facing an uncertain future made up of different imaginary outcomes. That's how I think of compatibilism.
I think the difference between physicalism and materialism in this discussion deals with substance. Materialism traditionally says everything is matter, whereas physicalism says everything is physical. With physicalism we take information and states as physical structures. I would suggest that the way physicalism identifies complex physical entities is not intuitive and could allow something like freewill to resist a reductionist argument, see for instance any discussion on “quantum mechanics.”
 

Copernicus

Industrial Strength Linguist
I think the difference between physicalism and materialism in this discussion deals with substance. Materialism traditionally says everything is matter, whereas physicalism says everything is physical. With physicalism we take information and states as physical structures. I would suggest that the way physicalism identifies complex physical entities is not intuitive and could allow something like freewill to resist a reductionist argument, see for instance any discussion on “quantum mechanics.”

That's a distinction I've seen made in people trying to defined the difference between physicalism and materialism, but I'm not convinced that the distinction is really valid. Materialists have existed for millennia, not just in the modern era, and I think that their position has been somewhat broader--that everything is material and/or physical. Modern science has arrived at a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of matter--that matter is essentially a form of energy. However, I see that as having little to do with the question of free will, which has to do with the nature of agency and control. Compatibilism is abut the definition of what we normally think of as "free will" within a causally deterministic framework.
 

Copernicus

Industrial Strength Linguist
Huh?
we were discussing 'mental health states' , and not brain activity per se.

No, you brought up the question of brain abnormalities, but the real issue here is that physical activity in brains are the cause of all mental activity, normal or abnormal. That was my point and why I suggested that your focus on mental health was basically a red herring in this discussion. Material eliminativism dismisses the reality of thought in general and free will in particular as mere illusions, and that has led hard determinists to conclude that responsibility for one's actions are also a convenient fiction.


You cannot show that mental health problems are ONLY precipitated by physical factors.
You might believe that they are, but that is only a belief.

A belief based on our ability to measure physical brain activity and correlate it with every known mental faculty. Consciousness itself is obviously a product of brain activity. If you want to believe that there are non-physical factors, then you need to explain what you mean by that and back up your belief with evidence. We know about the physical factors. Give us a reason to believe that there are any non-physical factors which have a causal influence on mental activity.


Merely saying that there is no thought without brain activity does NOT imply that 'bad thoughts' cannot precipitate a mental health problem.

If there is no mental activity in the absence of brain activity, then 'bad thoughts' would themselves be the product of physical brain activity. If brain trauma can affect mental activity while we live, then brain death almost certainly leads to the cessation of mental activity.


It works both ways .. we need a healthy mind & a healthy body .. and a problem with one of them can cause the other to deteriorate.

Is not your brain a part of your body? I know that mine is. I'm not at all sure what you think you'll find at the bottom of this rabbit hole. Maybe there is some immaterial spiritual force that interacts with brains, but nobody has detected any evidence that suggests a need to posit its existence. A conk on the head is more likely to lead to loss of consciousness than a kick in the butt.


...There may be a lot more to discuss, but without the possibility of miracles there is no Divine.

I don't see why .. it is not necessary for a Holy person to perform miracles, to teach about the Creator (Our Father).

Miracles are merely an additional 'ornament'. I don't believe in Jesus and Muhammad because they performed miracles.

Fine. Note that I never said you couldn't teach about faith in miracles and deities. I would never have assumed that you believed in Jesus and Muhammad because they were claimed to have performed miracles, although you probably believe that they received divine revelations. Such revelations would count as miracles, I think. All I said was that theology was a field of study that ultimately depended on miracles of one kind or another. If there happen to be theologists who don't believe in miracles, then they are probably better referred to as mythologists.
 
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Copernicus

Industrial Strength Linguist
You are assuming logic. Say we assume, like the Life Sciences and Evolution, we assume we live in a statistical universe. That universe says nothing is 100% deterministic. Anything can happen or not, but all have some finite odds. All choices need to be done inside a black box where the edges cannot be seen.
...

I find it tedious to plow through that wall of text when you start it out with so many questionable assumptions, and I simply don't have the time to start picking it apart to separate what makes sense to me from what doesn't. All I can say is that we have a very different understanding of what this subject is about.

I will concede that I assume logic, and I would hope that you embrace it as much as I do at some point. I know what statistics is, and I find finite mathematics generally to be a fascinating subject that I wish I had greater expertise in. Yes, we can draw a lot of interesting inferences about the nature of reality with statistics, although it is also distressingly easy to draw false conclusions from people who use statistics to impress others in internet discussion forums. I appreciate the fact that you didn't try to do that in your post.

Needless to say, I think the reality we live in may appear randomly chaotic, because it is impossible to predict the future with absolute certainty. I would prefer to think of reality as chaotically deterministic, which accounts for the fact that it is partially predictable. Since we don't know everything, we can only survive the chaos by relying on logic and reason as a means of making reasonably accurate guesses about how things will turn our. Free will--the ability to exercise willful control (within reasonable limits) over our actions--is therefore necessary for our survival.
 

muhammad_isa

Veteran Member
If you want to believe that there are non-physical factors, then you need to explain what you mean by that and back up your belief with evidence. We know about the physical factors. Give us a reason to believe that there are any non-physical factors which have a causal influence on mental activity..
You keep missing the point. We can have good thoughts and bad thoughts (negative thoughts).
It is irrelevant whether 'a thought' is only an electro-chemical signal or otherwise.

