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Free will?

ThePainefulTruth

Romantic-Cynic
Oh, sure, we can consider and reject bad ideas. But that's in our nature. :p

I'm not talking about rejecting bad ideas as much as rejecting temptation to do evil.


And therefore omnipotence is a logically incoherent concept.
No. Some might call it a paradox, but I don't think it's even that.

You were the one who posited that God is omnipotent/scient.
No, I'm just going along with theists for the sake of argument, and it isn't unreasonable to give those qualities to a being that created the universe.

Your hypothesis, you answer. :p
I've been doing so since I got here. Any such creatures would not have free will--the provision of which is obviously an incredibly delicate operation, even for the Divine One--I mean, creating this vast, completely rational cosmos without our being able to detect it's supernatural creator or lack of one.
 
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PolyHedral

Superabacus Mystic
Where is that done? Ever? I've seen Dirac's notation (probably the most common), Feynmann's, vector representations, and others, but never anything using coordinates.
I think it's used in Cox's Everything That Can Happen Does Happen. I have also spoken with several physicists, who have understood the notation without issue.

In Dirac's notation, kets represent the state as an abstract vector space unique to that system which spans some subspace of H.
I think you mean a vector in that space. A single state is represented by a single point in Hilbert space, because the ket is literally synonymous with the hat or bold type for vectors.

Where's time in all of this?
It parametrizes the line in Hilbert space. I think

The wave function provides only a formal description and does not by itself make contact with the properties of the system.
Actually, I was being accidentally specific earlier. The wavefunction's arguments are spectrum values of the operator the WF is written in the basis of, IIRC. The result conjugate-product of the result is the probability of observing that value.

Where are you getting these variables from? Do you think the wave function tells us anything about time evolution of any quantum system?
Since time evolution is a pure, unitary transform on the wavefunction, yes. Since time evolution's only parameter is the wavefunction, what else would tell us?

Because there is not sufficient evidence to support this. I went through some dozen or so studies already in this thread, and ended a lengthy discussion of the literature here:
I read that post, (and its previous part) and couldn't actually find any reference to a proof of non-locality, except a brief mention in a paper that was explicitly assuming the transactional interpretation. (which axiomatically posits backwards-propagating signals) There are lots of statements along the lines of, "Entanglement causes correlation at a distance, therefore ansible!" However, I contend these are flawed interpretations, not experimental verification of any sort. It confuses inferred observation with actual effect. You "know" that the other side of the pair has also collapsed not because you've measured it, but because you have followed the physical effects backwards and inferred it. That chain of physical effects is entirely local - because it hinges on the entanglement process, which requires the particles to be in proximity.

It isn't. More importantly, the detection of macroscopic systems in two places at the same time is hardly local.
Have you detected a macroscopic system in two places/states at the same time, or have you set up a macroscopic superposition? There's a crucial difference - the former is absurd, the latter is sensible.

Thanks to the "just take the math as is" approach, it's entirely possible to show that quantum systems violate superluminal restrictions, can be entirely acausal in this reality, can exist in multiple places at once in this reality, and can be dected in multiple differnt states at the same time and in this reality. Not some "multiverse". I linked you to two fully accessible studies with plenty of references to previous work in this field you can access without cost (which, alas, is not generally true).
So build me an ansible. :D


utterly irrelevant. Because it is no longer a thought-experiment.
I've still yet to sit down and actually parse what the actualized experiments were doing.
It's now empirical. More importantly, we now have "quantum teleportation" and other such violations of superluminal restrictions and causality.
Quantum teleportation explicitly requires a classical, i.e. subluminal, channel of communication.

All without some "many-worlds" splitting.
How would you even tell? Many worlds divergence is, by definition, impossible to observe.

Insofar as measurment is at all meaningful in physics, it has.
"Measuring" a superposition collapses it and produces one answer. That's the whole reason they're so mysterious. If we could measure them without disturbing them, there wouldn't be an issue.

The "law of really large numbers" assumes a probabilistic framework which precludes any MWI.
Except if you've "labelled" (for lack of better term - the values are unphysical, but are useful for bookkeeping) the wavefunction branches with their probabilities.

They are all we observe, and exist independently of the wave function formalism.
What does that mean? The only infallible data we have is our sensory input. We can't sense momentum, or electric charge, or spin. We need to model the world to understand where all our sensory experience comes from. The wavefunction formalism is simply a more explanatory model.

Do you think the universe is conscious and is capable of self-determining states of being through mental causation? Because that was the point of Descartes argument. Not a quantum computer, but consciousness.
I don't what else Descartes said. I was only quoting one argument.
 
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LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
who have understood the notation without issue.

