Free Will Vs Determinism

[atanu]

At this stage I will like to ask “Free will for whom?”

Does @Skwim or other determinists believe that determinism works exactly same for an ant, a criminal, an Einstein, and the Buddha? Or that there is some factor that can create more freedom for some?
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[ZenMonkey]

Several years ago, eight to be exact, I posted my reason for dismissing the idea of free will and adopting hard determinism. Because the topic of free will vs determinism hasn't been discussed in some time and a lot of newcomers have come on board RF I thought I'd bring it up again. The following is taken from my original post.



Discussions about free will usually center around an affirmation and/or a denunciation of it. Very interesting thoughts on both sides have come out of such conversations, many well thought out, others not so much. Whatever the case, there's frequently been a problem with what is meant by "will" and "free will," so much so that the issue can quickly become mired in misunderstanding. To avoid this I've found the following definitions to be on point and helpful.

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.

Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences.


The notion of free will is important to many because without it would mean each of us is nothing more than an automaton, a machine that performs a function according to a predetermined set of instructions, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If people lack freedom of choice how can they be blamed for what they do, or be deserving of any praise laid on them? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given.

Any exception to free will is regarded as temporary constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes and prevents it. Of course this isn't what the free will issue is about at all. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think another valid way way of looking at free will is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished. "I got a haircut yesterday, but I could just as well have had a hot dog instead."

Those who most ardently disagree with this are the hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused we could not have done differently---no, you could not have chosen to have a hot dog--- therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic question: Are we free to do other than what we chose or not? I say, No you are not. Free will is an illusion. But before going into why, we first need to get rid of the term "choice" because it assumes to be true the condition under consideration, freedom to do what we want. So no use of "choice" or any of its cognates.


Here's how I see it.

There are only two ways actions can take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely randomly" I mean absolutely and utterly random, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land, it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, has been suggested to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on super-atomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway, completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that easily negate randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless at least one of the causal determinants leading up to the event in question had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with our decisions. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.

What does this all mean then? It means that we can never do any any differently other than what we are caused to do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and intervening outside events (also causes) and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it is. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, free will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..

This means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course, we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints,but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .

This, then, is my argument---a bit shortened to keep it brief---against free will as it stands in opposition to determinism.

Thoughts?

I didn't read the entire post, but I'm more of a determinist than not ... I don't think it can be any other way. Life, we're subject to life. That's the crux of it. We have our likes dislikes preferences and whatnot, but we are subject to what is and based on what is we make our choices. We choose, but it's only a choice based on what is. So yeah, I'm a determinist.

 

[Skwim]

I didn't read the entire post, but I'm more of a determinist than not ... I don't think it can be any other way. Life, we're subject to life. That's the crux of it. We have our likes dislikes preferences and whatnot, but we are subject to what is and based on what is we make our choices. We choose, but it's only a choice based on what is. So yeah, I'm a determinist.

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[Straw Dog]

I’ve been on the fence about this subject for awhile, but have recently come to the conclusion that hard determinism is more coherent than a belief in free will. I also think it has better moral implications, but that may be a different topic.

The arguments put forth already are compelling on both sides. I have a simplified argument I’ve been contemplating today:

Most decisions are determined by our desires and we can’t choose what we desire in the first place, ergo free will is an illusion.

For example, let’s say we have two desires: 1) to eat chocolate cake and 2) to lose weight. We didn’t choose to want these things. We just do.

The process of being consciously aware of these conflicting desires creates the illusion of free will. We think that we’re freely choosing between them, but the choice ultimately depends upon which way the balance of probability swings. We “choose” what we desire most in that moment.

 

[Skwim]

I’ve been on the fence about this subject for awhile, but have recently come to the conclusion that hard determinism is more coherent than a belief in free will. I also think it has better moral implications, but that may be a different topic.

The arguments put forth already are compelling on both sides. I have a simplified argument I’ve been contemplating today:

Most decisions are determined by our desires and we can’t choose what we desire in the first place, ergo free will is an illusion.

You're absolutely right. There is no such thing as choosing, and free will is an illusion. And like everything else, our desires are also determined,

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[Straw Dog]

You're absolutely right. There is no such thing as choosing, and free will is an illusion. And like everything else, our desires are also determined,

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In that case, “I” am not right because there is no “I” to feel proud about being right. Leaking into the moral implications...

Pride itself doesn’t make any real sense nor does shame. These toxic emotions are products of an isolated egocentric moral agency that doesn’t map onto reality in any practical sense.

