So I think it would help to separate witness testimony which could be considered admissible in a court as evidence whether false or true from fact and instead ask the question, "what facts support your claim" in the place of "what evidence supports your claim" so as not to invite the potentially false evidence of testimony being presented as valid where I think it can be argued that it is not such as with regard to supernatural or miracle claims.
Testimony is evidence, but not good evidence that the testimony is accurate - just that somebody said it and maybe believes it.
Here are some working definitions that I find useful: Truth is the quality that facts have in common, facts being sentences that accurately map some aspect of reality and experience (correspondence theory of truth), and knowledge is the collection of facts. The fact regarding testimony is that the claim was made, and very little else. As interobserver consensus grows, the likelihood of the claim being factual increases with it.
Also, evidence is whatever is evident to the senses. When a sensation appears in consciousness, the mind fleshes it in with associated memories and logical connections to inform us of what we are experiencing and the ramifications of that (cognitive meaning of the evidence), followed by how we feel about it (affective meaning). Thus
evidence and
evidence of are a little different, which is why I'm careful not to say, "You don't have evidence" when what I mean is that the offered evidence doesn't justify the conclusions it is said to lead to.
I guess because I'm trying to come up with a coherent approach to assessing evidence, and if testimony are evidence and miracle claims are testimony then I believe miracle claims are some sort of evidence - even if they are only fabricated evidence or evidence that is the product of delusion.
Yes, testimony is evidence, but evidence of what?
A fact is something that is known to be true. How is something known to be true? Through consensus? Through repeated observation, perhaps? But then it was known to be true for millenia, that the sun rose every morning in the east, and set every evening in the west.
The facts were and remain that the sun appears on the eastern horizon every morning as night becomes day, and the opposite happens in the west. The initial working hypothesis accounted for these observations, and there was no reason to modify it until a paradigm shift was required to account for new information. Likewise with a flat earth with edges. That idea worked fine for hunter-gatherers, but not so well for sailors. We can call an idea correct if it accurately predicts outcomes, even if it needs to be updated later. We still rely on Newtonian mechanics for mundane purposes because it works, turning to Einstein's update for special cases, where Newton can no longer be called correct for its failure to accurately predict outcomes. It's a pragmatic approach to the idea of truth that avoids the counterproductive distractions that a quest for absolute or objective truth beyond subjective experience of it entail.
Placing too much emphasis on science to resolve every question leads to the problem that science doesn't actually resolve every question.
One can't make a mistake by placing too much emphasis on science. Suppose one believed that science would eventually answer every question. He may be incorrect, but what's the harm? One can, however, put too much emphasis on faith, which answers no questions. Your complaint is generally part of a plea to accept the idea of a religious magisterium, that religion can make valuable contributions to man's fund of knowledge, which is voiced as too much reliance on science rather than what is actually is - a complaint that there is not enough respect given faith as a source of knowledge by critical thinkers.
Many faithful feel strongly that revelation of God is evidence for God. Revelation is prophetic, and subjective.
Yes, but they're faith-based thinkers, meaning that their opinions aren't meaningful to empiricists. I know exactly what people are experiencing when they say that they experience God. It's the same thing they experience when they experience beauty or value or humor. As I mentioned above, when we have an apprehension (raw, unprocessed evidence) such as a spiritual experience, we then assign it meaning. Calling it experiencing a god is guessing. I have first-hand experience with that, having guessed that way once myself, when I was a Christian. Fortunately, evidence surfaces that I was not experiencing the Holy Spirit, but rather, my own mind in the hands of a charismatic preacher, the one that led me to the altar in my late teens while in the Army, which only became apparent when I moved away following discharge and began experiencing other congregations and less gifted preachers.
There's no way to proceed with debate strictly using objective facts. Imo. I think debate is more fruitful if one introduces a claim and the opponent makes a counter claim. That way both have to defend their claims.
It's the only way to do it correctly. One must begin with common evidence or shared premises previously established using evidence properly understood and use fallacy-free reasoning to arrive at sound conclusions or it's not debate, just discussion with dissent.
Regarding your second sentence, yes, that is debate. Somebody makes a claim whether evidenced or not, and somebody who disagrees explains why it can't be correct in his opinion. Think of two attorneys debating in front of a jury. The prosecutor makes a case for guilt, say of murder. Suppose it is plausible - believable to jury beyond reasonable doubt if it can't be contradicted. The defense must provide a rebuttal - a counterargument that if correct, makes the prosecutor incorrect. If he can't or doesn't, he loses the case. Verdict: guilty. If a plausible alibi is presented, then THAT needs to be falsified, or else the verdict will be not guilty. And back and forth until one attorney makes a plausible case for guilt or doubt that the other cannot successfully rebut. But what I described is all about facts.