How? Or why? After all, if you want to treat the wave function in so basic a sense, you've already introduced more than you need: "In quantum mechanics, the state of a particle is described by a complex-valued function of position and time, ψ(x, t), x ∈ , t ∈ R." Mathematical Concepts of Quantum Mechanics (Springer, 2003). However, the reason this is totally inadequate is apparent from something as simple as the double slit experiment, where ψ=ψ1+ψ2. And as this is only a simple combination of wavefunctions, in order to generalize the wave function to be applicable to any given quantum system, we require that wave function represent "the state of all possible states of a possible of a particle at a given time" (ibid). Also, the state of a microscopic system "can be loosely expressed by saying that if a system can exist in different configurations (corresponding for example to different classical descriptions), it can also exist in a superposition of these configurations, so to speak ‘suspended’ between them" (italics in original). from Exploring the Quantum (Oxford Graduate Texts).

Perhaps clearest of all (italics in original; emphasis added): "Moreover, quantum states are not simply specifications of the corresponding classical quantities. Consider a single classical particle. The state of a classical particle at some time is given by the three position coordinates and the three velocity components of the particle. It turns out, however, that the quantum state of a single particle at a particular time is, in general, a function in space. This means that, in contrast to the classical state, we can’t simply specify unique coordinates and velocities of a quantum particle." from Bowman's Essential Quantum Mechanics (Oxford University Press, 2008)


I think you mean a vector in that space. A single state is represented by a single point in Hilbert space
This ignores the most basic principles (esp. the superposition principle) of QM (emphasis added): "The state of a physical system at t=t0 is defined in terms of a ket, or a row vector |ψ0⟩ belonging to the vector space of states. The space of states is a vector space, therefore it follows that the superposition of two states is again a state of the system. The space of states also contains the concept of the scalar product." from Razavy's Heisenberg's Quantum Mechanics (World Scientific, 2011). Second, as for "in that space", again from Mathematical Concepts of Quantum Mechanics: "the space of quantum-mechanical states of a system is a vector space with an inner-product (in fact a Hilbert space)."

Also, from Exploring the Quantum (emphasis added): "In layman’s language, we may say that the wave function describes the state of the particle suspended, before measurement, in a continuous superposition of an infinite number of possible positions." Basically, the essence of quantum mechanics (and a main reason it exists, distinguished from classical), is captured by the fact that the state of a quantum system is described by vectors, plural, making the state (or ket) a vector space. Additionally, not only is an entirely seperate formalism needed (observable operators) to get any information about final states, but also we the accompanying measurement forces what cannot be described in terms of specific, unique coordinates even in Hilbert space to become not "points" or coordinates in Hilbert space, but in R3.

Finally, to include time in the picture at all, we either use it as a parameter or an observable, but never to characterize a quantum system (emphasis added): "the quantum state of a system at a given time is capable of precisely specifying only a corresponding subset of the physical magnitudes, that is, the currently “observed” quantities and the others that are functions only of them, in the intervals between measurement events, this being so only as long as quantities other than these remain unmeasured, that is, 'unobserved.'" from Jaeger's Entanglement, Information, and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Springer, 2009).

It parametrizes the line in Hilbert space. I think

It can't. Because no coordinate in Hilbert space can denote time, which is an element of R.

Since time evolution's only parameter is the wavefunction, what else would tell us?
The obervable operator used, which is how we are able to describe the quantum at all. That's often called the "second postulate" of quantum mechanics (italics in original): "Properties of a quantum-mechanical system that can (in principle) be observed, or measured, are called observables, and are represented by Hermitian operators." Essential Quantum Mechanics


However, I contend these are flawed interpretations, not experimental verification of any sort.
So the superposition of macroscopic systems (observed experimentally in e.g., "Quantum interference of large organic molecules") is explainable locally through...? Proof cannot be empirical. And there are many proofs that either QM or GR (or both) entails superluminal signals, nonlocality, and/or causality violations. These are necessarily mathematical, as (apart from the definition of proof itself) with QM that's what we have (mathematics), and with general relativity we are quite limited in our ability to experiment with CTCs other than mathematically.

This is not to say we don't have experimental evidence of both nonlocality and superluminal signalling. For the latter, see e.g.,
"Superluminal Twin Beams, Superluminal Images and the Arrival Time of Spatial Information in Optical Pulses with Negative Group Velocity"
"Superluminal Images and the Arrival of Spatial Information in Optical Pulses with Negative Group Velocity"
"Stimulated Generation of Superluminal Light Pulses via Four-Wave Mixing" (full text available for free here)

We find articles like this in journals like Science and Nature: "Quantum teleportation and entanglement distribution over 100-kilometre free-space channels"

In the above article, the authors note: "In comparison to these previous studies, the experiment presented in this Letter achieves long-distance free-space teleportation of an independent quantum state, thus paving the way for satellite-based global quantum communication."


It confuses inferred observation with actual effect.
The entirety of quantum theory rests on such inference. Hence the problems.


There's a crucial difference - the former is absurd, the latter is sensible.

When a journal like Science publishes a study like "Entangling Macroscopic Diamonds at Room Temperature", and when Nature publishes study like "Real-time single-molecule imaging of quantum interference" in which the authors state directly that their results are an "unambiguous demonstration" which is "only explicable in quantum terms" and "provide clear and tangible evidence of the quantum behaviour of large molecules", you'll forgive me if I tend to take such results seriously, rather than evidence that the most respected science journals in the world got really sloppy.