 

[Skwim]

In that case, “I” am not right because there is no “I” to feel proud about being right. Leaking into the moral implications...

Well, there will always be "I," the self. And, of course, even though morals are artificial constructs we all believe in them---only because we don't have the choice not to.

Pride itself doesn’t make any real sense nor does shame.

No they don't,

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[Straw Dog]

Well, there will always be "I," the self. And, of course, even though morals are artificial constructs we all believe in them---only because we don't have the choice not to.

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Conscious awareness of the process does create an internal feedback loop that changes the necessity of belief in certain artificial constructs.

If a carpenter finds or invents better tools for crafting his work, he will use them.

 

[Skwim]

Conscious awareness of the process does create an internal feedback loop that changes the necessity of belief in certain artificial constructs.

Part of the reason anyway.

If a carpenter finds or invents better tools for crafting his work, he will use them.

And why would he find or invent them? Because he had to. The deterministic processes of cause/effect would insure he will.

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[Straw Dog]

And why would he find or invent them? Because he had to. The deterministic processes of cause/effect would insure he will.

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Of course. We’re in complete agreement about the deterministic nature of reality. Nothing is freely happening within an ‘isolated individual’.

These thoughts are just exploring the ultimate moral implications of such a paradigm shift in popular social thinking. Emotional extremes like pride, shame, anger, and retribution make less sense. Other emotional attitudes like gratitude and compassion make more sense.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

There are only two ways actions can take place; completely randomly, or caused.

The entire argument rests on this premise, and it is false. Not just because it is grounded in two notions that are ill-defined separately and more so together (randomness can be caused; "completely random" can be opposed either to the kind of pseudorandomness of RNGs as opposed to actual RNGs, both of which are basically determilnistic, or to the application of statistical operators and the like the basic dynamical equations of physics which are of necessity otherwise deterministic because they are equations; a completely random event can be both entirely deterministic and have a known cause simply by defining the appropriate probability triple whence comes the space of all random variables; etc.).
Rather, it is simply a false dichotomy. I was happy to find this addressed in a rather elementary intro to quantum computing:
"the glaring fallacy in the argument lies in the implication Not Determined ⇒ Random. If that were correct, then we couldn’t have complexity classes like NP – we could only have BPP. The word “random” means something specific: it means you have a probability distribution over the possible choices. In computer science, we’re able to talk perfectly coherently about things that are nondeterministic, but not random." (pp. 291-292)
Aaronson, S. (2013). Quantum Computing Since Democritus. Cambridge University Press.
In the sciences in general, including the natural sciences, "randomness" has various uses including to refer to the basic, fundamental, and essential aspect of all empirical sciences: the freedom of CHOICE that the experimenter has. In clinical trials, in testing material samples, in determining the properties of elementary particles, etc., a foundational assumption throughout all science is that the ability to generalize from the results of a specific experiment to e.g., electrons in general or to chemical properties of some compound is justified because had the experimenter so desired, s/he could have tested another sample (or assigned the test vs. control conditions differently). The "at random" phrase found throughout the clinical literature has analogues throughout the sciences because it is precisely the assumption that the experimenter had the ability to choose to perform the experiment with a different sample of some population that allows the generalization from the sample to the population and therefore what makes sampling and populations and science possible (not to mention the ability to say more than that the results were not only limited to whatever was tested, but to those specific tests on that day in that location because the results were determined by hidden variables that predetermine all empirical results negating any claims of any possiblity for empirical inference).

There are instances of physical situations that, if governed entirely by simple Newtonian laws, are deterministic in that they are governed by deterministic equations but which are not actually uniquely determined because there are points in the "trajectories" of the "solution space" that allow for more than one outcome. But there is no randomness.
Of course, as these equations only apply to closed systems (which goes back again to the basic necessity for any empirical science- in order to perform experiments we must in some sense be able to seperate something being experimented with not only from the rest of the universe but from ourselves as observers), and the universe isn't one. Neither are we, for that matter.
Then there is the fact that determinism requires no causation at all. It is an entirely separate notion, particularly when it comes to so-called "laws of physics". Newton himself regarded the fundamental gravitational force determining the outcome of systems' behavior as acausal or a blackbox. There are all manner of ways, both physical and mathematical, to have a determined system without any causes at all. The notion that every cause has an effect predates the ability to even define a notion of determinism by some ~1,600 years as it relates specifications of initial conditions to future states.

