Free Will Vs Determinism

[Straw Dog]

Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible, it isn't really a middle ground, it's a more rational notion of what "free will" means.



If everything (internal to the mind as well as external) were exactly the same and the outcome could have been different then difference cannot be for any reason (all the reasons are the same), the only difference must be entirely random.



"Conscious overrule" is logically meaningless. Either the "overrule" is entirely due to its antecedents or it is, to some extent, random. Consciousness makes no logical difference to anything.



This I agree with.

I can dig it. Thanks for helping me to clarify my thinking on this subject. We both agree that hard determinism is false I think.

Free will can be rationally clarified in such a way that it still facilitates self-determination (a degree of control over one’s own life) and personal responsibility.

 

[Straw Dog]

Let’s try a thought experiment...

Anyone...

Imagine that you are put on trial for first-degree murder. It was premeditated. You planned everything out for months in detail.

Now imagine trying to plead innocent by way of bad luck. Blame your genes, blame your parents, blame your environment, blame brain freeze from eating too much ice cream too fast... at what point do these evasion tactics become absurd?

At what point does internal self-organization make us responsible for our external actions?

 

[Skwim]

Let’s try a thought experiment...

Anyone...

Imagine that you are put on trial for first-degree murder. It was premeditated. You planned everything out for months in detail.

Now imagine trying to plead innocent by way of bad luck. Blame your genes, blame your parents, blame your environment, blame brain freeze from eating too much ice cream too fast... at what point do these evasion tactics become absurd?

They don't because all played a part in who you were at the time you killed that someone.

At what point does internal self-organization make us responsible for our external actions?

It doesn't. Any "internal self-organization" arose to be what it is because it can be no different. In order to be different there would have to be some different causal effect that made it so.

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[Straw Dog]

They don't because all played a part in who you were at the time you killed that someone.


It doesn't. Any "internal self-organization" arose to be what it is because it can be no different. In order to be different there would have to be some different causal effect that made it so.

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Some cause-effect relationships are internal feedback loops, like the effects become original causes within a self-organizing system. It’s not a linear line. In this way, we can alter our own programming to a degree. It’s self-determinism.

Do you reject any form of compatibilism then?

 

[Willamena]

Some cause-effect relationships are internal feedback loops, like the effects become original causes within a self-organizing system. It’s not a linear line. In this way, we can alter our own programming to a degree. It’s self-determinism.

Do you reject any form of compatibilism then?

He rejects the concept of responsibility.

 

[osgart]

This whole debate is mostly opinion. A lot of claims and no relevant facts.

Personally I would have to say that free will is real when realized by the individual.

I mean define the freedom in question.

There is no doubt about the fact that humans have will.

Freedom to do otherwise then what one has done can never be proved out or in.

Personally I accept that I am an 'I'. That is my self established reality. My self established reality is that virtue is freedom, and vice is slavery. I have the freedom to choose between virtue and vice. This is a reality I recognize and accept.

If people have no free will then it is because they fail to see the freedoms to choose from in reality. Not every choice is a biological choice. There are spiritual choices to make.

 

[Straw Dog]

He rejects the concept of responsibility.

I’m glad someone sees where I’m going with this. It’s kind of a chicken and the egg scenario between which concept was rejected first.

 

[Straw Dog]

If everything (internal to the mind as well as external) were exactly the same and the outcome could have been different then difference cannot be for any reason (all the reasons are the same), the only difference must be entirely random.

I think the reason I’m underwhelmed by the argument against ‘could have done otherwise’ is because it’s like saying, if everything was exactly the same then the outcome would be exactly the same. That doesn’t tell us anything, really, and we can’t test it.

Let’s say that another similar situation arises. We’ll call it situation B. All of the external circumstances are the same as situation A.

The genes are the same. The environment is the same. The social and cultural pressures are the same. The events are playing out in the same sequence. The only variable is the internal processing. That’s what makes a difference in terms of agency.

We could act differently in situation B than we did in situation A. We could utilize creative problem solving, or lateral thinking, rather than just linear thinking. We could learn from situation A and alter our programming for situation B.