For someone who has so much faith in the possibility of some future experimental evidence that consciousness is possible using a computer, you sure are skeptical of actual experimental evidence when it comes to modern physics.

Quantum teleportation explicitly requires a classical, i.e. subluminal, channel of communication.
The classical requirement is simply that it needs to be capable of human observation: "Quantum teleportation relies on using both a quantum channel and a classical channel between two parties...The quantum channel is used by Alice and Bob to share the entangled auxiliary state." (from "Quantum teleportation over 143 kilometres using active feed-forward")

How would you even tell? Many worlds divergence is, by definition, impossible to observe.
Yes, but it is supposed to tell us why we can't measure the superposition state, or why we can only get a single state for the same system rather than observe the wave-particle (nonlocal) duality. As we can actually observe these now, what purpose does a many-worlds interpretation serve?

"Measuring" a superposition collapses it and produces one answer.
Not anymore. We can now get two answers at once, hence experiments like the one in Science: "A Quantum Delayed-Choice Experiment"

I don't what else Descartes said. I was only quoting one argument.
That argument was about proving consciousness. It isn't something else he said. That was it.
 
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LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Free will is a nonsensical concept to me.
Why?

Why is this thread so long???

For a number of reasons, but mainly because
1) the nuances as well as "nonsensical" concepts in modern physics
2) the nuances involving definitions of things like determinism, causality, and free wil.
&
3) the patience of (among others) PolyHedral. I have continued to respond to posts, and more than any other he has continued to challenge these, which is what (I would think) a debate section of a discussion forum is all about.
 

Penumbra

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Because I've never seen a definition that makes sense to me. Rather than being something that could exist in some possible universe but may or may not exist in this one based on physical laws, as far as I can tell it's an internally logically inconsistent concept that doesn't get past the definition phase.

For a number of reasons, but mainly because
1) the nuances as well as "nonsensical" concepts in modern physics
2) the nuances involving definitions of things like determinism, causality, and free wil.
&
3) the patience of (among others) PolyHedral. I have continued to respond to posts, and more than any other he has continued to challenge these, which is what (I would think) a debate section of a discussion forum is all about.
The combination of thread resurrection and discussion of physics is intriguing. Y'all must be particularly interested to resurrect such a discussion.
 

atanu

Member
Premium Member
For a number of reasons, but mainly because
-------
3) the patience of (among others) PolyHedral. I have continued to respond to posts, and more than any other he has continued to challenge these, which is what (I would think) a debate section of a discussion forum is all about.

Yes. He has even been patient with me. :) A great guy.
 

atanu

Member
Premium Member
Free will is a nonsensical concept to me.

Why is this thread so long???

Why?

For a number of reasons, but mainly because
1) the nuances as well as "nonsensical" concepts in modern physics
2) the nuances involving definitions of things like determinism, causality, and free wil.
&
3) the patience of (among others) PolyHedral. I have continued to respond to posts, and more than any other he has continued to challenge these, which is what (I would think) a debate section of a discussion forum is all about.
Because I've never seen a definition that makes sense to me. Rather than being something that could exist in some possible universe but may or may not exist in this one based on physical laws, as far as I can tell it's an internally logically inconsistent concept that doesn't get past the definition phase.

The combination of thread resurrection and discussion of physics is intriguing. Y'all must be particularly interested to resurrect such a discussion.

How about "the ability to make a choice or engage in some action such that you could have chosen or done otherwise"?


It depends.

Which variable would have been different to result in a different choice in the same environment?

None, except the knowledge of 'free will for whom?' :foot:
 
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LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
It depends.

Which variable would have been different to result in a different choice in the same environment?
The problem with phrasing it in terms of variables is that one has to relate these to "reality" somehow. Hence the lengthy discussion of modern physics, in which this isn't really done (or is done using methods which contradict theory). Or (even better) in the most recent experiments, variables of the same system have actually been measured with different results (values) at the same time. That was this means:
"Measuring" a superposition collapses it and produces one answer.
Not anymore. We can now get two answers at once, hence experiments like the one in Science: "A Quantum Delayed-Choice Experiment"
The link describes an experiment in which the same system is two different things at once. Other experiments describe objects at the macroscopic level as in two places at once.

So, if we can describe a macroscopic system as being in two different places or states at once, then we already have "variables" which aren't just such that they could've been different, but are instead somehow different then what they are. Hence my description of concepts in modern physics as "nonsensical."

I can describe functions and variables in terms of mental state causation in which a change of "will" (or volition) results in a change of result. In that case, consciousness causes diferent results depending on what a conscious agent wills. The reason for the lengthy discussion of physics is whether or not this is (or can be) within the realm of science, as well as whether or not it is in contradiction to science. Given the ubiquity of acceptence within the physical and life sciences of functional emergence, or the capacity for a system (like the brain) to produce a property (like consciousness) which is not reducible to the system itself but which can determine the system's future states, mental causation is clearly not in contradiction to much (perhaps most) of scientific work. And given the amount of scientific literature currently devoted to the nature of consciousness as a causal force, it clearly isn't outside the realm of science.

