Free will?

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Classical logic says that something cannot be A & not A at the same time and in the same way. Every sentence in your above statement relies on that being true even as you argue against it, because if it's not true language becomes irrelevant. Without identity, communication can't really occur.

Quantum mechanics, however, opens up situations where something can be both a wave and a particle, can be in a state of existential limbo with two distinct outcomes, etc. This is different than A and not A being identical in all ways.

It is as far as science relates to logic at all. Because until recently, the wave-particle duality meant only that we could measure some system exhibiting wave-like properties, or particle-like properties, but not both. So whatever ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics one held still involved at best thought experiments in which something could behave one way if observed in a certain way, and another way if observed in some different manner. All experiments had one, and only one, outcome.

This is no longer true. The article I linked to concerns the only tool science has available to understand the workings of reality as more than subjective interpretations: measurements/observations which can be used to describe the ways in which a system does what it does, such that it can be characterized as having certain properties but not others. Neuroscience involves a lot of neuroimaging, and perhaps the most important method is fMRI, which allows scientists to observe activity in parts of the brain under controlled conditions to see what places are more active given some type of cognitive task. Only fMRI doesn't actually measure activity, it measures something which gives and indication of blood-oxygen levels, which in turn is a measure of metabolic activity, and thus (ideally) neural activity. So when a subject is required to judge the similarity between two objects, or whether a spoken (or written) word corresponds to something larger or smaller than another word does, the metabolic changes hopefully provide a usable measure of whether or not particular regions were significantly more activated for this task relative to another.

Same with medical diagnoses, genetic markers, and all of science. When you measure and then describe a system has having certain properties (like a brain having vision pathways in particular regions), it either does, or it does not. Someone either has X virus, or they don't. That's the foundation of the scientific framework: being able to understand the dynamics of a system in terms of what properties it has/exhibits, and those that it does not.

QM didn't change this entirely for some time because even though we had systems which could behave in seemingly contradicting ways, we had only one actual measurement to deal with. So the wave-particle duality was protected by uncertainty, and the logic which does not obey classical logic could be an approximate model.

More modern experimental techniques have, even very recently, made this less and less true. The study I linked to was not one in which some quantum system could end up behaving like a particle if measured in some way, but like a wave if measured in another (cloaking a reality of seeming contradictions behind an inability to actually observe both). New quantum coherence techniques provided the ability to get measurements of a contradictory nature out of the exact same system.

Of course one can still say "well, the quantum system has the ontological property such that it can behave like a wave or a particle", but this doesn't solve the problem for 2 reasons. The first is that we are still left with using the same tool (observation/measurement) used to understand what anything is in a ways that gets results which cannot both be true (something cannot be a wave and a particle). The second is that superpositional states allow both microscopic and macrospic systems to be in two different places at the same time, thus having two different yet identical instantiations. This is again a violation of classical logic, as if e.g., I see a person in one location, they can only be at that location. If I see two people in two different locations, they must be different people. This is no longer true of even macroscopic systems.

That the part highlighted in blue was even brought up in response to my post shows that the physical details are still being brought into a logical model.

This is true. The question is whether or not it is possible to ever create a logical model which does what ideal scientific models (at least until recently, and still to a large extent) do: explain how everything works in terms of physical parts and the forces acting on them. If it is not (as is argued for living systems in general), then it will never be brought into a logical model in a way other than those which alreadly exist.

Rather, I've brought up that free will seems internally inconsistent and fails early on at the definition stage prior to physical details even factoring into the conclusion.

Because this is a classical causal model, in which we have distinguishable states and causes, and these are reducible to physical parts and physical laws. It is also largely rejected as inadequate, insofar as there seem to be functional properties/processes of systems which cannnot be reduced to the laws of physics and the parts at any time t (i.e., at any "state" at all), and yet can determine how the system evolves in time. To say that free will is internally inconsistent in the way you seem to relies on the notion that, at least in principle, I can explain the state of any system at any time t in terms of the physical parts making up the system and the laws of physics. Again, this is widely regarded as wrong. In the weakest rejection, the states don't violate the laws of physics, but they still cannot be reduced to (and therefore not predicted by) the state of the system at some prior time.

"What determines what the conscious agent wills?
More specifically, what does it mean for the conscious agent to 'will' something?"

How can 'free will' be proposed to exist without first having a fairly tight logical model of what 'will' is?

