Five Reasons to Believe in God

[9-10ths_Penguin]

The thesis of free will matches my experience. The thesis that I do not have free will does not match my experience.

But the alternate thesis isn't just that you don't have free will; it's that you feel like you have free will even though you don't. What about your experience suggests one over the other? What experience could suggest one over the other?

I am looking at free will as the alternative to hard determinism: Determinism at wiki.

That could very well be a false dichotomy. I have a hard time accepting that our only choices are that either every event for all of human history is predetermined as an inexorable chain of cause-and-effect or we have free will. For instance, maybe things aren't deterministic but we aren't the ones determining the outcome.

How does that work in a chain of cause and effect events? You seem to agree with Autodidact that because natural systems can produce different outcomes, and that the processing that leads to that event is very complex, that this is all that we mean by choosing/choice.

I think that validly fits within the definition of "choice", but I'm open to the definition including other things... but really, I'm just trying to figure out what you mean. You seem to be referring to something more than the physical as being part of "choice"; what, exactly? What else has to be present for it to be a choice as you're defining the term?

I would call that the illusion of choice or will. There is no mover to alter the course of cause and effect events. Only a complex organic system that blindly responds to environmental input. After the fact we think that we chose.

You say "blind response", but I don't see how that's not a choice.

Just so you know where I'm coming from, I'd say that computers or even simple digital electronic circuits "choose" their outputs based on their inputs. This may not be a complex or reasoned choice, but it's still "choice".

Nor our reason.

Yes, that's in there, too. Drawing inferences from experience involves both reason and the experiences themselves.

It's one way some people conceive of God. reference: Paul Tillich - The Courage to Be.

Hmm. Exactly what does "Ground of Being" mean? How do things with souls need a "ground of being" in a way that things without souls do not?

 

[Autodidact]

While the emergent property we call mind is a property of the brain, the processes that lead to outcomes are completely dependent upon conditions that we do not choose (because we can't, because there is no we). In Autodidactism, what we call 'mind' is the emergent outcome - the process itself is mindless.

Remember, there is a we, it's just identical with those physical processes.

Sigh. I feel like we are just talking past each other at this point. Because I need to keep using some kind of term to denote whatever it is that is our self, it seems like I am separating out the I. When I am looking at the situation from the perspective of Autodidactism, I am assuming that "I/we/us/you" equates only with the physical components of our body/brain. I am following your line of reasoning, as I understand it, that we are the result of a biological process, nothing more

Sometimes you assent, sometimes not. No, we're not the RESULT of biological process, we ARE the biological process. This is an important distinction.

What emerges from that biological process we call mind and choice and will and our personality, likes, dislikes, etc.

No. The biological process is us choosing. Not emerges from. Is.

But, if it is a cause and effect process then there is no place where the course of events can be altered. There is no place where choice can occur, no mover to make that different choice. See, by saying "no mover" I am acknowledging your position that there is no other us, or unseen or magical bits.

No, you're still fighting it. You're still looking for that entity, that mover, separate from the biological processes. The mover is the biology. When all that stuff happens, that physical process, that IS us making a choice. Think of it this way: that's HOW we make a choice.

I'm not sure if you missed my question about the computer analogy. If you put all the same data into the same computer with the same wiring, does the computer choose what output it gives you?

I guess you could say so. We talk that way about computers. e.g. if you're playing chess against the computer, you say the computer chooses the next move. So that's a pretty good analogy.

If the wiring changed every time you entered data, then it would quickly become too complex to predict the outcomes, but still, if you knew the wiring, you could predict the outcome. In that case does the computer choose what output it gives you?

Yes. The process, the program plus the uh, whatever is inside my computer, chips or whatever, = the computer choosing.

Can you think of any computer, AI, Turing machine that could choose what output to give you? What would have to be different?

I would say they all do.

 

[Willamena]

But the alternate thesis isn't just that you don't have free will; it's that you feel like you have free will even though you don't. What about your experience suggests one over the other? What experience could suggest one over the other?

How does one tell the difference between having free will and feeling like one has free will? (That's "what about the experience suggests...")

 

[Autodidact]

This is from part of my discussion with 9/10ths. I follow up on it there.