But a model of mental causation, or the ability of the conscious self to cause changes which are not reducible to neural activity, is also not easily demonstrated. Partly this is due to the nature of most classic scientific models, which are reductionist, and partly it is due to the nature of the cognitive sciences (not to mention the complexity of the brain).
 
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Penumbra

Veteran Member
Premium Member
The problem with phrasing it in terms of variables is that one has to relate these to "reality" somehow. Hence the lengthy discussion of modern physics, in which this isn't really done (or is done using methods which contradict theory). Or (even better) in the most recent experiments, variables of the same system have actually been measured with different results (values) at the same time. That was this means:

The link describes an experiment in which the same system is two different things at once. Other experiments describe objects at the macroscopic level as in two places at once.

So, if we can describe a macroscopic system as being in two different places or states at once, then we already have "variables" which aren't just such that they could've been different, but are instead somehow different then what they are. Hence my description of concepts in modern physics as "nonsensical."

I can describe functions and variables in terms of mental state causation in which a change of "will" (or volition) results in a change of result. In that case, consciousness causes diferent results depending on what a conscious agent wills.
What determines what the conscious agent wills?

More specifically, what does it mean for the conscious agent to 'will' something?

The reason for the lengthy discussion of physics is whether or not this is (or can be) within the realm of science, as well as whether or not it is in contradiction to science. Given the ubiquity of acceptence within the physical and life sciences of functional emergence, or the capacity for a system (like the brain) to produce a property (like consciousness) which is not reducible to the system itself but which can determine the system's future states, mental causation is clearly not in contradiction to much (perhaps most) of scientific work. And given the amount of scientific literature currently devoted to the nature of consciousness as a causal force, it clearly isn't outside the realm of science.

But a model of mental causation, or the ability of the conscious self to cause changes which are not reducible to neural activity, is also not easily demonstrated. Partly this is due to the nature of most classic scientific models, which are reductionist, and partly it is due to the nature of the cognitive sciences (not to mention the complexity of the brain).
It seems to me that a working logical model would come before a detailed physical model. But maybe that's just my background in systems engineering talking.

If a working logical model is not known, physical arguments would likely be effective in examining ideas for the logical model, but a logical model would still be the most essential piece to focus on developing as far as I can tell.
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
I hope you don't mind if I reverse your responses, as this will better enable a response.
It seems to me that a working logical model would come before a detailed physical model. But maybe that's just my background in systems engineering talking.

If a working logical model is not known, physical arguments would likely be effective in examining ideas for the logical model, but a logical model would still be the most essential piece to focus on developing as far as I can tell.

The problem with "a working logical model" is that for the past 100 years or so, we've had two fundamentally different types of logical (ontological) models. Classical logic says that something cannot be A & not A at the same time (non tertium datur). Quantum logic disagrees (so does quantum information theory and quantum computing). Currently, experimental evidence seems to support the latter as more closely resembling basic levels of reality.

That said, we have plenty of "logical" models for mental causation. Too many. They range from "emergent physicalism" to outright immaterialism, and everything in between. The problem isn't logic, but that logical models outside of purely symbolic/mathematical calculi depend upon linguistic usage. And language is filled with ambiguity. Additionally, as we cannot build a working model of consciousness, or even of something capable of that which even non-human "minds" (dogs, dolphins, etc.) are capable of, we can't demonstrate that mental causation is necessary or not via a working model.

And, as I said, physics is little help here, as the divide between the classical and the quantum has become increasingly fuzzy, but without the additional clarity of what quantum reality consists of. It seems that there is a fundamental indeterminism to reality, but it is not clear that this does (and if it does how it does) enable us to relate one of the logical or mathematical models of mental causation to observed, physical reality.

However, what is certainly clear is that simplistic causal models in which every cause has a set of effects, such that "free will" is incompatible with modern science, is completely outdated. It may be that the brain cannot produce an emergent ontological property of "self" (consciousness) capable of self-determining the brain, but circular causality is consistent with models of biological systems quite indepenently of the brain. It is ubiquitous in systems biology, characterizes much of quantum physics, is at least logically/mathematically proven in modern physics at both the micro and macro levels, and is consistent with a good many logical models of the mind.

What determines what the conscious agent wills?
More specifically, what does it mean for the conscious agent to 'will' something?
A "conscious agent" is capable of two things:
1) understanding concepts (abstract, semantic content rather than mere procedures and formulae)
2) A concept of "self" understood as a unified entity apart from other entities and even apart from the entity's vehicle (e.g., I might make reference "my hand" or even "my brain", yet understand these as somehow not "me")

However, apart from description (even mathematical description, so long as one-to-one correspondence between variables and functions and physical observations is not required; again, this is true of modern physics in general), there is no way (currently) to model what a "conscious agent" or "mental causation" means, or how it relates to human choice. How could it, when scientific models lacking this one-to-one correspondence are (with many exceptions) generally considered approximations?