Modern science and mathematics (and systems of formal logic) began as an effort to describe movement: planets, falling objects, etc. After a while, the increased success this approach of applying mathematics/logic with observation introduced the idea that everything can be described in terms of laws of physics and the dynamics of parts. It was assumed that, whatever we couldn't yet explain, would still be reducible.

We don't have "fairly tight logical model(s)" for metabolic-repair processes in cells. There is an ongoing debate, with competing logical models, over whether or not basic cells are computable because (it is argued) this process describes a "logical" function which takes as its domain most of the cell, and as its image all of the cells, yet can only be understood as both producing cellular activity while at the same time being a product of the same activity it is produced by. This can be easily modelled logically (it has been). But the logical models incorporate features which do not correspond only to the activity of parts and the laws of physics. Instead, they introduce a functional process which exists apart from (but somehow dependent upon) both the cell's dynamics and the laws of physics.

Emergence doesn't create a problem for logical models. But it does create a problem for "tight" logical models insofar as these can be mapped onto the physical properties of the system as well as physics. However, it is increasingly used across scientific fields to explain observed phenomena.

Basically, what you call inconsistent is only inconsistent (if I understand you) in that it doesn't fit into to the classical understanding reductionism and causation. We can't map the models onto specific physical processes, but rather rely on emergent ones. However, this is hardly something which applies only to the human brain, or to brains.

 

[Penumbra]

It is as far as science relates to logic at all. Because until recently, the wave-particle duality meant only that we could measure some system exhibiting wave-like properties, or particle-like properties, but not both. So whatever ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics one held still involved at best thought experiments in which something could behave one way if observed in a certain way, and another way if observed in some different manner. All experiments had one, and only one, outcome.

This is no longer true. The article I linked to concerns the only tool science has available to understand the workings of reality as more than subjective interpretations: measurements/observations which can be used to describe the ways in which a system does what it does, such that it can be characterized as having certain properties but not others. Neuroscience involves a lot of neuroimaging, and perhaps the most important method is fMRI, which allows scientists to observe activity in parts of the brain under controlled conditions to see what places are more active given some type of cognitive task. Only fMRI doesn't actually measure activity, it measures something which gives and indication of blood-oxygen levels, which in turn is a measure of metabolic activity, and thus (ideally) neural activity. So when a subject is required to judge the similarity between two objects, or whether a spoken (or written) word corresponds to something larger or smaller than another word does, the metabolic changes hopefully provide a usable measure of whether or not particular regions were significantly more activated for this task relative to another.

Same with medical diagnoses, genetic markers, and all of science. When you measure and then describe a system has having certain properties (like a brain having vision pathways in particular regions), it either does, or it does not. Someone either has X virus, or they don't. That's the foundation of the scientific framework: being able to understand the dynamics of a system in terms of what properties it has/exhibits, and those that it does not.

QM didn't change this entirely for some time because even though we had systems which could behave in seemingly contradicting ways, we had only one actual measurement to deal with. So the wave-particle duality was protected by uncertainty, and the logic which does not obey classical logic could be an approximate model.

More modern experimental techniques have, even very recently, made this less and less true. The study I linked to was not one in which some quantum system could end up behaving like a particle if measure in some way, but like a wave if measured another (cloaking a reality of seeming contradictions behind an inability to actually observe both). New quantum coherence techniques provided the ability to get measurements of a contradictory nature out of the exact same system.

Of course one can still say "well, the quantum system has the ontological property such that it can behave like a wave or a particle", but this doesn't solve the problem for 2 reasons. The first is that we are still left with using the same tool (observation/measurement) used to understand what anything is in a ways that gets results which cannot both be true (something cannot be a wave and a particle). The second is that superpositional states allow both microscopic and macrospic systems to be in two different places at the same time, thus having two different yet identical instantiations. This is again a violation of classical logic, as if e.g., I see a person in one location, they can only be at that location. If I see two people in two different locations, they must be different people. This is no longer true of even macroscopic systems.

I think the primary answer here is the one you argue against in your last paragraph here: that the quantum system has the ontological property such that it can be X and Y simultaneously. As long as we're specific about the set of characterstics that a given thing can express simultaneously.

So in other words if it can be demonstrated that an individual has the property of being able to be in two locations at once, I don't think that violates classical logic at all. Nothing about that is inherently absurd.

