All available evidence indicates that minds are products of brains. That minds are inseparable from brains. That the mind is an algebraic sum of the many functions of the brain.
When the brain is damaged, the mind is also damaged.
So yes, minds come from brains. Where do you think they come from and why?
We know two things in the domain of science and everything else is just a speculation.
1.We know that we have no real evidence of consciousness existing without a brain.
2.We don't actually have a whole lot of evidence of consciousness existing within a brain, either.
This area is open to study and
all we know for now is that they go together and that's it.
-It could be that the relation between brain and consciousness is something akin to a TV - you definitely need one to watch.But everything that you see on it exists, for some definition of the word, even if you don't have a TV, and asking where actually resides is the wrong sort of question altogether, as is the question of where it goes when you turn the TV off.
-It could also be that it's simply an effect of a brain that's in good working order, and it's got nothing to do with anything that isn't the actual matter inside the skull.
You can put electrodes on the scalp and say whether the brain inside is conscious or not, but that doesn't actually explain what it is we're looking for; when you try to define exactly what it is, you get lost in a maze of circular definitions.
We know also that:
-We can recognise it in ourselves
-we can infer that other people have it too
-we can be quite certain that a chimpanzee has something that is, at the very least, very similar to ours, and that a rabbit has some aspects of it but maybe not the whole set, as it were.
But that is really as far as it goes.
-It could also be that it's all an illusion, but that sort of raises the question of who it is that's having the illusion in the first place, and if so, why.
You could actually read a small library of more or less popular science books on the subject, and be none the wiser.
