free will vs natural determinism

[Harikrish]

is it a fact that everything is an illusion? Put differently, is it an illusion that everything is an illusion? Because if it isn't true that it is an illusion that everything is an illusion, then everything isn't an illusion. If it is an illusion, then it's not true that everything is an illusion (it's just an illusion).

It's always important, when making universal negations of some sort (everything is an illusion, there are no facts, there's no such thing as "truth", etc.) to consider the paradoxes that can be entailed.

Everything is an illusion because the truth is not self evident. What we see are but appearances which are deceptive because they appeal to the senses. This creates dualism in our perception of things, the subjected versus the objective and therefore contradictions.

Our interpretations are influenced by our biases which is the reality we define as it enters our consciousness. Buddhism helps to resolve the duality of appearances by removing its influences on our senses and separating it from our biases. In short it filters the observed to a singularity of purpose.

 

[JerryL]

It's what I do now.
So simple a component of a neuronal model as is a threshold is questionable (especially represented by a single parameter extrapolated to any and all networks), given that
1) Neurons have no well-defined thresholds (though they may have a well-defined rheobase)
2) The main classes of neuron types, integrators and resonators, are not only quite broad but also somewhat misleading given that e.g., a neuron’s characteristically integrating behavior need not remain so, as such a neuron can resonate
3) Resonators may not have even a well-defined rheobase
4) Despite the ongoing debate over the neural code, it is probably safe to say that whatever their contribution to neural information may be, spiking is not dependent upon any threshold so much as by a number of dynamic parameters governed by everything from the “classes” of firing patterns one can divide neurons into, dendritic structure, neuronal type, and whether the neuron even has a well-defined rheobase.

I believe you.

I also think that you may be discussing one branch of the science while I am discussing another. (I don't believe that the work in artificial insect intelligence, for example, dates to the 40s).

But I don't need to be right on my understanding of the state of the art to support what is are my main points; so I'm not willing to do the legwork to improve my understanding on the history of studying neural networks and AI above it's (currently rusty) state.

Because?

If I rewind time and play it forward over and over watching the same scene one of two things will happen.

1) It will play the same every time.
2) It won't play the same every time.

If #1: then every choice is fixed... it is the outcome of the conditions at the time.
If #2: then there is a non-fixed portion of choice which, by definition, is random (since non-random things are "conditions")

Either way, the inevitable outcome of conditions or the result of random variables, there's no "free choice"

Arbitrary in the sense that it is the "most important" goal of those working on neural networks, neuronal models, etc., have goals and consider this to be the "most important." True, how the question is approach can differ greatly. From a neuronal modelling perspective it's "the neural code".

"In every small volume of the cortex, thousands of spikes are emitted each millisecond...What is the information contained in such temporal pattern of pulses? What code is used by the neurons to transmit that information? How might other neurons decode the signal?... The above questions point to the problem of neuronal coding, one of the fundamental isssues in neuroscience. At present, a definite answer to these questions is not known." from Gerstner & Kistler's Spiking Neuron Models: Single Neurons, Populations, Plasticity (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

That's another good example if why I think we may be apples and oranges. You are talking neuroscience: traditionally a field of medicine, though now an interdisciplinary field that includes work in Computer Science; and I'm talking AI: traditionally a computer science field that now may include work in medicine.

I don't think that the "most important" goals are the same between the two.

BTW: Are you referring to Molecular Neuroscience, Cellular Neuroscience, or Cognitive Neuroscience? Or one of the dozens of others.

Surely you aren't telling me that the "most important" goal of social neurosciences is temporal pulses?!?

The perfect opportunity for a preview of the options (at least some of them).

“no formal system is able to generate anything even remotely mind-like. The asymmetry between the brain and the computer is complete, all comparisons are flawed, and the idea of a computer-generated consciousness is nonsense.”

Analogies are great, but only get you so far... kind of like a car.

You are equivocating my claim.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

But I don't need to be right on my understanding of the state of the art to support what is are my main points; so I'm not willing to do the legwork to improve my understanding on the history of studying neural networks and AI above it's (currently rusty) state.

Fair enough.

If I rewind time and play it forward over and over watching the same scene one of two things will happen.

Granting that there is time such that this is possible, which negates spacetime's ontology as a anything other than a mathematical convenience (something we know it is not, and thus closed time-like curves and other causal paradoxes enter into physics without even considering quantum physics).

1) It will play the same every time.
2) It won't play the same every time.

This is a bit like arguing that because we know that e.g., the allies one WWII or that Caesar was assassinated then these were determined. We cannot "play-back" actual physical systems (at least the 2nd law says so and the arrow of time seems to hold despite any would-be challenges). Thus to say that at some point in time t you decided x such that if we ran the clock backward you'd still choose x, this only matters if the way you run the model backwards in order to get the same outcomes is deterministic according to general laws. If you run it backward and the result requires the e.g., the brain's self-determining, then the model is affirming free will.

If #1: then every choice is fixed... it is the outcome of the conditions at the time.

If the conditions at the time are in part determined by the mind (or whatever one wishes to call the functionally emergent process whereby we have not only the sense of agency but a conceptualization of self), then the fact that the outcome is fixed is due merely from the benefit of hindsight and the free will.

Either way, the inevitable outcome of conditions or the result of random variables, there's no "free choice"

Imagine that given the initial conditions at the moment I am writing, I could decide not to respond. However, I decide to do so. Rewinding the clock will always ensure that I do what I did merely because I did, which shows nothing about whether I could have done differently.

Your argument is comparable to Aristotle's sea-battle conundrum. Take the proposition that "tomorrow it will rain." Grant that this proposition is necessarily either true or false. If true, then necessarily it will rain. If false, then necessarily it won't. Thus the capacity for us to make truth-bearing statements entails fatalism. Aristotle didn't think so, but his ability to argue otherwise failed. Since then this reasoning have been repeatedly exposed as flawed and these flaws even used to build non-classical logics.