This is true. The question is whether or not it is possible to ever create a logical model which does what ideal scientific models (at least until recently, and still to a large extent) do: explain how everything works in terms of physical parts and the forces acting on them. If it is not (as is argued for living systems in general), then it will never be brought into a logical model in a way other than those which alreadly exist.

Because this is a classical causal model, in which we have distinguishable states and causes, and these are reducible to physical parts and physical laws. It is also largely rejected as inadequate, insofar as there seem to be functional properties/processes of systems which cannnot be reduced to the laws of physics and the parts at any time t (i.e., at any "state" at all), and yet can determine how the system evolves in time. To say that free will is internally inconsistent in the way you seem to relies on the notion that, at least in principle, I can explain the state of any system at any time t in terms of the physical parts making up the system and the laws of physics. Again, this is widely regarded as wrong. In the weakest rejection, the states don't violate the laws of physics, but they still cannot be reduced to (and therefore not predicted by) the state of the system at some prior time.

Modern science and mathematics (and systems of formal logic) began as an effort to describe movement: planets, falling objects, etc. After a while, the increased success this approach of applying mathematics/logic with observation introduced the idea that everything can be described in terms of laws of physics and the dynamics of parts. It was assumed that, whatever we couldn't yet explain, would still be reducible.

We don't have "fairly tight logical model(s)" for metabolic-repair processes in cells. There is an ongoing debate, with competing logical models, over whether or not basic cells are computable because (it is argued) this process describes a "logical" function which takes as its domain most of the cell, and as its image all of the cells, yet can only be understood as both producing cellular activity while at the same time being a product of the same activity it is produced by. This can be easily modelled logically (it has been). But the logical models incorporate features which do not correspond only to the activity of parts and the laws of physics. Instead, they introduce a functional process which exists apart from (but somehow dependent upon) both the cell's dynamics and the laws of physics.

Emergence doesn't create a problem for logical models. But it does create a problem for "tight" logical models insofar as these can be mapped onto the physical properties of the system as well as physics. However, it is increasingly used across scientific fields to explain observed phenomena.

Basically, what you call inconsistent is only inconsistent (if I understand you) in that it doesn't fit into to the classical understanding reductionism and causation. We can't map the models onto specific physical processes, but rather rely on emergent ones. However, this is hardly something which applies only to the human brain, or to brains.

To address the blue conclusion/observation in particular, it's not that it's inconsistent in the sense that it cannot be mapped onto a causal framework. I've yet to see even a convincing quantum model of what it means to have a 'will' or a 'free will'.

Instead, observations of quantum mechanics seem to be commonly used as appeals to possibility rather than actual explanations.

If we were operating under pure Newtonian models here, where each and every event has a specific prior cause and where hypothetically if we had omniscient information about every aspect of the current state of every particle in the universe, perfect knowledge of all physical laws, and infinite processing/computational power, we'd be able to predict all future states of the universe infinitely far into the future. Pure physical determinism, in other words, unless it can be somehow argued that consciousness is entirely removed from that process.

But, with the observation that the universe does not work like that, and that instead there are elements of randomness, elements of odd and seemingly contradictory events, it provides a certain amount of 'wiggle room' to those that propose that something like 'free will' is a coherent concept. And this is usually as far as it is developed; that the mere existence of quantum events implies that free will is possible. But that doesn't actually address a core question of what it means to 'will' something, what it means to have 'free will', and then to develop a sensible model of what it means to have 'free will' as opposed to a scenario where it doesn't exist.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I think the primary answer here is the one you argue against in your last paragraph here: that the quantum system has the ontological property such that it can be X and Y simultaneously. As long as we're specific about the set of characterstics that a given thing can express simultaneously.

The entire point of the study I referenced was that we can measure/observe contradicting states of the same system at the exact same time.

So in other words if it can be demonstrated that an individual has the property of being able to be in two locations at once, I don't think that violates classical logic at all. Nothing about that is inherently absurd.

It's easy to describe anything in classical logic. "consciousness has the property P such that any conscious entity is self-determining". Or even more simplistically: "humans have the property of (in part) determining their one evolution in time through free will." However, classical logic as used by modern science is a different ball game. Because if I measure some system as being in some state, this includes location. Location becomes a property used in any logical identity of a physical system. If some physical system A has properties p1, p2, p,3...pN, and one of these corresponds to location at some time t, then it cannot be that anything with a different location property at that time t can be the same system. Thus, ~(A & ~A), required by classical logic, means that for any system in which we incorporate time and location it cannot be the case that for the same observation of time, the same system exists at a different location. Otherwise, we have A & ~A, a violation of classical logic.