As the entire premise is completely ill-founded and ill-defined not to mention unjustified, and as if true it negates the whole of the scientific enterprise as anything other than so-far a miraculous success that was fated to be true despite having no logical basis, I don't see any reason to treat is as anything more than what it is: a claim without basis or much in the way of definitions either.

 

[Skwim]

The entire argument rests on this premise, and it is false. Not just because it is grounded in two notions that are ill-defined separately and more so together (randomness can be caused; "completely random" can be opposed either to the kind of pseudorandomness of RNGs as opposed to actual RNGs, both of which are basically determilnistic, or to the application of statistical operators and the like the basic dynamical equations of physics which are of necessity otherwise deterministic because they are equations; a completely random event can be both entirely deterministic and have a known cause simply by defining the appropriate probability triple whence comes the space of all random variables; etc.).
Rather, it is simply a false dichotomy. I was happy to find this addressed in a rather elementary intro to quantum computing:
"the glaring fallacy in the argument lies in the implication Not Determined ⇒ Random. If that were correct, then we couldn’t have complexity classes like NP – we could only have BPP. The word “random” means something specific: it means you have a probability distribution over the possible choices. In computer science, we’re able to talk perfectly coherently about things that are nondeterministic, but not random." (pp. 291-292)
Aaronson, S. (2013). Quantum Computing Since Democritus. Cambridge University Press.
In the sciences in general, including the natural sciences, "randomness" has various uses including to refer to the basic, fundamental, and essential aspect of all empirical sciences: the freedom of CHOICE that the experimenter has. In clinical trials, in testing material samples, in determining the properties of elementary particles, etc., a foundational assumption throughout all science is that the ability to generalize from the results of a specific experiment to e.g., electrons in general or to chemical properties of some compound is justified because had the experimenter so desired, s/he could have tested another sample (or assigned the test vs. control conditions differently). The "at random" phrase found throughout the clinical literature has analogues throughout the sciences because it is precisely the assumption that the experimenter had the ability to choose to perform the experiment with a different sample of some population that allows the generalization from the sample to the population and therefore what makes sampling and populations and science possible (not to mention the ability to say more than that the results were not only limited to whatever was tested, but to those specific tests on that day in that location because the results were determined by hidden variables that predetermine all empirical results negating any claims of any possiblity for empirical inference).

There are instances of physical situations that, if governed entirely by simple Newtonian laws, are deterministic in that they are governed by deterministic equations but which are not actually uniquely determined because there are points in the "trajectories" of the "solution space" that allow for more than one outcome. But there is no randomness.
Of course, as these equations only apply to closed systems (which goes back again to the basic necessity for any empirical science- in order to perform experiments we must in some sense be able to seperate something being experimented with not only from the rest of the universe but from ourselves as observers), and the universe isn't one. Neither are we, for that matter.
Then there is the fact that determinism requires no causation at all. It is an entirely separate notion, particularly when it comes to so-called "laws of physics". Newton himself regarded the fundamental gravitational force determining the outcome of systems' behavior as acausal or a blackbox. There are all manner of ways, both physical and mathematical, to have a determined system without any causes at all. The notion that every cause has an effect predates the ability to even define a notion of determinism by some ~1,600 years as it relates specifications of initial conditions to future states.

As the entire premise is completely ill-founded and ill-defined not to mention unjustified, and as if true it negates the whole of the scientific enterprise as anything other than so-far a miraculous success that was fated to be true despite having no logical basis, I don't see any reason to treat is as anything more than what it is: a claim without basis or much in the way of definitions either.

Far past my knowledge of computational complexity theory to grasp, and to tell the truth, I don't think we're even on the same page, but thank you anyway for your effort. However, I do find a couple of remarks worth mentioning.

"There are instances of physical situations that, if governed entirely by simple Newtonian laws, are deterministic in that they are governed by deterministic equations but which are not actually uniquely determined because there are points in the "trajectories" of the "solution space" that allow for more than one outcome. But there is no randomness."​

I agree, There is no such a thing as true randomness; that something can happen for utterly no reason whatsoever. Not even at the subatomic level. And . . .

"Then there is the fact that determinism requires no causation at all."
​

Not sure what you're calling "determinism" because the word typically refers to the philosophical doctrine that all events, including those of humans, are ultimately causally determined. Paraphrased, your remark might read

"Then there is the fact that the doctrine requires no causation at all."
​

Which, to be sure, is a very odd claim.