The point is that your argument is simply "the past happened". Until you can say that it is impossible for the past to have happened other than it did because of an agents capacity for choice, then you are simply saying that what happened did happen, not that it was determined (and of course you are ignoring CTCs and other concepts in physics that could contradict even the ability to say truthfully that the past happened as it did and/or that the things which have happened can't have other outcomes despite being in the past).

BTW: Are you referring to Molecular Neuroscience, Cellular Neuroscience, or Cognitive Neuroscience? Or one of the dozens of others.

Such distinctions are, as you hinted, somewhat arbitrary.
The best way to understand how truly interdisciplinary the cognitive sciences are (including the neurosciences, computational intelligenc/A.I., soft computing & machine learning, mathematical biology, etc.), the easiest way is to check out the development over the years of the HCI International conferences. Most large, important conferences publish the papers read after they are peer-reviewed in a volume. The proceedings from HCII2014 were published in 27 volumes, which is actually a bit of a reduction from HCII2013 (the one which, lucky for me, was held in the US).

Surely you aren't telling me that the "most important" goal of social neurosciences is temporal pulses?!?

No. Merely that their goal is this to the extent that the resolution of such problems is, at higher level analyses, the heart of the cognitive sciences in general.

 

[JerryL]

Granting that there is time such that this is possible, which negates spacetime's ontology as a anything other than a mathematical convenience (something we know it is not, and thus closed time-like curves and other causal paradoxes enter into physics without even considering quantum physics).

It's a thought experiment and so can defy real laws (much like Einstein's accelerating elevator)

Imagine that given the initial conditions at the moment I am writing, I could decide not to respond. However, I decide to do so. Rewinding the clock will always ensure that I do what I did merely because I did, which shows nothing about whether I could have done differently.

How could you have decided differently? Would that not require that the state of your decision mechanism (brain we presume) be different?

No. You made your decision to respond because of the state of the universe, including yourself, at the time. It could not have come out differently.

Your argument is comparable to Aristotle's sea-battle conundrum. Take the proposition that "tomorrow it will rain." Grant that this proposition is necessarily either true or false. If true, then necessarily it will rain. If false, then necessarily it won't. Thus the capacity for us to make truth-bearing statements entails fatalism. Aristotle didn't think so, but his ability to argue otherwise failed. Since then this reasoning have been repeatedly exposed as flawed and these flaws even used to build non-classical logics.

One does not need the proposition. Either tomorrow it will rain or tomorrow it will not.

Indeed: Given enough information and processing power we could determine in advance which would happen. Whether it will rain tomorrow was fixed back at the formation of the universe. It was merely beyond our ability to compute.

The basic underpinnings are well understood; but due to butterfly effect predictions are difficult.

The point is that your argument is simply "the past happened". Until you can say that it is impossible for the past to have happened other than it did because of an agents capacity for choice, then you are simply saying that what happened did happen, not that it was determined (and of course you are ignoring CTCs and other concepts in physics that could contradict even the ability to say truthfully that the past happened as it did and/or that the things which have happened can't have other outcomes despite being in the past).

It doesn't matter if it's possible to happen differently. I covered that in option #2 in my previous post.

The past happening differently merely means that there's a random element. Randomness if free, but it is not will.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

It's a thought experiment and so can defy real laws (much like Einstein's accelerating elevator)

What is a thought experiment? Spacetime ontology or CTCs? Neither is. CTCs are solutions to Einstein's equations which make up one of the two most successful theories in modern physics (general relativity).The other theory is not only incompatible with TGR, but is not reversible. Thus the fundamental basis for your view (as I understand it), that running the clock back gets us the same results or different results such that either we have determinism or randomness) contradicts most of modern physics. In particular, the irreversibility of quantum mechanical "collapses" is fundamentally related to the observer (so much so that written into the framework is the notion that the result is determined by choice; in fact, we have demonstrated the ability to choice the outcome of experiments after the experiment is finished (see e.g., Kaiser, F., Coudreau, T., Milman, P., Ostrowsky, D. B., & Tanzilli, S. (2012). Entanglement-enabled delayed-choice experiment. Science, 338(6107), 637-640;
Ma, X. S., Zotter, S., Kofler, J., Ursin, R., Jennewein, T., Brukner, Č., & Zeilinger, A. (2012). Experimental delayed-choice entanglement swapping. Nature Physics, 8(6), 479-484;
Jeong, Y. C., Di Franco, C., Lim, H. T., Kim, M. S., & Kim, Y. H. (2013). Experimental realization of a delayed-choice quantum walk. Nature communications, 4;
Jacques, V., Wu, E., Grosshans, F., Treussart, F., Grangier, P., Aspect, A., & Roch, J. F. (2007). Experimental realization of Wheeler's delayed-choice gedanken experiment. Science, 315(5814), 966-968; etc.).

How could you have decided differently? Would that not require that the state of your decision mechanism (brain we presume) be different?

If there exists a decision mechanism, then that is (a form of) free will. The decision mechanism actually would define free will (and can serve as a definition now).

No. You made your decision to respond because of the state of the universe, including yourself, at the time. It could not have come out differently.

1) This is contradictory to most studies in modern physics, the growing understanding of circular causality, emergence, and relational biology as well as the increased understanding of the ontological indeterminacy of even non-quantum mechanical systems.

One does not need the proposition. Either tomorrow it will rain or tomorrow it will not.

That's true. And our argument reduces to such triviality. You assert that because the past happened as it did, then it happened as it did. This isn't evidence against free will because it isn't related to much of anything other than as a tautology. The claim you made above, though (about the "state of the universe") is far more important and is non-trivial. If you are correct here, then you are (IMO) correct about free will. However, as you haven't offered any indication that there exists evidence to support your view, let alone what that evidence is, I can't really evaluate it.

Indeed: Given enough information and processing power we could determine in advance which would happen. Whether it will rain tomorrow was fixed back at the formation of the universe. It was merely beyond our ability to compute.

