So substitute "in 24 hours". All words are nebulous. I can at least define precisely increments of time.
Not unless you feel it is impossible to make statements about the future. The classical answer to the question is that Aristotle's response didn't really hold but rather that statements about the future aren't truth-bearing. In other words, to define a would-be proposition like "there will be a sea-battle at 6:00 AM on 12/21/2030" as lacking truth-value.
That's one thing I've said.
Free will concerns causality. If nothing about your knowledge is capable of causally effecting what I do, than it cannot impinge upon my free will. Every action for which I am capable of exercising my "free will" (I am assuming here that "free will" isn't defined as "free of any influences all of the time" but rather closer to self-determining future states or to make choices such that at least part of your choice is caused by you) results in a future state which I have determined at least in part by exercising free will or (equivalently) by my self-caused choices.
Let us assume that there exists a strict (global) division between past and future. It therefore necessarily follows that knowledge of the future means that whatever choices I make in the future are known, and thus either that this knowledge is causally efficacious, or that I am still free to make the choices I do. Even if the results of future choices are known, I am able to make them so long as knowledge of them doesn't have any causal influence. Similarly, fixing the truth-value of statements about future choices doesn't at all limit my ability to make them.
If we assume, as is more consist with empirical findings and modern physics, that no strict (global) division between the past and present exists, then things become even easier. In both special and general relativity, there is only a strict division between past and present when causality becomes important (and actually, in GTR, not even necessarily then), and therefore locally. Thus knowledge of the future is nothing other than knowledge of the past, because everything that happens is both in the past and future.
By this logic, everything in the past is necessarily determined by the future, since we have knowledge of it. It is to mistake knowledge with what is required to limit free will: causal mechanisms. You are asserting that somehow the knowledge of my choices means it impossible for me to exercise my will when making them. THAT I will make the choices I will because I exercise my free will in doing so is compatible with your advanced knowledge of these choices (this is one form of compatabilism, so long as "determinism" is understood as including self-determined future states or self-caused future states). Your knowledge, lacking any causal efficacy, cannot and does not have any impact over my free will.
If I didn't have the choice, then something cause me to think I did. More specifically, any and all actions I made are determined by a series of causal mechanisms which I have no causal efficacy in making (if I could determine which choices I made, then I would at least in part cause my own choices, whereas if I had to make the "choices" I did, then I didn't actually choose anything because something not me caused everything which led up to and includes my "choice" as well as the resulting future states that I attribute as being in part caused by my choice). However, your writing down my choices is causally disconnected from them. Thus I am free to make choices other than those I did, all you know is the truth-value of various statements about the future, your knowledge can't influence my ability to make choices that I do not at least in part determine by being able to actually make choices, and to the extent I am fated to make these choices it is only because you know future states as if they had already happened. That is, your knowledge determines the future no more than knowledge of the past.
You aren't a truth-maker with respect to statements about the future, they just become truth-bearing and you know their value, but your knowledge makes the future no more determined or fated than if these values were unknown but still existed.
And unless are choices aren't at all self-caused or self-determined such that we can't say we exercised free will, then we are able to actually choose (exercise free will). Your asserting that mere knowledge causally effects decisions I have not made (providing you are not arguing for Laplacean determinism but rather that knowledge of my choices entails I cannot exercise my free will making them). However, you also assert that "knowing something is going to happen doesn't cause that thing to happen". Now, unless there is something about knowledge of the future that does cause the future, then knowledge of the future can't restrict my ability to exercise free will (to determine by choice future states, or to cause future states by choice).
The apparent logical incompatibility can be resolved in several ways. For example, we can suppose the error is in thinking that a being with perfect knowledge should be considered as "within" time but rather more akin to knowledge from the perspective of an entity which exists outside of time and sees everything unfolding within time statically (again, like the "box universe" model of spacetime or any ontic spacetime). Alternatively, your knowledge selects from a set of binary (true/false) values from what is really a many-valued set of truth-values (and therefore rules like the LNC and non tertium datur don't hold). Yet again, we must conclude that knowledge of the future which doesn't require Laplacean determinism and the perfect knowledge of Laplace's Intellect MUST therefore exercise causal power on future events. Or we could side with (some of) the compatibilists and conclude that there isn't any logical inconsistency or incompatibility between you knowing exactly what I will do, feel, and think in the future and my free will (that because your knowledge is vacuous and ineffective and cannot influence my free will it can't possibly constrain it, let alone negate it). These don't by any means exhaust the set of solutions (or even arguments as to why no solution is needed), but they are some examples.