To address the blue conclusion/observation in particular, it's not that it's inconsistent in the sense that it cannot be mapped onto a causal framework. I've yet to see even a convincing quantum model of what it means to have a 'will' or a 'free will'.

You don't need a quantum model at all. Emergence is logically modelled all the time, and appeals to irreducible functional feature which determine the system's dynamics over time. Consciousness can easily be modelled as a functional property of the human system which enables humans to determine their system's state (i.e., the physical states of their cells, organs, limbs, etc.). As this property is not completely reducible to the dynamics of the system's parts nor the laws of physics, it enables human systems to do things which are explainable only by recourse to this consciousness property. That property (consciousness) is the ability for the human system to concieve of itself as an abstract unity and to interact causally with the system without being reduced to it. To say that such a functional process involves "free will" now only requires that "free will" be defined such that choices can be in part determined by consciousness, and thus are only fully determined by something which is not only irreducible to the human system and laws of physics, but is also the self-conceptualization we have when we "choose". The "I/me" we refer to linguistically is not reducible to the human system's parts, but is rather an emergent functional process which allows us to concieve of ourselves as "I/me" unities and to self-determine.

Instead, observations of quantum mechanics seem to be commonly used as appeals to possibility rather than actual explanations.

I think that QM is far less supported than emergence at the moment. However, a good deal of current science holds that explanations cannot always be anything other than some kind of model in which something like consciousness cannot be described in terms of physical processes alone.

If we were operating under pure Newtonian models here, where each and every event has a specific prior cause and where hypothetically if we had omniscient information about every aspect of the current state of every particle in the universe, perfect knowledge of all physical laws, and infinite processing/computational power, we'd be able to predict all future states of the universe infinitely far into the future.

That's not really Newton, but Laplace.

Pure physical determinism, in other words, unless it can be somehow argued that consciousness is entirely removed from that process.

It was never shown to be the case that pure physical determinism describes much of anything when it comes to living systems. It has been increasingly abandoned, from physics to systems biology and beyond. Moreover, this is different from:

But, with the observation that the universe does not work like that, and that instead there are elements of randomness, elements of odd and seemingly contradictory events, it provides a certain amount of 'wiggle room' to those that propose that something like 'free will' is a coherent concept.

Because the "wiggle room" is presumed to exist only as a result of QM. Thus it is as if somehow the physical determinism of the 19th century had been shown to be the case other than at the quantum level, rather than just assumed to be the case and thus far not disproved. This is not true. Nor is it true that classical mechanics can somehow be consistently derived from quantum, nor that there exists a clear divide between the two, nor consensus that either is complete.

what it means to have 'free will' as opposed to a scenario where it doesn't exist.

Non-associative learning vs. associative along with some ability for "mental state predicates" (even if non-linguistic) is a start. Basically, if a system can only respond procedurally and cannot process concepts, and furthermore does not have a concept of self, then that system cannnot produce any functional "I/me" feature capable of determining the system's evolution over time.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I seem to have missed this.

For so much focus on semantics in the other thread, you seem to have got hung up on the equivalent of the difference between "color" and "colour." Let x=(x',y,z) for x',y,z ∈ R. Ta-da.

And this approach negates pretty much any description of any quantum system ever. Because the other coordinates aren't just unnecessary, they are meaningless. They can't be included in just about any transcription of any quantum system, nor are they useful in general.

All of this is responding to mistakes I haven't actually made.

This is what I responded to:

When formulating the WF as Ψ(x,y,z,t), the input variables aren't characteristic of the system at all - they are coodinates of time and space. It is, depending on how you look at it, either Ψ itself or the value Ψ(x,y,z,t) which characterisizes the system.

The function

describes the probability of the particle being found in position (x,y,z,t).

1) time cannot be an argument of the wavefunction.
2) These coordinates are meaningless

And that's why I stated:

This means that, in contrast to the classical state, we can’t simply specify unique coordinates and velocities of a quantum particle." from Bowman's Essential Quantum Mechanics (Oxford University Press, 2008)

You take arguments of space and time in the post I was responding to, ignore the fact that I quoted what I did because this is meaningless, and say that this is a result of something you haven't done? How so?

This is what I said earlier.