Without writing a book on the subject (as there are many), suffice it to say that a conscious agent is capable of doing what you often intuitively (conscious or no) think of yourself as doing: making choices. You may reflect upon a conscious decision later and decide that it was completely determined by neurons, your past, your environment, etc., but it at least appears that you make conscious choices. It at least seems as if many decisions you make are the product of "you" (understood as the same entity you reference e.g. every time you speak in the first person singular). Logicians refer to counterfactual/modal arguments relating to causality, to symbolic representations of properties, and so forth, but these all, in the end, require an ability to comprehend. They are not purely computational, and hence cannot be proven apart from interpretation.
 
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idav

Being
Premium Member
I hope you don't mind if I reverse your responses, as this will better enable a response.


The problem with "a working logical model" is that for the past 100 years or so, we've had two fundamentally different types of logical (ontological) models. Classical logic says that something cannot be A & not A at the same time (non tertium datur). Quantum logic disagrees (so does quantum information theory and quantum computing). Currently, experimental evidence seems to support the latter as more closely resembling basic levels of reality.

That said, we have plenty of "logical" models for mental causation. Too many. They range from "emergent physicalism" to outright institutionalism, and everything in between. The problem isn't logic, but that logical models outside of purely symbolic/mathematical calculi depend upon linguistic usage. And language is filled with ambiguity. Additionally, as we cannot build a working model of consciousness, or even of something capable of that which even non-human "minds" (dogs, dolphins, etc.) are capable of, we can't demonstrate that mental causation is necessary or not via a working model.

And, as I said, physics is little help here, as the divide between the classical and the quantum has become increasingly fuzzy, but without the additional clarity of what quantum reality consists of. It seems that there is a fundamental indeterminism to reality, but it is not clear that this does (and if it does how it does) enable us to relate one of the logical or mathematical models of mental causation to observed, physical reality.

However, what is certainly clear is that simplistic causal models in which every cause has a set of effects, such that "free will" is incompatible with modern science, is completely outdated. It may be that the brain cannot produce an emergent ontological property of "self" (consciousness) capable of self-determining the brain, but circular causality is consistent with models of biological systems quite indepenently of the brain. It is ubiquitous in systems biology, characterizes much of quantum physics, is at least logically/mathematically proven in modern physics at both the micro and macro levels, and is consistent with a good many logical models of the mind.


A "conscious agent" is capable of two things:
1) understanding concepts (abstract, semantic content rather than mere procedures and formulae)
2) A concept of "self" understood as a unified entity apart from other entities and even apart from the entity's vehicle (e.g., I might make reference "my hand" or even "my brain", yet understand these as somehow not "me")

However, apart from description (even mathematical description, so long as one-to-one correspondence between variables and functions and physical observations is not required; again, this is true of modern physics in general), there is no way (currently) to model what a "conscious agent" or "mental causation" means, or how it relates to human choice. How could it, when scientific models lacking this one-to-one correspondence are (with many exceptions) generally considered approximations?

Without writing a book on the subject (as there are many), suffice it to say that a conscious agent is capable of doing what you often intuitively (conscious or no) think of yourself as doing: making choices. You may reflect upon a conscious decision later and decide that it was completely determined by neurons, your past, your environment, etc., but it at least appears that you make conscious choices. It at least seems as if many decisions you make are the product of "you" (understood as the same entity you reference e.g. every time you speak in the first person singular). Logicians refer to counterfactual/modal arguments relating to causality, to symbolic representations of properties, and so forth, but these all, in the end, require an ability to comprehend. They are not purely computational, and hence cannot be proven apart from interpretation.

None of the truth your saying has any change in that it is all still computational and logical. Even multie world theory goes by logic despite human unknowns.
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
None of the truth your saying has any change in that it is all still computational and logical. Even multie world theory goes by logic despite human unknowns.
Computability theory and proofs demonstrate that there are incomputable problems. If we accept that logic and computational models are sound, then we must also accept that there are models which are incomputable. It's just a question of which models are incomputable.
 

idav

Being
Premium Member
Computability theory and proofs demonstrate that there are incomputable problems. If we accept that logic and computational models are sound, then we must also accept that there are models which are incomputable. It's just a question of which models are incomputable.

What does incomputable have to do with real world decisions. There is cause and effect regardless of the possibility of multiple simultaneous cause. When making a decision you still have to choose which results in a path that can be followed logically. Unknowns. May be incomputable but once hidden variables are actualized there is no incomputable. QM doesn't state that anything is possible. Classical macro limits still apply.
 

LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
I read that post, (and its previous part) and couldn't actually find any reference to a proof of non-locality, except a brief mention in a paper that was explicitly assuming the transactional interpretation. (which axiomatically posits backwards-propagating signals) There are lots of statements along the lines of, "Entanglement causes correlation at a distance, therefore ansible!" However, I contend these are flawed interpretations, not experimental verification of any sort.
I know I responded to this already, but I forgot to include two important things. The first is a simple question. What "post"? I posted a number of studies a while back discussing superluminal signals and CTCs. And as I have also referenced work on the issue of nonlocality so many times in general in this thread, I don't know which "post" and "previous part" you are talking about.