 

[Skwim]

Some cause-effect relationships are internal feedback loops, like the effects become original causes within a self-organizing system. It’s not a linear line. In this way, we can alter our own programming to a degree. It’s self-determinism.

I grant you that internal feedback loops within a self-organizing system is an interesting concept, but considering that this would have to remain a completely closed systems, what evidence do you have that such a thing could exist? That nothing could impinge on the elements of the loop and destroy it? Nope, I see no reason, other than psychological need, to even suppose it exists.

Do you reject any form of compatibilism then?

I do. Compatibilism is a desperate "yes but" attempt to save human freewill. Thing is, I've yet to see any version of compatiblism in which the freewill element survives the "how" question. "How does freewill act X arise? If there is no cause then the act has to be utterly random---it could just as well not occur as occur. And if there is a cause how did that cause arise? From Y, you say? then how did Y arise? and so on. . . . . . . " Each effect the result of a specific cause, and if that cause or another one quite like it doesn't appear then it's extremely unlikely event X will ever appear.


Now, if you truly feel there's merit in compatiblism I invite you to make your case.



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[ratiocinator]

Let’s say that another similar situation arises. We’ll call it situation B. All of the external circumstances are the same as situation A.

The genes are the same. The environment is the same. The social and cultural pressures are the same. The events are playing out in the same sequence. The only variable is the internal processing. That’s what makes a difference in terms of agency.

So why would the internal processing be different? Either because of some reason or it must be random. If the person's entire life was exactly the same in every single detail (which would be going back to the "rewind time" scenario), then the difference can only be random. If there was some difference in the past (no matter how small) then the reasons are either because of the differences or, again, they must be random.

 

[ratiocinator]

Now, if you truly feel there's merit in compatiblism I invite you to make your case.

The merit is that we are actually free to do as we want (practical constrains aside) - it's just that we haven't chosen our own personality, which would be nonsensical anyway. It's the only meaning of the term "free will" that is even self-consistent.

Much has been written about it, notably by Daniel Dennett (Freedom Evolves and Elbow Room) - his writing actually changed my mind on the subject.

 

[ratiocinator]

At what point does internal self-organization make us responsible for our external actions?

Responsibility is a construct of society. If we commit a premeditated crime and are a normal, functioning human being, we actually are the person who decided to commit said crime and society has to deal with us accordingly.

Responsibility exists for all practical purposes and from a human point of view. The god-like view of being able to see all the reasons why we came to be that person is unavailable to us and simply irrelevant, except from an abstract philosophical point of view (although it does make nonsense of the idea of an omnipotent, omniscient creator holding us responsible).

 

[Skwim]

The merit is that we are actually free to do as we want (practical constrains aside) - it's just that we haven't chosen our own personality, which would be nonsensical anyway. It's the only meaning of the term "free will" that is even self-consistent.

My mistake in not making it clear that the merit I'm speaking of is in that of a supporting argument. If you truly believe in determinism, the theory that all events, including moral choices, are completely determined by previously existing causes, how do you insert freewill into it?

And as I requested, I'm looking for a case (argument) to be made for it (compatiblism).


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[ratiocinator]

My mistake in not making it clear that the merit I'm speaking of is in that of a supporting argument. If you truly believe in determinism, the theory that all events, including moral choices, are completely determined by previously existing causes, how do you insert freewill into it?

And as I requested, I'm looking for a case (argument) to be made for it (compatiblism).

An argument for what? You seem to want me to support the idea that a fundamentally self-contradictory definition of "fee will" can exist in reality - which it obviously can't. Compatibilism is about a more rational definition of "free will" - specifically that it means that we are actually free to do what we want to do. If you think that determinism somehow contradicts that, then please explain how.

 

[Cooky]

An interesting talk:

 

[Skwim]

An argument for what? You seem to want me to support the idea that a fundamentally self-contradictory definition of "fee will" can exist in reality - which it obviously can't. Compatibilism is about a more rational definition of "free will" - specifically that it means that we are actually free to do what we want to do. If you think that determinism somehow contradicts that, then please explain how.

Actually it isn't. Simply look it up.

Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent.
Source: Wikipedia


Compatibilism, Thesis that free will, in the sense required for moral responsibility, is consistent with universal causal determinism.
Source Encyclopedia Britannica


Compatibilists argue that determinism is compatible with human freedom, and that indeterminism is not compatible or at best incoherent. They feel (correctly) that there must be a deterministic or causal connection between our will and our actions. This allows us to take responsibility for our actions, including credit for the good and blame for the bad.
Source: The Information Philosopher


Compatibilism is the theory that we can be both caused and free.
Source: Philosophy Now


The question at the end of the preceding section (Could we have free will even if determinism is true?) is a helpful way to differentiate the main positions regarding free will. Compatibilists answer this question in the affirmative. They believe that agents could have free will even if causal determinism is true (or even if near determinism is true.
source: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy


Compatibilism is the idea that there is no conflict between determinism and free will.
Source: Specter of Reason


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So, rather than addressing a definition of freewill, compatibilism tries to reconcile freewill with determinism---it takes determinism as a given. Now some compatibilists may resort to redefining "freewill" in order to to make it work within a deterministic world, but this is not only philosophically dishonest, but almost laughable.

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[Straw Dog]

I grant you that internal feedback loops within a self-organizing system is an interesting concept, but considering that this would have to remain a completely closed systems, what evidence do you have that such a thing could exist? That nothing could impinge on the elements of the loop and destroy it? Nope, I see no reason, other than psychological need, to even suppose it exists.

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I’m not just describing an interesting concept. I’m describing the self-organizing behavior of organic lifeforms and neural networks. This internal spontaneous order is amplified by positive feedback and doesn’t need any control from an external agent, even if it may still be subject to it.

It doesn’t have to be a completely closed system in order to attribute authorship to its actions, unless one is inclined to demand an impossible criteria for authorship of our actions.

 

[Straw Dog]

So why would the internal processing be different? Either because of some reason or it must be random. If the person's entire life was exactly the same in every single detail (which would be going back to the "rewind time" scenario), then the difference can only be random. If there was some difference in the past (no matter how small) then the reasons are either because of the differences or, again, they must be random.

It’s not random. It’s just spontaneous, occurring without external cause or stimulus. There’s a difference.

 

[Skwim]

I’m not just describing an interesting concept. I’m describing the self-organizing behavior of organic lifeforms and neural networks.

The internal feedback loops within a self-organizing system you described is nothing like any self-organizing behavior organic lifeforms and neural networks I've ever heard of. How about an example or two so we're on the same page

This internal spontaneous order is amplified by positive feedback and doesn’t need any control from an external agent, even if it may still be subject to it.

Where does this spontaneity come from? Like everything else, it too must have a cause.

It doesn’t have to be a completely closed system in order to attribute authorship to its actions, unless one is inclined to demand an impossible criteria for authorship of our actions.

Which means this "authorship" would be identical to cause. Correct? So right away your internal feedback loops are at the mercy of determinism, which pretty much blows away any chance for the freewill component of compatabilism.

Some cause-effect relationships are internal feedback loops, like the effects become original causes within a self-organizing system. It’s not a linear line. In this way, we can alter our own programming to a degree. It’s self-determinism.

I certainly hope you're not equating self-determinism with free will.

 

[Straw Dog]

The internal feedback loops within a self-organizing system you described is nothing like any self-organizing behavior organic lifeforms and neural networks I've ever heard of. How about an example or two so we're on the same page


Where does this spontaneity come from? Like everything else, it too must have a cause.

Which means this "authorship" would be identical to cause. Correct? So right away your internal feedback loops are at the mercy of determinism, which pretty much blows away any chance for the freewill component of compatabilism

I certainly hope you're not equating self-determinism with free will.

Gotta give me some points for trying. I’m not writing a thesis for graduate school here. I’m just having a conversation with other people seeking their own self-determination.

This internal self-organization isn’t at the ‘mercy’ of determinism. It’s a product of it. I agree that ultimate reason rests within the endless chain of causality, but that doesn’t erase the context of independent action. There’s a nuance in awareness happening here, such that the concept of responsibility still makes sense within the context of determinism.

Are we just passive observers?

Or are we active participants?

I think the confusion in this conversation occurs along the line of identification.