So you reject quantum physics and general relativity?

The basic underpinnings are well understood; but due to butterfly effect predictions are difficult.

The basic underpinnings aren't well understood, there exist mathematical proof that living systems are non-computable and the debate over such proofs is ongoing, there actually isn't any evidence that classical physics is deterministic other than that insofar as it was developed before it failed it was, and modern physics isn't deterministic.

It doesn't matter if it's possible to happen differently. I covered that in option #2 in my previous post.

No, you conflated self-determination with determinism. If I could have chosen other than that I did and this was because of my capacity to determine future states, then the capacity to have chosen other than that I did need not even be such that were we to run the clock back it would be possible for me to do so. In other words, what matters is what determines my decisions in the past, not whether they are determined (as if it is at least partially true for some decisions that it is I who determine the outcome, the fact that I did so viewed from the future simply states that I exercised free will).

The past happening differently merely means that there's a random element. Randomness if free, but it is not will.

The possibility of the past happening differently is not the same as it happening differently. If the state of the universe determines all outcomes given some set of physical laws, then yes I have no free will. If my choice to write a post here a few days ago is utterly fixed as any running back of the clock will still have me doing so, but the reason for this determination is my choice to have posted such that it is possible (in the counter-factual sense) for me to have chosen otherwise at the time I chose, then you conflate hindsight with determinism.

 

[JerryL]

What is a thought experiment? Spacetime ontology or CTCs? Neither is. CTCs are solutions to Einstein's equations which make up one of the two most successful theories in modern physics (general relativity).The other theory is not only incompatible with TGR, but is not reversible. Thus the fundamental basis for your view (as I understand it), that running the clock back gets us the same results or different results such that either we have determinism or randomness) contradicts most of modern physics.

That's not the basis for my view. That's a thought experiment which illustrates my deduction.

If there exists a decision mechanism, then that is (a form of) free will. The decision mechanism actually would

define free will (and can serve as a definition now).

Calculators have decision mechanisms (the point of my earlier analogy).

A switch based on the state of a radioactive atom, whether it had decayed and emitted radiation or not, would not only have a decision mechanism but a random element as well.

1) This is contradictory to most studies in modern physics, the growing understanding of circular causality, emergence, and relational biology as well as the increased understanding of the ontological indeterminacy of even non-quantum mechanical systems.

It's a logical argument, and most of those fields would be non-applicable.

But do please point me to an article in physics that states that the decision made by your brain is not the result of the state of your brain.

That's true. And our argument reduces to such triviality. You assert that because the past happened as it did, then it happened as it did.

You keep stating that. I have not.

The claim you made above, though (about the "state of the universe") is far more important and is non-trivial. If you are correct here, then you are (IMO) correct about free will. However, as you haven't offered any indication that there exists evidence to support your view, let alone what that evidence is, I can't really evaluate it.

A theist could use "the state of your soul" or the like. The actual mechanism is not relevant.

And my statement above being true is no a requirement. If it is true, then you are deterministic (not free) . If it is not true then the difference is random (not will).

So you reject quantum physics and general relativity?

There's no violation with relativity.

Thanks to butterfly, you could correctly argue that quantum uncertainty means tomorrow's weather could not have been predicted at the beginning of the universe. (random = not will)

The basic underpinnings aren't well understood, there exist mathematical proof that living systems are non-computable and the debate over such proofs is ongoing, there actually isn't any evidence that classical physics is deterministic other than that insofar as it was developed before it failed it was, and modern physics isn't deterministic.

We make devices capable of all a human brain can do every day. It's called a human brain.

Yea. I'm gonna have to dispute that claim.

No, you conflated self-determination with determinism. If I could have chosen other than that I did and this was because of my capacity to determine future states, then the capacity to have chosen other than that I did need not even be such that were we to run the clock back it would be possible for me to do so. In other words, what matters is what determines my decisions in the past, not whether they are determined (as if it is at least partially true for some decisions that it is I who determine the outcome, the fact that I did so viewed from the future simply states that I exercised free will).

Then you are equivocating my claim.

The possibility of the past happening differently is not the same as it happening differently. If the state of the universe determines all outcomes given some set of physical laws, then yes I have no free will. If my choice to write a post here a few days ago is utterly fixed as any running back of the clock will still have me doing so, but the reason for this determination is my choice to have posted such that it is possible (in the counter-factual sense) for me to have chosen otherwise at the time I chose, then you conflate hindsight with determinism.

And you completely gloss over that "choice" is either determainistic or random. "Turtles all the way down".

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

That's not the basis for my view. That's a thought experiment which illustrates my deduction.

So the thought experiment is that, were we to run back the clock, we'd have the same outcome? Again, how is this not equivalent to "given that X happened in the past, it happened."

Calculators have decision mechanisms (the point of my earlier analogy).

Calculators decide nothing. I doubt this is really your meaning, but can't garner from your description what is. Could you expand on this?

A switch based on the state of a radioactive atom, whether it had decayed and emitted radiation or not, would not only have a decision mechanism but a random element as well.

1) Even in Schrödinger's cat Gedankenexperiment, the decision mechanism is the observer or agent.
2) It isn't random. Were it truly random than QM would be useless.
3) As I noted, a more relatable Gedankenexperiment (Wheeler's delayed choice) has been empirically realized. Thus choices have shown to be capable of changing the outcome after it had already happened.
4) The fact that the dynamics of atoms or molecules is epistemically or even ontologically indeterminate isn't really that relevant until one factors in choice or decisions. The dynamical laws you refer to as "decision mechanism" are simply the application of laws, not decisions. In other words, you're describing outcomes that, while perhaps indeterministic, aren't self-determining.

It's a logical argument, and most of those fields would be non-applicable.