More importantly, without even getting into quantum physics at all, what reason do we have for thinking that superluminal signals are possible or impossible? In both cases, we have mathematical proof derived from the mathematical formulation of general relativity for the former (i.e., it's possible), and special relativity for the latter (impossible). However, it is only for the impossibility of superluminal signals that we have only mathematical "proof", while there is empirical (if contentious) support for the possibility of such signals.

There are solutions to Einstein's equations which allow (in the GTR framework) closed time-like curves. And it is not clear what exactly the STR prohibits. As Weinstein points out in "Superluminal signaling and relativity" (Synthese 148:381-399; 2006), the "proof" of the impossibility of superluminal velocities in relativistic spacetime can't actually be derived from Einstein's equations. That is, Einstein's original work only really requires that the speed of light be constant, and arguments that this entails "that it would be impossible to send signals faster than light...are nowhere to be found in Einstein's orginal work." Weinstein goes on to say (italics in original) "Nonetheless, it is commonly asserted that special relativity rules out the possibility of sending signals faster than light, of 'superluminal signalling'. However, it is well-known that there are physical phenomena perfectly compatible with special relativity in which 'something' travels faster than light. Thus accounts of such phenomena are usually accompanied by disclaimers explaining why the phenomenon in question cannot be used to send signals".


In other words, the "interpretation" problem is not one way. Even ignoring QM, it is by no means true that we have any theoretical reason to suppose that superluminal signals are impossible in relativistic spacetime(s). Rather, much of the arguments against the possibility of this, as well as why certain experiments which appear to show that superluminal signalling is indeed possible somehow do not actually show this, are aesthetic. They rest on the assumption that classical causality is somehow axiomatic, and thus "violations" of this cannot actually be violations. But, as the authors of "Closed timelike curves in relativistic computation" (Parallel Processing Letters, 22(03); 2012) put it, the physicists who hold CTCs to be impossible "usually suggest excluding them by assuming (as an axiom) that there are no CTCs in physically reasonable spacetimes." They also quote another here who compares this approach to Euclid's parallel postulate, which closed off "interesting lines of investigation" for millenia (with everyone trying to prove the fifth from the other four). A central reason the work of Lobachevski & Bólyai was taken seriously was Gauss, who had actually formulated a hyperbolic geometry of his own, but had decided he should not publish the results. It wasn't until his results were finally published some 30 years after the independent work of Lobachevski and Bólyai that serious work began on non-Euclidean geometries, which are central to the geometry of spacetime (Bólyai, whose father had sent Gauss his son's work on hyperbolic geometry and received the reply that Gauss not only believed it correct but had developed the same himself, believed that Lobachevski was a pseudonym Gauss used to protect his reputation).

In other words, centuries of work devoted to proving Euclid's fifth postulate held back a geometry necessary to understand spacetime even after consistent non-Euclidean geometries were developed, all because nobody wanted to consider seriously the possibility that it need not hold. Again, aesthetics (or, less generously, dogma).
 
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LegionOnomaMoi

Veteran Member
Premium Member
What does incomputable have to do with real world decisions.
This:
None of the truth your saying has any change in that it is all still computational and logical.

The idea behind computationalism, or that all thought is reducible to algorithms and computers (technically only to Turing equivalent computers, but at the moment this means all computers), is that the brain is a "Turing machine" of sorts and thus everything that the brain can do, a computer can do. Incomputability concerns things that computers cannot do. There are various "proofs" designed to show that human cognition necessarily violates these limits, some going back almost as far as computers. I don't find them particularly convincing, and neither do most within the cognitive and computer sciences. But these proofs are designed to show that human language/thought involves incomputable functions, and thus exceeds the limits of all current computers and any future computer which is Turing equivalent. That's how incomputability relates to "real world decisions".

There is cause and effect regardless of the possibility of multiple simultaneous cause.

On the contrary, it is generally agreed that this is not the case in many systems, at least insofar as there are "effects" with "causes" which we could just as easily reverse (i.e., call the "causes" the "effects") and it would be just as valid. A more serious problem is the claim that classical causality (all effects have efficient/proximal causes, even if the choice of which is which can in some cases be arbitrary) is just flat-out wrong.

When making a decision you still have to choose which results in a path that can be followed logically.

How can it be followed logically? Or rather, what do you mean by this?

QM doesn't state that anything is possible. Classical macro limits still apply.
And what are these limits?
 
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PolyHedral

Superabacus Mystic
How? Or why? After all, if you want to treat the wave function in so basic a sense, you've already introduced more than you need: "In quantum mechanics, the state of a particle is described by a complex-valued function of position and time, ψ(x, t), x ∈ , t ∈ R." Mathematical Concepts of Quantum Mechanics (Springer, 2003).
For so much focus on semantics in the other thread, you seem to have got hung up on the equivalent of the difference between "color" and "colour." :p Let x=(x',y,z) for x',y,z ∈ R. Ta-da.
This is totally inadequate is apparent from something as simple as the double slit experiment, where ψ=ψ1+ψ2. And as this is only a simple combination of wavefunctions, in order to generalize the wave function to be applicable to any given quantum system, we require that wave function represent "the state of all possible states of a possible of a particle at a given time" (ibid). Also, the state of a microscopic system "can be loosely expressed by saying that if a system can exist in different configurations (corresponding for example to different classical descriptions), it can also exist in a superposition of these configurations, so to speak ‘suspended’ between them" (italics in original). from Exploring the Quantum (Oxford Graduate Texts).