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[LegionOnomaMoi]

Not sure what you're calling "determinism" because the word typically refers to the philosophical doctrine that all events, including those of humans, are ultimately causally determined.

The point is that this philosophical doctrine is not actually much of a philosophical doctrine insofar as it conflates a simplistic Aristotelian causality with the kind of physical determinism we get from differential equations corresponding to physical laws.
There are several problems. The first is that determinism is usually presented as some kind of Laplace-like view of the universe:
“We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and as the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary positions of all things in the universe, would be able to comprehend in one single formula the motions of the largest bodies as well as the lightest atoms in the world, provided that its intellect were sufficiently powerful to subject all data to analysis; to it nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the past would be present to its eyes."
The problem is first that such a deterministic universe doesn't allow for directionality in terms of time (one can run the system "forward" or "backward" or reverse the names of either direction by e.g., assigning "initial conditions" to a later point and "evolving forward" using the same governing equations to reach past states). Cause/effect of the kind you refer to absolutely requires this directionality (causes must precede effects and nothing that is an effect B of some cause A can precede A). Hence the inability of Laplace's "intellect" or "intelligence" to distinguish past from future. A related problem is that such a universe is only a deterministic one to a being that is external to it. Simply positing that, theoretically, one can view the current, past, and future states of the universe as functions of some set of equations of state parametrized by time gives us a functional relationship or equation(s), but little else:
"It follows that, theoretically, the whole state of the material universe at time t must be capable of being exhibited as a function of t. Hence our universe will be deterministic in the sense defined above. But if this be true, no information is conveyed about the universe in stating that it is deterministic."
Russell, B.: (1953), "On the Notion of Cause with Applications to the Free-Will Problem," in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, (1953).

The biggest issue, however, with this conflation of determinism of the type that would see all future states as determined given some initial conditions is that at best causality enters into the would-be doctrine as an afterthought that doesn't fit well and at worst as entirely superfluous or even nonsensical. Earman spends a bit of time in his excellent philosophical treatise on determinism on just why it is that the notion of causality should be considered independently of and as a source of confusion regarding determinism:
"Perhaps the most venerable of all the philosophical definitions holds that the world is deterministic just in case every event has a cause. The most immediate objection to this approach is that it seeks to explain a vague concept - determinism - in terms of a truly obscure one - causation...A related objection concerns the lack of a perspicuous connection between the causation definition and James' sense of determinism [Note: James’ sense as quoted by author: 'What does determinism profess? It professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilites hidden in its womb: the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality. Any other future complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible. The whole is in each and every part, and welds it with the rest into an absolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be no equivocation or shadow of turning. (1956, p. 150)']. In one direction the connection can be made tight: if the world displays Jamesian determinism then the "Every event has a cause" can be vouchsafed by taking (as Laplace suggested -see below) the state of the world at any moment as the cause of the state to follow. But in the other direction the connection is obscure: How does it follow as a result of every event's having a cause that the future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb? Perhaps the cause-effect relation can be explained in such a way that this implication becomes transparent; but it is that explanation we want and not the evocative but obscure formula "Every event has a cause." There is a reasonably precise explanation of cause-effect in terms of a causal chain or signal, i.e., the propagation of a disturbance, say, in the form of the continuous transmission of a quantity of mass or energy through space; but this explanation does not yield the desired result. Imagine a materialistic world consisting of massive particles whose trajectories are straight lines except where the trajectories happen to intersect. Every interesting event or happening in this world is a happening to a particle, viz .. a change of position, a collision, etc. And every such event has a cause in terms of the earlier events on the causal chain or chains on which it lies. Yet this world may or may not be deterministic in James' sense; for it seems consistent with the description I have given that many future complements are compatible with the present state of this world."
Earman, J. (1986). A Primer on Determinism. (University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science Vol. 32). D. Reidel Publishing Co.

 

[Skwim]

There are several problems. The first is that determinism is usually presented as some kind of Laplace-like view of the universe:
“We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and as the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary positions of all things in the universe, would be able to comprehend in one single formula the motions of the largest bodies as well as the lightest atoms in the world, provided that its intellect were sufficiently powerful to subject all data to analysis; to it nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the past would be present to its eyes."

So why is this a problem?

The problem is first that such a deterministic universe doesn't allow for directionality in terms of time (one can run the system "forward" or "backward" or reverse the names of either direction by e.g., assigning "initial conditions" to a later point and "evolving forward" using the same governing equations to reach past states).