You refer to the state of the universe in your "logical argument". As such, you refer to physics. If your position is that the "state of the universe" is what determines that which we experience as a "choice" we determine, then you are not using simply logic but referring to the nature of the universe and the physics that govern it. Also, emergent functions and circular causality have been nowhere do developed or usefully applied as in the modeling of living systems or the study of the mind. Same with downward causality (hence Murphy, N., Ellis, G. F., & O'Connor, T. (Eds.). (2009). Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will. Springer.)

But do please point me to an article in physics that states that the decision made by your brain is not the result of the state of your brain.

I can do better. I can provide you with papers that a neuron (and any cell) is closed to efficient causation and thus is not determined (until one factors in functional emergent processes).
Louie, A. H. (2007). A living system must have noncomputable models. Artificial life, 13(3), 293-297.

Louie, A. H. (2008). Functional entailment and immanent causation in relational biology. Axiomathes, 18(3), 289-302.

"A simple representation of components to a system is the input/output block diagram. In this representation, each block represents an agent that effects a change on something, namely its input. The result of this interaction is some output. The abstract way of representing this is

where f is the process that takes input A into output B. Clearly B can now become the input for some other process so that we can visualize a system as a network of these interactions. The relational system represents a very special kind of transition this way. Rather than break everything down in the usual reductionist manner, these transitions are selected for an important distinguishing property, namely their expression of process rather than material things directly. This is best explained with an example. The system Rosen uses for an example is the Metabolism-Repair or [M,R] system. The process, f, in this case stands for the entire metabolism going on in an organism. This is, indeed, quite an abstraction. Clearly, the use of such a representation is meant to suppress the myriad of detail that would only serve to distract us from the more simple argument put this way. It does more because it allows processes we know are going on to be divorced from the requirement that they be fragmentable or reducible to material parts alone...
The transition, f, which is being called metabolism, is a mapping taking some set of metabolites, A, into some set of products, B. What are the members of A? Really everything in the organism has to be included in A, and there has to be an implicit agreement that at least some of the members of A can enter the organism from its environment. What are the members of B? Many, if not all, of the members of A since the transitions in the reduced system are all strung together in the many intricate patterns or networks that make up the organism’s metabolism. It also must be true that some members of B leave the organism as products of metabolism. The usefulness of this abstract representation becomes clearer if the causal nature of the events is made clear...
the mapping, f...is a functional component of the system we are developing. A functional component has many interesting attributes. First of all, it exists independent of the material parts that make it possible. This idea has been so frequently misunderstood that it requires a careful discussion. Reductionism has taught us that every thing in a real system can be expressed as a collection of material parts. This is not so in the case of functional components. We only know about them because they do something. Looking at the parts involved does not lead us to knowing about them if they are not doing that something. Furthermore, they only exist in a given context. “Metabolism” as discussed here has no meaning in a machine. It also would have no meaning if we had all the chemical components of the organism in jars on a lab bench. Now we have a way of dealing with context dependence in a system theoretical manner. Not only are they only defined in their context, they also are constantly contributing to that context. This is as self- referential a situation as there is. What it means is that if the context, the particular system, is destroyed or even severely altered, the context defining the functional component will no longer exist and the functional component will also disappear...
The semantic parallel with language is in the concept of functional component. Pull things apart as reductionism asks us to do and something essential about the system is lost. Philosophically this has revolutionary consequences. The acceptance of this idea means that one recognizes ontological status for something other than mere atoms and molecules. It says that material reality is only a part of that real world we are so anxious to understand. In addition to material reality there are functional components that are also essential to our understanding of any complex reality."

Mikulecky, D. C. (2005). The Circle That Never Ends: Can Complexity be Made Simple?. In Complexity in Chemistry, Biology, and Ecology (pp. 97-153). Springer

You keep stating that. I have not.

Then clearly I am misunderstanding you. What, then, is the basis for your assertion that choices are determined or free will impossible apart from how you have described past results as either being what they were or not what they were without even indicating the relevance of what would make them what they were (such as free will) if e.g., the former were true?

A theist could use "the state of your soul" or the like. The actual mechanism is not relevant.

It is. For example, I can define the mechanism as "free will", or the ability to exercise my free will (for my mind to determine outcomes via my choice) as the mechanism.

There's no violation with relativity.

You can't consider the past as you do in relativity as you consider causality linearly and in relativity cause and effect are at best defined by reference frames.

Thanks to butterfly, you could correctly argue that quantum uncertainty means tomorrow's weather could not have been predicted at the beginning of the universe. (random = not will)

The butterfly effect is fundamentally different. The difference is between epistemic and ontological determinacy.

We make devices capable of all a human brain can do every day. It's called a human brain.

Which we don't make.

And you completely gloss over that "choice" is either determainistic or random. "Turtles all the way down".

1) What basis is there for asserting these are the only two options?
2) If my choice is determined by my free will, it is deterministic in the sense you seem to use the term, yet by definition requires free will.

 

[JerryL]

So the thought experiment is that, were we to run back the clock, we'd have the same outcome? Again, how is this not equivalent to "given that X happened in the past, it happened."

We would either have the same outcome or we would not have the same outcome. Both disprove "free will".

Another variation. If we made an infinite number of copies of the universe right before a decision; they would either all make the same decision or they would not all make the same decision. Again: both disprove free will.

Calculators decide nothing. I doubt this is really your meaning, but can't garner from your description what is. Could you expand on this?

Of course they do. Define "decide".

1) Even in Schrödinger's cat Gedankenexperiment, the decision mechanism is the observer or agent.

There's no "decision mechanism". Both universes exist: one where the cat is alive and one where the cat is dead. Until there's an observation, a given individual is in both universes (the quantum function is still a wave). Once there's an observation, the wave collapses and the observer resolves into a single universe.

If you looked in the box: you would be in only one universe (the cat would be alive, or would be dead). If I was in the next room: I would still be in both (the cat's superposition has not changed for me).

2) It isn't random. Were it truly random than QM would be useless.