In Dirac's notation, kets represent the state as an abstract vector space unique to that system which spans some subspace of H.

I think you mean a vector in that space. A single state is represented by a single point in Hilbert space, because the ket is literally synonymous with the hat or bold type for vectors.

Also, from Exploring the Quantum (emphasis added): "In layman’s language, we may say that the wave function describes the state of the particle suspended, before measurement, in a continuous superposition of an infinite number of possible positions."

If the WF describes an infinite number of possible states, with no definite position and no definite time, how can this:

the WF as Ψ(x,y,z,t), the input variables aren't characteristic of the system at all - they are coodinates of time and space.

be accurate?

That's what the ψ(x, t)-type wavefunction does.

You've ignored the fact that t is an element of R, not hilbert space.

"The state of a physical system at t=t0 is defined in terms of a ket, or a row vector |ψ0⟩ belonging to the vector space of states."

Which means that the physical system is not defined by an actual state, but a subspace of possible states.

The quote does not appear to logically connect to your argument.

A line through a space, A, is defined by a function of R -> A. There's no need for A to resemble the real numbers, although it presumably has to be continuous for this idea to make sense as a "line."

There is fundamentally, absolutely, and in every way possible to imagine a necessity to think of time in terms of R. Because as everyone familiar with basic complex analysis or geometry knows, and what is so essential for i in terms of QM, complex numbers allow for circular maps. It is incredibly easy in Hilbert space to map a system to itself repeatedly (eternally). i allows this. Which is why only no one with an understanding of physics and systems woul argue that the real numbers are somehow irrelevant here.

A condition on the operators. Specifically, that operators applied to space-like separated points always commute.

This doesn't explain anything whatsoever.

Although I haven't had time to read all the papers, you seem to have ignored my objection that entangled states are neither nonlocal or superluminal.

I haven't. I've simply yet to see you to do anything other than state this. And as you are willing to assume anything about physical reality and computability without proof, evidence, and even in spite of proof, your unwillingness to accept peer-reviewed studies here seems a bit hypocritical.

In this case, the logic that entangled particles collapse superluminally is the same as that which dictates that occluded objects cease to exist.

Who said anything about collapse?

I have never said that quantum behaviour cannot be produced on arbitrarily large scales. I have said that entanglement is not superluminal, which those papers don't appear to comment on.

They do. Repeatedly.

"Human observation?" Where do humans appear in the equations?

Through this thing we call science.

For someone who was insisting upthread that the method behind QM was circular, you seem to accept the proposition that, because the apparatus has set up a superposition, that we have observed a superposition, very easily.

And for someone so sure that we have a good "follow the math" interpretation, what happens now that this interpretation utterly fails in face of empirical results?

I did read most of this one, and found this:

That looks like one answer to me.

Fine. So you understand why your many-worlds interpretation fails?

Also, I object to the authors' terminology.

What do the reviewers of Science know anyway?

 

[Ouroboros]

10 dimensions explained:
Watch Imagining The 10 Dimensions Video | Break.com

 

[PolyHedral]

And this approach negates pretty much any description of any quantum system ever. Because the other coordinates aren't just unnecessary, they are meaningless. They can't be included in just about any transcription of any quantum system, nor are they useful in general.

I have no idea what you're talking about.

This is what I responded to:

1) time cannot be an argument of the wavefunction.
2) These coordinates are meaningless

The coordinates are that of space. I don't see how they are not meaningful.

You take arguments of space and time in the post I was responding to, ignore the fact that I quoted what I did because this is meaningless, and say that this is a result of something you haven't done? How so?

Nothing about the Ψ(x,y,z,t) object specifies unique coordinates or velocities of particles.

If the WF describes an infinite number of possible states, with no definite position and no definite time, how can this be accurate?

Because it's the Ψ, i.e. the method which it maps (x,y,z,t) into C, that characterizes the system's behaviour?

You've ignored the fact that t is an element of R, not hilbert space.

...Why would it be an element of hilbert space?

Which means that the physical system is not defined by an actual state, but a subspace of possible states.

Not if you mean state as in an element of H. Systems are defined by exactly one vector in H, as I cited earlier.

There is fundamentally, absolutely, and in every way possible to imagine a necessity to think of time in terms of R. Because as everyone familiar with basic complex analysis or geometry knows, and what is so essential for i in terms of QM, complex numbers allow for circular maps. It is incredibly easy in Hilbert space to map a system to itself repeatedly (eternally). i allows this. Which is why only no one with an understanding of physics and systems woul argue that the real numbers are somehow irrelevant here.