Perhaps clearest of all (italics in original; emphasis added): "Moreover, quantum states are not simply specifications of the corresponding classical quantities. Consider a single classical particle. The state of a classical particle at some time is given by the three position coordinates and the three velocity components of the particle. It turns out, however, that the quantum state of a single particle at a particular time is, in general, a function in space. This means that, in contrast to the classical state, we can’t simply specify unique coordinates and velocities of a quantum particle." from Bowman's Essential Quantum Mechanics (Oxford University Press, 2008)
All of this is responding to mistakes I haven't actually made.
This ignores the most basic principles (esp. the superposition principle) of QM (emphasis added): "The state of a physical system at t=t0 is defined in terms of a ket, or a row vector |ψ0⟩ belonging to the vector space of states. The space of states is a vector space, therefore it follows that the superposition of two states is again a state of the system.
This is what I said earlier.
Also, from Exploring the Quantum (emphasis added): "In layman’s language, we may say that the wave function describes the state of the particle suspended, before measurement, in a continuous superposition of an infinite number of possible positions."
That's what the ψ(x, t)-type wavefunction does.

Basically, the essence of quantum mechanics (and a main reason it exists, distinguished from classical), is captured by the fact that the state of a quantum system is described by vectors, plural, making the state (or ket) a vector space.
"The state of a physical system at t=t0 is defined in terms of a ket, or a row vector |ψ0⟩ belonging to the vector space of states."

Finally, to include time in the picture at all, we either use it as a parameter or an observable, but never to characterize a quantum system (emphasis added): "the quantum state of a system at a given time is capable of precisely specifying only a corresponding subset of the physical magnitudes, that is, the currently “observed” quantities and the others that are functions only of them, in the intervals between measurement events, this being so only as long as quantities other than these remain unmeasured, that is, 'unobserved.'" from Jaeger's Entanglement, Information, and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Springer, 2009).
The quote does not appear to logically connect to your argument.

It can't. Because no coordinate in Hilbert space can denote time, which is an element of R.
A line through a space, A, is defined by a function of R -> A. There's no need for A to resemble the real numbers, although it presumably has to be continuous for this idea to make sense as a "line."

The obervable operator used, which is how we are able to describe the quantum at all.
Those operate on a wavefunction, and so the thing that determines future evolution is the present wavefunction only.

So the superposition of macroscopic systems (observed experimentally in e.g., "Quantum interference of large organic molecules") is explainable locally through...?
A condition on the operators. Specifically, that operators applied to space-like separated points always commute.

In the above article, the authors note: "In comparison to these previous studies, the experiment presented in this Letter achieves long-distance free-space teleportation of an independent quantum state, thus paving the way for satellite-based global quantum communication."
Although I haven't had time to read all the papers, you seem to have ignored my objection that entangled states are neither nonlocal or superluminal.

The entirety of quantum theory rests on such inference. Hence the problems.
In this case, the logic that entangled particles collapse superluminally is the same as that which dictates that occluded objects cease to exist.

When a journal like Science publishes a study like "Entangling Macroscopic Diamonds at Room Temperature", and when Nature publishes study like "Real-time single-molecule imaging of quantum interference" in which the authors state directly that their results are an "unambiguous demonstration" which is "only explicable in quantum terms" and "provide clear and tangible evidence of the quantum behaviour of large molecules", you'll forgive me if I tend to take such results seriously, rather than evidence that the most respected science journals in the world got really sloppy.
I have never said that quantum behaviour cannot be produced on arbitrarily large scales. I have said that entanglement is not superluminal, which those papers don't appear to comment on.

For someone who has so much faith in the possibility of some future experimental evidence that consciousness is possible using a computer, you sure are skeptical of actual experimental evidence when it comes to modern physics.
I am skeptical of your arguments, which are either not being backed up by the papers you are citing, or are not backed up by sufficient reasoning. (e.g. the wave-particle duality thing below)

The classical requirement is simply that it needs to be capable of human observation: "Quantum teleportation relies on using both a quantum channel and a classical channel between two parties...The quantum channel is used by Alice and Bob to share the entangled auxiliary state." (from "Quantum teleportation over 143 kilometres using active feed-forward")
"Human observation?" Where do humans appear in the equations?

Yes, but it is supposed to tell us why we can't measure the superposition state, or why we can only get a single state for the same system rather than observe the wave-particle (nonlocal) duality. As we can actually observe these now, what purpose does a many-worlds interpretation serve?
It does tell you exactly what happens when you measure a superposition state. For someone who was insisting upthread that the method behind QM was circular, you seem to accept the proposition that, because the apparatus has set up a superposition, that we have observed a superposition, very easily.