3) As I noted, a more relatable Gedankenexperiment (Wheeler's delayed choice) has been empirically realized. Thus choices have shown to be capable of changing the outcome after it had already happened.
4) The fact that the dynamics of atoms or molecules is epistemically or even ontologically indeterminate isn't really that relevant until one factors in choice or decisions. The dynamical laws you refer to as "decision mechanism" are simply the application of laws, not decisions. In other words, you're describing outcomes that, while perhaps indeterministic, aren't self-determining.

You are running into terribly unproven models with Wheeler; and forming a conclusion that the community has not done.

Even accepting your conclusion: all you've done is assert that future conditions are part of the deterministic equation. It doesn't negatively impact my case.

You refer to the state of the universe in your "logical argument". As such, you refer to physics. If your position is that the "state of the universe" is what determines that which we experience as a "choice" we determine, then you are not using simply logic but referring to the nature of the universe and the physics that govern it. Also, emergent functions and circular causality have been nowhere do developed or usefully applied as in the modeling of living systems or the study of the mind. Same with downward causality (hence Murphy, N., Ellis, G. F., & O'Connor, T. (Eds.). (2009).

Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will. Springer.)

I've already addressed this. "State of the universe" is a convenience. Also: nothing you have asserted here conflicts with my conclusion.

As to your cite:
"I discuss the quantum mechanic evidence that has brought us to the view that the world, including our brains, is not completely determined by physics and that even very simple nervous systems are subject to deterministic chaos."

There's determinism right in the summary of chapter 1.

Introducing quanta has no effect on the logic at hand. Either the quantum elements are determined by conditions, are not (therefore are random), or are a mix of the two. That's still just another turtle below the previous one.

I can do better. I can provide you with papers that a neuron (and any cell) is closed to efficient causation and thus is not determined (until one factors in functional emergent processes).
Louie, A. H. (2007). A living system must have noncomputable models. Artificial life, 13(3), 293-297.

I again quote from your source:
"The conclusion of Chu and Ho’s recent article [1] published in Artificial Life is that “Rosen’s central proof is wrong”. The “central proof” refers to the main conclusion of Robert Rosen’s book Life Itself [4], that a living system is not a mechanism and consequently must have noncomputable models. "

"A simple representation of components to a system is the input/output block diagram. In this representation, each block represents an agent that effects a change on something, namely its input. The result of this interaction is some output. The abstract way of representing this is

"

That is a straw-man... at least relative to my claim.

Then clearly I am misunderstanding you. What, then, is the basis for your assertion that choices are determined or free will impossible apart from how you have described past results as either being what they were or not what they were without even indicating the relevance of what would make them what they were (such as free will) if e.g., the former were true?

Either given the state of everything there is only one thing that can happen next, or there is more than one thing.

If there is only one: no freedom.
If there is more than one: then what determines the outcome. You can't argue "choice" because it's juts moving the goalposts (what makes choice chose)? At the bottom of that stack of turtles you are back to "random". So no will.

It is. For example, I can define the mechanism as "free will", or the ability to exercise my free will (for my mind to determine outcomes via my choice) as the mechanism.

"mind". There's a poorly defined word.

But yes. You can equivocate a word to create a fallacious conclusion.

You can't consider the past as you do in relativity as you consider causality linearly and in relativity cause and effect are at best defined by reference frames.

I most certainly can as long as the model works within the scope of the experiment.

The butterfly effect is fundamentally different. The difference is between epistemic and ontological determinacy.

I feel an equivocation again.

Which we don't make.

I'm pretty sure that my wife and I did indeed make one.

1) What basis is there for asserting these are the only two options?
2) If my choice is determined by my free will, it is deterministic in the sense you seem to use the term, yet by definition requires free will.

1) logic.
2) Just like a calculator. You are assuming the consequent.

 

[Skwim]

Firstly, thank you for the information, I wanted to make sure I wasn't misunderstanding the subject.

My experiences so far tell me otherwise. Also maybe you're forgetting, it's philosophy not a fact. You or anyone else saying it doesn't make it so either. Just a quick googling, nope not a fact. Perhaps that's your conclusion, certainly isn't mine.

I'm not going to reply after this, I was simply curious about it. I don't know enough to debate the subject but thanks for replying.

Just so you know. I came to my positionn rationally.

There are only two operants that bring events into being: utter randomness, or causation. Speaking of human acts, if they're utterly random then the human will is at the mercy of this randomness; everything one does has just as much chance of not occurring.
If they're caused then they're at the mercy of those cause/effect events that ultimately terminated in a particular action event. And, the only way the event could be different, is if something within the series of cause/effect events was different; however, because there was no such "different something", the action event had to be what it is and nothing else. If I take a particular path that ends up at my house there is no way I could take that path and end up at my neighbor's house. The only way I could end up at my neighbor's is if there was a difference in my path. But, because there wasn't I had no choice but to end up at home. Same with what we do. We only do what the particular preconditions dictate. And this dictate is the reason for doing.

 

[Willamena]

Everything is an illusion because the truth is not self evident. What we see are but appearances which are deceptive because they appeal to the senses. This creates dualism in our perception of things, the subjected versus the objective and therefore contradictions.

Our interpretations are influenced by our biases which is the reality we define as it enters our consciousness. Buddhism helps to resolve the duality of appearances by removing its influences on our senses and separating it from our biases. In short it filters the observed to a singularity of purpose.

What evidence do we have that there is anything more true than what appeals to the senses?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

We would either have the same outcome or we would not have the same outcome. Both disprove "free will".

If free will is the mechanism determining the outcome, we don't.

Another variation. If we made an infinite number of copies of the universe right before a decision; they would either all make the same decision or they would not all make the same decision. Again: both disprove free will.

Is this some informal possible worlds argument?

Of course they do. Define "decide".

The ability to process concepts such that presented with conceptual input the cognitive system can determine an output based upon the semantic content of the input.

Both universes exist: one where the cat is alive and one where the cat is dead.