I do not understand this as a response to what I wrote.

This doesn't explain anything whatsoever.

Well, the fact I wandered into quantum field theory territory doesn't help. However, it explains everything, because it's basically the inversion of the measurement problem.

In QFT, operators are localized to a specific location. The principle of locality in QFT is that two operators on two space-like separated points always commute. Literally, this means that the order of measurements has no effect. In higher-level terms, this means that causality is always preserved, because two space-like separated measurements cannot affect each other.

Who said anything about collapse?

That's what happens when you measure the state of an entangled particle. Isn't it?

They do. Repeatedly.

Quote them.

Through this thing we call science.

"The classical requirement is simply that it needs to be capable of human observation: "Quantum teleportation relies on using both a quantum channel and a classical channel between two parties...The quantum channel is used by Alice and Bob to share the entangled auxiliary state." (from "Quantum teleportation over 143 kilometres using active feed-forward") "

Science is not what you mean by "human observation" and you know it. :sarcastic Quantum teleportation (indeed, any quantum process) does not require a human observer to work.

And for someone so sure that we have a good "follow the math" interpretation, what happens now that this interpretation utterly fails in face of empirical results?

I see no failure. The maths is accurate, is it not?

Fine. So you understand why your many-worlds interpretation fails?

Not in relation to what I just quoted, no.

What do the reviewers of Science know anyway?

Maths, I would guess. Not necessarily the best metaphor to use to explain the maths in an intuitive way. Also, I hope you wouldn't be so crass as to appeal to their authority and their authority alone when you disagree with me that "particles" are a flawed concept.

 

[Thief]

I don't believe God needed numbers to become the creator.
And neither was it needful to have numbers to place spirit in Man.

We have freewill BY freewill.

 

[PolyHedral]

I don't believe God needed numbers to become the creator.

All of science disagrees with you.

 

[Willamena]

"What determines what the conscious agent wills?
More specifically, what does it mean for the conscious agent to 'will' something?"

How can 'free will' be proposed to exist without first having a fairly tight logical model of what 'will' is?

Wouldn't an ontological (metaphysical) model be more meaningful?

 

[Thief]

All of science disagrees with you.

I love science!
Grew up reading encyclopedias!
Ranked superior in a nationwide school comparion test!

Science disagrees with me?....nay.

That you have lead yourself astray using science as a crutch...speaks not of science.
It speaks of you.

Science does not disprove God.
Science demonstartes how complex God really is !

So I believe....because of science.

 

[Skeptisch]

Science does not disprove God.

You are right. But then, how could one prove what does not exist?

 

[atanu]

Suppose we show a bone to a dog. It, barring some abnormal situation, will take the bait.

Suppose we place an enticement before a man. Can the man try to discriminate and choose to avoid the enticement?

 

[Darkstorn]

I'm just gonna answer an old post here, if the same answer has already been delivered, very good. I just don't wish to browse through almost 50 pages of text, most of which seem highly off-topic.

A persistent illusion.

What if the physical world and what we perceive is the illusion and our consciousness, self and indeed, free will are the reality?

Here's the thing: Yes, if you're a frustratingly logical person what you say makes perfect sense. It is the laws of the physical world, and our consciousness doesn't follow these laws, the same way a deity would not.

But it makes equal sense to consider the opposite. We currently have no actual way of measuring what consciousness is. And no proof that it's a chemical process. It might as well be magic(read: a concept we don't understand...)

So, logically: Either consciousness and free will are an illusion. Or everything else is. I'm hopeful that i have free will though(even at the expense of what we perceive as reality): I did somehow manage to post this argument even though my motive and intention to enter this thread was amusement...

Ps. Yes, i'm an atheist...

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I have no idea what you're talking about.

So it would seem. My bad, I suck at explaining. What is it I wasn't clear about specifically?

The coordinates are that of space. I don't see how they are not meaningful.

Because they don't correspond to anything actually used in quantum physics.

Nothing about the Ψ(x,y,z,t) object specifies unique coordinates or velocities of particles.

It does. Because unless it is a function which is never used, then it takes arguments. And these arguments necessarily correspond to 4-dimensional coordinates. 3 of space, and one of time. However, as no physicist on the planet actual does this with quantum systems, it poses a problem for your description.