See his post #243, my post #245, his post #246, and my post #250.

The long and short of it is that, so far, I have seen no compelling explanation for how a meat robot actually can make meaningful choices, yet my experience of life is that I do.

I want you to meet my internet friend, febble. I may have to search for her. This is exactly what she said, when she was a Christian similar to you. She says, when she solved the free will problem by conceiving of it differently, she became an atheist. or possibly an agnostic, don't remember for sure. I think I may have her email address.

btw, generally speaking, how stuff feels to us is not (IMO) a good indication of what's really going on. e.g. the table feels solid, but science tells me it's 99% nothing.

 

[Autodidact]

To me choice implies will and intent.

Whether the process is carried out by a computer or a brain, if, given the variables, there can only be one outcome, you have a result, not a choice. In a meat robot world "choice" is our reflection back on the event and seeing that one of multiple options was acted upon, IOW, an illusion.

Well, if the computer has enough squish, enough randomness and variability built into its program, as we do, then there could be many outcomes, and you could not predict which you would get.

 

[Willamena]

That could very well be a false dichotomy. I have a hard time accepting that our only choices are that either every event for all of human history is predetermined as an inexorable chain of cause-and-effect or we have free will. For instance, maybe things aren't deterministic but we aren't the ones determining the outcome.

Agreed. Alternately, what if things are deterministic, and we are the ones determining the outcome.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

How does one tell the difference between having free will and feeling like one has free will? (That's "what about the experience suggests...")

That's what I'm saying: I can't think of any way to tell the difference. If we need to establish that we have free will (as opposed to only feeling like we do) in order to establish that we have souls, in order to establish that God exists, then we don't even get out of the gate. No test I can think of would be able to distinguish between the two possibilities, so we don't get the result that points toward free will, and then none of the rest of the chain works.

 

[Willamena]

That's what I'm saying: I can't think of any way to tell the difference. If we need to establish that we have free will (as opposed to only feeling like we do) in order to establish that we have souls, in order to establish that God exists, then we don't even get out of the gate. No test I can think of would be able to distinguish between the two possibilities, so we don't get the result that points toward free will, and then none of the rest of the chain works.

That you look to "establish a difference" sets up a means of distinguishing between "we have free will" and "we feel like we have free will (but don't)." If there's no difference, there's no real distinction.

Edit: The free will we feel we have is the free will we have.

 

[Willamena]

That you look to "establish a difference" sets up a means of distinguishing between "we have free will" and "we feel like we have free will (but don't)." If there's no difference, there's no real distinction.

Edit: The free will we feel we have is the free will we have.

The anger that I feel I have is the anger that I have --but if I think about it, for just a second, it dissolves in recognition.

 

[Mr Spinkles]

Exactly where has will been exerted?

Why, between the ears, of course.

Can a computer, with all the same input, ever give different output?

No. But a computer which gathers input and processes it, models its environment and acts on decisions based on its calculations ... that defines "choice". It does not have to be a magical computer which disobeys the cause and effect of the universe, in order to satisfy this definition.

Can you see that this has nothing to do with how I define "choice"?

Now, do you think my definition is flawed? If so, how would you define "choice"?

 

[lunamoth]

Well, if the computer has enough squish, enough randomness and variability built into its program, as we do, then there could be many outcomes, and you could not predict which you would get.

But for each event there can be only one outcome, even if we lack the knowledge to predict it. That outcome is a result, not a choice.

[I came back to the thread tonight because I refreshed a bit on process philosophy and process theology, and wanted to reply to your other post while it was still fresh. ]

 

[lunamoth]

Remember, there is a we, it's just identical with those physical processes.


Sometimes you assent, sometimes not. No, we're not the RESULT of biological process, we ARE the biological process. This is an important distinction. No. The biological process is us choosing. Not emerges from. Is.

No, you're still fighting it. You're still looking for that entity, that mover, separate from the biological processes. The mover is the biology. When all that stuff happens, that physical process, that IS us making a choice. Think of it this way: that's HOW we make a choice.