This has been experimentally realized in our universe with a superposition of 430 atoms (actually, in lots of experiments I just don't know off hand any ones that are larger).

"In as far as the term designates the quantum superposition of two macroscopically distinct states of a highly complex object, the molecules in our new experimental series are among the fattest Schrödinger cats realized to date. Schrödinger reasoned whether it is possible to bring a cat into a superposition state of being 'dead'; and 'alive'. In our experiment, the superposition consists of having all 430 atoms simultaneously ‘in the left arm'; and 'in the right arm'; of our interferometer, that is, two possibilities that are macroscopically distinct. The path separation is about two orders of magnitude larger than the size of the molecules"


from Gerlich et al's (2011) "Quantum interference of large organic molecules" Nature Communications, p 4.

Until there's an observation, a given individual is in both universes (the quantum function is still a wave). Once there's an observation, the wave collapses and the observer resolves into a single universe.

1) It's described by a wavefunction. It isn't a wave.
2) You're wrong. See above for one of hundreds of empirical instantiations of Schrödinger's cat Gedankenexperiment.

You are running into terribly unproven models with Wheeler; and forming a conclusion that the community has not done.

I'm not relying on Wheeler, but on the many dozens of empirical implementations of his "thought experiment". Did you not read the studies?

Even accepting your conclusion: all you've done is assert that future conditions are part of the deterministic equation. It doesn't negatively impact my case.

That's because your case is that if something happened it did. It doesn't take into account the capacity for free will to be the determining factor.

As to your cite:
"I discuss the quantum mechanic evidence that has brought us to the view that the world, including our brains, is not completely determined by physics and that even very simple nervous systems are subject to deterministic chaos."

There's determinism right in the summary of chapter 1.

1) That's from the abstract of the paper that is chapter 2.
2) Here's the conclusion:
"Let me summarize. Classical physical determinism is out; the future is not fully determined by the current facts. Quantum mechanics teaches that randomness is inherent in the basic structure of the universe. There is always some probabilistic aspect to nature. Indeterminism implies that what you do is not fully determined by the past. The future is literally an open book; while the letters on the page you are reading right now are clearly visible, it is more and more difficult to be certain of the text in the following pages that foretell what happens next. They become progressively fuzzier and illegible."

Nice try.

Introducing quanta has no effect on the logic at hand.

You logic is simply that things that happen happen. As you can't say what the mechanisms are that make things happen, then this introduces the capacity for free will as such a mechanism.

I again quote from your source:
"The conclusion of Chu and Ho’s recent article [1] published in Artificial Life is that “Rosen’s central proof is wrong”. The “central proof” refers to the main conclusion of Robert Rosen’s book Life Itself [4], that a living system is not a mechanism and consequently must have noncomputable models. "

Um...do you understand what you just quoted? That is, what it means?

Either given the state of everything there is only one thing that can happen next, or there is more than one thing.

For free will to necessarily not exist because of this, you'd have to show that free will isn't a determining factor. You haven't even begun to indicate an ability to start to show this.

 

[Etritonakin]

Everything is real -but not necessarily as it seems.

It seems to me that the only true source of randomness would be conscious decision. Decision itself need not be based on anything -though the number of decisions to consider or from which to choose can be limited by certain factors. (However, those decisions can lead to even greater or fewer numbers of decisions to consider or from which to choose)

From what I have read of the uncertainty principle, it actually supports this. Things essentially go on as they would based on their nature until they are affected by the observer -whose actions are based on decision.

(I'm not much for the many-worlds theory for the same reason I'm not much for time travel -as they would both require the constant addition of material.)

 

[Skwim]

It seems to me that the only true source of randomness would be conscious decision.

So you're saying that conscious decisions create randomness? Randomness in what?

Decision itself need not be based on anything -though the number of decisions to consider or from which to choose can be limited by certain factors.

So decisions may simply materialize out of thin air, and would likely be utterly random occurrences?

From what I have read of the uncertainty principle, it actually supports this. Things essentially go on as they would based on their nature until they are affected by the observer -whose actions are based on decision.

I assume you're speaking of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which only operates at the quantum level where subatomic particles and waves exist. And the thing is, quantum states in the brain (those in which you suggest the principle would play a part) would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale at which they could be useful for neural processing. So, the uncertainty principle is meaningless to freewill.

 

[JerryL]

If free will is the mechanism determining the outcome, we don't.

If free will makes the same decision, it's not free. If it makes different decisions it's not will.

Remember. That's an adjective and a noun. That's not one thing. By treating it as one thing you are committing an assuming the consequent fallacy.

Is this some informal possible worlds argument?

Nope. Remains a thought experiment.

I kind of feel this is the routine.

Me: "Thought experiment: If you were standing on the sun and a nova blew up above you: the surface would look dark by comparison"

You: Respond with a bunch of "can't stand on the sun", "is nothing that could nova nearby" and vagueries about the "surface" which completely ignore the point.

The ability to process concepts such that presented with conceptual input the cognitive system can determine an output based upon the semantic content of the input.

Then you've created a definition where me deciding to swallow food instead of chewing more isn't a "decision".

Get back to me when you want to use a shared definition. Until then your statement is unhelpful to the discussion.

"

In as far as the term designates the quantum superposition of two macroscopically distinct states of a highly complex object, the molecules in our new experimental series are among the fattest Schrödinger cats realized to date. Schrödinger reasoned whether it is possible to bring a cat into a superposition state of being 'dead'; and 'alive'. In our experiment, the superposition consists of having all 430 atoms simultaneously ‘in the left arm'; and 'in the right arm'; of our interferometer, that is, two possibilities that are macroscopically distinct. The path separation is about two orders of magnitude larger than the size of the molecules"

Nice, but it doesn't interact with what I said.

1) It's described by a wavefunction. It isn't a wave.
2) You're wrong. See above for one of hundreds of empirical instantiations of Schrödinger's cat Gedankenexperiment.

Does saying "though experiment" in German make you feel better?

