I think that "the ability to choose" isn't quite right, because it doesn't capture the idea of desiring one option over another. I'd personally define "will" as something more like "the ability to formulate goals and work toward them."It is not my intention to confuse the language, and I apologize if it seems that way. I don't think the point is conflicted. We can use a different word, maybe compelled seems less manipulative. But, the overall point is that, as far as will goes, somehow one dominant desire rises to the top and becomes the only possible will. And this is not, at this point, a rational process.
If you have a definition of will that you prefer we can go with that. I think we need to agree on a definition of will, and also free will if you see that as different, before we proceed. As I said in another post, if you are content with 'the ability to choose' as the complete definition of will, then we can't go any further.
Yes, I think it is rational.This is fine - our ethics are a useful social construct not dependent upon free will. This also implies, I think, that agents (people) have moral responsibility even when they have no ability to do otherwise. The free will defense has never gotten anybody out of jail!
Is this rational, or just 'reasonable' because it is what works?
But I think that whether belief in God is reasonable comes down to evidence, because it's really a matter of two questions:As I said previously, I am exploring why it is reasonable to believe in God (at least as reasonable as the alternatives). You seem to be asking for empirical evidence (as demonstrated for your request for testable hypotheses in order to be convinces). I don't have that. There is another thread for evidence for God. I believe my entry was 'chocolate.'
- is the belief compatible with what we know? Has the belief been refuted?
- does what we know suggest or point to the belief?
I think both are necessary for a belief to be reasonable. If a belief fails that first test, then it's not reasonable. However, that test by itself isn't enough, as Russell's Teapot demonstrates: there's no way to refute the claim that there's a teapot in orbit between the Earth and Mars, but (and hopefully you'll agree) belief in that teapot isn't reasonable. We need to meet the second test as well.
I'm not sure if "possible" is the right word, because conceivably, someone smart enough could come up with some sort of thinking entity that isn't subject to our biological constraints... but no, I don't think humans have free will, at least in the sense I think you're using the term.OK! That actually looks to me like a pretty clear position - you do not think free will is possible.
I guess that works, but I'm not really sure where you're going with this. I didn't think it was exactly earth-shattering to suggest that creatures that aren't necessarily rational do seem to want things and work toward acheiving those things they want.Not trying to put words in your mouth, just trying to make sure I understand your point. You seem to say that will is separate from reason, and reason (if present) acts after will arises, or acts on the products that will puts forth and picks the 'best' one. And that when reason is present (in a human, as opposed to a sponge), reason may be more or less faulty, resulting in better or worse choices. If I am not getting you correctly I would be happy to work from your explanation.
If you don't need it for your argument/discussion, it's probably better to put it aside.We'd need to discuss process philosophy to get into that. I'm happy to put that aside or we can start a different thread.