Not anymore. We can now get two answers at once, hence experiments like the one in Science: "A Quantum Delayed-Choice Experiment"
I did read most of this one, and found this:
mml-math-5.gif

That looks like one answer to me. :p

Also, I object to the authors' terminology. The concept of duality implies that the quantum objects are sometime waves, and sometimes particles, and they have to decide which to be. (And break locality in the process.) IMO, this is nonsense. They are always quantum things! Both Wheelers', and AFAICT their experiments do not exclude this model, which requires no superluminal signalling, and so no "signal" in the first place! The quantum always behaves as a complex-valued function which produces a discrete, quantized signal on a detector with a probability described by the Born rule, and so doesn't need to know whether or not the second beam-splitter is there until its actually put there.

In the case of Wheeler's experiment without the beam splitter, the wavefunction spreads along the two channels, and meets the two detectors. Because the setup is symmetrical, it is equally likely to register on either detector. If you stick the beam-splitter in the middle, then the two wave fragments both half-reflect off it, and then meet the (non-)reflected counterpart that came from the other channel, and interfere with it. Because the interference result depends on relative phase, that produces the results the experimenters saw.
 
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Penumbra

Veteran Member
Premium Member
I hope you don't mind if I reverse your responses, as this will better enable a response.

The problem with "a working logical model" is that for the past 100 years or so, we've had two fundamentally different types of logical (ontological) models. Classical logic says that something cannot be A & not A at the same time (non tertium datur). Quantum logic disagrees (so does quantum information theory and quantum computing). Currently, experimental evidence seems to support the latter as more closely resembling basic levels of reality.
Classical logic says that something cannot be A & not A at the same time and in the same way. Every sentence in your above statement relies on that being true even as you argue against it, because if it's not true language becomes irrelevant. Without identity, communication can't really occur.

Quantum mechanics, however, opens up situations where something can be both a wave and a particle, can be in a state of existential limbo with two distinct outcomes, etc. This is different than A and not A being identical in all ways.

That said, we have plenty of "logical" models for mental causation. Too many. They range from "emergent physicalism" to outright immaterialism, and everything in between. The problem isn't logic, but that logical models outside of purely symbolic/mathematical calculi depend upon linguistic usage. And language is filled with ambiguity. Additionally, as we cannot build a working model of consciousness, or even of something capable of that which even non-human "minds" (dogs, dolphins, etc.) are capable of, we can't demonstrate that mental causation is necessary or not via a working model.

And, as I said, physics is little help here, as the divide between the classical and the quantum has become increasingly fuzzy, but without the additional clarity of what quantum reality consists of. It seems that there is a fundamental indeterminism to reality, but it is not clear that this does (and if it does how it does) enable us to relate one of the logical or mathematical models of mental causation to observed, physical reality.

However, what is certainly clear is that simplistic causal models in which every cause has a set of effects, such that "free will" is incompatible with modern science, is completely outdated. It may be that the brain cannot produce an emergent ontological property of "self" (consciousness) capable of self-determining the brain, but circular causality is consistent with models of biological systems quite indepenently of the brain. It is ubiquitous in systems biology, characterizes much of quantum physics, is at least logically/mathematically proven in modern physics at both the micro and macro levels, and is consistent with a good many logical models of the mind.
That the part highlighted in blue was even brought up in response to my post shows that the physical details are still being brought into a logical model. I haven't posted anything here about free will being incompatible with modern science (and instead expressed interest/confusion on why so much emphasis on this thread has been placed on physics). Rather, I've brought up that free will seems internally inconsistent and fails early on at the definition stage prior to physical details even factoring into the conclusion.

A "conscious agent" is capable of two things:
1) understanding concepts (abstract, semantic content rather than mere procedures and formulae)
2) A concept of "self" understood as a unified entity apart from other entities and even apart from the entity's vehicle (e.g., I might make reference "my hand" or even "my brain", yet understand these as somehow not "me")
Granted.

However, apart from description (even mathematical description, so long as one-to-one correspondence between variables and functions and physical observations is not required; again, this is true of modern physics in general), there is no way (currently) to model what a "conscious agent" or "mental causation" means, or how it relates to human choice. How could it, when scientific models lacking this one-to-one correspondence are (with many exceptions) generally considered approximations?

Without writing a book on the subject (as there are many), suffice it to say that a conscious agent is capable of doing what you often intuitively (conscious or no) think of yourself as doing: making choices. You may reflect upon a conscious decision later and decide that it was completely determined by neurons, your past, your environment, etc., but it at least appears that you make conscious choices. It at least seems as if many decisions you make are the product of "you" (understood as the same entity you reference e.g. every time you speak in the first person singular). Logicians refer to counterfactual/modal arguments relating to causality, to symbolic representations of properties, and so forth, but these all, in the end, require an ability to comprehend. They are not purely computational, and hence cannot be proven apart from interpretation.
Other than your final paragraph which essentially expected me to presuppose free will as existing (which I won't do), these questions were admittedly unanswered:

"What determines what the conscious agent wills?
More specifically, what does it mean for the conscious agent to 'will' something?"

How can 'free will' be proposed to exist without first having a fairly tight logical model of what 'will' is?
 
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