And "empirical though experiment" is an oxymoron.

And it's semantics which does't interact with what I said.

I'm not relying on Wheeler, but on the many dozens of empirical implementations of his "thought experiment". Did you not read the studies?

Then you were foolish to cite him.

Some of them.

That's because your case is that if something happened it did. It doesn't take into account the capacity for free will to be the determining factor.

It actually proves that "free will" cannot be the determining factor without being an oximoron.

If free will always chooses the same thing then it's not free (just will).
If it does not, then it's not will (just free).

I'm going to cut it short at this point because you keep doing the same things over and over.

1) You aren't actually addressing the argument.
2) You engage in a great deal of semantic equivocation.
3) You are introducing one irrellevancy after another; I can only assume in furtherance of #1

 

[Etritonakin]

So you're saying that conscious decisions create randomness? Randomness in what?

So decisions may simply materialize out of thin air, and would likely be utterly random occurrences?

I assume you're speaking of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which only operates at the quantum level where subatomic particles and waves exist. And the thing is, quantum states in the brain (those in which you suggest the principle would play a part) would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale at which they could be useful for neural processing. So, the uncertainty principle is meaningless to freewill.

Decisions cannot always be predicted -no matter how much is known -due to ignorance or neglect of knowledge, etc. -which is why we have smileys like this...

With physics, all is predictable if all is known. (Some disagree -but I disagree with them)

It seems that decision is possible due to a certain arrangement of physical things -but if that arrangement was the product of decision...... but, anyway.....

My point was that free will is not meaningless to the uncertainty principle.

 

[Skwim]

My point was that free will is not meaningless to the uncertainty principle.

Interesting, But in what way is freewill meaningful to the uncertainty principle?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

If free will makes the same decision, it's not free.
Remember. That's an adjective and a noun

“Oxford English Dictionary | The definitive record of the English language
free will, n.
Pronunciation:
Brit. /ˌfriː ˈwɪl/ , U.S. /ˌfri ˈwɪl/ “
Huh. The OED says it’s a noun. Whaddya know? (also, I checked some online dictionaries for you and found the same).
Even if it weren’t, half of language is prefabs, idioms, collocations, and other forms of constructions (multiple word combinations that can’t be understood by their constituent parts) such as
open book
guilt free
once upon a time
birds of a feather
it takes one to know one
give up
throw away
bought off
right away
kith and kin
etc.
This isn't logic, it's bad linguistics. You've defined free will such that it can't exist because the exercise of free will (even in the radically free, as in free from all external influences) always produces an outcome. That's the entire point: can one act or decide in such a way that they could have done differently (i.e., could they have chosen otherwise). You've reversed the logic (illogically) by taking the outcome as determined to start with because it has happened and ignored the only important matter: causation (determinism being included as relevant due to its relation to causation).
More simply, free will concerns causes: are the causes for all my choices, acts, beliefs, etc., completely determined (in either the more philosophical Laplace determinism or the related classical physics determinism)? If they are, then everything I do is determined by some set of causes such that it is possible to know in advance every decision, act, thought, etc., I will have in my entire life 1,000 years before I am born.
How completely nonsensical your definition, argument, and approach is may be demonstrated by how thoroughly it defeats the entire notion of determinism. Having removed causality from the picture, you go on to make claims about what is determined. Of course, determinism is defined by causality and its relation to effects. Moreover, you haven’t just left causality out, you’ve rendered it an impossibility. Given any effect, that effect is necessarily so because it is. Nothing can be caused, because every effect is necessarily that effect (or whatever informal notion you intend by your use of “random”).
Your argument makes determinism impossible along with causality as you define as necessarily so that which has been (or is).

By treating it as one thing you are committing an assuming the consequent fallacy

No, I am using an understanding of language to realize that “free will’ describes a single property or capacity,

Nope. Remains a thought experiment.

“In the 1930s, when Schrödinger presented his cat paradox, it was considered a mere Gedankenexperiment (i.e., a thought experiment). Quantum phenomena, such as interference effects, had at that time been observed only in the microscopic domain. It was thus not only argued that quantum mechanics is unnecessary for a description of the macroscopic world of our experience, but moreover that quantum mechanics should be banned from this realm altogether. An example of the latter stance is the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which postulates a fundamental dualism between a microscopic “quantum” domain and a macroscopic classical realm.’
Today, our view has changed drastically. On the one hand, quantum effects have been observed in the laboratory far beyond the microscopic domain. Researchers have created mesoscopic and macroscopic “Schrödinger kittens” such as superpositions of microampere currents flowing in opposite directions and interference patterns for massive molecules composed of dozens of carbon atoms."
Schlosshauer, M. A. (2007). Decoherence: and the quantum-to-classical transition. Springer. (emphases added).

In the study I cited it was hundreds of atoms, but the point is that it seems the physics community find the thought experiment so completely realized empirically that we find papers such as e.g.,
Gisin, N. (2006). New additions to the Schrödinger cat family. Science, 312(5770), 63-64.
or
Franson, J. D. (2013, June). Nonlocal Interferometry Using Schrodinger Cats. In Quantum Information and Measurement (pp. T1-1). Optical Society of America.

Then you've created a definition where me deciding to swallow food instead of chewing more isn't a "decision".

How so?

“And "empirical though experiment" is an oxymoron

And empirical realization of a thought experiment is not. Hence studies like:
Jeong, Y. C., Di Franco, C., Lim, H. T., Kim, M. S., & Kim, Y. H. (2013). Experimental realization of a delayed-choice quantum walk. Nature communications, 4

And it's semantics which does't interact with what I said.

I’m trying to interpret your idiomatic use of “interact” here. I brought up empirical realization of Wheeler’s delayed-choice experiments, where the results of the experiment (the measurement, findings, etc.) could be freely chosen after the measurements were done and experiment over. These experiments are, strangely enough, almost as impossible or paradoxical as your account of determinism vs. randomness, but in reverse. In these experiments, choices made in the present affected an outcome in the past. A central difference is that your "thought experiment" (i.e., every outcome that has been either had to be that which it was ergo determinism, or it would be something else ergo random) remains as much of a 'thought experiment" as it ever was, while I was citing empirical findings.