Yup, our universe only runs in one direction, toward disorder, so there is no running the system "forward" or "backward." It only does run in one direction. If it ran backward it would be a wholly other universe.

Cause/effect of the kind you refer to absolutely requires this directionality (causes must precede effects and nothing that is an effect B of some cause A can precede A). Hence the inability of Laplace's "intellect" or "intelligence" to distinguish past from future. A related problem is that such a universe is only a deterministic one to a being that is external to it. Simply positing that, theoretically, one can view the current, past, and future states of the universe as functions of some set of equations of state parametrized by time gives us a functional relationship or equation(s), but little else:

If one takes disorder into account it's quite clear how to distinguish past from future.

"It follows that, theoretically, the whole state of the material universe at time t must be capable of being exhibited as a function of t. Hence our universe will be deterministic in the sense defined above. But if this be true, no information is conveyed about the universe in stating that it is deterministic."
Russell, B.: (1953), "On the Notion of Cause with Applications to the Free-Will Problem," in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, (1953).

That a snapshot at time t fails to convey any information about the universe's deterministic nature only means it's an inappropriate tool. It comes down to a "So what?" situation.

The biggest issue, however, with this conflation of determinism of the type that would see all future states as determined given some initial conditions is that at best causality enters into the would-be doctrine as an afterthought that doesn't fit well and at worst as entirely superfluous or even nonsensical.

Not at all. Causality is a necessary given in determinism. cause → effect Without it the concept is incomplete. It would be like taking M out of E=MC²

"Perhaps the most venerable of all the philosophical definitions holds that the world is deterministic just in case every event has a cause. The most immediate objection to this approach is that it seeks to explain a vague concept - determinism - in terms of a truly obscure one - causation...

Why is the concept of cause → effect vague? And why is the concept of cause obscure?

A related objection concerns the lack of a perspicuous connection between the causation definition and James' sense of determinism [Note: James’ sense as quoted by author: 'What does determinism profess? It professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilites hidden in its womb: the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality. Any other future complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible. The whole is in each and every part, and welds it with the rest into an absolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be no equivocation or shadow of turning. (1956, p. 150)']. In one direction the connection can be made tight: if the world displays Jamesian determinism then the "Every event has a cause" can be vouchsafed by taking (as Laplace suggested -see below) the state of the world at any moment as the cause of the state to follow. But in the other direction the connection is obscure: How does it follow as a result of every event's having a cause that the future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb?

In just the manner expressed. That the possibilities are hidden doesn't mean they aren't there. Seems the author simply doesn't like the Jamesian implication.

Perhaps the cause-effect relation can be explained in such a way that this implication becomes transparent; but it is that explanation we want and not the evocative but obscure formula "Every event has a cause." There is a reasonably precise explanation of cause-effect in terms of a causal chain or signal, i.e., the propagation of a disturbance, say, in the form of the continuous transmission of a quantity of mass or energy through space; but this explanation does not yield the desired result.

This supposed implication seems to be a wholly psychological disappointment. And exactly what is obscure about the formula, "Every event has a cause"?

Imagine a materialistic world consisting of massive particles whose trajectories are straight lines except where the trajectories happen to intersect. Every interesting event or happening in this world is a happening to a particle, viz .. a change of position, a collision, etc. And every such event has a cause in terms of the earlier events on the causal chain or chains on which it lies. Yet this world may or may not be deterministic in James' sense; for it seems consistent with the description I have given that many future complements are compatible with the present state of this world."

Why wouldn't it be deterministic? And taking "compliments" to mean states, I fail to see any explanation as to why "many future complements are compatible with the present state of this world." One and only one future state is compatible with the present state of this world.

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[ratiocinator]

It never ceases to amaze me how much BS is written about this by seemingly intelligent and thoughtful individuals. Whether the universe is strictly a deterministic system or not is an open question but the stark fact remains that if it isn't, then the only other possible ingredient is randomness. If every event is not fully determined by all its antecedents, then, to the extent that it isn't, it is determined by none of its antecedents, which means that, to that extent, it is random. Randomness cannot make anything more "free". In order for "free will" to mean anything, there must be some choice-making system that is free to do as it wishes and its wishes must be determined by who it is and it must be who it is because of reasons: nature, nurture and experience. If "free will" means anything at all it can only be in the compatibilist sense - that we can can do what we will but we cannot will what we will. Anything else leads to an infinite regress - we can only do what we want to do the most (which may well mean doing something we may well not want to do for all sorts of reasons but some other, more compelling reason, is more important to us), otherwise we'd have to choose what we wanted to want to do the most, so then we'd have to choose what we wanted to want to want to do the most, and so on, and so on...