Because it's the Ψ, i.e. the method which it maps (x,y,z,t) into C, that characterizes the system's behaviour?

There is a reason Euclidean space and Complex space differ. And there is a reason physicists use Euclidean space when dealing with time (and restrict functions here to R). Using complex space necessarily involves scalars which send maps back to their origins. Time, regardless of any interpretation of QM, does not and CANNOT act like this. Multiplication by a scalar CANNOT send a system back to the spacetime (or time) coordinates it originated from. Again, this is incredibly basic.

...Why would it be an element of hilbert space?

Please see above.

Not if you mean state as in an element of H. Systems are defined by exactly one vector in H, as I cited earlier.

What did you cite?

Well, the fact I wandered into quantum field theory territory doesn't help. However, it explains everything, because it's basically the inversion of the measurement problem.

It doesn't, though.

In QFT, operators are localized to a specific location.

They are also utterly distinct from the wavefunction and are "localized" in such a way to make the many-worlds description you have used meaningless.

The principle of locality in QFT is that two operators on two space-like separated points always commute.

This is meaningless. Operators are merely after-the-fact mathematical means to use statistical methods (under the assumption that the many-worlds interpretation is wrong) to understand quantum measurements quite apart from any wavefunction.

Quote them.

I did.

Science is not what you mean by "human observation" and you know it.

It absolutely is. It is what I have been trying to pound into this discussion from just about the beginning.

I see no failure. The maths is accurate, is it not?

No, not according to your interpretation.

 

[Willamena]

:tribal: :slap: :tribal2: :kissbette :goldfish: :tuna: :hotdog:

Poly and Legion at a beach party.

 

[Matthew78]

I'm curious about what free-will skeptics think about the implications of fully caused human behavior. Personally, I am frightened by the thought that free will doesn't exist and human behavior is fully caused because it means that there is no ultimate moral responsibility and people cannot be held responsible for their actions if they couldn't have chosen otherwise. But nevertheless, I want to ask free-will skeptics the following questions:

1.) If a man has a desire to murder someone, say his wife for cheating on him, or a coworker merely for making him mad over a political argument, is that desire fully caused? If this hypothetical man has such a desire, should that man be forced to seek professional help for his desire?

2.) There are some grown adults, mostly men, who are attracted to underaged girls, especially girls who haven't reached puberty yet or are going through it. Is this attraction biologically caused? Is their sexual desire fully caused as well? If they have such desires, should they be forced to seek treatment or should they be let go as long as they have no intention of acting on their desire?

3.) If a woman is suicidal, say, over a break-up with her boyfriend and desires to end her life, is this desire caused? If she has a desire, should she be allowed to act on it and end it all? Her desire is not her fault but is caused by her brain.

In all of these scenarios, these desires would have to be caused by the brains of the people who have these desires. We may judge these desires as unhealthy or even sickening but free-will skeptics will argue that these people cannot be held accountable for their desires. They didn't will their desires into existence, the desires just arise. What is to be done in each case?

 

[PolyHedral]

3.) If a woman is suicidal, say, over a break-up with her boyfriend and desires to end her life, is this desire caused?

Consider the contrary position - free will definitely does exist, and our minds are our own to decide.

Are you going to tell the lady to simply snap out of her suicidal thoughts? After all, by the premise we have assumed, she can.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

:tribal: :slap: :tribal2: :kissbette :goldfish: :tuna: :hotdog:

Poly and Legion at a beach party.

Please. I'd never attend a beach party without clear indications that alcohol was plentiful. And scantily clad men with terrible bodies to make me look/feel better.

 

[Thief]

Consider the contrary position - free will definitely does exist, and our minds are our own to decide.

Are you going to tell the lady to simply snap out of her suicidal thoughts? After all, by the premise we have assumed, she can.

And to lay down your life in the stead of another would be less than willful?

Yeah, I know I'm shifting the perspective....
but the answer is not found in what you want to hear.

Sometimes you have to change your mind.....and perspective....
and that takes will.....freewill.

I can't do it for you.

 

[Willamena]

Consider the contrary position - free will definitely does exist, and our minds are our own to decide.

Are you going to tell the lady to simply snap out of her suicidal thoughts? After all, by the premise we have assumed, she can.

It doesn't follow that, because our minds are our own to decide, anything is possible.

(For that, you have to eliminate both free will and determinism.)