This series of responses to my questions again makes your view sound similar to process philosophy, which is also sometimes called philosophy of the organism. If you are interested in reading more about this, here is a link: Process Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Anyway, process philosophy deals with the whole issue of will by concluding that everything has will - all of existence, every being from rocks and sponges to humans and God. In this light I can see and accept your explanation above quite easily. If you are interested in discussing process philosophy some more we could do that. I've actually been looking for a discussion partner who is interested in this topic.

I guess you could say so. We talk that way about computers. e.g. if you're playing chess against the computer, you say the computer chooses the next move. So that's a pretty good analogy.

Actually, that's not a good analogy. The computer makes a move based upon input (what moves have already been made) and its programming (computing every possible move and possibly also taking into consideration the pattern of the opponents moves to anticipate strategy), but its still all hard data input and hard wiring and one outcome. The only variation could come from some kind of intentionally inbuilt randomness factor.

Yes. The process, the program plus the uh, whatever is inside my computer, chips or whatever, = the computer choosing.

I would say they all do.

How about sponges? Do they make choices and have will?

 

[lunamoth]

But the alternate thesis isn't just that you don't have free will; it's that you feel like you have free will even though you don't. What about your experience suggests one over the other? What experience could suggest one over the other?

I'm not getting the distinction. The experience is that I feel like I am making choices. This is very real for me. Do I want to keep typing or go to bed? OK, I want to keep typing for now. That felt like a choice. But, in a deterministic material world it is merely the outcome of processes not influenced by me (because there is no me) in the least. Data in - result out.

How am I any different from a sponge? I can compute more variables, sure. Does a sponge have will?

That could very well be a false dichotomy. I have a hard time accepting that our only choices are that either every event for all of human history is predetermined as an inexorable chain of cause-and-effect or we have free will.

It probably is a false dichotomy because there are other positions such as compatibilism and indeterminism. However, it all seems to boil down to whether we are locked into a strict cause and effect (even considering that some causes may be random due to QM), or whether there is fuzziness and wiggle room where true will can be exerted. But that still requires an agent "I" to choose that is not locked into cause and effect - so biological processes do not fit the bill - they are locked into cause and effect.

For instance, maybe things aren't deterministic but we aren't the ones determining the outcome.

Then who or what is?????

I think that validly fits within the definition of "choice", but I'm open to the definition including other things... but really, I'm just trying to figure out what you mean. You seem to be referring to something more than the physical as being part of "choice"; what, exactly? What else has to be present for it to be a choice as you're defining the term?

Hmmmm. I mean that there needs to be some kind of agency and will for there to be choice, and I can't locate these in a material, deterministic world.

You say "blind response", but I don't see how that's not a choice.

Just so you know where I'm coming from, I'd say that computers or even simple digital electronic circuits "choose" their outputs based on their inputs. This may not be a complex or reasoned choice, but it's still "choice".

I guess we are using two different definitions of choice, then. What you describe as choice I think of as a result. Run the experiment or program and get a result.

Hmm. Exactly what does "Ground of Being" mean? How do things with souls need a "ground of being" in a way that things without souls do not?

The idea of Ground of Being is a whole exploration in itself. I make a connection with it and process philosophy, which is also a whole other conversation. Are you interested in learning about process philosophy and discussing it further? Short answer to your question, in process philosophy one might think of all 'things' as having souls (although, the basic unit of existence is not a material thing, but a process, and 'actual entities' are more rightly thought of as becomings).

Here is a link to give you a taste: Process Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 

[Copernicus]

Well, you agreed with my first point in your post # 187. So if you agree that it is likely that there is more to the material world 'out there' than we can sense, wouldn't it by the same token apply to the material world 'in here' (ourselves)?

Not really. We do know what we experience. All we can know is built on bodily experiences--our 'embodied minds'. That does not mean that there is nothing beyond the reach of our senses. Notice that God is detectable to us, in theory. We have alleged eyewitness accounts of miracles, encounters, etc. If God were literally inaccessible to our senses, then he would be of no interest to us and we would not be discussing his existence.

Your comment seems like a non-sequitur to what I wrote above, but, yes, certainly what we think of as virtues are twisted to evil ends (I only beat her because I love her). Let's use the idea of objective morality instead of God, just so we can avoid being confused by all of the twistings that take place because we fallible humans make religions.