ETA: And just to add, it really doesn't affect the above argument if you think there is a non-physical or "supernatural" aspect to minds - they still have to be deterministic choice-makers or not (and therefore involve randomness).

 

[Skwim]

If "free will" means anything at all it can only be in the compatibilist sense - that we can can do what we will but we cannot will what we will.

And why can't you will what you will? Could it be that what you will has already been determined? Of course it has. So where lies the freedom? The compatabilist position is driven by the need not to acknowledge hard determinism. A sorry twisting of determinism and free will to save one's sense of freedom and choice. In my opinion, the snowflake's solution.

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[ratiocinator]

And why can't you will what you will? Could it be that what you will has already been determined? Of course it has.

Indeed it has but it is determined by the person you are and, if freedom means anything at all, it's the ability to act according to your true self.

So where lies the freedom? The compatabilist position is driven by the need not to acknowledge hard determinism. A sorry twisting of determinism and free will to save one's sense of freedom and choice. In my opinion, the snowflake's solution..

And it's an opinion that you're perfectly entitled to and which I see the argument for. However, the idea of "free will" in the sense you are denying simply isn't a self-consistent logical possibility, so denying it is pretty pointless. However, the freedom to act according to your nature and desires really does exist (unless you are under external coercion). What you are saying is that we cannot be free of the people we are (what life and nature have made us) and of course we can't - that doesn't even make sense.

It's a valid stance to say that "free will" doesn't exist if you're prepared to accept a definition of it that doesn't make sense in the first place. Square circles don't exist either...

 

[Skwim]

Indeed it has but it is determined by the person you are and, if freedom means anything at all, it's the ability to act according to your true self.

Au contraire. The "free" in free will is commonly taken to mean the ability to have done differently.

However, the freedom to act according to your nature and desires really does exist (unless you are under external coercion).

And your "nature and desires," as I understand your implied meanings, are those determined by antecedent events; causes.

What you are saying is that we cannot be free of the people we are (what life and nature have made us) and of course we can't - that doesn't even make sense.

No it doesn't, which is why I would never say it. However, I will say that you have no choice in who you are or in what you do.

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[ratiocinator]

The "free" in free will is commonly taken to mean the ability to have done differently.

Which is another reason why the definition of what "free will" means that you are using makes no sense to begin with. If we could literally rewind time and face exactly the same choice in exactly the same state of mind, we either could have "done differently" or not. If so, then there could have been no possible reason for the difference (everything would have been the same), so it can only be random, and if not, then we have determinism - but that doesn't stop the choice from being a true reflection of who we are - which is the only way in which "free choice" makes any more sense than a square circle.

However, I will say that you have no choice in who you are or in what you do.

I agree I have no choice about who I am, but who I am does have a choice as to what I do. The one is the consequence of the other. You are simply clinging to a notion of "choice" that makes no sense to begin with. There can be no choice without a choice-maker, and there can be no choice-maker without a "nature" or "personality" that it uses to make one choice rather than the others, and there can be no "nature" or "personality" unless there are reasons why it has become that way.

The only choice(!) here is if you dismiss "free choice" as an incoherent logical impossibility, and whether the universe is deterministic or not is totally irrelevant, or accept a more realistic definition, in which case determinism is actually necessary for it to exist.

I don't think we actually disagree about what is going on - this is more a matter of semantics and the relevance of a deterministic universe.

 

[Skwim]

Which is another reason why the definition of what "free will" means that you are using makes no sense to begin with.

Probably not, but consider; why do you come to do the things you do? Either there is a reason, a cause, or there is not, no cause, in which case what you do would be utterly random. Assuming you don't opt for randomness then the only other option is causation. EVERYTHING that happens, including what you do and think is caused. AND every one of those causes had a cause. AND every one of those causes had a cause. And . . . . If you want to interject some kind of "freedom" into the mix then it too has to be accounted for by a cause. It arose because. . . . If it didn't then the reason would have had to be utter randomness.

If we could literally rewind time and face exactly the same choice in exactly the same state of mind, we either could have "done differently" or not.

No you couldn't because choice doesn't actually exist. It's an illusion. You do what you do because you can't do otherwise.

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