Psychology studies the mind .. not just electro-chemical process.
..but it seems like you just wish to ignore 'concept of mind', due to idealistic belief.

I would never have assumed that you believed in Jesus and Muhammad because they were claimed to have performed miracles, although you probably believe that they received divine revelations. Such revelations would count as miracles, I think..
Do you think?
Ah .. you see Revelation as a miracle.
Yes .. theology is the study of the Divine .. revelation, and that which surrounds it.
..including the history, geography of civilization(s), and of course, study of the Scriptures themselves.
 

Curious George

Veteran Member
That's a distinction I've seen made in people trying to defined the difference between physicalism and materialism, but I'm not convinced that the distinction is really valid. Materialists have existed for millennia, not just in the modern era, and I think that their position has been somewhat broader--that everything is material and/or physical. Modern science has arrived at a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of matter--that matter is essentially a form of energy. However, I see that as having little to do with the question of free will, which has to do with the nature of agency and control. Compatibilism is abut the definition of what we normally think of as "free will" within a causally deterministic framework.
I think I better understand what you are saying. I think I had misunderstood you earlier. Thank you for explaining.
 

Copernicus

Industrial Strength Linguist
You keep missing the point. We can have good thoughts and bad thoughts (negative thoughts).
It is irrelevant whether 'a thought' is only an electro-chemical signal or otherwise.

It can be irrelevant, but my philosophical position as a cognitive scientist is that free will is an emergent property of physical brain activity. That is relevant in the current discussion, because it is about the deterministic framework in which one defines what it means to possess free will. Most physical objects undergo changes that cause physical events, but minds are a type of system of physical interactions that represent agents in causal systems. That is, unlike other physical phenomena, they exercise willful control over some events. Agents are very special types of causers.


Psychology studies the mind .. not just electro-chemical process.
..but it seems like you just wish to ignore 'concept of mind', due to idealistic belief.

If you believe that, then you have completely misunderstood me. Much of my life has been very much devoted to the study of human cognition, i.e. the human mind. You are confusing me with those eliminative materialists who treat the mind as a convenient fiction, but I have been rather careful to reject that position in my posts. I am not a reductionist. It is valid to describe systems on at least two levels--in terms of the properties and interactions of the components that give rise to the system (for example, brain activity) and the higher level behavior of the system that emerges from those component behaviors (for example, mental activity). Reductionists take the position that the former is the only proper way to describe systems. To a reductionist, the whole only equals the sum of its parts and fully explains the properties of the overall system. They see no forest, just a bunch of trees.


...I would never have assumed that you believed in Jesus and Muhammad because they were claimed to have performed miracles, although you probably believe that they received divine revelations. Such revelations would count as miracles, I think..

Do you think?
Ah .. you see Revelation as a miracle.
Yes .. theology is the study of the Divine .. revelation, and that which surrounds it.
..including the history, geography of civilization(s), and of course, study of the Scriptures themselves.

Yes, of course. There's that little matter of the study of the Scriptures themselves--allegedly the product of divine revelation. Without that included in the study of history and geography of civilizations, you would just have the subjects of history and geography to deal with. No theology.
 
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muhammad_isa

Veteran Member
It can be irrelevant, but my philosophical position as a cognitive scientist is that free will is an emergent property of physical brain activity.
That seems to contradict your statement below..

If you believe that, then you have completely misunderstood me. Much of my life has been very much devoted to the study of human cognition, i.e. the human mind.
OK, but you can't blame me for thinking that, as you said "Give us a reason to believe that there are any non-physical factors which have a causal influence on mental activity."

..so, whatever you believe about "emergent properties of the physical", does the concept
of mind exist or not?
If it does, why the need to reduce it to discuss the concept, which is non-physical by definition?
 

Copernicus

Industrial Strength Linguist
That seems to contradict your statement below..


OK, but you can't blame me for thinking that, as you said "Give us a reason to believe that there are any non-physical factors which have a causal influence on mental activity."

..so, whatever you believe about "emergent properties of the physical", does the concept
of mind exist or not?
If it does, why the need to reduce it to discuss the concept, which is non-physical by definition?

Muhammad, do you understand the concept of systemic emergence? The emergent properties of H2O molecules are not fully predictable from the properties of interacting hydrogen and oxygen atoms alone. Water is an emergent property of interacting H2O molecules that is not fully predictable from the properties of those individual molecules. Salt (NaCl) has very different properties from the properties of sodium and chloride alone. Nevertheless, atoms, molecules, particles, and liquids are all physical things. Minds are physical in that sense--as an emergent property of neural activity. Nothing I have said above is contradictory. It is just that you don't see minds as emergent physical systems. Unless I mistake you, you believe in a reality that consists of two types of existence--the spiritual and the physical. I believe that what you think of as spiritual is really just another kind of emergent physical system. There is no interaction between physical and spiritual planes of existence, because it is only the physical that exists.

BTW, a major figure in cognitive science and philosophy, Daniel Dennett died today. This headline is misleading in that the editor who created it did not understand the difference between analog and digital computers. Brains are a type of analog computing device, so they don't actually run programs in the same sense that digital computers do.

Daniel Dennett, fiery atheist philosopher who saw human brains as ‘programmes’ – obituary

He regarded everything from the ‘genius’ of JS Bach to religious ideas as the product of Darwinian evolutionary processes
 
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