That is something of a problem, unless we have a clear definition of 'objective morality'. Religious morality is not 'objective' in the sense that most people think. It is based on authority, but the source of the authority is not directly available (thanks to Divine Silence). So people come to acquire it through the alleged mediation of human sources that claim divine inspiration of some sort. In the end, the interpretation of divine authority that an individual follows depends on serendipity--that person's upbringing, beliefs, desires, and moods. What you call 'objective morality' is as subjective as it can get in actual practice.

You reject this idea (objective morality) - right? All morality is subjective.

Yes, including yours.

 

[Autodidact]

But for each event there can be only one outcome, even if we lack the knowledge to predict it. That outcome is a result, not a choice.

I'm not following you. There is always only one outcome for any event. (except quantum events.)

Can't a choice be a result?

 

[lunamoth]

I'm not following you. There is always only one outcome for any event. (except quantum events.)

Can't a choice be a result?

It can be if there is free will, so one needs to either explain how we have free will (freedom from the chains of cause and effect), or claim their faith in it. Otherwise an outcome is a result that sometimes has the illusion of being a choice.

 

[Copernicus]

It can be if there is free will, so one needs to either explain how we have free will (freedom from the chains of cause and effect), or claim their faith in it. Otherwise an outcome is a result that sometimes has the illusion of being a choice.

It is impossible for me to imagine what you could mean by "freedom from the chains of cause and effect". How can you make a choice without having a goal drive that choice? For example, you can choose to lose weight or not, but your decision depends on how much you desire to cut down on calorie intake. That desire, in turn, depends on how bad you feel about your appearance. That desire, in turn, may depend on comments that people make and how much TV advertisement you are exposed to. And so on. In what sense could anyone ever be free of the "causal chain"? We still have the free will to do what we want. We just cannot really choose to live in a different reality.

 

[lunamoth]

It is impossible for me to imagine what you could mean by "freedom from the chains of cause and effect". How can you make a choice without having a goal drive that choice? For example, you can choose to lose weight or not, but your decision depends on how much you desire to cut down on calorie intake. That desire, in turn, depends on how bad you feel about your appearance. That desire, in turn, may depend on comments that people make and how much TV advertisement you are exposed to. And so on. In what sense could anyone ever be free of the "causal chain"? We still have the free will to do what we want. We just cannot really choose to live in a different reality.

What (in the system you describe above) is free?

PS - Belated Happy Birthday!

 

[Autodidact]

It can be if there is free will, so one needs to either explain how we have free will (freedom from the chains of cause and effect), or claim their faith in it. Otherwise an outcome is a result that sometimes has the illusion of being a choice.

I'm going to question whether free will = freedom from the chains of cause and effect. If that is what it means, then I deny it exists. How can we ever get away from cause and effect?

So I was reading about Watson, the computer. Watson plays Jeopardy against human opponents. Say the answer to the question is, "Thomas Edison," and Watson gives it in 3.4 seconds and Ken Jennings in 3.5 seconds. How is Watson choosing that answer different from Ken Jennings choosing it?

Also, how does the existence of an invisible super-powerful magical person make free will any more (or less, for that matter) likely?

 

[Copernicus]

What (in the system you describe above) is free?

Your ability to fulfill your greatest desire (which is not something that can be consciously chosen). If someone deprived you of food, and that caused you to lose weight despite your greater desire to satisfy your hunger, then you would lack freedom of choice with respect to what you would most like to do. You would lack the freedom of choice to guide your behavior in the direction you most want. Free will can only ever mean anything with respect to specific choices in the face of competing desires.

The fact that you do not have enough money to buy an ocean liner restricts your free will in a sense. If you were obsessed with purchasing an ocean liner, you might feel frustrated, but that is not exactly what we mean by "free will". Free will is the ability to choose between buying an item or not buying one, given that you can afford the item. It is never a random (acausal) event. Your competing desires will ultimately determine the choice you make. Hence, you must calculate what will bring about the outcome you most desire.

PS - Belated Happy Birthday!

Thanks!