Then you were foolish to cite him.

I didn’t. Referring to his thought experiment, particularly when I was doing so only to refer to the empirical realizations of his thought experiment, isn’t citing him. Had he never lived and these studies used very different terms for the same results, it would have not the slightest impact on my argument, as I wasn’t relying ever on the “thought experiment”.

It actually proves that "free will" cannot be the determining factor without being an oximoron.

No it’s just poor logic. It’s like claiming determinism is true because the past exists. Determinism & free will are notions that relate to causality. Free will is a question of whether, how, and to what extent we are able to cause effects that are self-determined (at least to some extent), or put differently that we are able to cause effects that are not wholly deterministic.
You have eschewed causality and turned this question around to ask about effects: given some effect like my decision to respond to this post, you've ignored entirely what the causes might be and asked instead the irrelevant question "granting that effect (the post) could you have not written it?" Since free will is not a question of effects but of causes, you create a straw man.
Your entire argument is "given that X happened, then X happened. Ergo, determinism".

 

[Etritonakin]

Interesting, But in what way is freewill meaningful to the uncertainty principle?

"Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle - HowStuffWorks
science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/science.../quantum-suicide2.htm

Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle relates to how we affect a particle we're attempting to measure"

 

[JerryL]

“Oxford English Dictionary | The definitive record of the English language

You suck at quoting. Here's Oxford:
"The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one’s owndiscretion."

I assert that we act of necessity.

On the other hand: both free and will are words in their own right.

Free: Not under the control or in the power of another; able to act or be done as one wishes:
Will: The faculty by which a person decides on and initiates action:

If you want to get all semantic (perhaps it will make you feel important so you can "win"), then you can equivocate what I've said with a dictionary (please do a better job then in your last post); thus proving what I said in about my second post to you... that you are talking past me not with me.

This isn't logic, it's bad linguistics. You've defined free will such that it can't exist

Yes I have defined free will in such a way that it cannot exist. That was my initial claim. You are, I assume, now admitting I was correct and that you merely failed to understand what I was saying?

because the exercise of free will (even in the radically free, as in free from all external influences) always produces an outcome. That's the entire point: can one act or decide in such a way that they could have done differently (i.e., could they have chosen otherwise). You've reversed the logic (illogically) by taking the outcome as determined to start with because it has happened and ignored the only important matter: causation (determinism being included as relevant due to its relation to causation).

You are back into unnecessary mechanisms. You just try over and over to obstufcate the underlying point.

You cannot make any decision other than the one you are going to make. With enough information, that decision could be modeled now and you will make it in the future. It's deterministic.

Or there's a random element. No amount of information would lest us predict it accurately. In which case it's not your "choice" but the choice of the random element which, by the virtue of being random, isn't will.

The actual *mechanisms*, which you keep propping up and hacking down are straw men.

More simply, free will concerns causes: are the causes for all my choices, acts, beliefs, etc., completely determined (in either the more philosophical Laplace determinism or the related classical physics determinism)? If they are, then everything I do is determined by some set of causes such that it is possible to know in advance every decision, act, thought, etc., I will have in my entire life 1,000 years before I am born.

With enough information, a completely accurate model, and enough processing power yes.

...unless there's a random element.

How completely nonsensical your definition, argument, and approach is may be demonstrated by how thoroughly it defeats the entire notion of determinism. Having removed causality from the picture, you go on to make claims about what is determined. Of course, determinism is defined by causality and its relation to effects. Moreover, you haven’t just left causality out, you’ve rendered it an impossibility. Given any effect, that effect is necessarily so because it is. Nothing can be caused, because every effect is necessarily that effect (or whatever informal notion you intend by your use of “random”).

You just can't help yourself can you? I make no claims about causality. You do. Then you hack apart your own claims and declare victory.

Perhaps you have indeed proven your own claim wrong. I don't care. It's not my claim.

No, I am using an understanding of language to realize that “free will’ describes a single property or capacity,

So then "free will" isn't a form of "will"? They are two separate words and so to separate things?

Then you aren't interacting with my claim.

Today, our view has changed drastically. On the one hand, quantum effects have been observed in the laboratory far beyond the microscopic domain. Researchers have created mesoscopic and macroscopic “Schrödinger kittens” such as superpositions of microampere currents flowing in opposite directions and interference patterns for massive molecules composed of dozens of carbon atoms."

Straw man.

Either tomorrows choices can only play out one way or they can play out more than one way. If they can play out more than one way, what determines which way they play out? It can't be based on the state of the universe (as that is the same going in), so it must be random.

A central difference is that your "thought experiment" (i.e., every outcome that has been either had to be that which it was ergo determinism, or it would be something else ergo random) remains as much of a 'thought experiment" as it ever was, while I was citing empirical findings.

Which don't interact with my experiment. Red herrings.

No it’s just poor logic. It’s like claiming determinism is true because the past exists. Determinism & free will are notions that relate to

causality. Free will is a question of whether, how, and to what extent we are able to cause effects that are self-determined (at least to some extent), or put differently that we are able to cause effects that are not wholly deterministic.

You prop up your definitions and hack away at them. Straw man.

Given the state of everything, the next thing to happen is inevitable or it is not. If it is, then it's determined by the initial conditions. If it's not then there's a factor that isn't a condition, so must be random (if it weren't it would be a condition).

 

[JerryL]

We understand the basics of a neural network better than you think. We can even replicate it (though not to the complexity level of the human brain; Artificial insect intelligence (they make decisions about left vs right too) is surprisingly advanced.

I wanted to update on this since it came across my desk:
A Worm's Mind In A Lego Body

Looks like an artificial brain. Not a human brain mind you: but a brain.